Dagestan: Local hostility to Botlikh Military Township and

12/01
The Defence Academy of the United Kingdom
Russian Series
Dagestan: Local hostility to Botlikh Military Township
and anger over Gimry Tunnel closure
Charles W Blandy

Dagestan: Local hostility to Botlikh Military Township
and anger over the Gimry Tunnel closure
Charles W Blandy
Key Findings
• Corruption is the principal problem for Russia and Dagestan
• Corruption in Dagestan is having a negative effect on education
• The adaptation process of young people from the “Forest” needs accelerating
in Dagestan
• Behaviour of Law Enforcement Organs needs improvement in relation to the
local population
• The possibility exists that Ramzan Kadyrov, head of Chechnya, would like to
have use of the Botlikh Military Township
• The newly vacated Botlikh Military Township needs thought as to its use by the
Dagestan government in conjunction with the Botlikh rayon administration and
Botlikh Village Council
• The Gimry Tunnel needs to be properly controlled and answerable to the needs
of the Gortsy residents in Mountainous Dagestan
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ii
Contents
Map 1 – Southern Federal District and North Caucasus Federal District 1
Map 2 - Dagestan – District (Rayon) Locations 2
Introduction 3
Creation of North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD)
Formation of Southern Military District (SMD)
Background Major Factors Affecting Ordinary People in Dagestan 5
Governance and Corruption
Religion and Tyranny of Law Enforcement Organs
Dagestan – Security Situation 2 February 2012 7
Botlikh – Deployment of Military Formation 10
Background to Establishment of Fortresses in North Caucasus
“Invasion” of Avaristan in August 1999
Actions of Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister
President Putin – Continued Border Security Concerns
Justification for a Federal Military Presence
Border Security Concerns
Requirement for Training Area
Construction of Botlikh Military Township and Local Reaction
Redeployment of 33 Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (Mountain) 22
Reasons for Redeployment of 33 (Sep) MR Bde (Mtn)
Anger over Prolonged Closure of Gimry Tunnel 25
Background to Village of Gimry
The Gimry Tunnel
Conclusions 27

Map 1 – Southern Federal District and North Caucasus Federal District
Southern Federal District
Krasnodar Territory, Rostov Region,
Volgograd Region, Astrakhan Region, Republic of Kalmykia, 1. Republic of Adygeya.
North Caucasus Federal District (Red diagonal hatching) Stavropol’ Territory,
2. Republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia, 3. Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria,
4. Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, 5. Republic of Ingushetia, 6.Republic of Chechnya and Republic
of Dagestan. (@CWB)
1

2
Map 2 - Dagestan – Rayon (District) Locations 1
Rayon
Rayon & Centre Rayon
Rayon & Centre
No.
No.
1 Nogayskiy/Terekli-Mekhteb 22 Kayakentskiy/Kayakent
2 Tarumovskiy/Tarumovka 23 Shamil’skiy/Khebda
3 Kizlyarskiy/Kizlyar 24 Gunibskiy/Gunib
4 Babayurtovskiy/Babayurt 25 Tsuntinskiy/Kedero
5 Khasavyurtovskiy/ Khasavyurt 26 Tlyaratinsky/Tlyarata
6 Kizilyurtovskiy/Kizilyurt 27 Charodinskiy/Charoda
7 Kumtorkalinskiy/Korkmaskala 28 Lakskiy/Kumukh
8 Under Makhachkala 29 Akushinskiy/Akusha
9 Novolakskiy/Novolakskoye 30 Dakhadayevskiy/Ukurakh
10 Kazbekovskiy/Dylym 31 Kaytagskiy/Madzhalis
11 Buinakskiy/Buinaksk 32 Derbentskiy/Derbent
12 Botlikhskiy/Botlikh 33 Kulinskiy/Vachi
13 Gumbetovskiy/Mekhelta 34 Tabarsaranskiy/Khuchni
14 Untsukul’skiy/Untsukul’ 35 Rutul’skiy/Rutul
15 Karabudakhentskiy/Karabudakent 36 Agul’skiy/Tpig
16 Tsumadinskiy/Agvali 37 Khivskiy/Khiv
17 Akhvaskiy/Karata 38 Kurakhskiy/Kurakh
18 Khunzakhskiy/Khunzakh 39 Suleiman-Stal’skiy/Kasumkent
19 Gergebil’skiy/Gergebi’l 40 Magaramkentskiy/Magaramkent
20 Levashinskiy/Levashi 41 Akhtinskiy/Akhty
21 Sergokalinskiy/Sergokala 42 Dokuzparinskiy/Uskhchay
1 Respublika Dagestan 1:500 000, (Moskva: Roskartografiya, 1995). Central, western mountainous
Districts 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18 and 25 from map above marked in heavy red type. (@CWB)

Dagestan:
local hostility to Botlikh Military Township
and anger over Gimry Tunnel Closure
C W Blandy
“There are a number of fundamental characteristics of foreign and domestic policies of any country,
which permit a prediction of its future. In particular, Russia's new year began with a sharp increase in
salary for the security forces. Now junior officers in the army and the police receive an average of 50
to 100 thousand roubles. And this is despite the fact that doctors and teachers are forced to settle for
the monthly sum of a derisory 4-6 thousand roubles. Experts believe that this imbalance is explained
by the Kremlin's insurance policy against future economic and other shocks, when any protest can be
suppressed by force. There is also a version that, in fact, nothing new is happening, because the
whole history of Russia – the continual militarisation and violence, when the life of its subjects has not
been the normal natural laws of development, and force where only the king (General Secretary,
President, landowner, the chief) decide to whom to give freedom, and whom - to punish. And if the
average Russian today, these threats are somewhat abstract in nature, life of Dagestan is an
increasingly regulated power component.” 2
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine continuing local hostility toward the earlier construction of a
military township at Botlikh for a motor rifle brigade, the formation’s abrupt redeployment to the
western North Caucasus, somewhat surprising after the expenditure of 14 billion roubles (R) on
building the township in the first instance, and the wider scale of anger directed at the continued
closure of the Gimry vehicle tunnel.
Before focusing on the specific points concerning Botlikh and the Gimry tunnel, there is a need to note
the major changes affecting the system of regional government in Southern Russia and the North
Caucasus, as well as the reorganisation of the military command structure. It is also important to be
aware of some general factors affecting the lives of ordinary people in Dagestan, in particular, the
importance of the short extract above from an article by Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev, a journalist at
the Dagestani weekly newspaper Ndelo.
With regard to the degree of permanent military support based in Dagestan, this matter requires an
astute, intelligent assessment bearing in mind that in the past, there was not only historical evidence
of complacency by St Petersburg during the Long Caucasus War in Tsarist times, 3 but also in more
recent times with the Chechen ‘invasion’ in August 1999, 4 and the fact that since the summer of 2011:
Dagestan continues to remain the most turbulent region of the North Caucasus. The high
activity of the underground here is combined with a whole multitude of social, religious and
ethnic conflicts, which have penetrated Dagestani society at all levels. The consequences of a
mass spread of firearms amongst the population, many quarrels – land, inter-ethnic, interconfessional
and simply everyday life – often end in shooting with human casualties. 5
2 Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev, ‘Dagestan Territoriya spetsoperatsii?’, Ndelo, Vypysk No 5 (1044), 10
February, www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=6363.
3 Moshe Gammer Muslim Resistance to The Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and
Dagestan, (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 1994), pp. 139 and 149.
4 C W Blandy ‘Chechnya: Two Federal Interventions – An Interim Assessment’, CSRC P29, January
2000 p. 32.
5 ‘Pravozashchitnikov tsentr Memorial Situatsiya v zonye konflikta na Severnom Kavkazye: Otsenka
pravozashchitnikov. Leto 2011’. ‘Polozheniye v Dagestaniye’, Kavkaz-Uzel, http://www.kavkazuzel.ru/articles/194174/#6
3

Creation of the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD)
On 19 January 2010, President Dmitriy Medvedev increased the number of federal districts from
seven to eight. Map One (above) shows the comparatively new North Caucasus Federal District
(NCFD, Severo-Kavkazskiy Okrug (SKFO)) marked by red hatching, containing the republics of
Dagestan, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia-Alania, Ingushetia and
Chechnya, which were detached from the Southern Federal District (SFD, Yuzhniy Federal’niy Okrug
(YuFO)). 6 The NCFD is based in Pyatigorsk in Stavropol’ kray.
President Medvedev also announced the appointment of Aleksandr Khloponin, a former governor of
Krasnoyarskiy kray, as his plenipotentiary representative to the new federal district. At a meeting with
Khloponin, President Medvedev recalled that the main problems prevalent in the North Caucasus
were “mass unemployment, criminality, clan power, corruption. To eradicate all this, not only forceful,
but economic methods are envisaged”. 7
The Republic of Adygeya remains within the Southern Federal District (SFD), although it would have
appeared more logical to have included the republic within the NCFD, due to its close ethnic ties, with
the Republics of Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Following the announcement of
the decree, the youth movement “Adygye Khase of Karachayev-Cherkessia” asked the federal centre
to reconsider its decision. Whilst the youth movement regarded the separation of the North Caucasus
republics and Stavropol’ kray into a separate federal district as a positive factor, their members were
concerned that the Cherkess (Adygskiye) republics had now been placed in two separate federal
districts. Moreover, the Cherkess (Adygi) were now artificially divided into three republics: Adygeya,
Karachayevo-Cherkessia (KChR) and Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR), “which are now split between
different federal districts, and we consider this to be completely unacceptable”. 8
Nevertheless, as Mairbek Vatchagaev pointed out, with only two years before the 2014 Winter
Olympics in Sochi tensions are bound to increase in the western part of the North Caucasus. 9
Formation of the Southern Military District (SMD)
In addition to the regional government changes mentioned above, it was announced on 21 September
2010 that President Medvedev had signed a decree “Concerning the military-administrative division of
the Russian Federation” 10 which introduced an updated pan-Russia military command and territorial
structure for the Armed Forces. The number of military districts was reduced from six to four, resulting
in four combined strategic directions (Ob’edinenniye strategichiskiye komandovanniye (OSK)), namely
“West”, “South”, “Centre” and “East”.
The former North Caucasus Military District (NCMD) was upgraded to become the more powerful
Southern Military District (SMD), with effect from 4 October 2010 based at the headquarters at Rostovon-Don.
11 The combat potential of SMD was estimated to be some “50-200 %” greater than that of
the former NCMD. The Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and Caspian Flotilla are subordinated to the SMD
headquarters in Rostov. 12 It was also interesting to note that the SMD in terms of territorial area is the
smallest, but in terms of troop density it has the highest concentration of military forces in the Russian
6 Yelena Denisova, ‘President naznachil svoyego predstavitelya na Severnyy Kavkaz’, 20 January
2010, http://www.smi.ru/10/01/20/909796549.html
7 Ibid.
8 ‘Cherkesskaya molodezh’ prochil vklyuchit’ Adygeyu v SKFO’, Kavkaz-Uzel, 24 January 2010,
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/164602/
9 Mairbek Vatchagaev, ‘What Russian Statistics On Militant Attacks In the North Caucasus Reveal’,
Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol 8, Issue 224, December 9 2011, para 8,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38760&tx_ttnews%5Bbac
kPid%5D=7&cHash=49995d423be7ab73b7a363ba1971732f
10 ‘C 1 Dekabrya v Rossii budet chetyrye voyennykh okrugakh’, Kommersant-Online, 21 September
2010, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1508004&NodesID=7
11 Yuri Gavrilov, ‘Doubling Force’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, October 05 2010, p. 2.
12 ‘Formation of the Southern Military District was completed’, Gazeta, October 04 2010, p. EV.
4

Federation. 13 With the creation of Strategic Directions (OSK) a further division of functions between
the General Staff, High Commands, district commanders and army structures has been effected.
Background - Major Factors Affecting Ordinary People in Dagestan
Governance and Corruption
There are at least four main interconnecting factors which contribute to instability in the republic. First,
the system of republic government in Dagestan based on titular nationalities, designed to cope with
the wide ethnic diversity in the republic and reduce inter-ethnic strife, has tended to foster clan
corruption (further details on government structure are at Appendix One). A second factor is the very
scale of corruption itself, mentioned in an article by Akhmednabi Akhmenabiyev in Ndelo on 14
October 2011, which stated that:
Problem No 1 for Russia and Dagestan is corruption. The whole life of an individual in a direct
sense is penetrated by this defect: birth requires a bribe when a person is born, when the time
of death comes it is necessary to pay at the mortuary. It seems the most frightening thing:
today the state is maintained on the foundations of corruption. 14
Akhmenabiyev’s article also included the views of a businessman who argued:
It is possible to solve any problem by bribery. Likewise, it is possible to purchase any position.
Everything depends on the size of the purse. Personally, the matter that most concerned me
was the situation with the law enforcement organs. Today the structure is being turned into a
continuous market of corruption. Of course it is true that honest employees also work there,
but they don’t make the weather. 15
A deeper, longer term aspect of corruption in Dagestan, which has been condemned by Enver
Kisriyev, results from the clan system [see Appendix]: talented young people from poor families are
denied the opportunity to benefit from higher education due to their inability to find the money to
‘secure’ a place. Without higher education they are unable to obtain good employment and become a
respected person in society. 16 Kisriyev maintains that when a person drops out of a social context, he
is not able to find a place in society, with the result that he develops hatred towards the regime, as
well as despair, and searches for a justification to fulfil his desire to fight against the existing system.
They may turn to more extreme measures, especially when there appears to be no other way out,
particularly when the unemployed person loafing around in the street becomes of interest to law
enforcement organs. 17 It is no surprise that young unemployed people seek to join the ‘forest’
brothers, 18 or a jamaat or religious community. This brings us to the third factor, namely the question
of religion, and fourth, the tyranny of law enforcement organs.
Religion and Tyranny of Law Enforcement Organs
As Kisriyev stated with reference to religion in Dagestan, conceptually there are two strands of Islam.
The first is contemporary traditional Islam, sometimes known as the tarikat. At the head of the Spiritual
Directorate of Muslims of Dagestan (Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musul’man Dagestana (DUMD)) are
Sufi sheikhs assisted by murids. 19 DUMD is the official organ of the Muslim religion in Dagestan. The
‘other’ form of Islam, the Salafity (Wahhabity) are based in jamaats, local villages or communities of
like-minded people. This form of Islam does not have priests because they believe that no person can
13 Sergey Konovalov, ‘Obnovlennaya oborona Severnogo Kavkaza – Generaly otlichitalis’ o
prakticheski polnom perevooruzhenii voysk v regione’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 25
October 2011, http://www.ng.ru/nvo/2011-10-25/6_kavkaz.html
14 Akhmednabi Akhmenabiyev, ‘Proizgrannaya voyna’, Ndelo, Issue No 40 (1028) 14 October 2011,
http://www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=5741, p. 1.
15 Ibid., p. 1.
16 Enver Kisriyev, ‘Klanovaya sistema porozhdayet lyudey, obrechennukh na gibel’ i sozdayushchikh
massu problem dliya Obshchestva’, Kavkaz-Uzel, 13 August 2010, http://dagestan.kavkazuzel.ru/articles/172950,
pp. 2 & 3.
17 Ibid., p. 2.
18 Ibid., p. 2.
19 Ibid., p. 2.
5

serve as a substitute for Allah. Furthermore, because of the apparently close links between the
government and DUMD, the fact that official Islam appears to turn a blind eye to, or is implicit in,
endemic corruption, the disappointed, rebuffed young seek a simpler path for their religious
observance. In Kisriyev’s view:
6
The reason for the armed struggle of Islamic extremists against the government lies not in a
religious, but in a social-economic space: inhabitants of Dagestan automatically become
enemies of the regime if they take the path of ideological dissidence, while the republic’s
authorities do not maintain a position of neutrality in the resolution of religious questions. 20
Complaints over the “tyranny” of law enforcement organs resonated at a well-attended public meeting
in Makhachkala at the end of 2011:
Today Muslims are arrested, beaten, killed. We demand that this lawlessness is terminated.
We are at a critical point. . . . . all these abductions were being carried out by law enforcement
special detachments. 21
Why was the lawlessness of members of the power structures in the region continuing and
who shouldered responsibility for this lack of control? 22
An article by Konovalov in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 2 November 2011 reflected Kisriyev’s arguments
about why young people in Dagestan join the ‘forest’ brothers. Based on the result of a survey (see
Table Three) investigating the motivations of those who join insurgent groups, it concluded that the
majority of respondents believe the extreme brutality of law enforcement organs in the republic is a
key factor (although it was also noted that insurgent groups behave in a similarly brutal manner). Local
journalist Nadir Isayev notes that those who move ‘to the forest’ (i.e. join the insurgents) are
predominantly those born in the 1980s and 1990s, i.e. 21 to 31 year olds. 23
Table Three – Reasons for Movement to Forests 24
Reason Percentage
Due to Law Enforcement Organs 49.4
Religious Conviction 28.3
Unemployment 20.8
No particular reason 1.0
It should come as no surprise that the leader of the ‘Caucasus Emirate’, Dokku Umarov, capitalised on
the unpopularity of law enforcement agencies, announcing changes with regard to those members of
the Russian civilian population who would no longer be targeted. 25 Umarov spoke about the new
changes in a video broadcast from one of the sites which supported the boyeviki (see Box One).
20 Ibid., p. 3.
21 Murad Muradov, ‘Dokhodim do kriticheskoy tochki’, Ndelo, Vypusk No 46 (1034) 29 November
2011, http://www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=5987, p. 1.
22 Den’ga Khalidov, ‘Eri v koren’, Ndelo, Vypusk No 48 (1036) 9 December 2011,
http://www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=6049
23 Sergey Konovalov, ‘Неудобная социология терроризма в Дагестане Произвол силовиков,
радикальные религиозные убеждения и массовая безработица’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2
November 2011, http://www.ng.ru/regions/2011-11-02/1_dagestan.html, p. 1. In response to the
question “Why, in your view, do Dagestanis go off to the forests?”, some 2,117 people aged between
18 to 80 years participated in the survey.
24 Op. cit. Sergey Konovalov
25 ‘Umarov prikazal boyevikam na Kavkazye izbegat’ atak na mirnyye tseli’, Kavkav-Uzel, 3 February
2012, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/200452/

Box One – Extract from Dokuu Umarov Video and Comment by Rabbi Shmulevich 26
In the video, the leader of the ‘Caucasus Emirate’ says that Russia has begun the process of civil
protest, and the population, according to him, no longer accepts Putin's policies, which may mean
that it does not support the methods of waging war in the Caucasus, which Putin authorized. At the
same time Umarov says, in opposing the current government of the Russian Federation, citizens
[will] protect themselves from attack by militants. The militant leader has ordered his men to attack
the territory of Russia by accurately pinpointing and selectively targeting security forces, the army,
intelligence services and political leadership of the country. Rabbi Abraham Shmulevich head of the
Institute Eastern Partnership, wrote in his blog "Live Journal" that Islamist terrorist attacks only
contributed to the growth of anti-Caucasian and anti-Muslim sentiment among Russians with a
substantial boost in support for the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. In changing strategy, Shmulevich
is convinced, it not only opens the way for the militants to build relations with politicians in the West,
it also removes one of the Kremlin's main pillars of legitimacy in the eyes of the population.
Dagestan - Security Situation 2 February 2012
Underlining the seriousness of the situation facing the government and authorities in Dagestan, at the
beginning of 2012 the Dagestan Coordination Committee under the chairmanship of the Dagestan
Republic’s President Magomedsalam Magomedov reviewed the security situation in the republic. This
resulted in additional security measures, namely five mobile operational groups composed of Internal
Troops MVD, FSB and MOD servicemen. The groups were to be dispatched to the rayony where
insurgent activity was highest: Derbentskiy (32), Kiziliyurtovskiy (3), Tsumadindinskiy (21),
Untsukul’skiy (14) and Sergokalinskiy (16). 27
In the summer-autumn of 2010 the new president of Dagestan, Magomedsalam Magomedov
proposed the formation of MVD Internal Troops (VV) special subunits formed from local Dagestani
residents to prosecute the campaign against the boyeviki, a campaign which had been largely
ineffective. As Magomedov explained, countering well-prepared, trained and intelligent armed bandits
required superior skills, weaponry and equipment, with specially trained subunits, capable of operating
in forest and mountainous terrain. Magomedov also added that such personnel should have strict a
moral and material motivation for the successful neutralisation of illegal bandit formations,
emphasising that “[e]very metre of Dagestani land must burn under the feet of bandits, wherever they
are situated – in forests, in the mountains, in towns and villages”. 28
26 ‘Umarov prikazal boyevikam na Kavkazye izbegat’ atak na mirnyye tseli’, Kavkav-Uzel, 3 February
2012, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/200452/
27 ‘V Dagestanye opredelili rayony maksimal’noy aktivnosti boyevikov’, Lenta.ru, 08.02.12,
http://lenta.ru/news/2012/02/02/hotspots
28. Akhmednabi Akhmednaabiyev, ‘Dagestan – Territoriya spetsoperatsiy’ Ndelo, Vypusk No 5 (1044)
10 February 2012, http://www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=6363
7

8
Box Two – Security Forces Available to Dagestan against Armed Underground 29
Dagestan: MVD (inc. SOBR, OMON) approx 20,000 men (Makhachkala: 102 Bde MVD VV,
136 MR Bde Buynaksk, 99 Gds Bde MP Kaspiysk (in all some 10,000 men)? Subunits of mobile
detachment MVD Russia; command of servicemen of different special services 500 men. At disposal
of operational headquarters approx 3,000 men. FSB Russia (Dag) 1,500 men plus. Within the
structure is a spetnaz subunit of FSB “Al’fa”, within the zone of responsibility belonging to NCFD.
Since March 2007 on the outskirts of Makhachkala (Caucasus court) a special training centre FSB
Russia in Dagestan which could take up to 1,000 people. Total some 57,000 people with MVD
Dagestan
Chechnya: MVD: around 16,000 men: Regt Oil/Gas external protection Regt 3,000 men, Spetsnaz
regt 2,000 men; two separate patrol/VP guard regts plus the Akhmed Kadarov Regt (500 men) in all
3,000 men. In Btns (Sever) and (Yug) of 46 Div MVD Russia – 2,000 men, two spetsnaz coys from
former 42 MRD – 500 men; At permanent readiness 42 MRD (15,000 men), 46 Sep Bde MVD VV -
15,000 men, in mtn terrain FPS FSB 1,000 men. FSB has around 3,000 men with 500 allotted to
counter-intelligence. From both Republics some 118,000 men representing the power structures
could be mustered.
The operations involving the five mobile operational groups composed of MVD, FSB, MVD servicemen
in Derbentskiy, Kiziliyurtovskiy, Tsumadindinskiy, Untsukul’skiy and Sergokalinskiy rayony were
somewhat overshadowed by a major operation on the Checheno-Dagestan border in the area of
Dagestan’s Kazbekovskiy rayon over the period 13-18 February 2012 (see Box Three).
Box Three – Outline of Checheno-Dagestan Border Operation 13-18 February 2012 30
Over four days the special operation on the Checheno-Dagestan border resulted in 17 members of
the law enforcement forces being killed, with 24 policemen injured.
13 Feb 12: The border operation started on the evening of 13 February when boyeviki fired at the
police. The operation was initiated in the Nozhay-Yurtovskiy rayon in Chechnya and
then crossed over into Kazbekovskiy rayon of Dagestan.
14 Feb 12: Servicemen from the power structures started the special operation. However, there was
no news of casualties by Saturday evening.
16 Feb 12: Three bandit groups were surrounded, numbering some dozens of men, and on the
following day the leader of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov announced that one of the bandit groups had
been liquidated. Its leader was a 47 year-old Chechen, Magarbi Timeraliyev, known as Abudar or
Makharbi. All the casualties and relatives killed in the special operation received material
compensation from the charitable fund named after Akhmad Kadyrov.
17 Feb 12: A source from Interfax reported that 11 – 13 policemen had been killed in the clashes
with the boyeviki.
18 Feb 12: MVD Chechnya numbered the casualties amongst members of the law enforcement
organs. Over the four days of the special operation 17 members of the law enforcement organs had
been killed with the police sustaining light or medium wounds.
A summary of a later report from Lenta.ru on the operation on the Checheno-Dagestan border will
have given little comfort to Aleksandr Khloponin, the Presidential plenipotentiary representative to the
NCFD at Pyartigorsk, the MVD and SMD, particularly the last sentence:
In two border rayony of Chechnya and Dagestan a battle continued the whole of last week
between MVD subunits of the two republics and three bandit formations numbering several
dozens of people. The outcome was disturbing: police casualties – more than 40 men killed or
wounded. One insurgent band of 20 was destroyed. The remainder have dispersed to the
29. Ibid., Akhmednabi Akhmednaabiyev, Ndelo, 10 February 2012.
30. ‘MVD Chechni pereschitalo pogibshikh na granitse s Dagestanom’,
http://lenta.ru/news/2012/02/18/chchn/

mountains and forests…The scale of the armed clash has not been seen in the last few
years either on the territory of Chechnya or throughout the North Caucasus. 31
The Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov announced on 17 February that many subunits of the Chechen
power structures had surrounded, blocked and annihilated Magarbi Timiraliyev’s bandit group, killing
seven boyeviki. The spetsoperation against Timiraliyev’s band which began in thick forestedmountain
terrain of the high mountain rayon of Nozhay-Yurt “was concluded in the Kazbekovskiy
rayon of Dagestan”. 32 Meanwhile certain inconsistencies concerning the deaths of the boyeviki
appeared on the Chechen leadership’s website. 33 There were reports that the counter-terrorist
operation being concluded in Dagestan’s Kazbekovskiy rayon had aroused concerns from the
Dagestani side. Moreover, according to Akhmed Magomedov in his article on 20 February in Kavkaz-
Uzel, Ramzan Kadyrov had also told journalists that “from this year the governments of both republics
between them have discussed joint actions against the armed underground”. 34 However, the
Dagestani view was that “the behaviour of people from Chechen power structures could spoil the
cooperation of two brotherly republics.” 35 Den’ga Khalidov, a member of the Russian Congress of
Caucasus Peoples and publicist considered that:
Chechens from the power structures have no role to play in Dagestan. The republic has its
own forces. Even if today there were certain advantages, although personally I have my
doubts about this, in a strategic plan there will be a worsening of relations between brotherly
peoples. A decade later no one will understand why the Chechens came to Dagestan, they
will analyse this fact purely from the negative side. 36
The publicist and poet Adallo expressed himself in more categorical terms, stating that the local
government must learn to speak with the boyeviki: “I heard…how one of the North Caucasus leaders
went to the boyeviki himself to convince them to return to a peaceful life. But the Dagestan
government sits in comfortable offices and relaxes at resorts. It’s all the same, with us it will be, the
most important thing – keep the armchair.” 37
Perhaps the absence of a permanent federal military presence at Botlikh, following the redeployment
of 33 Motor Rifle Brigade (Mountain), rekindles earlier memories of the Chechen invasion headed by
Shamil’ Basayev and Emir Khattab in August 1999, as well as fears about Kadyrov’s ambitious
dreams, a nightmare for the Avars and other Dagestanis living along the border:
Remember, before the beginning of the war in 1999, practically all the troop formations were
transferred out of Dagestan. Similarly, in Moscow the ‘hawks’ win again, who dream of
igniting the fire of a civil war in the republic. Today they move the mountain riflemen out,
tomorrow the turn of others will come, next a full-scale war. There is a belief that the military
township could be transferred to special subunits, subordinated to the Chechen president
Ramzan Kadyrov. They will take part in all special operations in Mountainous Dagestan,
particularly in view of the fact that recent armed clashes in Tsumadinskiy and Tsuntinskiy
districts showed the professional unpreparedness of our police. There is yet another variant of
events: the military township could actually be transferred to be under the full control of district
and republic authorities – that would be the very worst option for its future, since for the
maintenance of its infrastructure gigantic funding is required. 38
31. Andrey Kuznetsov, ‘Pogranichnaya Boynya – Na granitse Chechni i Dagestana zavershilos’
masshtabnoye srazheniye’, http://lenta.ru/articles/2012/02/20/border/, p.1.
32 Akhmed Magomedov, ‘Khalidov: Chechenskiye siloviki ne dolzhny uchastvovat’ v spetsoperatiyakh
v Dagestanye’, Kavkaz-Uzel, 20 February 2012, http://dagestan.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/201500/
33. Andrey Kuznetsov, ‘Pogranichnaya Boynya – Na granitse Chechni i Dagestana zavershilos’
masshtabnoye srazheniye’, http://lenta.ru/articles/2012/02/20/border/, p.1.
34 Op. cit. Magomedov.
35 Op. cit. Magomedov.
36 Op. cit. Magomedov.
37 Op. cit. Magomedov.
38 Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev ‘Zavtra budyet Voyna?’, Ndelo, Vypusk No 14 (1002) 15 April 2011,
http://www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=4672
9

Botlikh - Deployment of a Military Formation
Background to Establishment of Fortresses in North Caucasus
Historically one of the manifestations of Russian imperial power in the 18 th and 19 th centuries was the
relentless march of the Caucasus Fortified Lines. The establishment of fortresses along the line of the
River Terek, 39 such as Kizlyarskaya (1739), Mozdokskaya (1763) and Groznaya (1817), started “the
creation of a dense chain of cordoned fortresses from the mouth of the Terek to the mouth of the
Don”. 40 Additional fortresses were constructed, namely Sunzhenskaya (1817), Labinskaya (1840) and
later Urupskaya (1850). By the 1830s Tsarism had started to create Cossack stanitsy 41 on the
lowlands, where, according to E. D. Muzhukhoyeva 42 , between 1838 and 1850 the following Cossack
stanitsy were established on the Terek left bank on the Vladikavkaz plain: Ardonskaya (1838)
Nikolayevskaya and Vladikavkazskaya (1842), Zmeyskaya (1849), Gorskya (1850) and Ardonskaya
(1863), which in turn led to the advent of stanitsy on the Sunzhenskaya fortified line. In 1845-1846 the
stanitsy of Sleptsovskaya, Mikhaylovskaya, Troitskaya were established, followed by the stanitsy of
Assinovskaya (1847), Zakan-Yurtovskaya (1850), Samashkinskaya and Alkhan-Yurtovskaya (1851).
Map Three below shows the sheer scale of an all-embracing network of fortresses and fortified lines
throughout the North Caucasus during the 18 th and 19 th centuries.
39 Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 2 nd Edition, Vol 42, 1956, p. 361.
40. Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 2 nd Edition, Vol 19, 1953, p. 274.
41. Stanitsa : a Cossack village or settlement.
42. E. D. Muzhukhoyeva ‘Checheno-Ingushetiya v Administrativno-Politicheskoy sisteme upravleniya
Terskoy oblasti v 40 – 60 gody XIX Veka’ in Checheno-Ingushetiya v Politicheskoy istorii Rossii i
Kavkaza v dorevolyutsionnom proshlom. A. I. Khasbulatov (Editor-in-Chief), Sh. B. Akhmadov, Ya. Z.
Akhmadov, A. A. Mamkiyev, V. E. Naumenko, (Checheno-Ingushskiy nauchno-issledovatel’skiy institut
istorii, ekonomiki, sotsilogii i filologii) pp. 61-86.
10

Map Three – Caucasus Fortified Lines 43
Whilst the map above concentrates on the areas that were mainly under the control of the Black Sea
and Terek Cossacks, Akhmednabiyev notes that in 1859 there was also a precedent not only for the
establishment of a military township at Botlikh, but also for vast expenditure, followed 20 years later by
the total abandonment of the fortress:
In 1859 Tsarist Russia constructed the so-called Preobrazhenskaya fortress, over 20 years
later a similar settlement was completed in Botlikh itself. Huge sums of money were
expended, but the fate of both structures was similar: every Dagestani can admire their ruins,
the mountain dwellers have long ago taken building materials, only the melancholy wind and
wild animals rule here now... 44
43 Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 2 nd Edition, Vol 19, 1953, p. 274.
44 Op. cit. Akhmednabiyev, 15 April 2011.
11

Map Four – Nodal Position of Botlikh
It can be seen from Map Four above that Botlikh commands routes to and from the North-West via the
Khagal-Sodontsy and Karami Passes, as well as in and out of Chechnya via Vedeno. Botlikh
commands other routes leading south up the Andiskoye Koysu past Agvali and Tsumada with many
footpaths, trails and minor tracks from Chechnya and Georgia joining the Andi-Koysu river line from
the west. Botlikh also commands the route to Muni, Tlokh, Gimry via the Erpeli-Gimry tunnel to
Buynaksk, and was a point on Chechen resupply routes to Zandak from the south during the First and
Second Russo-Chechen Wars.
12

“Invasion” of Avaristan in August 1999
Early in the morning of 2 August 1999, groups of fighters from Chechnya crossed
over the Snegovyy Pass, which divides Chechnya from Dagestan:
[They] entered the village of Agvali in Tsumadinskiy rayon and attempted to establish their
‘control and Islamic order there'. According to certain information, after a clash with the local
militia who were supported by local inhabitants, the fighters were forced to leave the rayon
centre and fortify themselves in three other villages, namely Echeda,Gigatl’ and Gakko. 45
I wrote in January 2000 that in the subsequent course of events on 7 and 8 August 1999, it became
clear that this was no ordinary raid, but an ‘invasion’, a large-scale penetration into Dagestani territory
to secure a bridgehead as part of a wider operation. Chechen ‘bandit formations’ and Islamic
fundamentalists numbering up to 2,000 men led by Shamil’ Basayev and the Saudi Arabian field
commander Khattab seized a number of villages in Botlikhskiy and Tsumadinskiy rayony:
At 0400 hrs on 7 August uninvited guests had already occupied the first Dagestani village of
Ansalta. They went through the forest in groups of 12-15 men not meeting any resistance.
Waking up at 0530 hrs for morning prayers the inhabitants of Ansalta caught glimpses of
fighters sitting on roofs, crossroads and in yards. By 1000 hrs the fighters, not encountering
any resistance, were in the aul of Rakhata ...By 8 August Shadroda, Ziberkhali and Tando,
one of the highest villages in the region, were all occupied. 46
The stated aim of the ‘invasion’ at the beginning of August 1999 by the illegal Chechen
bandformirovaniya under Shamil’ Basayev and Islamic extremists under Emir al Khattab was to create
an Islamic Republic comprising Dagestan and Chechnya. The establishment of a bridgehead in
Avaristan based on Wahhabi extremists active in Tsumadinskiy and Botlikhskiy rayony was crucial to
a successful first phase of the operation.
One of the main elements of this plan was force the federal
forces command to disperse its forces, to commit and use all its reserves “on the principle of a firebrigade
responding to false calls.” 47
Map Five below shows the position around Botlikh, the surrounding area and the position of forces at
the start of the Federal Forces counter-action in August 1999.
45 C W Blandy ‘Chechnya: Two Federal Interventions – An Interim Comparison and Assessment’
P29, CSRC January 2000, p. 30 quoting Enver Kisriyev,Voyna prishla v gornyye rayony Dagestana,
Tsentr po izucheniyu Iuregulirovaniyu konfliktov Instituta etnologii antropologii RAN, 17 August 1999,
through Natsional’naya Elektronnaya Biblioteka, 18 August 1999.
46 C W Blandy P29 p.30, quoting Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 15 August 1999, p.5.
47 C W Blandy ‘Dagestan: The Storm Part 1- The Invasion of Avaristan’ CSRC P30 March 2000 p. 24
Dmitriy Nikolayev, ‘Staryye problemy na novom etape’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8 September 1999.
13

Map Five – Position of Botlikh – The Start of Federal Forces Counter-Action 48
Map Six below summarises the operations conducted by federal forces, which commenced with
Botlikhskiy rayon on 26 July 1999, followed by the Kadarskaya (Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi) operation
lying just to the south of Buynaksk on 29 August 1999 and the final phase in Novolakskiy rayon on 5
September 1999 prior to the forceful intervention into Chechnya itself on 1 October 1999.
48 Kommersant, No 141, 10 August 1999, p.2. See also C W Blandy ‘Dagestan: The Storm – Part 1
The ‘Invasion of Avaristan’, P30, March 2000, p. 26.
14

Map Six – Federal Forces Operations 26 July – 5 September 1999 49
Federal Shortcomings prior to the “Chechen Invasion”
The Basayev/Khattab ‘invasion’ in 1999 was very nearly successful in advancing on Makhachkala, the
capital of Dagestan which could have seen support from the Wahhabi complex south of Buynaksk
illustrated in Map Five above. Initially it was only the local militia in the area of Botlikh that provided
any form of protection and resistance against the armed ‘invasion’ from Chechnya and it is
conceivable that a strong federal military presence based at Botlikh, trained in mountain-warfare,
could possibly have been a deterrent. Even before a Chechen-led assault from the West took place,
the attention of federal forces had been concentrated on the imposition of a blockade around
Chechnya due to Chechen raids in the direction of Khasavyurt and Kizliyar.
Box Five – Earlier Chechen Raids in Direction of Khasavyurt and Kizliyar
“Analysis of more than 80 recent attacks on police checkpoints and frontier posts of the interior
troops, the tactics of military operations carried out by guerrilla groups, and terrorist acts and
diversions allows certain conclusions to be drawn. It appears that guerrilla groups have learned the
strength and composition of the grouping of the Russian Interior Ministry's regional departments and
interior troops along the Chechen administrative border, the composition of the defence system and
its weak points, as well as the defects in the organization of the troops' routine service procedures
and combat duties”. 50
49 Kommersant-Daily, 7 September 1999. See also C W Blandy ‘Dagestan: The Storm – Part 1 The
‘Invasion of Avaristan’, P30, March 2000, p. 6.
50 Op. cit. C W Blandy ‘Chechnya: Two Federal Interventions – An Interim Comparison and
Assessment’ P29, CSRC January 2000, p. 36, quoting Dimitry Nikolayev, ‘Terroristy zhdut signala’
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No 137 (1953), 29 July 1999, p. 1.
15

“Located on the river Terek on the outskirts of the town of Kizlyar, Dagestan, the Kopai dam complex
has always attracted Chechen terrorists. Its defenders have already repelled several attacks and
raids. The logic is simple: blow up the dam, and the river will flow out of control and flood most of
Kizlyar and the vineyards of the Nagaysk and Kochubey districts. It will be a real catastrophe for the
republic... More often than not, terrorists attack the outposts in the villages of Pervomayskoye
(Khasavyurt rayon), Krasnooktyabrskoye (Kizlyar rayon), and the ones that defend the Grebenskiy
Bridge across the Terek and the Kopai complex”. 51
The only permanent motor rifle presence in Dagestan at the time was 136 Motor Rifle Brigade
stationed at Buynaksk. However, the effectiveness of the brigade at that time might have been in
some doubt, as mentioned in Box Six below.
16
Box Six – Shortcomings of 136 (Separate) Motor Rifle Brigade at Buynaksk 52
“Soldiers sold their own people to the Chechens”. Colonel Ramazan Salmanov, Commander of the
Buynaksk garrison, announced that: 'Soldiers and officers of the 136 th motor rifle brigade located in
the Dagestani town of Buynaksk have been engaged in slave trading'. During the last two years, 46
soldiers and officers of this detachment were sold to Chechens. The 136 th motor rifle brigade consists
of about 5,000 people, and has long had a bad reputation. Suffice it to say that in 1997 Chechen
thugs from the gang of Khattab shot at the base of this brigade with automatic guns and grenade cup
discharges for several hours but were never seriously counterattacked.
Magomed Tolboyev, a former secretary of the Dagestani Security Council, announced: 'I know that
this brigade has the most up-to-date arms, and I also know that servicemen of this detachment sold
mines, automatic guns, and grenade cup dischargers. Some of these weapons later returned to
Dagestan, and our law enforcement agencies confiscated some of them on the black market of
Khasavyurt'. On February 26 [1999], Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin flew to Dagestan. On the eve
of his trip, he announced that over 100 servicemen are currently being kept hostage by Chechens,
and that the Buynaksk brigade has the highest number of kidnapped men.”
Actions of Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister
It has been said that it was not until the summer of 2004 that Vladimir Putin, as the second Russian
President, conceived the concept of creating separate motor rifle mountain brigades for the effective
protection of the state border in the North Caucasus. Nevertheless, it is probable Putin had for some
time been aware of the need for a stronger manifestation of military power to bolster border security in
the Caucasus, in particular the internal administrative border between ‘troublesome’ Chechnya and
Dagestan. It is also conceivable that the concept of a permanent military presence with the
construction of a military township in mountainous Dagestan covering the internal Checheno-
Dagestan border and the borders further south, with possible threats of incursions from Georgia and
Azerbaijan had crossed Putin’s mind much earlier than 2004.
Putin had been whisked out of employment in the security services to become prime minister under
President Boris Yel’tsin in August 1999 replacing Sergey Stepashin. As the newly appointed prime
minister he visited Botlikh in the autumn of 1999 following the ‘invasion’ by Basayev and Khattab from
Chechnya into Dagestan. An article in Argumenty Nedeli on 23 November 2011 concerning the recent
and abrupt redeployment of the mountain motor rifle brigade from Botlikh served as a reminder of
Putin’s visit in August 1999 and his promise to the people of Botlikh and the command of NCMD:
51 Op. cit. C W Blandy ‘Chechnya: Two Federal Interventions – An Interim Comparison and
Assessment’ P29, CSRC January 2000, p. 36, quoting Kommersant-DAILY, 24 July 1999, p. 4.
52 Op. cit. C W Blandy ‘Chechnya: Two Federal Interventions – An Interim Comparison and
Assessment’ P29, CSRC January 2000, p. 33, quoting Leonid Berres and Yury Safronov, (trans. Kirill
Frolov), Kommersant-DAILY, 27 February 1999, p. 1.

In the autumn of 1999 Vladimir Putin the then Prime Minister flew to the small Dagestani town
of Botlikh. Having assembled the command of the North Caucasus Military District and the
rayon elders, he promised: the Russian army will defend the southern borders forever. 53
President Putin – Continued Border Security Concerns
President Putin’s concerns over Russia’s border security were again raised towards the end of 2003
when, despite attempts to reform and improve the border service, its level of professionalism had not
attained a high enough degree of competence to counter the actions of Chechen boyeviki, particularly
emanating from Chechnya or from their comparatively safe haven in the Pankisi gorge (situated in the
eastern area of Georgia bordering Dagestan). 54 In December 2003 the actions and escapades of
Ruslan Gelayev, 55 perhaps one of the most ruthless, professional and hardened Chechen field
commanders, illustrated this very point. Gelayev and his band had been trying without success to get
back across the border to the comparative safety and comfort of the Pankisi gorge in Georgia (see
Box Seven below).
Box Seven – Border Violations: Ruslan Gelayev - December 2003 56
Deep in the night of 15 December 2003 one of the inhabitants of Shauri (Tsuntinskiy rayon) came to
the FPS outpost “Mokok”, situated 15-20 km from the administrative border with Chechnya and the
state border with Georgia, with the news that there was a group of bandits in the village. The
detachment commander Captain Radim Khalikov, in a Gaz-66 set off “to verify this information”. Nine
servicemen belonging to the Khunzakh FPS detachment who went to investigate this piece of
information fell into an ambush laid by Gelayev on a small track between Mokok and Shauri. Not only
were the servicemen shot at point blank range, but they were also beheaded. The operation later
culminated in the deaths of Gelayev and his band in February 2004 at Galatli in Tsuntinskiy rayon.
At around that time the border guards service was undergoing transformation and moved from being
an independent entity to becoming the Federal’naya Pogranichnaya Sluzhba (FPS) under the control
of the Federal’nyaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service (FSB)), the successor
organisation to the KGB. A Federal Special Programme, the “State Border of the Russian Federation”
(2003-2010) 57
had been initiated for the construction and fitting out of the Russian state border.
However, despite this special border programme there were still concerns with regard to the security
of borders in the North Caucasus. In July 2005 Shamil’ Basayev carried out another significant terror
attack in the village of Znamenskoye, Nadterechnyy rayon in Chechnya, killing 14 people, including
three civilians, and wounding 24 people. 58
So important was the task of border security in the eyes of the Russian president that, whilst in
Makhachkala at the FSB spetsnaz centre on 15 July 2005, he spoke about plans for the deployment of
mountain brigades to the North Caucasus region, in Botlikh (Dagestan) and in Zelenchukskaya
(Karachayevo-Cherkessia). The Russian president gave directives to the then Defence Minister
Sergey Ivanov; FSB Director Nikolay Patrushev; Head of the Ministry for Economic Development
German Gref; Chief of General Staff Yury Baluyevskiy and the Head of the FPS Vladimir Pronichev.
He made it very clear that the federal centre was well aware of the situation not only in Dagestan, but
in the region as a whole, stating:
53 Aleksandr Chuykov, ‘Ministr razoruzheniy – Serdyukov po rasporizheniyu Medvedeva
unichtozhayet lyubimiy voyenniy gorodok Putina’, Argumenty Nedeli, 23 November 2011
http://www.argumenti.ru/print/army/n316/139263
54 See C W Blandy ‘Pankisskoye Gorge: Residents, Refugees, & Fighters’, P37, CSRC, March 2002.
55 Gennadiy Troshev, Moya Voyna: Chechenskiy dnevnik okopnogo generala (Moskva: Vagrius
2002), p. 345.
56 Igor’ Plugtarev, ‘Fiasko spetssluzhb v Daghestane’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (NVO)
19 December 2003, http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2003-12-19/1_Dagestan.html
57 C W Blandy ‘North Caucasus: Border Security’ Caucasus Series 08/10 March 2008, Advanced
Research and Assessment Group Defence Academy of the United Kingdom
58 C W Blandy ‘North Caucasus: Advent of Mountain Brigades’ Caucasus Series 07/35 November
2007, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom;
Vladimir Ivanov ‘Yuzhnyye granitsy usilyat’,Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 22 July 2005,
http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2005-07-22/2_board.html
17

18
It is vital to act in the immediate future, taking into account the international obligations of the
country, such as cooperation with European partners and the question of the creation of ‘four
common spaces’, including the space of internal security. From Astrakhan up to the border
with Azerbaijan, the whole of this border sector must be reliably closed, defended. And in a
region where the Krasnodar Kray resorts are situated, millions of our citizens have holidays,
thus this zone must be protected. 59
On 19 July 2005 the Russian government took the decision to deploy mountain brigades in the
shortest time possible along the vulnerable sectors of the country’s southern border, as a result of the
presidential demand to accelerate the process of strengthening the southern borders. This was
indicative of Putin’s displeasure that little or nothing had been done with regard to military protection of
the borders and the formation of two mountain brigades. The President had ordered the formation of
two mountain brigades over 18 months previously as a matter of priority, and yet it transpired that the
infrastructure was still in the process of being created for these formations. It had been envisaged that
the formations would be operational by the beginning of 2005, but the date had been put back to the
beginning of 2006. The time lag between an expressed presidential wish and its fulfilment taking the
best part of five years verged on the scandalous, illustrating a degree of myopia on the part of the
General Staff. 60 It was perhaps indicative of resentment over interference by a politician in military
matters, which were the responsibility of the General Staff.
Many difficulties had been experienced in the recruitment of mountain specialists, men, animals
(mules and donkeys), the actual manning to the prescribed strength, the purchase, fitting out and
provision of special equipment and weapons to the authorised scale (ukomplektovaniye) not least of
which was the fact that 68 Detached Motor Rifle (Mountain) Brigade of Soviet times had been
disbanded long, long ago.
Moreover, a brigade stationed at Botlikh, some 252 km southwest of the Dagestani capital
Makhachkala, should it be required, could also be in a position to participate in counter-terrorist
operations (CTO) in Central and Southern Dagestan in support of MVD VV, other federal and republic
law enforcement organs, and also provide timely additional support in the event of an external threat
to the 136 Separate Motor Rifle Brigade at Buynaksk or even the 99 Guards Naval Infantry Brigade
based at Kaspiysk.
Recalling a meeting with President Putin at Sochi in 2006, the then Dagestani President Mukhu Aliyev
stated that he was concerned about the situation in the south of the republic, particularly the problem
of the increasing spread of Wahhabism in southern Dagestan. 61 The deployment of a motor rifle
mountain brigade to Botlikh was relevant to a notorious area such as Gimry in Untsukul rayon, 62
where the vehicle tunnel, which shortens the journey from Buynaksk to Botlikh, was a frequent object
of attacks by boyeviki. The situation in Untsukul rayon, which is in the very centre of Dagestan, was
described as “having a tendency to deteriorate”, 63 due to the activities of religious extremists, the
growth of crime, wide-scale unemployment 64 and misappropriation of funds, as well as President
Aliyev’s inability to eradicate the legacy of endemic corruption practised previously by the former
system of collegiate governance.
59 Op. cit. Plugtarev.
60 Op. cit. C W Blandy ‘North Caucasus: Advent of Mountain Brigades’, p. 2.
61 Ibid., p. 3; Milrad Fatullayev ‘Lokal’naya nestabil’nost’’, Nezavismaya Gazeta, 18 September 2007,
http://www.ng.ru/regions/2007-09-18/5_nestabilnost.html
62 Op. cit. C W Blandy ‘North Caucasus: Advent of Mountain Brigades’, p. 3; Fatullayev.
63 Op. cit. C W Blandy ‘North Caucasus: Advent of Mountain Brigades’, p. 3; Fatullayev.
64 Op. cit. C W Blandy ‘North Caucasus: Advent of Mountain Brigades’, p. 3; Ol’ga Allenova, ‘Mesta
ne stol’ otdelenniye’ Kommersant Vlast’ No. 14 (718) 16 April 2007. It is of interest to note in
Allenova’s interview with President Mukhu Aliyev, his views on some of the reasons for unemployment
in Dagestan and the subsequent increase of Wahhabism in Dagestan: ‘Mukhu Aliyev is convinced that
basic problems of Dagestan have appeared because of the neighbourhood with Chechnya. The
president said ‘You see after the war in Chechnya a complete collapse of industry in Dagestan took
place. You understand for us a transfer of hundreds of kilometres of railway lines took place. Generally
all the industry of a village, people were left with no work. All electricity supply and gas lines were
rerouted. Therefore the process of Wahhabi recruitment proceeded unhindered. In reality Wahhabism
is alien to Dagestan, we have a very strong tradition of Islam, you see Islam appeared in Dagestan in
the VII Century, and later moved into Russia. Wahhabism has become an ideology in Chechnya,
because they have not had such ancient Islamic traditions that we have.’’

Requirement for Training Area
Plans for the deployment of a mountain brigade to Botlikh included a new training area in the Vedeno
rayon of Chechnya of some 2,200 hectares for the mountain brigade. This would require the
construction of an improved road from Botlikh over the Kharami pass to provide access to the training
area. The concept of a new training area was in fact an integral part of a much wider project of training
area modernisation and refurbishment within the Federal Special Programme of the “Transition to
bringing formations and troop units up to strength with contract servicemen for 2004-2007”. 65 All
servicemen in the two mountain brigades would be kontraktniki. 66
During initial and ongoing training of a mountain brigade, preparation for mountain warfare would
presumably become paramount for both winter and summer operations. Besides learning winterwarfare
skills and working in high mountain terrain, there would also be a requirement for a high
standard of infantry weapon skills in forest warfare, as Chechnya is widely and densely forested,
particularly in the area of Vedeno and Nozhay-Yurt. It is worth remembering the distinctions that
Moshe Gammer has made between warfare conditions in Dagestan and those in Chechnya. 67
In many ways the notion that Chechnya, particularly under an individual such as Ramzan Kadyrov,
would relinquish any territory for training federal forces, was a mistaken premise. Kadyrov had resisted
previous federal attempts to develop a training area in the Chechen lowlands on the grounds that the
area selected by the federal forces headquarters in Khankala was an ancestral religious site.
Additionally, Chechnya is a very small republic territorially, and much of the countryside and
agricultural land has been covered by a multitude of unrecorded mine fields as a result of the two
conflicts. On a visit to Chechnya in early December 1995 during a break in the journey from
Makhachkala in the eastern foothills of Chechnya, we were firmly told not to move off the track
because of mines.
There can have been no doubting Putin’s determination to implement the formation and deployment of
the two MOD mountain brigades with his strongly expressed requirement that the infrastructure which
was being built for the military (roads, electricity, water and gas) must serve all the inhabitants in the
areas of Botlikh and Zelenchukskaya. 68
As I wrote at the time:
The development of the infrastructure for these bases with the provision of roads, electricity,
water and gas was probably as important as the actual formation of the brigades in a longterm
perspective. Using the resources of the defence ministry, particularly the skills of military
engineer troops in building roads, was perhaps the only way to ensure that the task was
completed without vast sums of budget subsidies from the centre disappearing into deep
pockets in Daghestan. 69
Botlikh is situated along a narrow finger of land 250-500 metres above sea level alongside the
Andiyskoye Koysu where the steep-sided, narrow mountain valley becomes more restrictive towards
the river’s source. Mountainous terrain surrounding Botlikh is in the height bracket of 1,000 to 2,000
metres. In and around Botlikh there is an acute shortage of workable land for agriculture, horticulture
and animal husbandry. Even the smallest space becomes a vital element in the production of food.
The establishment of a brigade barrack/township has reduced the area of land available for local
inhabitants to pursue cottage industries that help to supplement a meagre income derived from
subsistence farming. However, the inhabitants of Botlikh who had had their land seized for the
construction of the barrack complex had, by July 2007, not received the promised compensation of
65 Op. cit. C W Blandy ‘North Caucasus: Advent of Mountain Brigades’, p. 3;
‘Glavnokomanduyushchiy Sukhputnymi voyskami general armii Aleksey Maslov: Armii nuzhny
professionaly’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 11 September 2007, http://www.redstar.ru/2007/09/11_09/5_01.html
66 Op. cit. C W Blandy ‘North Caucasus: Advent of Mountain Brigades’, p. 3.
67 ‘Mountain warfare had to be waged in Daghestan and forest warfare in lower Chechnia. Only in
upper Chechnia did the two converge. Chechnia and Daghestan thus formed separate theatres of
war, necessitating completely different – sometimes even diametrically opposed – tactics.’ Gammer,
pp. 16-17.
68 Vitaliy Denisov ‘Motostrelki sedlayut gory’, Krasnaya Zvezda 20 July 2007,
http://www.redstar.ru/2007/07/20_07/1_01.html
69 Op. cit. C W Blandy ‘North Caucasus: Advent of Mountain Brigades’, p. 6.
19

R123m from the Ministry of Defence; the money had only just been transferred to the military district. In
2004-2006 the inhabitants of Botlikh carried out protest action against the authorities, which included
blocking the road to the building site and boycotting work on the construction site itself. Furthermore
the head of the Botlikh village administration, Ruslan Aliyev, was shot and killed whilst in Makhachkala
on 22 March 2006, another reminder of the possible tentacles of criminal activity in political and
economic matters bubbling beneath the surface.
In an earlier article in Ndelo 70 , Akhmednabiyev noted that Botlikh is one of the largest districts in the
republic and certainly the largest in Mountainous Dagestan. According to the 2002 Russian census, 71
more than 54,000 people live in Botlikh rayon with 11,700 in the district centre, the village of Botlikh.
However, in the opinion of those that Ndelo interviewed, approximately 20,000 people live in Botlikh. 72
The difference in population figures is due to the fact that people prefer to register their actual place of
birth for electoral purposes, probably ensuring their vote is more effective probably ensuring their vote
is more effective and less likely to suffer from electoral fraud. 73
As mentioned above, despite the large land area, the district experienced a severe shortage of land.
Therefore, the people of Botlikh spoke out against the transfer of their land to the Russian Ministry of
Defence for the construction of buildings planned to accommodate mountain riflemen. They even cited
separate articles of the RF Land Code, based on the fact that land can only be taken with the consent
of the owner or by judicial process. The reaction of the residents of Botlikh was distinctly negative.
20
Box Eight – Botlikh Residents’ Reasons 74
“Botlikh is our land. We don’t want anyone to move here. We have our own way of life, language,
culture. We have managed to preserve ourselves in the course of a thousand years. Now, comes the
loss of our history. People of Botlikh seem to be in a minority in their ancestors’ home.
After the arrival of the rifle brigade there will be an increased flow of people from other neighbouring
districts. They often ignore our way of life, conflicts are not infrequent on our land. Here associated
elements from all Mountainous Dagestan will settle here more frequently.
People from Botlikh took part in protest action, they turned to all the federal and republican
departments, courts, but in their opinion there were no grounds and today the comfortable military
township embellishes the outskirts of Botlikh”. 75
The rayon centre turned to the European Court of Human Rights in 2006. Satisfaction was demanded
for the full restoration of their land or failing that financial compensation on the scale of R3.7bn 76 The
people of Botlikh also argued that the presence of a military township could destabilise the situation
throughout the whole of Mountainous Dagestan, in slightly stronger and more meaningful terms than
in the earlier article in Ndelo on 18 February 2011.
70 Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev, ‘Gornyie strelki ukhodyat iz Botlikha?’, Ndelo, Vypusk No. 6 (994) 18
February 2011, http://www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=4303
71 Census published in 2002. Botlikh rayon total: 50,489, Avars – 50,469, Dargins – 2, Kumyks – 9,
Lezgins – 6, Laks – 7, Nogay – 1, Russian – 46, Chechen – 16, Azeri – 3. See www.ethnokavkaz.narod.ru/rndaghestan.html
72 Akhmednabiyev, ‘Gornyie strelki ukhodyat iz Botlikha?’
73 See Robert Chenciner discussing irregularities of procedure in elections in Daghestan: Tradition &
Survival (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997), p. 221.
74 Akhmednabiyev, ‘Gornyie strelki ukhodyat iz Botlikha?’
75 Akhmednabiyev, ‘Gornyie strelki ukhodyat iz Botlikha?’
76 Akhmednabiyev, ‘Zavtra budyet Voyna?’

Box Nine – Botlikh Residents’ Views on Interlopers 77
“Russian contractors coming here, not having any concept of the Caucasus people’s, Dagestanis and
Botlikh peoples’ way of life – we already appear to be a minority in our own historical homeland.
When building the military township, many said that life will be changed for the better. But none of this
happened. Gas pipeline? The military township and the microrayon (subdivision) of the urban area
were the objective for the gas pipeline, but today there are no plans for the supply of gas to Botlikh.
The supply of electricity? This is even worse. In winter we often don’t have light, but the military
township is always clearly illuminated. Water supply? In the village four months without water, unpurified
water is drawn up through pumps from the Andiyskoye River, at the same time the township
and urban subdivision do not experience any problem with the water supply.”
According to Akhmednabiyev, this expression of dissatisfaction from the people of Botlikh provoked
hostile reaction from republican and federal officials. They referred to the people of Dagestan and
Botlikh as “Wahhabis and religious extremists”, making remarks such as those included in Box 10
below. Senior Russian ministers, politicians and high-ranking military officers would perhaps have
been well aware of the circumstances arising from the Basayev and Khattab extremist ‘invasion’ into
Dagestan in 1999 which was to support Wahhabi extremists from poor areas along the Checheno-
Dagestan administrative border 78 and the Wahhabi complex south of Buynaksk.
Box Ten – Uncomplimentary Remarks directed at People of Botlikh 79
“Botlikhtsy are contaminated with the ideas of Wahhabism (Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov); “Botlikh
is the fifth column of Basayev” (Lieutenant General Yuriy Netkachev); “Only religious extremists and
accomplices are opposing the construction of the township” (from the Dagestani leadership in a letter
to the former presidential plenipotentiary representative to the YuFO (Southern Federal District),
Dmitriy Kozak). Publicly, no-one was able to explain away such a discriminatory policy. However,
Ndelo in a private meeting with senior officers heard that: “Russia has had enough of Dudayev with
Maskhadov”. Another stated that: “Such a negative relationship towards us was never experienced
even in Chechnya”. In extreme circumstances, no-one openly said “On our land you do nothing for us.
Here similar statements echo repeatedly at every step”.
According to Akhmednabiyev, there were also a series of incidents in the district, including a number
of construction firms not receiving payment for their part in the construction of the military township
with the Russian Ministry of Defence owing a sum in excess of R1bn. 80 A number of fires were started
in the mountains in 2009. The head of the municipal council of Shodroda (Botlikh rayon), Salman
Khasbulayev blamed the military. Additionally, brawls took place in Botlikh involving drunken
servicemen, who went unpunished. Drunk servicemen also harassed young local women.
Investigations were arranged between the military and the district inhabitants.
However, despite some reports to the contrary, the construction of the military township had its
benefits: well-asphalted roads, the gasification of mountain areas, building work for a certain part of
the population, the development of small and large retail goods outlets and the actual presence of a
township in the centre of the mountains.
77 Ibid.
78 Andi/Dido
79 Akhmednabiyev, ‘Zavtra budyet Voyna?’
80 Ibid.
21

Redeployment of 33 Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (Mountain)
All of a sudden, document (No 205/141 508) from the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation,
dated 29 March 2011, sent through the Headquarters Southern Military District at Rostov-on-Don to
the leadership of Botlikh district stated that the military township and all its infrastructure would be
quickly transferred to the district or the village authorities. According to Akhmednabiyev writing in
Ndelo on 15 April 2011:
Recently in Mountainous Dagestan a dramatic event occurred to which both experts and
simple inhabitants are giving an unambiguous reaction. The mountain rifle brigade deployed in
the environs of Botlikh is leaving the military township. Informed sources maintain that this
event…shows short-sightedness and a lack of common-sense by state, federal, republic and
local authorities, with a devil-may care attitude to the state budget, paying scant attention to
the taxpayer for the gigantic sums ‘thrown to the wind’. 81
Following news of the impending withdrawal of the mountain rifle brigade, which certainly occupied an
advantageous strategic position, many questions were raised (including by the military) concerning the
abandonment of Botlikh, perhaps because of the lack of a proper training area. Amongst the people of
Botlikh rumours circulated, such as the fact that the military were afraid of the gortsy, they did not trust
the Dagestanis. Independent experts considered the situation in a more ominous light, according to
Akhmednabiyev’s article in Ndelo on 15 April 2011 82 :
There is a concern that the military township could be transferred to special subunits,
subordinated to the Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov. They will take part in all special
operations in Mountainous Dagestan, particularly in view of the fact that recent armed clashes
in Tsumadinskiy and Tsuntinskiy districts showed the professional unpreparedness of our
police. There is yet another variant of events: the military township could actually be
transferred to the full control of district and republic authorities – that would be the very worst
option for its future, since for the maintenance of its infrastructure massive funding is
required. 83
Underlying the rumours was the real fear that special forces belonging to Ramzan Kadyrov would take
over the Botlikh military township. As already mentioned above, the special operation of 13-17
February 2012 on the administrative border between Chechnya and Dagestan had already raised
concerns in Dagestan about the possibility of future joint Chechen and Dagestani operations. Mairbek
Vatchagaev noted that Magomed Baachilov, the secretary of Dagestan’s Security Council “frantically
denied such cooperation with the Chechen authorities”. 84 Many experts and professional servicemen
condemn the redeployment of the mountain brigade from Botlikh (see Box Eleven below).
81 Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev, ‘Zavtra budyet Voyna?’, Ndelo, Vypusk No 14 (1002) 15 April 2011,
http://www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=4672
82 Akhmednabiyev, ‘Zavtra budyet Voyna?’
83 Ibid.
84 Mairbek Vatchagaev, ‘Fighting along Checheno-Dagestani Administrative Border Heaviest in
Recent Years’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol 9, Issue 38, February 23 2012,
www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39052&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid
%5D=24&cHash=f8f05f87b8fd917028c8e9e68ebcd40f

Box Eleven – Redeployment of 33 Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (Mountain) 85
The departure of 33 Brigade is a mistake. . . . In every North Caucasus Republic there must be a
similar formation. In truth, provocations can happen any time – inside Dagestan itself. (Aleksandr
Khramchin, deputy head, Institute of Political and Military Analysis).
Local members of the power structures speak more strongly – it’s not our job to judge the decisions of
the country’ leadership, it is a colossal mistake. . . . If in 1999 the airborne desant (bn VDV) had not
been withdrawn from the mountains, Basayev could hardly have entered the rayon. But Basayev
knew very well that the bn had been removed. Who gave the order? (Magomed Suleymanov, Colonel
(retd) FSB).
Adding to the confusion, it should not be forgotten that on 12 June 2011, the Dagestani President
Magomedsalam Magomedov had positively stated that the motor rifle brigade was staying in Botlikh:
“the troops are not leaving the base in Botlikh – only going on a planned transfer”. 86
Reasons for Redeployment of 33 (Sep) MR Bde (Mtn)
The scale of violence, on the periphery of Dagestan, in the Chechen Nozhay-Yurtovskiy rayon
involving some 30 boyeviki, bears no resemblance to the scale of events which took place some 12
years ago involving large illegal bandit formations from Chechnya. The scale and size of Chechen
formations can be determined from the later action at Ulus-Kert in February/March 2000, when an
illegal armed formation under the command of Emir Khattab killed some 84 servicemen from 6
Company, 76 th (Pskov) Airborne Division VDV . Box Twelve gives an indication of the strength of bandit
formations in 1999-2000. Obviously with the threat of bandit formations with a strength of 2,000
boyeviki or more considered unlikely the need for a mountain brigade at Botlikh is reduced.
Box Twelve – Chechen Illegal Armed Formation at Ulus-Kert in Feb-Mar 2000 87
“A battle against unequal odds took place in the Argun gorge 84 desantniki perished belonging to 6
Company, 104 (Cherekha) Parachute-Desant Regiment, 76 (Pskov) Division of the Airborne Forces
when they held the onslaught of 2,000 boyeviki and killed 700 of them. Within 24 hours of the action
at Ulus-Kert, rumours had started to spread around Pskov oblast’. The lack of confirmed information
added to the anguish of relatives”.
The article in Argumenty Nedeli on 23 November 2011 was perhaps the first published ‘concrete’
confirmation that the mountain brigade had left Botlikh. An article in Kavkaz-Uzel 88 on 7 December
gave further confirmation that the mountain brigade had been redeployed to Adygeya in the western
North Caucasus. It transpired that Colonel Aleksandr Zybkin had presented himself to the head of
Adygeya, Aslan Tkhakushinov on 26 October. Zybkin reported that his brigade was at 75 per cent
strength, comprising some 2300 men, and the brigade was occupying the barracks in Maikop formerly
occupied by 291 Artillery Brigade, which had been transferred to Ingushetiya. Furthermore:
Sources in the Russian military establishment earlier stated that the mountain brigade was
now under the command of the recently fully formed 49 Combined Arms Army’s headquarters
at Stavropol’ and that the mountain brigade, under conditions of strict security, was in the area
of Maykop. A source from the SMD stated that “The brigade’s task was to ensure military
85 Chuykov, ‘Ministr razoruzheniy – Serdyukov po rasporizheniyu Medvedeva unichtozhayet lyubimiy
voyenniy gorodok Putina’
86 ‘Magomedsalam Magomedov: Gornostrelkovaya brigada ostanetsya v Botlikhye’,
http://dagestan.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/187123
87 C W Blandy, ‘Chechnya: Two Federal Disasters’, P 38 CSRC April 2002, p. 10.
88 ‘Peredislokatsiya gornoy brigady iz Dagestana v Adygeyyu ne nanesla ushcherba
oboronosposobnosti RF, zayavlyayut voyennyye’, Kavkaz-Uzel, http://www.kavkazuzel.ru.articles/197171/
23

24
security on the Main (Great) Caucasus Range – from the side of the Russo-Georgian and
Russo-Abkhaz borders. 89
An unnamed serviceman from the brigade said the reason for the redeployment was the absence of a
training area for carrying out full military training although, Magomedov had inferred in his July
statement that the brigade had been sent on temporary deployment.
The redeployment of 33 (Sep) MR Bde (Mtn) westwards makes sense from a military contingency
planning aspect, taking account of the fact that the role of Federal MOD formations and units is
primarily for defence of the Russian Federation against external threats. It should also be remembered
that securing the 2014 Winter Olympics at Sochi was a success for Putin and a great boost for
Russia’s position in the world – perhaps of greater meaning and importance than implied by the
headline in Argumenty Nedeli on 23 November 2011. 90
Moreover, the major reason for the brigade’s deployment to Mountainous Dagestan had evaporated
with the demise of large Chechen illegal bandit formations. and the leading role against the
continuing insurgency played by the Chechen president, Ramzan Kadyrov. However, there are
questions about what will happen if there is a change in the present Chechen leadership.
In an attempt to answer this, it is important to remember the ethnic structure along the Checheno-
Dagestan administrative border, bearing in mind that a pan-Russian Federation census is held every
10 years. The census makes no distinction between Avars and the two smaller groups who speak the
Avar language, namely the Anditsy and Didoitsy, who live along the actual administrative border area
of Dagestan and some in Chechnya itself. In some respects these smaller groups are closer to
Chechens than the Avars. This was one of the factors, coupled with the fact that they were
impoverished and to some extent had embraced the Wahhabi way of life, that was of assistance to
Basayev in August 1999.
In addition to the demise of the illegal bandit formations, another factor was the upgrading of the
Federal’naya Pogranichnaya Sluzhba (FPS) Federal Border Service under the FSB through the
changes brought about by Federal Special Programme concerning the “State Border of the Russian
Federation” (2003-2010).
With regard to the activities and actions of the FPS FSB in protecting the state borders in Dagestan,
undoubtedly life involved in border security detachments had improved in contrast to the extreme
cases and incidents experienced some years before. Recent articles in Krasnaya Zvezda support this
view. 91 Another factor was the question of proximity to a training area. 136 (Sep) MR Bde stationed at
Buynaksk (formerly Temir-Khan-Shira, capital of Dagestan) had its own dedicated training area. Being
based at Buynaksk the brigade was also in easy reach of major routes leading to other areas of
Dagestan and was certainly involved in the CTO carried out in Gimry during the winter of 2006-2007.
Moreover, 136 (Sep) MR Bde has recently been re-equipped with the latest T-90 tanks and other
modern vehicles. 92
The closure of the Chirkata-Gimry tunnel is a key factor, which has caused much anger and frustration
amongst the Gortsy. From a military point of view if the closure was due to the fact that there were
89 Ibid.
90 Chuykov, ‘Ministr razoruzheniy – Serdyukov po rasporizheniyu Medvedeva unichtozhayet lyubimiy
voyenniy gorodok Putina’.
91 Aleksandr Tikhonov, ‘Na Prukaspiyskikh rubezhakh’,
http://www.redstar.ru/2011/11/30_11/3_04.html. Aleksandr Tikhonov, ‘Na kromkye rodnoy zemli’,
http://www.redstar.ru/2011/12/07_12/3_02.html
92 Russian RGVK Dagestan TV, ‘Russia: Dagestan gets new hardware’, BBC Monitoring, 14
December 2011.

eally safety and health problems with regard to the use of the tunnel, then this could not be dismissed
by the military. If the tunnel had been damaged by convoys of military equipment and troop-carrying
vehicles, together with a host of contractors vehicles, then that would be a negative factor acting
against the effectiveness of the mountain brigade – perhaps, the brigade planning staff felt that the
brigade could under certain circumstances become boxed in.
Anger over Prolonged Closure over Gimry Tunnel
Background to Village of Gimry Untsukul Rayon
It is necessary to mention the problems associated with the village of Gimry. Gimry has a long history
of resistance against Tsarist, Russian and, in modern times, the various actions and operations
initiated by the Federal and Dagestan power-wielding structures and law enforcement organs.
Possibly, it could also be said that Gimry is very much an integral part of the Avar psyche, perhaps
reflecting the fact that they are numerically the largest titular nationality 93 in Dagestan, as well as
respect for their warrior, warlike qualities and bravery in the past.
Gimry was the birthplace of Khazi-Mullah, the first Imam and leader of the Caucasus nations against
Imperial Russia in the1830s. Moreover, Imam Shamil’ (the third Imam), an Avar was also born in
Gimry (Gimrah) 94 and maintained a close association and contact with Gimry throughout the Tsarist
campaigns and oppression. 95 Imam Shamil’ is regarded as a hero in Dagestan, not only amongst the
Avars, but especially in Chechnya where he led the fight during the long Caucasian War, and
throughout the Muslim North Caucasus. It is probably true and not over-stated to say that some form
of friction for the last decade, possibly more, has surrounded or emanated from the village of Gimry.
So, there is a long tradition of opposition, active and passive, from the village of Gimry toward central
authority, as Andrei Smirnov wrote in 2006: “Gimry has an old and established tradition of rebellion
and guerrilla warfare”. 96 Kavkaz-Uzel published an earlier short article, slightly sceptical in tone which
expressed the view that:
Meanwhile, it is not understood with whom our colleagues are fighting for three days using
artillery and aviation in Dagestan? There was no information from Moscow. 97
Perhaps the most relevant and recent operation by the power structures against the people in Gimry
was in January 2012. 98 On 9 January the village of Gimry became the object of a complete blockade:
the populated point was surrounded by servicemen from the law enforcement agencies, snipers
occupied the surrounding high ground and military hardware and equipment were positioned on the
perimeter. On the outskirts a tented camp was erected. The purpose of the special operation was to
93 http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rndaghestan.html. The overall figures and percentage share of
the population for the 2012 Census less Agul, Rutul, Tsakhir, Nogay, Azeri & Tat, show:
Ethnic Dagestan Avar Dargin Kumyk Lezgin Lak Tabasaran Russian Chechen
Tot. 2,910249 850,011 490,384 431,736 385,240 161,276 118,848 104,020 93,658
% 100% 29.2% 16.9% 14.8% 13.2% 5.5% 4.1% 3.6% 3.2%
94 Gammer, p. 446, makes some 14 references to Gimry (Gimrah).
95 Ibid.
96 Andrei Smirnov, ‘Gimry Re-emerges as an Anti-Russian Stronghold in Dagestan - “Federal Forces
battle handful of Dagestani militants’, North Caucasus Analysis, January 6, 2006, Volume 7 Issue 1,
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3110&tx_ttnews%5Bbac
kPid%5D=188&no_cache=1
97 Ibid.
98 ‘Sovbez Dagestana sroki okonchaniya spetsoperatsii v Untsikul’skom rayonye ne opredeleny’,
Kavkaz-Uzel, 19 January 2012. http://dagestan.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/199501/
25

search for so-called “flash drives” (fleshki), namely demands for payments for a jihad. Box 13 below
provides an outline of events.
10 Jan – village blocked.
26
Box 13 – Outline of Search Operation at Gimry – 9 Jan to 17 Jan 12 99
11 Jan – village blocked and surrounded by law enforcement agency servicemen. Entry and exit
permitted to and from the village.
14 Jan – villagers held a protest meeting, attended by about 1,000 people.
17 Jan – village head Aliaskhab Magomedov reported that the security forces had left the village. The
Dagestan Security Council did not know when the operation would be concluded. The operation was
conducted on behalf of NAK (National Anti-Terrorist Committee) to search for people involved in
illegal armed groups and those who assist them.
The Gimry Tunnel
The history of the Chikarta-Gimry (Erpeli-Gimry) tunnel has not been without incident either.
According to a source in an article by Kavkazskiy-Uzel 100 on 6 June 2011, construction of the Chirkata-
Gimry Tunnel started some 30 years ago. It was opened officially in 1984, although the passage for
motor vehicles did not start until some four years later in 1988. The tunnel has suffered many closures
since due to different CTOs and tunnel repairs.
A villager from Gimry volunteered the fact that the leaders of the seven mountain rayony of Dagestan,
namely, Untsukul’skiy, Botliskhkiy, Akhvakhskiy, Tsumadinskiy, Gumbetovskiy, Khunzakhskiy and
Tsuntinskiy, wrote to President Dmitriy Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and the leadership
of Dagestan, Magomedsalam Magomedov with a request to open the tunnel before 10 June 2011,
stating that if no action was taken, the authors of the letter would take wide-scale strike action. 101
There has been a plethora of articles in both Kavkaz-Uzel and Ndelo concerning the continued closure
of the tunnel, due to CTOs and ongoing tunnel repairs. The tunnel was closed three years ago, with
the result that inhabitants from mountain areas and districts with a total population amounting to
270,000 people on occasion needing to go Makhachkala and other places in Dagestan have been
forced to make lengthy detours along narrow roads or tracks not able to cope with an increased
volume of traffic. One result is an increase in traffic accidents.
It is not only the danger of vehicle accidents, but also the additional costs involved, first due to the
length of journey (additional mileage amounting to a round trip of between 200-350 km) lasting
between 6-8 hours over manifestly unsuitable roads built as far back as the 1920s. 102 Additionally, the
tunnel closure also had an impact on the cost of building materials, food and other important
necessities of life. It destroyed the trading balance between villages and towns: during summer time,
the main produce from mountain areas are perishable goods such as apricots and peaches, and the
Gortsy felt that they were in an untenable position. After the closure of the tunnel the standard of living
99 Ibid.
100 ‘V Dagestanye zhiteli trebuyut otkryt tunnel’ “Chikarta-Gimry’, Kavkaz-Uzel, June 06 2011,
http://dagestan.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/186759
101 Ibid.
102 ‘Gimrinskiy tonnel’ – afera veka’, Ndelo, Vypusk No 22 (1010), 10 June 2011,
http://www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=4996

of some 270,000 Gortsy markedly deteriorated, as, according to some economists, the mountain
districts were losing R3.5-4 to 4m per day. 103
The other factor is that, in the case of Botlikh, the inhabitants have already been forced to give up land
due to the 60 hectares allocated for the construction of the military township. It is not just the loss of
revenue, but a forced change in lifestyle and habits of a lifetime, which are particularly challenging and
disturbing for older people whose whole life-style has been devoted to working on the land.
Probably the most trying matter for the villagers of the high mountain villages with regard to the
Chirkata-Gimry tunnel was the constant lack of effective action on the part of the Dagestani authorities
to reverse the tunnel’s closure to ordinary civilian vehicle usage. According to an article in Ndelo on 17
June 2011, officially the tunnel was closed in 2008. 104 According to the head of the Dagestan
Republic, new anti-fire requirements necessitated the installation of new equipment, meaning
additional work and finance to fund it. Local government plans agreed with the Russian Mintrans Dept
envisage the tunnel opening in 2012.
The situation became more acute after military equipment and personnel from the Botlikh 33 rd brigade
were moved through the uncompleted tunnel, triggering widespread unhappiness amongst local
inhabitants who had already been waiting two years for the tunnel to open.
At a meeting held on 10 June 2011, Magomedsalam Magomedov outlined two possible options :
either to explain the situation to people and, having allowed all the military movement, close the tunnel
for a continuation of the work, or to open it on a temporary basis so that the Gortsy could take their
produce to the market. Various conflicting opinions were voiced, at the meeting, ranging from the
views of rayon heads on other routes to the problems faced by the head of Dagestan’s road
construction organisation “Dagavtodora” concerning the costs. It was finally agreed that the Gimry
tunnel would be open until 20 July for five hours in the morning and evening.
An officer from the Counter Organised Crime and Terrorism Department of the Russian MVD stated
that:
Generally in the area of this tunnel boyeviki are constantly carrying out reconnaissance.
Military convoys for the mountain grouping use this route, which gets overused in the area of
Botlikh. It is a strategic road, a strategic tunnel.Repeatedly they attempt to blow up the tunnel
which would significantly complicate movement from the Dagestan lowlands to the
mountains. 105
Perhaps, now that the mountain brigade has redeployed to Adygeya, life and vehicle traffic can
resume an uninterrupted passage through the tunnel. Meanwhile, the abandoned ‘jewel’ of a military
township can just, as in the past be left to “the melancholy wind and wild animals . . . .”
Conclusions
Recent events in the Russian Federation and in Dagestan have shown that corruption is one of the
main problems affecting government structures, from central government itself, through officials down
to local government and law enforcement organs (the Appendix provides further background and
detail on the system of government in Dagestan). Corruption has permeated into every aspect of life in
Dagestan.
103 ‘V Dagestanye zhiteli trebuyut otkryt tunnel’ “Chikarta-Gimry’, Kavkaz-Uzel, June 06 2011,
http://dagestan.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/186759
104 Ragimat Adamova & Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev, ‘Tonnel’ pretknoveniya kak narod ostayal
svoye pravo’, Ndelo, Vypusk No 23 (1011), 17 June 2011, http://www.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=5052
105 Ibid.
27

The adaptation process of turning the young away from life in the forest needs greater emphasis.
Measures are needed to ensure that even children from the poorest backgrounds are enabled to
benefit from higher education establishments.
The law enforcement organs need to improve relations with the local Dagestani Muslim population, in
particular non-Muslim law enforcement servicemen from outside the region.
The future of Botlikh military township requires careful consideration as to its future use and
responsibility for future funding and maintenance.
The possibility exists that Ramzan Kadyrov, head of Chechnya, would like to have the use of Botlikh
military township. However, this could have an adverse effect on the Dagestani population.
The redeployment of 33 MR Bde (Mtn) removes a potential important stabilising factor from the
eastern North Caucasus in the event of external threats from the Caspian or beyond from south of
Azerbaijan. Planned improvements to the Caspian Flotilla are already being implemented.
Appendix - Dagestan – System of Government
System of Government
A presidential system of government was introduced in February 2006 with a four year term of office
for an elected president. Dagestan is known by many as the ‘Mountain of Languages’ due to the fact
that there are over 32 different nationalities or ethnic groups. However, for the purposes of
government only 14 of them, known as titular nationalities, based on their share of the population,
have a hand in the administrative structure of the republic.
Corruption in Politics and Government
A point which needs to be emphasised was the fact that the drafters of the Constitution and
parliamentary system went to extraordinary lengths to maintain an ethnic balance, remembering that
in the North Caucasus, and in the South Caucasus as well at that time:
28
Hotbeds of around 30 potential inter-ethnic conflicts smoulder, any infringement of the
complicated inter-ethnic balance in any point of this region can lead to a domino effect. 106
Despite all the checks and balances emanating from the new Constitution to restrict the power of the
person then heading the State Council, namely the Chairman, first among equals, Magomedali
Magomedov:
One way or another he tied all political and financial elitist groupings, including semi-criminal
ones to himself, having handed out to their leaders profitable and influential positions. 107
Change to Presidential System of Governance
Magomedali Magomedov’s negative legacy for the change to a presidential form of government in
February 2006 was highlighted in an article on 21 February by Sergey Markedonov:
Clan power and criminalisation of the political process. Elections in the National Assembly in a
series of rayony had taken place, for example, in a very tense situation accompanied by
conflict (including armed ones) with different ethnic clans; conservatism, weak revitalisation
[stagnation] (from the time of CPSU) the personnel of the Dagestani elite had practically not
106 Vyacheslav Nikolayev, ‘Dagestan mozhet tozhe ‘rvanut’, Literaturnaya Gazeta, No 35 (5667) 27
August 1997, p. 1.
107 Il’ya Maksakov, ‘Dagestan stal politicheskim poligonom Rossi Unikal’noye sbalansirovaniye
zakondatel’stvo respubliki ne mozhet’ ternet’ chastichnykh izmeneniy v intereskh vlasti’ by Magomed-
Zarid Varisov – Director of the Information-Analytical Department of the Peoples Assembly of
Dagestan, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No 72 (1643) 23 April 1998, p. 5.

changed; adherence to strong government, strict hierarchy, absence of democratic
beginnings, the decisive role of the eldest in age and rank, the weak role of women and youth;
an insignificant role of parties and civil society, the absence of political competition; secrecy of
government”. 108
Reflecting the change to a presidential system of government, Mukhu Aliyev, an Avar, was elected
President on 20 February 2006. Igor’ Boykov described the main forces caught up in the pre-election
campaign for Dagestani president with an election due in February 2010:
It was a confrontation between different ethnic and family land-owning clans. Such clans are
united not only by blood relationship but by village or even rayon connections. At their head
as a rule, were “respected people” as they are called in Dagestan – heads of urban or district
administrations, high level officials, deputies from different levels, and business chairmen. 109
Table One below shows the authorised Census population figures for 1998 and 2002. The Census
figures for 2010 as yet have not been confirmed.
Date
Ethnicity
Table One – Dagestan Titular Nationalities – 1998 Census & 2002 Census 110
Date 1998
Census Totals
1998 Census
Ethnic %
Date 2002
Census Total
2002 Census
Ethnic %
Dagestan 2,167,100 2,576,531
Avars 630,000 29.1 758,438 29.4
Dargins 357,000 16.5 425,526 16.5
Kumyks 273,000 12.6 365,804 14.2
Lezgins 252,000 11.6 336,698 13.1
Laks 105,000 4.8 139,732 5.4
Tabasarans 105,000 4.8 110,162 4.3
Nogay 42,000 1.9 38,168 1.5
Rutuls 24,298 0.9
Aguls 63,000 2.9 23,134 0.9
Tsakhurs 8,168 0.3
Russians 157,000 7.3 120,175 4.7
Azeris 93,578 4.3 111,656 4.3
Jews 1,478 0.1
Mtn Jews 1,066 0.04
Chechens 73,000 87,867 3.4
Ukrainians 2,809 0.1
Armenians 6702 0.3
Tatars 4,659 0.2
Tats 12,900 825 0.03
From Table One above which shows the Census for 1998 and 2002 regarding Titular Nationalities in
Dagestan based on population figures and also the ethnic percentage share for each ethnic group.
The ethnic percentage share from Table One above is then shown in Table Two, which then
determines the number posts, senior government, the share in senior posts, parliament’s share etc.
108 Sergey Markedonov, ‘Dagestan: ot Magomedova k Aliyevu’, Politcom.ru, 21 February 2006,
http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=2247
109 Ibid. Also Igor’ Boykov, ‘Na Porogye Voyny’, Zavtra No 46 (834) 11 November 2009
http://zavtra.ru/cgi//veil//data/zavtra/09/834/41.html , p. 2.
110 C W Blandy, ‘Dagestan: Birth of Presidential Republic’, op. cit.
29

30
Date
Ethnicity
Table Two – Titular Nationalities in Administrative Structure of Dagestan 111
Government
Senior Posts
Share in Senior
Posts
Parliament Share Population Share
Avar 11 28.21 28.93 29.4
Dargin 8 20.51 17.36 16.5
Kumyk 7 17.95 13.22 14.2
Lezgin 4 10.26 11.57 13.1
Lak 3 7.69 4.96 5.4
Russian 2 5.13 7.44 4.7
Azeri 1 2.56 4.13 4.3
Tabasaran 2 2.56 4.13 4.3
Chechen 1 2.56 3.31 3.4
Nogay 0 0.00 1.65 1.5
Rutul 0 0.00 0.83 0.9
Agul 1 2.56 0.83 0.9
Tsakhir 0 0.00 0.83 0.3
Tat 0 0.00 0.83 0.03
Table One above shows the Census for 1998 and 2002 regarding Titular Nationalities in Dagestan
based on population figures and also the ethnic percentage share for each ethnic group. The ethnic
percentage share from Table One above is then shown in Table Two, which then determines the
number posts, senior government, the share in senior posts, parliament’s share etc.
Basically it is the ethnic lust for power and influence, as well as personal gain which maintains
corruption in Dagestani society to the detriment of the poor and less fortunate.
111 Ibid.

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this paper are entirely and solely those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect official thinking and policy either of
Her Majesty’s Government or of the Ministry of Defence.
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