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Developing opportunities for the PRS service for the PRS service in ...

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<strong>Develop<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>opportunities</strong><br />

<strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>PRS</strong> <strong>service</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong> FP7 3rd call<br />

Xavier Bert<strong>in</strong>champs<br />

<strong>PRS</strong> Technical Officer<br />

GSA-Security Department<br />

PUBLIC<br />

1 1


Foreword<br />

• “PNT is <strong>in</strong>tegral to U.S. national security, <strong>in</strong>frastructure,<br />

and prosperity; however, <strong>in</strong> most cases its role is not<br />

obvious.<br />

• In terms of national security, PNT is vital to command, control,<br />

and communications capabilities and to all <strong>for</strong>ms of precision<br />

operations such as locat<strong>in</strong>g targets, deliver<strong>in</strong>g weapons on target,<br />

and provid<strong>in</strong>g logistical support.<br />

• From a national economic perspective, PNT plays a critical role <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> operation of transportation, communications, power<br />

distribution networks, emergency response operations, and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

critical <strong>in</strong>frastructures. ”<br />

(National Position<strong>in</strong>g, Navigation, and Tim<strong>in</strong>g Architecture Implementation Plan, Public Release)<br />

• What about Europe<br />

PUBLIC<br />

2 2


Grow<strong>in</strong>g Galileo – <strong>PRS</strong> Agenda<br />

• Overview of GSA Security Activities (Morn<strong>in</strong>g session)<br />

• GSA and its Security Department<br />

• Why <strong>PRS</strong><br />

• <strong>PRS</strong> <strong>in</strong> FP7-3rd call<br />

• Applications <strong>for</strong> <strong>PRS</strong> (Afternoon session/Applications -<br />

Commission)<br />

• Mass market and niche sectors<br />

• Professional applications<br />

• Technologies <strong>for</strong> <strong>PRS</strong> Receivers (Afternoon session/receivers - GSA)<br />

• What is <strong>PRS</strong><br />

• R&D roadmap <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>PRS</strong> Receiver <strong>in</strong> GSA<br />

• Collaborative projects <strong>for</strong> <strong>PRS</strong> Receivers<br />

• Constra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>for</strong> sensitive Collaborative projects<br />

• Overview of <strong>the</strong> <strong>PRS</strong>-PMR tender<br />

PUBLIC<br />

3 3


GSA supports market<strong>in</strong>g and security of EU GNSS<br />

Political<br />

Oversight<br />

European<br />

Council and<br />

Parliament<br />

Programme Management<br />

European<br />

Commission<br />

Implementation<br />

European Space<br />

Agency (ESA)<br />

assistance<br />

European GNSS<br />

Supervisory Authority<br />

(GSA)<br />

IOV contracts<br />

FOC contracts<br />

GNSS Security & Monitor<strong>in</strong>g Centre<br />

Security accreditation<br />

Market<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> <strong>service</strong><br />

Market monitor<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Applications R&D<br />

PUBLIC<br />

4 4


GSA Tasks on Security and <strong>PRS</strong><br />

PUBLIC<br />

5 5


Why <strong>PRS</strong><br />

• Several THREATS to GNSS <strong>service</strong>s<br />

1. Denial of <strong>service</strong> (DoS)<br />

2. Spoof<strong>in</strong>g<br />

3. Misuse<br />

• Aga<strong>in</strong>st EU / MS <strong>in</strong>terests<br />

• Several security NEEDS <strong>for</strong> critical applications<br />

⇒ <strong>PRS</strong><br />

1. Improved Cont<strong>in</strong>uity of Service<br />

2. Au<strong>the</strong>ntication<br />

3. Access Control<br />

PUBLIC<br />

6 6


Jamm<strong>in</strong>g threat and need <strong>for</strong> improved cont<strong>in</strong>uity<br />

• Signal power at reception side is very low<br />

• Can be easily jammed by<br />

• Non-<strong>in</strong>tentional RF <strong>in</strong>terference<br />

• Intentional jamm<strong>in</strong>g<br />

• Jamm<strong>in</strong>g is countered by<br />

• <strong>PRS</strong> signal<br />

• Wider band Signal<br />

• Band Diversity (L1 + E6)<br />

• Additional measures<br />

• Signal process<strong>in</strong>g, hybridization techniques<br />

• Controlled Radiation Pattern Antenna (CRPA)<br />

• Spectrum monitor<strong>in</strong>g, law and en<strong>for</strong>cement<br />

PUBLIC<br />

7 7


O<strong>the</strong>r <strong>for</strong>ms of DoS and need <strong>for</strong> improved cont<strong>in</strong>uity<br />

• The need of cont<strong>in</strong>uity <strong>for</strong> <strong>PRS</strong> applications translates<br />

<strong>in</strong>to two k<strong>in</strong>d of measures<br />

• Measures on Galileo <strong>in</strong>frastructure assets, as a general rule<br />

⇒Benefits to all Galileo <strong>service</strong>s<br />

• Additional measures specifically designed to support <strong>PRS</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />

case of direct attack<br />

PUBLIC<br />

8 8


Spoof<strong>in</strong>g threat and <strong>the</strong> need <strong>for</strong> Au<strong>the</strong>ntication<br />

• GNSS signals can be generated and radiated so to make<br />

receivers calculate counterfeit and hazardous PVT<br />

• GNSS spoofer is essentially a GNSS signal generator +<br />

transmitter element<br />

• Spoof<strong>in</strong>g is countered by crypto techniques<br />

• Crypto Key must be protected<br />

⇒<strong>PRS</strong> is encrypted and <strong>PRS</strong> keys are protected<br />

PUBLIC<br />

9 9


Misuse threat and <strong>the</strong> need <strong>for</strong> Access control<br />

• Satellite navigation is a <strong>for</strong>ce multiplier<br />

• Provid<strong>in</strong>g more efficiency to command, control,<br />

communication, <strong>in</strong>telligence, accuracy of weapons<br />

• When national security is threatened, it may be<br />

necessary to deny adversaries from any GNSS capability<br />

• Access to GNSS shall be controlled by<br />

• Capability to deny by local jamm<strong>in</strong>g of all but controlled<br />

<strong>service</strong>s<br />

• Control of <strong>the</strong> access to <strong>the</strong> <strong>PRS</strong> <strong>service</strong><br />

• <strong>PRS</strong> Key dissem<strong>in</strong>ation is controlled<br />

• Access to <strong>PRS</strong> equipment and technology is controlled<br />

PUBLIC<br />

10 10


Drivers <strong>for</strong> <strong>PRS</strong> technologies and Applications<br />

• Galileo programme schedule<br />

• Early <strong>service</strong>s planned <strong>for</strong> 2014-2015<br />

• Initial Operational Capability<br />

• 18 Satellites<br />

• <strong>PRS</strong>, OS & SAR available beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of 2014<br />

• Need to th<strong>in</strong>k about <strong>the</strong> needs from 2014 onwards<br />

• Need to complement <strong>PRS</strong> with o<strong>the</strong>r GNSS constellations<br />

• Need to anticipate<br />

↗Rais<strong>in</strong>g of threats<br />

↗Rais<strong>in</strong>g of dependency on GNSS<br />

↗Cont<strong>in</strong>ued general trend towards more security<br />

PUBLIC<br />

11 11


Budget outl<strong>in</strong>e<br />

• GSA’s Calls <strong>for</strong> proposals : €27.5 m<br />

• 3 CP topics where <strong>PRS</strong> is mentioned<br />

• Professional applications<br />

• New & <strong>in</strong>novative applications & <strong>service</strong>s <strong>for</strong> mass market & niche sectors<br />

• Technologies <strong>for</strong> <strong>PRS</strong> receivers<br />

• GSA’s Calls <strong>for</strong> tenders<br />

• Integrated PMR and <strong>PRS</strong> receiver architecture : € 0.9 m<br />

PUBLIC<br />

12 12


What Collaborative Projects are we look<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong><br />

• Objectives<br />

• Market<strong>in</strong>g potential <strong>for</strong> <strong>PRS</strong><br />

• Added value through system <strong>in</strong>tegration with<br />

leverag<strong>in</strong>g effect of trusted PVT<br />

• R&D focused on technological gaps <strong>in</strong> <strong>PRS</strong> Receivers<br />

• Constra<strong>in</strong>ts<br />

• Takes <strong>in</strong>to account relevant security standards and<br />

regulations<br />

• Uses iterative development, with early prototypes<br />

⇒ Need <strong>for</strong> effectiveness, synergies, leverag<strong>in</strong>g<br />

effects, partnership, and use of civil technology<br />

wherever possible<br />

PUBLIC<br />

13 13


THANK YOU<br />

Xavier Bert<strong>in</strong>champs<br />

<strong>PRS</strong> Technical Officer<br />

European GNSS Supervisory Authority<br />

PUBLIC<br />

14 14

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