pdf - WHALE

operational logic that is almost irresistible. The madcap, and some
would say, militarily and politically indefensible, Allied dash away
from Berlin and to south central Germany and Prague are consistend
with American knowledge, at some very high level, of Kammler's
SS Sonderkommando black projects and secret weapons empire.
Hitler's own obsession with the defense of Breslau in lower Silesia
and of Prague itself, an obsession that made no sense to his
generals, make military sense only in the context of an atom bomb
and intercontinental rocket project that was successful in the
attainment of the first and perilously close to the attainment of the
second.
Similarly, Reichsfuhrer SS Heinrich Himmler's offer of a
surrender to the Western Allies has usually been dismissed as the
frantic attempts of a desperate mass murderer to avoid his
inevitable fate, and nothing more. But Himmler, like Hitler, and
possibly only Martin Bormann, was one of the "inmost circle" who
knew the full extent of Kammler's empire and its actual activities
Himmler may have therefore used this knowledge as a possible
bargaining chip. His offer was rejected, not so much because it was
not genuine(from Himmler's point of view), but because he had
long lost genuine control of it. The deal had already probably been
cut between Kammler's representatives and OSS station chief in
Zurich, Allen Dulles, or via General Patton himself. Bormann, too
as we have seen, was implicated in this plot, and, as we shall see in
subsequent chapters, is directly linked to Kammler.
The thesis of an actual German atom bomb also explains the
odd little events that began to surface in scattered Allied press
reports toward and immediately after the end of the European War
long-range heavy lift round trip "proof of concept" flights from
Europe to within sight of New York City, Luftwaffe maps of
Manhattan with blast damage estimates for an atom bomb of the
same approximate yield as Hiroshima, a Norwegian airfield filled
with over forty long range bombers capable of making the flight,
"Buna plants" that incomprehensibly use more electricty than Berlin
and paradoxically produce no rubber during the entire course of the
war, U-boats loaded with infrared fuses - a device whose technical
complexity betokens an immediate nuclear application - and
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