autonomous regions under federalism: the indian experience

Research Report 

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS 

UNDER FEDERALISM: 

THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 

Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal 

(SPCBN)/UNDP

Research Report 

Autonomous Regions Under Federalism: 

THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 

Researcher 

Uddhab Pyakurel (PhD) 

Kathmandu, Nepal 

Submitted to 

Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal (SPCBN/UNDP) 

Kathmandu, Nepal

ABOUT 

THE 

RESEARCHER 

Uddhab Pd. Pyakurel, Ph.D. from Jawaharlal Nehru 

University, New Delhi, is teaching Political Sociology 

as Assistant Professor in School of Arts, Kathmandu 

University, Nepal. He is also associated with various 

democracy forums, i.e., South Asian Dialogues 

on Ecological Democracy (SADED), Vasudhaiva 

Kutumbakam (VK), and Network Institute for Global 

Democratisation (NIGD). He often contributes articles 

to journals and local newspapers on contemporary 

social and political issues. He is the author of a book 

Maoist Movement in Nepal: A Sociological Perspective 

(New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2007), and co-author 

of Dalit Representation in National Politics of Nepal, 

(Lalitpur: NNDSWO, 2012). 

Published by : Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal 

(SPCBN)/UNDP 

First edition : 2013 

Copyright : Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal 

(SPCBN)/UNDP 

Design : Himal Shrestha 

Press : 

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in the report are those of the author and do not 

necessarily represent the views of SPCBN/UNDP.

Contents 

1. Background 1 

2. Methodology 1 

3. Genesis of the Autonomous Regions/Autonomous 

Councils in India 2 

4. Development and Expansion of the Autonomous 

District/Regional Councils in India 7 

5. Autonomous Regions: Different Practices in India 8 

6. The Indian Experience of Autonomous District 

Councils/Regions: An Appraisal 17 

6.1. Strengths 17 

6.2. Weaknesses 18 

6.2.1. On the Issues of development and social 

transformation 18 

6.2.2. On matters pertaining to conflict management 21 

7. The Indian experience and some lessons for the proposed 

federal set up in Nepal 26 

Annexure I Field work Details 34 

Annexure II: SIXTH SCHEDULE Of the Indian Constitution 36 

Bibliography 57

1. Background 

The Interim Constitution has declared Nepal 'A Federal Democratic Republic'. Accordingly 

the dissolved Constituent Assembly’s Committee on State Restructuring and Division of 

State Powers recommended a federal system that would comprise 14 provinces and within 

them, 23 autonomous regions. 1 Along with this recommendation, the term 'autonomous 

region' has become a popular term in political discourse in Nepal. However, there is a 

dearth of knowledge in this field with very little available literature in Nepal that would 

substantiate our knowledge. At the same time, one finds that India has several autonomous 

regions (autonomous region and autonomous district councils) with varying degrees of 

autonomy to accommodate the aspirations of the various scheduled tribes and other 

minorities. Therefore, this research has been conducted not only to understand the Indian 

experience of having autonomous regions and Atonomous District Councils (ADCs) but 

also to build comparative knowledge on this subject. 

2. Methodology 

Basically the study is a review of available literature on the idea and practices of 

Autonomous Regions/Districts in India. However, primary data, in order to substantiate 

the secondary data, has been collected through a couple of Focus Group Discussions 

and interviews (see annex 1) during short field visits of some of these areas in India's 

Northeast i.e. Gorkhaland Territorial Administration, Garo Hills Autonomous District 

Councils, and Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council. In Addition, constitutional and 

legislative provisions concerning the operational modalities on Autonomous Regions/ 

Districts have also been reviewed. 

1. For details, see full report of the committee available in http://www.ccd.org.np/resources/Concept_Paper_ 

Restructuring_State_GTZ_ENG.pdf, accessed on December 1, 2012. 

Autonomous Regions Under Federalism: The Indian Experience 1

3. Genesis of the Autonomous regions/Autonomous Councils in India 

Though the autonomous district council/autonomous regions were an innovation of 

independent India, the whole idea of autonomy in India's Northeast emerged during 

the British period. The history goes back, for the Northeast India, to 1826. There was a 

kingdom named Ahom in Assam. It was established in the Brahmaputra valley by the 

Shans, who migrated from upper Burma (present Myanmar) in the first half of the 13th 

century, and conquered this area. Bengal was with the Mugals at that time. That was the 

time when Burma was expanding its territory towards this side. And this area was almost 

captured by the Burmese. In 1818, disturbed by repeated invasions from Burma, the 

Ahom king requested assistance from the Maharaja of Manipur, and Maharaja of Tripura. 

They even asked help from British East India Company, which was then based at Calcutta. 

The British East India Company responded to the request, and fought and defeated the 

Burmese Armies. Eventually, the war ended in February 1926 with the Treaty of Yandaboo, 

by which the Burmese agreed to withdraw from Assam. But the British stayed back. That 

is how British set their foot there in the India's Northeast. In other words, the war gave 

the East India Company an opportunity to establish rights and interests in the Northeast, 

leading to the extinction of the Ahom kingdom in 1838 (Lihiri 1955). It is said that the 

British became interested in the region because of the availability of certain raw materials 

i.e. cotton and coal which was considered valuable. 

Once they found a space in the area, they started building a network of roads not only 

to expand further to other areas but also to link Khasi Hills and Guwahati. They, with 

the help of Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873, also introduced the concept of 

"Inner Land permit" in Nagaland and Mizoram on the pretext of protecting the minority 

indigenous ethnic groups in the hill areas of Assam by restricting outsiders’ entry, business 

activities, land transactions and settlement (Inoue 2005). It is said that the situation was 

very bad in those days as Nagas and Mizos (Hmingthazuala 1997) were practicing head 

hunting 2 - one tribe killing the members of another tribe. They thought that would lead 

to lots of bloodshed if these people came into contact with each other. Though the reason 

given for such restrictions was the prevalence of disturbance due to violence in the tribal 

areas, even the British wanted to isolate the area so that they could fulfill their business 

interest. 

2. 'Head hunting' was promoted by the tribal communities at that time. The community as a whole used to 

honour and respect a person or persons who could bring home the head of their enemies. For details, 

see R. Hmingthazuala, "Traditional Vs. Emerging Middle Class Leadership in the Context of Mara 

Autonomous District Councils" in L.S Gassah (ed.) The Autonomous District Councils, New Delhi: 

Omsons Publication,1997. 

2 

Autonomous Regions Under Federalism: The Indian Experience

They also decided to declare certain Hill areas as "Scheduled Districts" 3 by enacting the 

Scheduled Districts Act 1874. Then, Khasi, Garo, Jayantia, Hills of Tripura, Hills along with 

certain parts of Mizoram were brought under the Scheduled Areas/districts. That is how 

the concept of "scheduled area" came into existence. Under the Act, the local government 

could declare whatever laws were in force or not in force in the area in question. It 

also authorized the local government to extend any enactment which was in force in 

British India. Then, the whole area of today's Meghalaya; hilly areas of Assam i.e. Karbi 

Anglong and North Cachar Hills; Mizoram; and hills of Tripura were given the power of 

administration. Eventually, these provisions became part of the Government of India Act 

of 1935. In that connection, they declared these areas as excluded and partially "excluded"; 4 

Nagaland and Mizoram were declared as "excluded" area, and Meghalaya was brought 

under the partially "excluded" areas. Prof. Kumar states, "Once the British withdrew from 

India, we could not temper too much with the Government of India Act, 1935. That is 

why most of the provisions of the 1935 Act were adopted in the Indian Constitution. That 

is how the background for Autonomous Districts Councils/Autonomous Regions in the 

Northeast India was created during British rule". 5 

However, the concept of autonomous region/autonomous council was envisioned by the 

anti-colonial leaders of India as the founding fathers of India were sensitive to the need 

for adequate understanding of the situation in the Northeast, especially with regard to the 

growing aspirations of the tribal people. It was in fact an innovation of Independent India 

in order to examine whether such autonomy works in the given situation. Also, it can be 

argued that the Indian leaders were very visionary to innovate such political structure 

when the issue of identity and identity politics was not that much prominent issue in the 

society. 

Following independence in 1947, the Interim Government of India appointed a subcommittee 

of the Constituent Assembly, called the North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal 

and Excluded Areas Sub-committee under the chairmanship of the Assamese political 

leader, Gopinath Bordoloi who later on became the first Chief Minister of Assam. The sub- 

3. Scheduled Districts were those remote and backward tracts of provinces of British Indian which had never 

been brought within or had from time to time been removed from the operation of the general Acts and 

Regulations and jurisdictions of ordinary courts or in which that operation was not complete, and officers 

were supposed to be guided by the spirit of indispensable laws, or were actually guided by such laws as had 

somehow or other been considered to be in force. 

4. Where there was an enclave or a definite tract of country inhabited by a compact tribal population, it was 

classified as an "excluded" area, and the area where the tribal population was mixed up with the rest of the 

communities and the tribals were substantial enough in numbers were classified as "partially excluded" 

areas. For details, see S.K. Agnithotri "District Councils under the Sixth Schedule" in L.S Gassah (ed.) The 

Autonomous District Councils, New Delhi: Omsons Publication,1997. 

5. As per the discussion with Prof. Nikhlesh Kumar on October 18, 2012 


committee, also known as the Bordoloi Committee, sought to reconcile the aspirations 

of the hill people for political autonomy with the Assam government’s drive to integrate 

them with the plains. In its reports the committee took the following four factors into 

consideration for proposing a separate scheme of administration for these areas, which 

were ultimately called the Autonomous Districts: 

• The distinct social customs and tribal organization of the different people as well 

as their religious beliefs. 

• The fear of exploitation by the people of the plains on account of the latter's 

superior organization and experience of business. 

• The fear that unless suitable financial provisions were made, or powers were 

conferred upon the local councils themselves, the provincial Government might 

not, due to the pressure of the plains people, set aside adequate funds for the 

development of tribal areas. 

The committee further felt that the assimilation of the people of these areas with the rest 

of the country would not take place by the sudden breaking up of growth on the old 

foundations. This meant that the evolution should come, as far as possible from the tribes 

themselves and it was equally clear that contact with outside institutions was necessary 

though not in a compelling way (Agnihotri 1997). Before submitting the report, the fivemember 

Bardoloi Committee undertook an extensive tour of Northeast India, where they 

interviewed local leaders at all district headquarters including the people at Shillong, 

the Khasi district headquarters, except the Naga Hills (where they were prevented by 

insurgency) and the Garo Hills (where they were prevented by rains (Stuligross 1999: 

497-525). Following these extensive interviews and fieldworks, the Bardoloi Committee 

concluded saying that "while it is in everyone's interest to incorporate all Indians into a 

single representative system, a period of substantial autonomy at the district level in tribal 

areas would enhance that process while at the same time offering a reasonable compromise 

for those people in the Northeast who sought complete independence from India as well as 

Britain". 6 Bardoloi Committee sought to craft an institution that would ensure maintenance 

of "the distinct social customs and tribal organizations of the different peoples as well as 

their religious beliefs," and also would ameliorate "the fear of tribal exploitation by the 

people of the plains on account of their superior organization and experience of business." 

It also sought to ensure that the specified regions would have sufficient financial autonomy 

to make the political, social, and economic autonomy meaningful. 7 The Committee not 

6. Report of the Sub-Committee on the North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas, commonly 

known as the Bardoloi Report, appears in B. L. Hansaria, Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India: A 

Study. Gauhati: Ashok Publishing, 1983, pp.183-229. 

7. Bardoloi Committee Report, note 20, section 6, appears in B. L. Hansaria, Sixth Schedule to the 

Constitution of India: A Study. Gauhati: Ashok Publishing, 1983, pp.183-229.. 

4 


only acknowledged the difficulty of making tribal distinctions 8 but also stated saying that 

"all people of the same tribe should be brought together under a common administration". 

In fact, the Bardoloi Committee report included detailed provisions for Autonomous 

District Councils/Autonomous Regions in the formerly "excluded areas" of Assam. It 

proposed and presented The Sixth Schedule to the Constituent Assembly for debate on 

September 5, 1949, which was fully ratified on September 7 after three days of dialogue 

among the following four competing factions: 

• Brajeshwar Prasad and his followers were for district autonomy to be overseen 

more directly by the central government; 

• Kuladhar Chaliha and colleagues were for such autonomy to be more subject to 

the influences of the state government; 

• Rohini Kumar Chaudhry and his followers thought autonomy under any guise 

would hinder assimilation; and 

• Gopinath Bardoloi and friends were for such autonomy to evolve according to 

the changing developmental conditions of people in the districts as understood, 

autonomously, by those people. 9 

However, the draft Sixth Schedule based on the Bardoloi Committee report was accepted 

almost exactly (with only three very minor amendments) as presented to the Constituent 

Assembly (Stuligross 1999:497-525). It is said that the Sixth Schedule included elements 

of all four different positions, (mentioned above) which themselves may be viewed as 

different positions on the assimilationist/integrationist debate. Along with the finalisation 

of the Sixth Schedule, which is incorporated in the articles 244(2) and 275(1)) of the 

Indian Constitution, envisages the establishment of Autonomous District Councils 

(ADCs) with judicial, legislative and executive powers to those upon whom it is conferred 

(Prasad 2005). However, there are differences of opinions to examine the autonomous 

provisions assumed under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. If followed, 

Stuligross (1999) the ADCs are closest to the pure integrationist position. The five basic 

characteristics of the ADC, according to him, are as follows: 

• First, there were to be autonomous districts for each of the six major tribal 

groupings 10 i.e. United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District and Garo Hills District 

8. Though the tribes [in the Naga Hill District] are all called Naga, they speak different languages and have 

differing customs and practices, for details, see sections 4 and 2 of the Bardoloi Committee Report, 

appears in B. L. Hansaria, Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India: A Study.Gauhati: Ashok Publishing, 

1983, pp. 183-229. 

9. For details, See Constituent Assembly Debates: Official Report, 9.12.1946-24.1.1950 (New Delhi: Lok 

Sabha Secretariat, 1966-1967), September 5-7, 1946, pp. 1001-1082. 

10. The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India, Lucknow: Eastern Book, 1994, pp. 207-226 (13th ed). 


comprise present-day Meghalaya; the Lushai Hills District comprises present-day 

Mizoram; the Mikir Hills District and North Cachar Hills Districts remain within 

the State of Assam; and the Naga Hills District was envisioned as a governing 

institution for people who live in what today is Nagaland. 11 In a manner similar 

to the Tribal Advisory Councils (TACs) under the Fifth Schedule, these districts 

were known to be larger than the identity group relevant to most people in the 

area. 12 Unlike in the case of the TACs, however, the Sixth Schedule includes 

arrangements for regional councils within each district council. The regional 

councils were expected to be consistent with the territories of tribal units. 

• Second, ADCs were empowered to make laws on subjects ranging from land 

use and economic development policy to social customs including (but not 

limited to) succession of traditional leaders, marriage, divorce, and inheritance. 

The recommendations by Bardoloi Committee clearly intended to preserve 

traditional customs within a modern institutional context. The Sixth Schedule 

offered no opinion regarding particular customs of particular communities; it 

insists, however, that the ADCs acknowledge these customs explicitly and enact 

legislation in a manner that would make the customs comprehensible to a judicial 

magistrate. 13 However, ADC's ability to legislate autonomously is restricted as all 

ADC bills must receive the assent of the governor before they become laws. 

• A third function of ADCs is to administer justice. District and regional courts 

are to be established both for the trial of all cases in their respective territories 

and also for appeals. 

• Fourth, ADCs are expected to establish and manage primary schools, dispensaries, 

markets, ferries, fisheries, roads, road transport and waterways in the district 

and may, with the previous approval of the Governor, make regulations for the 

control thereof and, in particular, may prescribe the language and the manner 

in which primary education shall be imparted in the primary schools in the 

district. Hence, the ADC is vested with broad administrative capacity, and one 

of its most important tasks is primary education. The Bardoloi Commission's 

report acknowledged the important socializing role of primary education; this 

paragraph ensured that this role was controlled by an institution designed 

explicitly to be responsive to tribal sensitivities. 

11. Nagaland ADC was never accepted by the Naga leaders and was never implemented. 

12. The Fifth Schedule of the constitution applies to tribal regions in Central India. 

13. For details, see Bardoloi Committe Report, note 20, sections 6, 17. 

6 


• Fifth and finally, the ADCs have the right to assess and collect certain taxes. They 

are also expected to receive funds from both the Central and State Governments 

(both funneled through the state exchequer) and to manage these receipts in 

a manner comprehensible to the state Auditor-General. The Sixth Schedule 

attempted to give ADCs the legislative, judicial, administrative, and financial 

capacity - within a context of central and state interest - needed to establish and 

enforce its own social and developmental priorities. 

4. Development and Expansion of the Autonomous District/Regional Councils in India 

Along with the constitutional provisions, the autonomous district councils were introduced 

in some of the autonomous districts of the then undivided Assam in 1952. Also some 

regional council was introduced in Mizoram in 1953. In fact the constitution contained 

a special provision in the form of the Sixth Schedule for the administration of “tribal” 

areas that were meant to protect the tribal people who were living scattered throughout 

the country. The provision was applied to the ethnic groups in the hill region of the North 

East. Under it, the “tribal” areas in the North East were divided into two parts - Part A 

and Part B. The United Khasi and Jaintia Hills District, the Garo Hills District, the Lushai 

Hills District, the Naga Hills District, the North Cachar Hills District, and the Mikir Hills 

District were placed in Part A as Autonomous Districts administered by the Government 

of Assam, with a limited representation in the Assam State Legislative Assembly and in 

the National Parliament. Whereas the North East Frontier Tract, the Balipara Frontier 

Tract, the Tirap Frontier Tract, the Abor Hill and Mishmi Hills Districts and the Naga 

Tribal Area came into Part B administered by the Governor of Assam acting as Agent of 

the President of India. Tripura and Manipur were not promoted to states but were made 

special administrative regions under the control of central government. Hereafter, state 

formation in the North East followed a process whereby the area once unified into Assam 

was separated and ultimately turned into separate states (Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, 

Meghalaya and Mizoram) from Assam one after another (Inoue 2005). 

After the Indian Constitution was brought into force, the Government of Assam framed 

the Assam Autonomous District (Constitution of District Councils) Rules 1951 and 

the Pawi-Lakher (Constitution of Regional Councils) Rules, 1952 for the autonomous 

region in the Lushai Hills District. Accordingly, following paragraph 2 of the Sixth 

Schedule to the Indian Constitution, the District Councils and the Regional Councils 

were constituted in 1952 and 1953 respectively. Also, the Government set up an Interim 

Tribal Advisory Council (ITAC) in each hill district and also desired the participation 

of the tribal representatives in the administration of the areas, even during the interim 

period pending the formation of the District Councils. The councils had no statutory basis 

and the councils used to advise the District Superintendent/Deputy Commissioners on 


various administrative problems and development schemes of the district. So it was really 

a training ground for the hill tribes in self governance. Since these regional councils were 

upgraded either into district councils or states, there are no more such regional councils 

today in India's Northeast. 

If followed today's structure, the Northeast India has, sixteen District Councils – three in 

Assam, three in Meghalaya, three in Mizoram, one in Tripura and six in Manipur. 14 This 

structure become possible after the Mizo Hills was elevated to the status of the Union 

Territory of Mizoram in accordance with the North-Eastern Areas (Re-organisation) Act, 

1971. The Mizo District Council was abolished in 1972. The Pawi-Lakher Regional Council 

was constituted for the Pawis. The Lakhers and the Chakmas, were also turned into District 

Councils of their own in 1972 under the provisions of the said Act. The Government of 

Manipur as per the provisions of the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971 

passed by the Parliament also constituted six Autonomous District Councils for the 

tribal people for the hill areas of Manipur. However, the District Councils in Manipur are 

outside the purview of the Sixth Schedule. As far as the concept of autonomous district 

councils are concerned, it is generally thought to preserve the culture and identity of the 

communities categorized as tribes. 

5. Autonomous Regions: Different Practices in India 

While talking about Indian practice of autonomous regions/districts, it will be a blunder 

if one follows the political structure which is constituted under the purview of the Sixth 

Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Though the establishment and functions of most of 

these autonomous councils are based on the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution (see annex 

2), there are many such councils which are created on the basis of Temporary, Transitional 

and Special Provisions provisioned under the part XXI of the Indian Constitution. 15 As 

mentioned earlier, there are several autonomous regions in India to which the Central 

Government has given varying degrees of autonomy within the state legislature. For 

example, there are six Autonomous District Councils - Churachandpur Autonomous 

District Council, Chandel Autonomous District Council, Senapati Autonomous District 

Council, Sadar Hills Autonomous District Council, Tamenglong Autonomous District 

Council, and Ukhrul Autonomous District Council in the state of Manipur which are 

14. It is interesting to note that the Nagas, for whom the Sixth Schedule was mainly provided, have no 

autonomous District Councils of their own till date. 

15. Part XXI, Articles 370 371, 371A, 371B, 371C, 371D, 371F, 371G of the constitution allows the States 

i.e. Jammu & Kashmir, Maharastra and Gujarat, Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, Andhra Pradesh, Sikkim, 

Mizoram, to go for temporary, transitional and special provisions. 

8 


in function without coming under the purview of the Sixth Schedule. In fact, these 

institutions are created under the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act passed in 

1971, and it is said that this act was created as a package deal for the entire hill areas of 

Manipur (Ray and Kamkhenthang 1997). 

Also, we find two autonomous regions - Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council- 

Kargil and Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council-Leh--in Ladakh region of the 

state of Jammu and Kashmir 16 and Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) in the 

Darjeeling District of West Bengal as the latest examples of autonomous region, which, 

unlike the ADCs in the Northeast India, were created through a bill that was passed in 

the respective State Legislative Assemblies. In fact, two Autonomous Hill Development 

Councils in Ladakh 17 was constituted under the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development 

Council Act, 1995 whereas GTA was formed along with a bill which was passed in the 

West Bengal Legislative Assembly on 2 September 2011. Prior to it, the memorandum 

of agreement for the formation of an autonomous administrative body for the Darjeeling 

hills, was signed on 18 July 2011 at Pintail Village near Siliguri by West Bengal Home 

Secretary G.D. Gautama, Union Home Ministry Joint Secretary K.K. Pathak and Gorkha 

Janmukti Morcha (GJM) general secretary Roshan Giri in the presence of Union Home 

16. Ladakh consists of two districts: Kargil and Leh. Both the districts have a roughly equal population of 

a little more than a hundred thousand people. The majority of the population of Kargil, some 85 per 

cent, are Shi‘a Muslims, most of whom belong to the Balti ethnic community, along with Buddhists and 

Sunni Muslims in as minorities, whereas Leh district is with, the overwhelming majority of Buddhist, 

with a minority of Sunni, Shi‘a Balti and Nurbakshi Muslims, who account for roughly 15 per cent of the 

population 

17. It is said that Ladakhis, who never identify themselves with the Kashmiris, were alienated by the 

iniquitous power structure and partisan policies of the Kashmiri government. Once the state 

imposed Urdu as a medium of instruction in schools, the Ladakhi Buddhists felt further isolation. 

Being a minority community in the State and anxious to protect their distinct religion and culture, 

they wanted to take an independent decision about their political future. As early as 1949 the 

Ladakhi people had demanded for either the union territory status or some form of autonomy to their 

region. Following a series of agitation in the late 1980s the central and state governments relented 

to their demands. Accordingly the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Council Act was enacted on May 

9, 1995 which provided for an Autonomous Hill Council each for Leh and Kargil, and an interdistrict 

advisory council to advise them on matters of common interest to both districts, and to 

resolve their differences and preserve communal harmony in Ladakh. As far as the autonomy in 

governance is concerned, the executive powers and functions of the councils included allotment, 

use and occupation of land vested in the Council by the government, formulation and review of 

development programmes for the district, budget (Plan and non-Plan), formulation of guidelines 

for the implementation of schemes at the grassroots level, special measures for employment 

generation and poverty alleviation, promotion of co-operative institutions and local culture and 

languages, management of un-demarcated forests and canals or watercourses for agriculture, desert 

development, tourism planning, promotion and development; and preservation of the environment 

and ecology of the area. The councils have extensive rights to collect State taxes and levy local 

taxes and fees of different kinds, including taxes on grazing, business, transport, entertainment and 

'temporary occupation of village sites and roads.' 


Minister P. Chidambaram, West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee and Gorkha 

Janmukti Morcha leaders. GTA has three hill subdivisions Darjeeling, Kalimpong, 

and Kurseong and some areas of Siliguri subdivision under its authority. 

The GTA replaced the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council, which was formed in 1988 

and administered the Darjeeling hills for 23 years. The DGHC did not fulfill its goal 

of forming a new state, which led to the downfall of Subhash Ghisingh and the rise of 

another party GJM headed by Bimal Gurung in 2007, which launched a second agitation 

for a Gorkhaland state, and finally after three years of agitation the GJM also reached an 

agreement with the state government to form a semi-autonomous body to administer the 

Darjeeling hills. The GTA possesses administrative, executive and financial powers but 

no legislative powers. Although the demand of Gorkhaland could not be fulfilled for the 

Gorkhas but the GTA has more powers than the former DGHC. The main differences 

between these two councils are as follows: 

1) The DGHC had 28 seats, where as the GTA has 45 seats and five nominated 

members. 

2) There were 19 departments with DGHC, while the GTA has 54 departments 

along with 14 executive members. 

3) DGHC did not have the power to prepare the budget for its departments. It 

would receive funds as part of the state government’s budget while the GTA can 

have its own budget and can allocate funds to various departments. 

4) DGHC was given an annual grant of Rs 22 crores by the Central Government 

where as the GTA will receive a grant of Rs 200 crores every year for the next 

three years. 

5) DGHC did not have the power to create posts of Group C and Group D, so it 

could not generate employment where as GTA has the power to create Group D 

staffs. 

6) DGHC did not have the power to amend any rule but the GTA has the 

power to prepare its regulations and send them to the state government as 

recommendations. 

As far as the fate of grassroots democracy is concerned, even though the GTA has the 

Department of Panchayats and Rural Development, the GJM leadership is yet to be 

free from the anxiety as to how it would function. Although the GTA is formed with 

an objective to establish the ethnic identity of Gorkhas by expediting all-round (socioeconomic, 

infrastructural, educational, cultural, and linguistic) development of the people 

in the region but in practice it is often equated with fiefdom by the people. The manner in 

which the CPM and other parties refuse to take part in elections raises suspicion as many 

10 


feel that the other parties were threatened by GJM cadres. The leaders like Bimal Gurung 18 

and Roshan Giri 19 say that GTA is only for temporary period in the process of getting 

statehood- Gorkhaland for Gorkhas. The major reason for the playing of identity politics is 

that the Gorkhas feel that they are treated at par with Nepalese citizens owing to the Indo- 

Nepal treaty of 1950 that allows the citizens of both India and Nepal to have reciprocal 

rights in matters of residence and property. This has led to the playing of emotions by the 

leaders- earlier Ghising and now Gurung. Many people are already feeling that the future 

of Gorkhas is uncertain as they say that the GJM had betrayed the movement for separate 

state gaining which they view that would solve the identity issue of the heterogeneous 

community called Gorkhas or Nepalis in India. 

According to available data, the existing autonomous regions/district councils in India 

along with its formation date and objectives are as follows: 

Table 1: Various Autonomous District/Regional Council in India 

Name of the 

Autonomous District/ 

Regional Council 

State Formation Date Objective of the formation Constitutional 

provision 

Bodoland Territorial 

Council 

Assam 

December 7, 2003 

Renounced violence and 

embraced peace with 

justice and development 

through a democratic 

process 

Sixth Schedule 

Karbi Anglong 

Autonomous Council 

Assam 

1952 

Accumulation of 

grievances and new 

aspiration of tribal youth 


Dima Hasao 

Autonomous District 

Council 

Assam 

February 2, 

1970 (separated 

from Mikir Hill 

district) 

As per the demand of 

Dimasa tribal 


Garo Hills 


Council 

Meghalaya 

1952 


Jaintia community 


Jaintia Hills 


Counci 

Meghalaya 

1966, along with 

the bifurcation of 

United Khasi- 

Jaintia HDC 

To satisfy Jaintia 

community 


18. For details, see Darjeeling: Gorkha Janmukti Morcha threatens to resurrect Gorkhaland Agitation, 

available in http://thehimalayanbeacon.com/darjeeling-gorkha-janmukti-morcha-threatens-to-resurrectgorkhaland-agitation/, 

accessed by the author on November 4, 2012. 

19. Researcher's discussion with Giri on October 15, 2012. 






provision 

Khasi Hills 


Council 

Meghalaya 

1966, along with 

the bifurcation of 

United Khasi- 

Jaintia HDC 


Jaintia to go for separate 

council 


Chakma Autonomous 

District Council 

Mizoram 

On April 29, 1972 

along with the 

abolition of Pawi- 

Lekher Regional 

Council 


Chakma community 


Lai Autonomous 


Mizoram 

29 April 1972 

As per the demand of Lai 

community 


Mara Autonomous 


Mizoram 

1972 

To address separatism 

movement by Mara 

community 


Tripura Tribal Areas 


Council 

Tripura 

1 April 1985 

by the 49th 

amendment to the 

Constitution of 

India. 

To empower the 

Indigenous people to 

govern themselves and 

also to bring all round 

developments of the 

backward people so as 

to protect and preserve 

their culture, customs and 

traditions 


Ladakh Autonomous 

Hill Development 

Council, Kargil 

Jammu and 

Kashmir 

July 2003 

For the border 

development of the 

people of the area 

Part XXI article 

370 (temporary, 

transitional 

and special 

provisions) 20 

Ladakh Autonomous 

Hill Development 

Council, Leh 

Jammu and 

Kashmir 

August 28,1995 

Owing to the difficult 

geographical problems, 

the need for greater 

public participation 

in the planning and 

development process was 

all the more necessary 


370 {temporary, 

transitional and 

special provisions 

(Ladakh 

Autonomous Hill 

Development 

Council Act, 

1995)} 

20. Official website says that it was formed "on the pattern of Darjeeling Hill Development Council", for 

details, see http://kargil.nic.in/lahdck/lahdck.htm. 

12 






provision 

Gorkhaland 

Territorial 

Administration 

West 

Bengal 

GTA came in to 

being in 18 July 

2011 by replacing 

Darjeeling 

Gorkha Hill 

Council, formed 

in 1988 

To address the three-year 

long agitation by the GJM 

for separate statehood 

Gorkhaland 

Territorial 

Administration 

Bill 2011 

Churachandpur 


Council 

Manipur 

26th December 

1971 


370{(temporary, 



Article 371 (C) 

under the Manipur 

(Hill Areas) 


Act 1971} 

Chandel 


Council 

Manipur 

26th December 

1971 







(Hill Areas) 


Act 1971} 

Senapati 


Council 

Manipur 

26th December 

1971 







(Hill Areas) 


Act 1971} 

Sadar Hills 


Council 

Manipur 

26th December 

1971 







(Hill Areas) 


Act 1971} 






provision 

Tamenglong 


Council 

Manipur 

26th December 

1971 







(Hill Areas) 


Act 1971} 

Ukhrul Autonomous 


Manipur 

26th December 

1971 







(Hill Areas) 


Act 1971} 

While talking about different autonomous regions/councils, one needs to understand that 

there are at least three different forms of such institutions available in India: the first one 

comprises Hill District Councils under the purview of Sixth Schedule of the Constitution; 

the second consists the Hill District Councils under the purview of State laws; and the 

third comes under the Development Councils formed under the temporary, transitional 

and special provisions as provided in Part XXI of the Constitution. While categorizing 

these practices as per the Constitution, the first ten (Hill District Councils of the State of 

Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura) come under the Sixth Schedule, the last six Hill 

District Councils of Manipur state become part of the second provision, and the rest three 

(GTA, Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, Kargil and Ladakh Autonomous 

Hill Development Council, Leh) fall under the third. However, it is still quite obvious 

that the nature and the extent of autonomy vary to the different autonomous regions/ 

districts. Since the provisions of the Sixth Schedule are not uniform in all areas brought 

within its ambit, the Councils in their operation are liable to state intervention. As a result, 

District Councils in Meghalaya and Assam 21 are exercising more powers than the same in 

21. As far as state intervention is concerned, it is less in Meghalaya and lesser in Assam in comparison to 

other states, for details, see B.K. Roy Burman, Sixth Schedule of the Constitution in L.S. Gassah (ed.) The 

Autonomous District Councils. New Delhi: Omsons Publication, 1997. p. 32. 

14 


Mezoram and Tripura (Kshetri 2006). Similarly, district councils under the Sixth Schedule 

are different from and more powerful than the district councils in Manipur (Ibid). Also, 

regional councils which are new in establishment are having more administrative, 

executive and financial powers than ADCs under the Sixth Schedule even if they have no 

legislative powers. 

The following table shows some important points of distinction of various forms 

of autonomous structures practiced in India. While doing so, all 20 such political/ 

administrative structures were classified into three border categories ADCs under the 

Sixth Schedule; District Councils under of Manipur, and Territorial Administration. And 

Gorkhaland, being the latest formation, has been chosen for the purpose of analysis. 

Table 2: Important points of distinction between The District Councils under the 

Sixth Schedule, District Councils under the Special Provisions, and the Regional 

Administration. 

List of Points 

District Councils under 

the Sixth Schedule 

District Councils 

demanding to be under 

the Sixth sShedule 

(Manipur) 

Autonomous Territorial 

Administration (GTA) 

Constitutional 

provisions under which 

these institutions are 

established 

Under the Sixth 

Schedule of the 

Constitution 

Under the provision 

of the State Legislature 

(Manipur Hill Area 

District Council Act 

Under the provision of 

the State (West Bengal) 

Legislature (GTA Act 

2011) 

Legislative Power 

With the prior approval 

of the Governor, they 

have the power to make 

laws with respect to: 

• Allotment, 

occupation or use of 

land for agricultural 

and non-agricultural 

purposes other 

than land classed as 

reserved forests 

• The management of 

unclassified forest 

• The use of canel 

or water course 

for purpose of 

agriculture 

• Regulation of 

Jhuming or other 

forms of shifting 

cultivation 

• Appointment and 

succession of chief 

or headmen 

No Legislative Power, 

section 52 of the Act 

provides them only 

byelaws making power 

Only the power to 

make regulations to be 

applicable within the 

region with respect to 

all or any of the matters 

enumerated as power 

and functions of the 

GTA. 


List of Points 

District Councils under 

the Sixth Schedule 

District Councils 

demanding to be under 

the Sixth sShedule 

(Manipur) 

Autonomous Territorial 

Administration (GTA) 

• Inheritance of 

property 

• Marriage 

• Social Reform 

Judicial Power 

They have powers to 

constitute village council 

or courts for trail or 

suits 

They have not. The 

village authorities 

are authorized and 

empowered for trial of 

small cases/litigations 

under the provisions of 

village Authority Act 

1965 

No judicial power 

Power to assess and 

collect land revenues 

and to impose taxes 

They have powers: 

• To assess and collect 

land revenues 

• To levy and collect 

takes on lands, 

buildings, and tells 

on persons 

• To levy and collect 

all or any of taxes 

on professionals, 

traders, calling 

and employment; 

entry of goods etc.; 

animal, vehicles 

and boats; taxes 

for maintenance 

of schools, 

dispensaries or 

roads 

Does not arise 


They have power to levy 

and collect these taxes 



It has the power to 

impose, levy and collect 

taxes and fees like those 

related to registration 

of vehicles, licences 

and water supply. Subsection 

3 of Section 33, 

however, makes it clear 

that vehicles already 

registered with another 

authority need not 

re-register again. Under 

Section 27 of the bill, 

the state government 

has also agreed to form 

a Regional Transport 

Authority for the 

GTA area with the 

district magistrate as 

chairperson. 

Rights to take part in 

the Council Election 

• Only for tribes 

For all registered voters 

For all registered voters 

Today’s aspiration 

• Strengthening the 

autonomy provided 

by the Sixth 

Schedule 

• Some of the ADCs 

i.e. Bodos in Assam 

and Garos in 

Meghalaya demand 

to have separate 

statehood 

Almost all autonomous 

councils demand to be 

under the purview of 


• Continued 

demanding for more 

autonomy 

• Separate statehood - 

the Gorkhaland 

16 


While talking about the formation of Autonomous Region/District Council under the 

Sixth Schedule, it provides for if the Governor of a state (i.e. the state government) notifies 

any area as an autonomous region, a district council comprising of 30 members will be 

elected. Out of the total members, a maximum of four members are appointed by the 

Governor of the state, while other members are elected on the basis of adult suffrage. The 

Chief Executive Member (CEM), the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the Council 

are elected from among the members and the CEM selects other Executive Members. 

There are different internal rules for different Autonomous District Councils as different 

conditions exist in different regions. For instance, the District Councils in Assam and 

Meghalaya have been constituted at the district level whereas in Mizoram, the District 

Councils have been created at both the district and sub-divisional levels (Prasad 2005). It 

is the Governor who has the final say in the creation and dissolution of the Council. For 

finances, the Autonomous District Council gets a meager amount from the business and 

commercial enterprises and some land revenue. A district and regional fund, endowed 

and managed by the Governor, is the main source by which the autonomous body is 

financed. The powers of the autonomous councils vary. There is a long list of subjects and 

powers of such councils under the Sixth Schedule: Articles 244 (2) and 275 (I). The list, 

as mentioned in the above table includes allotment, occupation or use, or setting apart 

of land, the regulation of jhum (shifting cultivation), establishment of village or town 

committees or councils and their powers as well as administration, flood control, trade 

and commerce, town and village police. 

6. The Indian Experience of Autonomous District Councils/Regions: An Appraisal 

From the above discussion on the Autonomous Region/District Councils, it can be 

assumed that there is no single government mechanism or law in India regarding 

autonomy in the various regions inhabited by diverse groups. The Indian experience 

with granting autonomy deals with maintaining law and order situation or quelling 

protests and insurgencies by recognising the identities of many communities either 

as tribals or Buddhists or Gorkhas. One may conclude that such autonomy is not 

granted with long-term vision but on ad hoc basis - just to deal with the immediate 

crisis. That is why the situation in the India’s Himalayan region - from Kashmir to the 

Northeast - are getting complicated with each passing day. The following section makes 

an appraisal of the Indian practice, mainly the ADCs in North-eastern Hills. 

6.1. Strengths 

The autonomy assured to the Northeast and some other parts of India has a geopolitical 

importance. If the Indian leaders had not realized the importance of this move, dealing 

with these parts of the country would have been more complicated than what the 


situation is there today. According to Reddy and others (Reddy and Reddy 2007), 

leaders including Gopinath Bardoloi opposed the Muslim League's effort to include 

Assam and other parts of the North-easten Region in East Pakistan. They say it is 

because of the courageous stand of Gopinath Bardoloi and other Indian leaders that 

the State like Assam is a part of India today. The present study examines whether or 

not the Autonomous District Councils/Regions meet the objectives set out before their 

formation. As far as the objectives are concerned, the leaders formed such political/ 

administrative structures with an approach of assimilation/integration. That is why 

Indian State should be credited for the following because without such autonomy it 

would have been impossible to achieve the objectives: 

• Majority of the tribes that were demanding independence when India became 

free, are now demanding either more autonomy within the district councils or 

for separate statehood within the Indian Union. 

• Preserved the identities and traditions of the various communities, and that 

the tribes previously engaged in insurgency have been integrated into the 

Indian Union. 

Also, the Autonomous Regions/Districts, despite many limitations faced by them, have 

succeeded in transforming the traditional tribal society into a legally defined and structured 

one. It is fit for having representative from the government in a formal constitutional way 

at the district level and in some cases even at the village level (Gangujy 1997). In fact, 

Autonomous Regions/Districts have served as the basic model for meeting the demands 

for autonomy launched by ethnic minorities elsewhere in the country (ibid). 

6.2. Weaknesses 

While reviewing the performance of ADCs in India, we need to examine the developmental 

goal it has achieved. Also, since the autonomy has been discussed primarily as a mechanism 

to avoid conflict, we need to examine whether the ADCS has been instrumental in 

resolving conflicts in the regions. 

6.2.1. On the Issue of development and social transformation 

It is said that the creation of Autonomous District Councils/Regional Councils does not 

address the issues pertaining to the controlling of resources, finances and costs of running 

autonomous territories in a comprehensive manner. Though ADCs "were not designed to 

be agents of economic development" (Stuligross 1999:497-525), they started working as 

development agents at the local level during the course of time, and performed as weak 

agents of economic development. The following six reasons are identified for such weak 

performances of ADCs. 

18 


• First, they are ineffective at lobbying the state government and shaping the state 

developmental budget. 22 Rather, they had been forced to adopt 'undesirable 

practices 23 so as to raise fund to discharge their constitutional obligations like 

running of primary schools, dispensaries, etc. 

• Second, ADCs have been unable to influence state budget processes indirectly 

through members of the State Legislative Assembly (MLAs) elected from 

constituencies in the ADC territory. For example, in Meghalaya, though the 

entire area of the state falls into one of three ADC territories, MLAs have tended 

to find themselves in an adversarial rather than cooperative relationship with 

ADC leaders MLAs, who got their start as ADC leaders, work to retain their seats 

and to strengthen the state government - which is now their source of patronage 

opportunities, and even tend to ignore ADCs once they become MLAs. 24 State 

development plans lead to economic growth in autonomous districts, but not as 

a product of ADC influence. 

• Third, ADCs themselves have relatively tiny development budgets. Although 

the Sixth Schedule provides a substantial list of developmental functions to the 

ADC, it does not obligate either the Central or State government to provide funds 

for this purpose. The central government has directed the States to distribute 

a portion of tribal development funds directly to ADCs for administration. In 

absence of such legal mandates, State governments have, however, chosen not to 

disburse funds that are not specifically required. 

22. Influence at the state level is important not only because state governments have the largest development 

budgets, but also because the states administer many central government-sponsored development projects. 

Paragraph 13 of the sixth schedule requires that the state government place the portion of spending bills 

relevant to autonomous districts before the ADC in time for them to discuss the proposal before it is 

in final form. The ADC is limited by the "discussion" requirement, which is well short of the power to 

"advise" or "direct" the state government. Also, in practice, ADCs never receive the proposed budget in 

time even to discuss it carefully; frequently they do not receive the proposal before the state legislative 

assembly votes on it. In practical terms, the Khasi ADC "has no role in state budget preparation, even in 

the matter of grants- in-aid for small development projects. For details, David Stuligross, "Autonomous 

Councils in Northeast India: Theory and Practice" Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 24, No. 4 

(Oct.-Dec. 1999), pp. 497-525. 

23. Extraction of timer beyond ecologically sound management limit, large scale of land to private persons, 

thereby disturbing community rights as well as violating the principles of fair share for being individual 

members are identified as undesirable practices. For details, see B.K. Roy Burman, Sixth Schedule of the 

Constitution in L.S. Gassah (ed.) The Autonomous District Councils. New Delhi: Omsons Publication, 

1997. p. 33. 

24. According to the then Meghalaya Hills Commissioner T. Kropha , they forget that ADCs gave them 

their political start and helped to develop their constituency, For details, David Stuligross, "Autonomous 

Councils in Northeast India: Theory and Practice" Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 24, No. 4 

(Oct.-Dec. 1999), pp. 497-525. 


• Fourth, within the context of their small budgets, ADCs face annual budget 

difficulties because the state government is almost always late in providing its 

required disbursements. It is also said that a portion of the budgeted allotment 

never arrives. These disputes between the State government and ADCs on the 

issue of budget often go to court. 

• Fifth, ADCs have been ineffective at collecting taxes themselves. It has been stated 

that the local and state governments in India typically collect less in taxes and 

fees than their authority permits. It is because of leaders' fear according to which 

taxpayers, in their guise as voters, frequently punish ambitious tax collectors 

in the polls. For example, the Khasi Hills ADC includes budget lines for each 

revenue source allotted by the Sixth Schedule, but in practice money is collected 

primarily from resource royalties, non-tribal residents, and non-residents - in 

other words, not directly out of the pockets of most voters. The ADC is reasonably 

efficient in collecting taxes from non-tribal people, but chooses not to collect 

taxes from tribal people, and the motto behind it was to make the lives of these 

residents less pleasant, with the intention of dissuading potential new migrants 

(Stuligross 1999: 497-525. 

• Sixth, and finally, ADCs are ineffective agents of development because they do 

not deploy their meager budget in ways that would promote a direct role in 

economic growth. Also their substantial staff is actively involved in community 

outreach and provides regular opportunities for villagers to voice economic, 

political, and social grievances. While talking about ADCs-staff relations, since 

the senior officers of the ADCs are on deputation from their respective state 

cadres, they are thus subjected to a system of double hierarchy. Then, most of 

them seek the escape route of not doing anything which would hamper their 

career interest in the state cadre. As a result, ADCs remain ineffective in its 

operation. That is why, Roy Burman (1997:33) states here in the situation that 

"the elected office barriers become resentful; the people become critical and; the 

employees become cynical". 

In summary, the experiment of autonomous councils has met with complete failure in 

most of the Northeastern states. Here, it seems it is worth to mention a statement by Roy 

Burman (1997), who says "Autonomy with so much promise has become so little" (Ibid: 

36). He further states that the ADCs have been reduced today to be subordinate organs 

of the state rather than institutional structure for channelizing self-regulatory inputs of 

the communities which are to be seen as complements to the institution of the state". 

The personal ambitions of the local leaders as well as the State government’s reluctance to 

delegate powers to the councils are at the core of the problem. That is why decentralization 

of powers to the village level needs to be considered and this can be done by setting up 

Village Councils under the autonomous councils in order to make economic democracy 

20 


accessible up to the grassroots level (MoHA n.d.). Also, the following points have been 

identified as weakness of the ADCs, while practicing the autonomy. 

• It has been widely accepted that the ADCs in India are "the inclusive political 

structure"; 25 "neither is it meant for". 26 Though there are good numbers of 

minorities, they hardly find any representation in the Councils either by election 

or by nomination. That is why; ADCs are "accused of insensitivity to the social 

and cultural aspirations of the minorities" (Roy Burman 1997:38). 

• Power does not percolate down to the village level but it is concentrated at the 

district level that does not lead to empowerment of people at the grassroots. State 

government is reluctant to delegate powers to the councils, and district councils 

are also not for decentralization of powers up to the village level. 

• Though the provisions in the Sixth Schedule have dealt mainly with the issue of 

safeguarding the land and customs of the hill tribes of the region, many of the 

ADCs are yet to codify their customary laws. 

• Restriction in buying land and settling in these autonomous regions/districts has 

a negative impact in development and certain city's growth. If a person, even 

after serving for 30-40 years, cannot settle there, he/she will have compulsion 

not only to come out but also to take all money out from there, which otherwise 

would have been used there. 27 

6.2.2. Autonomy and Conflict Management 

The basic meaning of the term "autonomy" is understood by independence or freedom, 

as of the will or one's actions. And, demand for autonomy is not merely about political 

representation; it is about altering the very relations of ruling–the question of what is 

power, what governance is and what are other possible roles of state, civil society and 

communities (Parajuli 2004). Once we talk about autonomy in political sense, it is “a state 

of affairs falling short of sovereignty" (Hechter 2000) which "means that a minority has a 

collective power base, usually a regional one, in a plural society" (Gurr 1993:292). It is also 

considered as “a political arrangement in which an ethnic group has some control over its 

own territory, people, and resources but does not have independence as a sovereign state" 

(Harff and Gurr 2004:221). In fact, “autonomy is understood to refer to independence 

of action on the internal or domestic level, as foreign affairs and defense normally are 

in the hands of the central or national government, but occasionally power to conclude 

25. As per the discussion with prof. Nikhlesh Kumar on October 18, 2012. 

26. As per the discussion with prof. L.S. Gassah on October 18, 2012 

27. Author's discussion with Prof. Monirul Hussain, October 19, 2012. 


international agreements concerning cultural or economic matters also may reside with 

the autonomous entity" (Hannum and Lillich1980:858-89). Also, it has been defined as 

“an arrangement aimed at granting a certain degree of self-identification to a group that 

differs from the majority of the population in the state, and yet constitutes the majority in 

a specific region. Autonomy involves a division of powers between the central authorities 

and the autonomous entity”. 28 As far as power relations of the concept of autonomy 

are concerned, “powers are not merely delegated but transferred; they may thus not be 

revoked without consulting with the autonomous entity. … the central government may 

only interfere with the acts of the autonomous entity in extreme cases (for example when 

national security is threatened or its powers have been exceeded) (Daftary 2000:5). 

If we discuss about the reasons of why the issue of autonomy has been discussed, most 

of the scholars state that it is one of the strategies aimed at preventing, managing, and 

settling internal conflicts in divided societies (Wolff 2011). It is also acknowledged that 

the territorially concentrated groups in divided societies are more likely to demand selfdetermination 

(Toft and Saideman 2008:39-50; Toft 2003; Saideman and Ayres 2000:1126- 

44; Saideman and Lowe 2000:539-58) and if autonomy is not assured, they are likely to be 

engaged in violent conflict in its pursuit (Weidmann and Cederman 2010:491-499; also 

Fearon and Laitin 1999). At the same time, the academic community is deeply divided 

over the issue whether territorial approaches to conflict resolution in divided societies 

offer appropriate mechanisms to keep or restore peace while preventing the break-up of 

an existing state. For example, Cornell (2002:245-76); Hale (2000:31-56; 2004:165-93) and 

Treisman (1997:212-49) are found highly skeptical of territorial approaches to resolve 

conflicts, arguing that rather than being a cure, territorial approaches induce conflict. 

Cornell (2002: 245-76), in his analysis of ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus argues that the 

“institution of autonomous regions is conducive to secessionism. On the contrary, Gurr 

(1993:301) shows recent historical track record and argues that, on balance, autonomy 

arrangements can be an effective means for managing regional conflicts”. For Ghai (2000: 

14-24) true autonomy prevents secession" whereas Hartzell and Hoddie (2007:169) 

offer statistical evidence and states that “designing a negotiated settlement or negotiated 

agreement to include (territorial power sharing) lowers the risk of a return to war”. Cohen 

(1997): 607-630) and Schneckener (2002: 203-28) similarly endorse the use of territorial 

28. It should be noted here that autonomy in a functional sense need not be conceived of in territorial terms 

only. Rather, there is also a strand in the literature of conflict resolution that advocates non-territorial 

autonomy arrangements, especially in cases where claimant groups are territorially not sufficiently 

concentrated. Such “personal autonomy applies to all members of a certain group within the state, 

irrespective of their place of residence. It is the right to preserve and promote the religious, linguistic, 

and cultural character of the group through institutions established by itself ” (for details, Lapidoth, R. 

(1997) Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace 

Press.199. p. 175). . 

22 


approaches to resolving self-determination conflicts. However, it should be noted here 

that autonomy in a functional sense need not be conceived of in territorial terms only. 

Rather, there is also a strand in the literature of conflict resolution that advocates nonterritorial 

autonomy arrangements, especially in cases where claimant groups are 

territorially not sufficiently concentrated. For example, Lapidoth (1997) clearly regards 

the distinction between territorial and personal autonomy as having great significance for 

the management of ethnic conflict. 29 It is said that unlike territorial autonomy, where the 

group constitutes a significant element in the population, personal autonomy is relevant 

in situations where the ethnic minority is interspersed throughout the state (Rothchild 

1997). This distinction between territorial and non-territorial autonomy is made by a 

number of other scholars, including Heintze (1998:7-32) as well. 

To link the academic debate with the Indian practice, it is said that these autonomous 

councils have been created largely around tribal identities and are either an outcome of 

an insurgency or these have become the fertile soil for insurgency that seeks a separate 

'homeland' for certain groups better known as tribe or community. The over five-decade 

long history of insurgency in the Northeast is as much a narrative of violence and mayhem 

as an unending story of remoteness, underdevelopment and alienation, each of these 

phenomena feeding the other. Establishing an autonomous council is an attempt of the 

Indian state to meet the tribal aspirations and also to contain or to quell such insurgencies. 

For instance, in 2001, the government of Assam signed a cease-fire agreement with one of 

the factions of the armed groups, the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) that led to the 

signing of the Memorandum of Settlement of the Boro Territorial Council in 2003. 

Karbi Anglong was created as a district in 1951 and a year later it was granted the status 

of autonomous district council, and in 1970, almost all the Development Departments of 

the Government of Assam functioning in the Karbi Anglong District were placed under 

the Administrative control of the Karbi Anglong District Council. However, the Council’s 

incompetence and the state’s indifference led to the accumulation of grievances and new 

aspiration of tribal youth to have economic power. In the 1980s, the Karbi, who constitute a 

shaky majority, and other tribes, began agitating for greater autonomy. The agitation, once 

peaceful and led by a faction of the Communist Party of India (Marxist- Leninist), soon 

gave way to insurgency that soon led to creation of different factions of insurgents. As a 

result, an agreement was reached between the government of Assam and armed leaders 

in 1995, whereby more departments were entrusted to Karbi Anglong District Council, 

29. For her a territorial political autonomy is "an arrangement aimed at granting to a group that differs from 

the majority of the population in the state, but that constitutes the majority in a specific region, a means 

by which it can express its distinct identity" (p.33) whereas “personal autonomy applies to all members of 

a certain group within the state, irrespective of their place of residence. It is right to preserve and promote 

the religious, linguistic, and cultural character of the group through institutions established by itself ” 

(p. 175). 


which was renamed as Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC). Under it, there are 

thirty subjects including industry, Forest, Agriculture, Education, Cooperative, Health and 

Family Welfare, Irrigation, Town and Country Planning, Excise and Finance including 

Sales Tax, excise and professional tax, etc. However, it has not solved the problem; rather 

the existence of armed groups and the other communities have led to numerous incidents 

of ethnic clashes between the Karbi and those perceived to be “encroachers” into their 

territory. 

Another instance is that of Meghalaya which is covered under the provisions of the Sixth 

Schedule of the Constitution. There are three major tribes: Khasi, Garo, and Jantia for 

whom there are three Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) named after each of these 

tribes in terms of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. With the coming into force 

of the Sixth Schedule 30 to the Constitution of India in 1951, the autonomous district 

councils were constituted for the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District and the Garo Hills 

District in addition to some other districts of the region in 1952. The first elections to the 

district councils in Meghalaya were held during April-June 1952. The Khasi-Jaintia Hills 

Autonomous District Council was subsequently bifurcated on 1 December 1964 when a 

new council called the Jowai District Council, which was later renamed as the Jaintia Hills 

Autonomous District Council was created for administrative expediency. Again the regions 

comprising present Meghalaya was made an autonomous state within the state of Assam 

on 2 April 1970. But this experiment of creating an autonomous state within the mother 

state did not work for long due to the lack of co-operation between the two Governments. 

Consequently, the Government of India accorded full-fledged statehood to Meghalaya on 

21 January 1972 in order to satisfy the persistent demand of the people of the newly created 

autonomous state. However, corruption by the politicians and dissatisfaction of the people 

have culminated into insurgency that started as a movement against the domination of the 

‘dkhars’ (non-tribals or outsiders such as Gorkhas, Bengalis, and people of other Indian 

states ) as the youths found themselves unemployed and the tribals were unable to compete 

with non-tribal businessmen. The Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC) 

formed in 1992 represented the interests of the dominant tribes of the State, the Khasis, 

Jaintias and the Garos. However, tribal differences led to a split in the HALC in 1995 

(Mukhim 2007) into the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), representing 

the Khasis and the Jaintias, and the Achik Matgrik Liberation Army (AMLA) representing 

the Garos. The main reason for split was over the reservation policy in Meghalaya, which 

allows the Garos 40 per cent and the Khasi and Jaintia communities the other 40 per 

cent quota in employment and education. The AMLA subsequently passed into oblivion 

30. Sixth Schedule (Articles 244 and 275) contains the provisions for the administration of north-east (mainly 

the tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram). 

24 


to be replaced by the Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC). Whereas the HNLC 

aims at converting Meghalaya “as a province exclusively for the Khasi tribe and free it 

from ‘domination’ by the Garo tribe”, the ANVC’s purported objective is to “carve out a 

homeland called ‘Achik Land’ in the areas of Garo Hills.” Between 1992 and 2009 (till July), 

at least 383 insurgency related fatalities were recorded in Meghalaya. The state capital 

Shillong is becoming a hub for trading of illegal small arms and explosives, which are 

brought through the Garo hills or Mizoram (http://cdpsindia.org/ meghalaya_insurgency. 

asp). However, As Barbora (2005) states, instead of leading to the reduction of violent 

conflict, it has only added to the volatile ethnic polarisation in the region (ibid). When 

a tribe is promised autonomy, there will remain others who will claim to be aggrieved 

by that arrangement. As with the cases of Bodos and Karbis, the creation of autonomous 

councils has worsened ethnic and political relations of these tribes with other people who 

live in the same region. For instance, during the July 2012 riots between the Bodos and 

the Muslims, more than 85 people have died and around 400,000 have been forced to flee 

their homes to displacement camps; 31 Bodo separatist rebels have regularly attacked these 

Bengali Muslims, along with other non-Bodo minorities, since 1992 in a determined bid 

to create a Bodo majority in their perceived ethnic homeland. The worst violence was 

reported in 1996-97, when about a quarter of a million people were displaced. The latest 

information of violent conflict in India's Northeast, there are still as many as 115 armed 

rebel groups (40 in Manipur, 39 in Assam, 4 in Meghalaya, 2 in Mizoram, 4 in Nagaland, 

and 25 in Tripura) (Mahata 2013:54-94). 

Having said that we can conclude by saying that the ADC practice with "ethno-territorial" 

autonomy has not set the best example as: (1) the provision of ethnic territorial autonomy 

does not treat outsider/migrants as citizens having equal rights, it is therefore exclusionary 

arrangement, (2) it allows for elite capture, preventing to deepen democracy at grassroots 

level ,(3) it does not help to boost economic development ,(4) it creates tension between state 

law and customary law, (5) it produces conflict between targeted group and minority groups 

living in the same territory. However, some positive impact of autonomy arrangement 

i.e. (1) scale down demands from separation to autonomy, (2) transformation of former 

insurgent groups into negotiated political settlement, contributing for integration of India, 

(3) its strategic implication for India's security interest, etc. should also not be forgotten. 

31. "Assam riots: India's worst communal clashes in a decade", retrieved from http://daily.bhaskar.com/ 

article/NAT-TOP-assam-riots-indias-worst-communal-clashes-in-a-decade-3686384-NOR.html, accessed 

on December 22, 2012. 


7. The Indian Experience and some lessons for the proposed federal set-up in Nepal 

It is needless to mention that democracy and federalism have integral relationship for 

real democratic set up. Both are centered to people power in all its ramifications. Yet, is it 

practiced or planned matters much? When it comes to stability, Lovise Aalen and Magnus 

Hatlebakk (2008) studied various experiences of federations and come to the conclusion 

that: 

Illustrate the intrinsic problems of ethnic federalism: the danger of a never 

ending process of state demands from more and more ethnic groups. Unless 

claims for separate statehood are accompanied by a high degree of flexibility 

from the central government to change sub-federal borders, there is a danger 

of increased and continued ethnic tension. It also shows that unless ethnic 

subdivision is supplemented by a strong protection of minority rights, it is 

likely to lead to increased discrimination of sub-ethnic communities. 

In fact, Ethnic homogeneity is hardly possible in any territory in multi-ethnic states, due to 

the diversity and mixture of peoples across ethnic boundaries. Therefore, new minorities 

are likely to be created within the subunits, which are in danger of being victimized, 

intentionally or not (Adeney 2000 cited in Aalen and Hatlebakk 2008). On the other hand, 

by creating ethnically heterogeneous sub-units it is possible to prevent national minorities 

from becoming local majorities (Elazar 1987). Based on the conclusions made by Lovise 

Aalen and Magnus Hatlebakkt (2008), Nepal should carefully consider the following 

arguments before going for federation. 

• Federal structures should facilitate the consolidation of a deep-rooted and 

inclusive democracy, involving all segments of society, including various ethnic 

groups, gender and regions. 

• It should enhance a political system which permits the expression of various 

cleavages in society (class, caste, urban/rural, religion etc). .. Nationally based, 

and not only ethnically confined parties, should be allowed and encouraged. 

• It should ensure a strong protection of minority rights and universal individual 

human rights, by asserting that all citizens within the various federal units, not 

only the indigenous ones, should have the right to employment and property. 

In doing so, the new constitution, as mentioned by Lovise Aalen and Magnus Hatlebakk 

(2008) should (a) include flexible and transparent procedures for the creation of potentially 

new federal sub-units, and (b) carefully balance the rights of federal units with those of the 

central state. A strong and legitimate political centre is a precondition for rule of law and 

a genuine protection of the rights of all citizens of Nepal. 

26 


While setting-up a federal structure, Nepal needs to take the following aspects into 

account: 

Nepal needs to start an intense debate about whether it wants to follow assimilation or 

integration 32 process in order to engage with new aspirations which are coming up along 

with the success of Janaandolan II. As stated earlier, India tried both the options at best as 

possible. In doing so, India has also not forgotten its geopolitical limitation. 33 Along with 

this, India tried to explore many new innovations, and it has been continuously engaged 

to go for better options in order to resolve issues such as identity politics, domination, 

exploitation, etc. However, as Stuligross (1999: 497-525) states, the dominant mode of 

national incorporation in India was the individual. According to him, India recognizes 

more explicitly that an individual's political decisions are frequently mediated by the social 

communities with whom the individual identifies. It is said that the impact of Pakistani 

partition along communal lines made India "to acknowledging the role of communities in 

political life which can make for a cumbersome and complex but perhaps more effective 

constitution" (ibid). 

Also, Nepal needs to clarify its stand on the concept of "total" or "comprehensive" 

democracy. These are the terms which are always in limelight of Nepali political 

discourse, especially after the 12-point Agreement signed between the then rebellious 

Maoists and the Seven-party Alliances in 2005. Since Nepal has brought back democracy 

to ensure inclusion and to avoid the exclusionary practices of the past, it has to think twice 

before replicating ADC model of India in Nepal. Rather, it has been witnessed that the 

practice of regional autonomy i.e. GTA in West Bengal and Kargil and Leh of LAHDC 

in J&K have set better examples in insuring inclusive democratic practice in India. It is 

because the ADCs are seen as exclusionary practices which in a way helped "increased the 

32. Assimilation means giving up the way a minority thinks and their values, and adopting the values of the 

host. In other words, assimilation absorbs minorities into the ways of the majority - requiring them to 

adopt the majority's language, customs and 'values' whereas integration, by contrast, requires acceptance 

of a country's laws, of human rights such as freedom of speech, and of basic democratic rights, but does 

not require the eradication of all cultural differences or group-identities; it is conceived of as a two-way 

process, through which both the majority and the minorities influence and change one another, and in 

which differences can be peacefully accommodated as long is there a common commitment to living 

together. For details, see Appleton, Joanne, "Assimilation or integration: migrants in Europe" Encounters 

Mission Journal Issue 36 March 2011 

33. If follow all ADC's geographical location, all ADCs till today are located in the international borders 

of India, whereas there is the Fifth Schedule of the constitution which has been applied to address the 

problems of the tribal regions in Central India. If follow the implementation part of autonomy by the 

Indian state even today, the ADC-like status has been granted to other three regions-- Gorkhaland (West 

Bengal), the Ladakh and Ley Autonomous Council (Kashmir) beyond the northeast and these are all 

placed in bordering areas of Indian. But the similar autonomy was not assured to those areas which are 

in the India's midland. For example, Uttarakhand (formarly in Uttar Pradesh), Chhattisgarh (formerly in 

Madhya Pradesh), Telengana (Andhra Pradesh), Coorg (Karnataka), Vidarbha (Maharashtra), and North 

Karnataka, were not assured such autonomy even if they were having similar struggles for long. 


political appointments, increase the conflicts between the state government and ADCs, to 

progressively ethnicize politics leading to inter-ethnic tensions" (Chaube 1973:94). 

As far as inter-ethnic relations are concerned, it is observed in the ADCs in India that 

the relations between tribal and non-tribal in ADCs sometimes reach at the stage of 

mutual distress which has been interpreted as "friendship is replaced by animosity and 

monocracy displaces democracy" (Goswami 1997:94). Also, it has been identified that 

there is complain of domination of the majority tribes over the minority tribes, and 

minority tribes are denied the opportunities to read and write in their own dialect in 

many ADC areas (ibid 101). So no remedy has been provisioned to overcome the problem 

(Prasad 1997). 

It is reported that the ADCs were not gender friendly as well. As mentioned by De, ADC 

practice revealed that the decision making had generally been restricted to particular 

sections and women had been perpetual power-addressees (DE 1997). That is why; Nepal 

has two options, either to go for ADC concept with a total revision of the provisions in 

order to ensure not only development related issues but also the issue of inclusiveness, 

or two, find out alternative ways in order (1) to accommodate tiny minorities in broader 

federal frame, and also (2) to broaden the scope of self rule as it is one of the two major 

components of federal system, (another component being shared rule) down to the grass 

roots level. 

If we go back again to India and observe the contemporary debate which seeks an alternative 

of ADCs, they are basically discussing on two approaches. As the first alternative, they 

have started discussing about non-territorial arrangement in order to ensure community 

autonomy. While doing so it has been mentioned that "given the failure of state institutions 

to bring about any element of governance or sense of cohesion to village and district 

administrations in states, it has been suggested that traditional tribal institutions which 

work on the basis of social cohesion, a collective will, leadership of elders and both justice 

and honour be given extensive powers for economic and social development at the level 

of villages and groups of villages. In addition, such traditional systems, currently not 

recognized by the Constitution, should be given constitutional status to carry out these 

administrative and political tasks with government funding"(Hazarika 2004:776-776). The 

proposal further states that "these traditional institutions, which are defined by different 

names among different tribes, could elect a forum or platform representing from all the 

states where they live" (ibid). 

In fact, this concept comes along with the aspiration of "shared rule in shared lands but selfrule 

within one’s own community" which was extensively expressed during the fieldwork 

of the study as well. In fact, insuring autonomy in terms of territory may not be the wiser 

idea; autonomy can be provided in terms identity but not with territory as territory is a 

28 


shared homeland 34 of the entire citizen. It has been widely recognized that shared rule 

in the province and self-rule or autonomy within the community may be the pragmatic 

solution to go for participatory democracy "as the art of collectively creating an acceptable 

pattern of social relation" (Miller 2005), where identity groups are dispersed, such as 

in Nepal. Federalism with territorial autonomy, based on a geographical delineation of 

provinces/regions, cannot provide self determination for all ‘nations’, and will also create 

new minorities with risk of further exclusion (Breen 2010). 

As second alternative, they are discussing introduction and empowerment of the 

Panchayati Raj Institutions to ADCs areas so that the financial and executive power would 

be directly dedicated to the grassroots level. The Indian government has already done a 

substantive homework for the alternatives. In India, the impending crisis of governance 

in tribal communities was finally acknowledged when the Indian government passed a 

law in December 1996 that extends a scheme of decentralization in the Adivasi areas. 

This Act 35 recommends a series of administrative units starting from Gramsabha at the 

hamlet/village level to Gram Panchayat, the intermediate Panchayat, and the autonomous 

district councils. Most importantly, this provision gives the Gramsabha an unprecedented 

power over the use and protection of resources under its reach. 

Along with the 73rd amendment to the Indian Constitution, 36 power, scope function, and 

financial support for the exercise of the powers and discharge of the responsibilities by the 

Panchayati bodies are now compared with those attached to the ADCs under the Sixth 

Schedule. And, it has been found that while ADCs have several regulatory powers subject 

to state controls, the Panchayati bodies are in a more advantageous position in respect to 

developmental functions. That is why, it has now become an informed choice for ADCs 

whether to introduce Panchayati bodies under their territories and enjoy more power 

of self-governance or continue to be at the "mercy of state government in the exercise 

of development functions" without Panchayati bodies. If ADCs agreed to introduce 

Panchayati bodies as per the 73rd amendment in their territories, it is expected that it 

will help overcome not only the development related problem (i.e. fund transfer, nonavailability 

of funds, etc.) at the grassroots level but also address the grievances of non- 

34. Author's discussion with Prof. Monirul Hussain, October 19, 2012. 

35. The Act, entitled the Provision of the Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas Act (1996), states that 

‘Every Gramsabha (village assembly) shall be competent to safeguard and preserve the traditions and 

customs of the people, their cultural identity, community resources and the customary mode of dispute 

resolution.’ 

36. The Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992 mandates provisions for; 1) Establishment of a threetier 

structure (Village Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti or intermediate level Panchayat and Zilla Parishad 

or district level Panchayat); 2) Establishment of Gram Sabhas at the village level. Regular elections to 

Panchayats every five years; 3) Proportionate seat reservation for SCs/STs; 4) Reservation of not less than 

1/3 seats for women; 5) Constitution of State Finance Commissions to recommended measures to improve 

the finances of Panchayats. 


tribes and minority tribes there. During the fieldwork of this study, we also sensed that they 

are going to agree to introduce a new mechanism 37 in order to address the development 

issues in ADCs. "Balancing political administration (that is traditional system), and 

development administration (that is modern institution i.e. Panchayati Raj Institutions) 

is a very crucial issue now," states Dr. AK Nongkynrih, 38 Associate Professor, Dept. of 

Sociology, North Eastern Hill University, Meghalaya. Dr. Nongkynrih has been involved 

in amending customary laws in the Khasi Hill ADC states and according to him, people 

don't want these traditional institutions (i.e. headmen, Village Councils, and ADCs) to 

be involved in development activities. Even Prof. Nikhlesh Kumar sees the possibility of 

introducing 73rd amendment of the Constitution in the ADC areas in the near future. 39 

However, it seems that it is not an easy task for scholars to convince politicians who are 

part of political structures. It is because of the fact that the power structure (either it is 

state or province or even ADC) is always conservative and cohesive where reformist or 

innovative approaches are rare to find. While talking about grassroots democracy, it is 

not only ADCs in Northeast India but also other autonomous regions which have not 

shown their friendliness towards Panchayati bodies. For example, even though the GTA 

has the Department of Panchayats and Rural Development, the GJM leadership is yet to 

be free from the anxiety as to how it would function. 40 During the 23 years of Darjeeling 

Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC)’s rule in Darjeeling, local governance comprised of Gram 

Panchayats at the village level in the hill Sub-Divisions of Darjeeling, Kalimpong and 

Kurseong and of Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti and Siliguri Mahakuma Parishad in 

Siliguri Sub-Division of the district. However, this two-tier system of local governance 

37. In fact, several experiments have been witnessed in recent years with communitisation at the village 

level, which are aimed at harmonizing a 'village community body' with the traditional village body. Two 

of these initiatives--the NEC sponsored project for natural resources management in Assam, Meghalaya 

and Manipur, and the communitisation initiatives undertaken in Nagaland--created community-based 

bodies, without disturbing traditional systems. These community-based bodies focused on optimal uses 

of natural resources of the areas concerned. From there it was but a natural step for such bodies, as they 

learnt the habits of democratic participation, to move into other areas of service delivery. They also learnt 

to negotiate in a non-confrontational way with the local traditional body. Since the impetus for change 

came from within, conflicts that may have arisen due to outside design were eliminated. Along with these 

experiments, it has been suggested to mould into institutional designs that will work in similarly placed 

areas. For details, see Report of the Expert Committee on Planning for the Sixth Schedule Areas and those 

Areas not covered by Parts IX and IX-A of the Constitution, New Delhi: Ministry of Panchayati Raj. 

September 2006. 

38. Author's discussion with Dr. AK Nongkynrih, October 19, 2012. 

39. Author's discussion with Prof. Nikhlesh Kumar, October 19, 2012. 

40. Authors' discussion with Isha Mani Pakhrin, Town Committee Chairperson, Gurkha Janamukti Morcha, 

Darjeeling; Neema Tamang, Press and Publicity Dept. of Town Committee, Gurkha Janamukti Morcha, 

Darjeeling; and Sudhir Ghale, teacher plus town committee member, Darjeeling on October 15, 2012. 

They are not very clear whether the GTA can go with the GTA Memorandums of Agreement in order to 

introduce three-tire Panchayati Raj bodies. 

30 


was opposed by Subhash Ghising and it ultimately ceased to exist from 2006. This was the 

main reason why the DGHC lost its legitimacy among the common people, who viewed 

the council and its leader as corrupt with no development of the region. Even in Kargil and 

Leh of Ladakh, the LAHDC was constituted as a body in 1995, the Halqa Panchayats 41 

came into being only in 2001, and no Block Development Councils have been formed as 

yet. 42 That is why, Nepal needs to learn from these limitations and experiences through 

various models of autonomy in India and set a best, durable and visionary example. 

Finally, the lesson Nepal can draw is that instead of assuring ethno-territorial autonomy, 

it is always less damaging for a country to provide autonomy based on ethnicity/identity 

(but without territory). In other words, it may not be good idea for Nepal to roll back its 

decision to go for federalizing the country even if it has been facing hindrances on its way. 

While federalizing the country, it is better to take the following points into account: 

1. Federal structures need to be formed in order to make it accessible to all people 

residing in various backward and developed regions. That is why each political 

party needs to be flexible regarding the number of provinces. In doing so, political 

parties have to give up their positions to follow either of the models - North- 

South and ecological zone model. 

2. Once federal units are decided, each and every province has to be bound 

constitutionally to introduce inclusive mechanisms i.e. proportional 

representation, affirmative action policy and even quota for the mainstreaming 

of backward communities in state and union level of governance. I don't think 

that ethnic activists and scholars are for political structures i.e. autonomous 

councils/regions which wish to be exclusive as in the past in Nepal. In order to 

popularize ethnic issues in Nepal, Bhattachan (2003), one of the radical scholars, 

states, "any other model of democracy, except inclusive, in Nepal would continue 

to breed insurgency based on caste/ethnicity, language, religion and region, and 

the best way to avoid them is inclusive democracy". 

3. While restructuring the state, it can be managed up to the ward level of Village 

Development Committees (VDC)/Municipalities, and the objective of such 

restructuring should be not be the division of the population of a community or 

group but to see the possibility of forming a political structure with maximum 

41. The LAHDC is working as a body that is responsible for district level planning and development in 

Ladakh. 

42. Though Jammu and Kashmir Panchayat Act of 1989 provides for a three tier system of Panchayats, only 

the district planning and development body and the Halqa Panchayats have been constituted, and there 

is no Block development Councils formed in Jammu and Kashmir. For details, see Overview of Local 

Governance in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, retrieved from http://www.thp.org/resources/speeches_ 

reports/research/overview_local_governance_jammu_and_kashmir, accessed on December 12, 2012. 


homogeneity. If Nepal restructures its political structure up to the Ward level 

by following such a model, it is likely to ensure representation of almost all 

communities at least at the grass roots level. Such a strategy will address issues 

of exclusion and inclusion of all minority groups including those groups which 

were assured of autonomous regions (to each group) by the earlier CA. In fact, 

this model can include many communities that form majority in more political 

structures such as the VDCs and Municipalities. 

4. Local bodies should be empowered as "self-governance" body with limited 

judicial rights. For the autonomy at the local level, Nepal has already set a model 

along with the introduction of "Local Self-Governance Act 1999" in the recent 

past. If the allocated budget reach to the villages on time, and proportional 

representation system is enforced in the Village Councils (the apex body of the 

VDCs), self-governance of Nepal still seems to be quite a practical model. 

In order to address ethnic aspirations to preserve their own traditional practices (if 

any 43 ), formation of elected councils at the center seem to be very good idea which is, 

in a way, popularized and practiced as "non-territorial federalism model" globally. Even 

Nepal has been practicing similar structure in the name of "Commission" or "Committee" 

— National Dalit Commission, National Janajati Uthan Pratisthan, National Women’s 

Commission, etc. in order to address problems faced by some of the marginalized 

communities/groups. These are examples of non-territorial political structures which 

particularly focus on empowering a specific community. In other words, the model has 

helped in promoting multiples cultures i.e. language and customs relating to marriage 

and divorce, inheritance of property along with issue of giving primary education. Also, 

it will help ensure cohesive community as mentioned by LGA. 44 What is lacking here 

in Nepal is that we tried to popularize "non-territorial" model as if it is a new concept 

for us. But the model was not seriously debated by the political parties in Nepal. In fact 

the major parties still have "binary opposition" position on the issue of federalizing 

Nepal. That is why the model is yet to be widely accepted by new aspirant groups. While 

43. It is because many ethnic groups in Nepal have been part of “assimilation” project accelerated by Shah 

Regime in order to unify Nepal. Along with assimilation project, only a few ethnic groups exist today in 

Nepal along with their tradition and customary practices. 

44. For him, community cohesion is one where (a) there is a common vision and sense of belonging for all 

communities; (2) the diversity of people's different backgrounds and circumstances is appreciated and 

positively valued; (3) those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and strong and 

positive relationship are being developed between people from different background and circumstances 

in the workplace, in school and within neighbour. For details, see LGA (2006), Leading Cohesive 

Communities: A Guide for Local Authority Leaders and Chief Executives. London: Local Government 

Association Publications. 

32 


arguing about it, this paper doesn't suggest that existing commissions mentioned earlier 

have capacity to address aspirations by the communities. However, if Nepal addresses a 

couple of weaknesses of such Committees and Commissions, it can make them as follows: 

(a) council based on a particular ethnicity/identity, (b) empower and bring under the 

constitutional frame (make constitutional body), (c) make popularly elected body by its 

community members with certain executive and financial power to preserve and promote 

language and customs relating to marriage and divorce, inheritance of property along with 

issue of giving primary education. Such structure can be formulated nationally or at the 

provincial level only. It however depends upon how the population of particular group is 

distributed. If the population of a group has spread all over the country, such a council 

should be created at the central level whereas a provincial level "non-territorial" council 

is possible if a group is confined only to a particular province. These seem to be the only 

ways to ensure "inclusive democracy" and also to avoid further ethnic polarization and 

conflicts in Nepal. 


Annexure I 

FIELDWORK DETAILS 

1. Darjeeling (October 13-16) 

Interacted with: 

• Bhaskar Limbu, Nabin Rai (Yuba Jana Morcha leaders) 

• Isha Mani Pakhrin, Town Committee Chairperson, Gurkha Janamukti Morcha, 

Darjeeling (9733169559) 

• Sudhir Ghale, teacher plus town committee member, Darjeeling 

• Neema Tamang, Press and Publicity Dept. of Town Committee, Gurkha 

Janamukti Morcha, Darjeeling 

• Roshan Giri, General Sectary, Central Committee, Gurkha Janamukti Morcha 

(9734914126) 

• Amar Singh Rai, Chairman, Darjeeling Municipality (9434248938, avilion2003@ 

yahoo.com) 

• Dinesh Singh, Local businessman, Hotel Seven seas, Darjeeling, 9775963893 

• Rajiv Rai, Local businessman, Hotel Seven seas, Darjeeling, 7679482862 

• Ramesh Tamang, Local Teacher, Darjeeling (8670404567) 

2. Meghalaya, India (17-20, October 2012) 

Interacted with: 

• Prof. L.S. Gassah, Dean, School of Social Sciences, North Eastern Hill University, 

Meghalaya, India (9863065078,lsgassah@gmail.com) 

• Prof. Nikhlesh Kumar, Dept. of Sociology, North Eastern Hill University, 

Meghalaya, India (9436304552,lsgassaharchikans@yahoomail.co.uk) 

34 


• Dr. Geetika Ranjan, Associate Professor , Dept. of Anthropology, North Eastern 

Hill University, Meghalaya, India 

• Sharalyne Khyriemmyat, PhD fellow, Dept. of Sociology, North Eastern Hill 

University, Meghalaya, India (sharalyne73@gmail.com) 

• Dr. AK Nongkynrih, Associate Professor, Dept. of Sociology, North Eastern Hill 

University, Meghalaya, (aknongkynrih@nehu.ac.in) 

• Dr. Biswajit Mohapatra, Associate Professor, Dept. of Political Science, North 

Eastern Hill University, Meghalaya, (9436334734) 

• Indra Bahadur Siris Magar (9863153517), Local inhabitant. 

• Manju Khatanmau (Gurung), Local inhabitant. 

• Babita Khatanba, Local inhabitant. 

3. Guwahati, Assam (17-20, October 2012) 

• Prof. Monirul Hussain, Prof. of Political Science, Guwahati University, Assam. 

• Prof. A.C. Sinha, Former Professor of Sociology, Dean, School of Social Sciences, 

North Eastern Hill University, Meghalaya, India (acoomarsinha42@yahoo.com). 

• Rashmi Sharma, Local inhabitant, Assam. 


Annexure II 

SIXTH SCHEDULE OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION 

[Articles 244(2) and 275(1)] 

Provisions as to the Administration of Tribal Areas in the States of Assam, 

Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram 

1 1 . Autonomous districts and autonomous regions.-(1) Subject to the provisions of 

this paragraph, the tribal areas in each item of Parts I, II and IIA and in Part III 

of the table appended to paragraph 20 of this Schedule shall be an autonomous 

district. 

(2) If there are different Scheduled Tribes in an autonomous district, the 

Governor may, by public notification, divide the area or areas inhabited by 

them into autonomous regions. 

(3) The Governor may, by public notification, - 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

(ff) 

(g) 

include any area in any of the Parts of the said table, 

exclude any area from any of the Parts of the said table, 

create a new autonomous district, 

increase the area of any autonomous district, 

diminish the area of any autonomous district, 

unite two or more autonomous districts or parts thereof so to form 

one autonomous district, 

alter the name of any autonomous district, 

define the boundaries of any autonomous district: 

Provided that no order shall be made by the Governor under clauses (c), (d), (e) and 

(f) of this sub-paragraph except after consideration of the report of a Commission 

appointed under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 14 of this Schedule: 

Provided further that any order made by the Governor under this sub-paragraph 

may contain such incidental and consequential provisions (including any 

1. Paragraph 1 has been amended in its application to the State of Assam by the Sixth Schedule to the 

Constitution (Amendment) Act, 2003 (44 of 2003), s. 2 , so as to insert the following proviso after 

sub-paragraph (2), namely: “Provided that nothing in this sub-paragraph shall apply to the Bodoland 

Territorial Areas District.” 

36 


amendment of paragraph 20 and of any item in any of the Parts of the said table) 

as appear to the Governor to be necessary for giving effect to the provisions of the 

order. 

2 2 . Constitution of District Councils and Regional Councils.- (1) There shall 

be a District Council for each autonomous district consisting of not more than 

thirty members, of whom not more than four persons shall be nominated by the 

Governor and the rest shall be elected on the basis of adult suffrage. 

(2) There shall be a separate Regional Council for each area constituted an 

autonomous region under sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 1 of this Schedule. 

(3) Each District Council and each Regional Council shall be a body corporate by the 

name respectively of “the District Council of (name of district)” and “the Regional 

Council of (name of region)”, shall have perpetual succession and a common seal 

and shall by the said name sue and be sued. 

(4) Subject to the provisions of this Schedule, the administration of an autonomous 

district shall, in so far as it is not vested under this Schedule in any Regional 

Council within such district, be vested in the District Council for such district 

and the administration of an autonomous region shall be vested in the Regional 

Council for such region. 

(5) In an autonomous district with Regional Councils, the District Council shall have 

only such powers with respect to the areas under the authority of the Regional 

Council as may be delegated to it by the Regional Council in addition to the powers 

conferred on it by this Schedule with respect to such areas. 

(6) The Governor shall make rules for the first constitution of District Councils 

and Regional Councils in consultation with the existing tribal Councils or other 

representative tribal organisations within the autonomous districts or regions 

concerned, and such rules shall provide for- 

2. Paragraph 2 has been amended in its application to the State of Assam so as to insert the following 

proviso after sub-paragraph (1), namely: 

"Provided that the Bodoland Territorial Council shall consist of not more than forty-six members of 

whom forty shall be elected on the basis of adult suffrage, of whom thirty shall be reserved for the 

Scheduled Tribes, five for non-tribal communities, five open for all communities and the remaining 

six shall be nominated by the Governor having same rights and privileges as other members, including 

voting rights, from amongst the un-represented communities of the Bodoland Territorial Areas District, 

of which at least two shall be women.” 

Paragraph 2 has been amended in its application to the State of Assam by the Sixth Schedule to the 

Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1995 (42 of 1995), s.2 so as to insert the following proviso after subparagraph 

(3), namely,- 

“Provided that the District Council constituted for the North Cachar Hills District shall be called as the 

North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council and the District Council constituted for the Karbi Anglong 

District shall be called as the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council.” 

Paragraph 2 has been amended in its application to the State of Assam by the Sixth Schedule to the 

Constitution (Amendment) Act, 2003 (44 of 2003) s. 2 , so as to insert the following proviso after the 

proviso in sub-paragraph (3), namely: 

“Provided further that the District Council constituted for the Bodoland Territorial Areas District shall be 

called the Bodoland Territorial Council.” 


(a) the composition of the District Councils and Regional Councils and the 

allocation of seats therein; 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

(h) 

the delimitation of territorial constituencies for the purpose of elections to 

those Councils; 

the qualifications for voting at such elections and the preparation of electoral 

rolls therefor; 

the qualifications for being elected at such elections as members of such 

Councils; 

the term of office of members of Regional Councils; 

any other matter relating to or connected with elections or nominations to 

such Councils; 

the procedure and the conduct of business (including the power to act 

notwithstanding any vacancy) in the District and Regional Councils; 

the appointment of officers and staff of the District and Regional Councils. 

(6A) The elected members of the District Council shall hold office for a term of five 

years from the date appointed for the first meeting of the Council after the general 

elections to the Council, unless the District Council is sooner dissolved under 

paragraph 16 and a nominated member shall hold office at the pleasure of the 

Governor: 

Provided that the said period of five years may, while a Proclamation of Emergency 

is in operation or if circumstances exist which, in the opinion of the Governor, 

render the holding of elections impracticable, be extended by the Governor for a 

period not exceeding one year at a time and in any case where a Proclamation of 

Emergency is in operation not extending beyond a period of six months after the 

Proclamation has ceased to operate: 

Provided further that a member elected to fill a casual vacancy shall hold office 

only for the remainder of the term of office of the member whom he replaces.] 

(7) The District or the Regional Council may after its first constitution make rules with 

the approval of the Governor with regard to the matters specified in sub-paragraph 

(6) of this paragraph and may also make rules with like approval regulating- 

(a) 

(b) 

the formation of subordinate local Councils or Boards and their procedure 

and the conduct of their business; and 

generally all matters relating to the transaction of business pertaining to the 

administration of the district or region, as the case may be: 

Provided that until rules are made by the District or the Regional Council under 

this sub-paragraph the rules made by the Governor under sub-paragraph (6) of 

this paragraph shall have effect in respect of elections to, the officers and staff of, 

and the procedure and the conduct of business in, each such Council. 

38 


3 3 . Powers of the District Councils and Regional Councils to make laws.- (1) The 

Regional Council for an autonomous region in respect of all areas within such 

region and the District Council for an autonomous district in respect of all areas 

within the district except those which are under the authority of Regional Councils, 

if any, within the district shall have power to make laws with respect to- 


Constitution (Amendment) Act, 2003 (44 of 2003), s. 2 , so as to substitute sub-paragraph (3) as under, 

“(3) Save as otherwise provided in sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 3A or sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 

3B, all laws made under this paragraph or sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 3A or sub-paragraph (1) of 

paragraph 3B shall be submitted forthwith to the Governor and, until assented to by him, shall have no 

effect.” 

After paragraph 3, the following paragraph has been inserted in its application to the State of Assam by 

the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1995 (42 of 1995), s. 2, namely: 

“3A. Additional powers of the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council and the Karbi Anglong 

Autonomous Council to make laws.—(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 3, the North 

Cachar Hills Autonomous Council and the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council within their respective 

districts, shall have power to make laws with respect to- 

(a) industries, subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule; 

(b) communications, that is to say, roads, bridges, ferries and other means of communication not 

specified in List I of the Seventh Schedule; municipal tramways, ropeways, inland waterways and 

traffic thereon subject to the provisions of List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule with regard to 

such waterways; vehicles other than mechanically propelled vehicles; 

(c) preservation, protection and improvement of stock and prevention of animal diseases; veterinary 

training and practice; cattle pounds; 

(d) primary and secondary education; 

(e) agriculture, including agricultural education and research, protection against pests and prevention of 

plant diseases; 

(f) fisheries; 

(g) water, that is to say, water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, water storage 

and water power subject to the provisions of entry 56 of List I of the Seventh Schedule; 

(h) social security and social insurance; employment and unemployment; 

(i) flood control schemes for protection of villages, paddy fields, markets, towns, etc. (not of technical 

nature); 

(j) theatre and dramatic performances, cinemas subject to the provisions of entry 60 of List I of the 

Seventh Schedule; sports entertainments and amusements; 

(k) public health and sanitation, hospitals and dispensaries; 

(l) minor irrigation; 

(m) trade and commerce in, and the production supply and distribution of, food stuffs, cattle fodder, raw 

cotton and raw jute; 

(n) libraries, museums and other similar Institutions controlled or financed by the State; ancient and 

historical monuments and records other than those declared by or under any law made by Parliament 

to be of national importance; and 

(o) alienation of land. 

(2) All laws made by the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council and the Karbi Anglong Autonomous 

Council under paragraph 3 or under this paragraph shall, in so far as they relate to matters specified 

in List III of the Seventh Schedule, be submitted forthwith to the Governor who shall reserve the same 

for the consideration of the President. 

(3) When a law is reserved for the consideration of the President, the President shall declare either that he 

assents to the said law or that he withholds assent therefrom: 

Provided that the President may direct the Governor to return the law to the North Cachar Hills 

Autonomous Council or the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council, as the case may be, together with 


a message requesting that the said Council will reconsider the law or any specified provisions thereof 

and, in particular, will, consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may 

recommend in his message and, when the law is so returned, the said Council shall consider the 

law accordingly within a period of six months from the date of receipt of such message and, if the 

law is again passed by the said Council with or without amendment it shall be presented again to the 

President for his consideration. 

After paragraph 3A, the following paragraph has been inserted in its application to the State of Assam 

by the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 2003, (44 0f 2003), s. 2, namely: 

“3B. Additional powers of the Bodoland Territorial Council to make laws.—(1) Without prejudice to the 

provisions of paragraph 3, the Bodoland Territorial Council within its areas shall have power to make 

laws with respect to :- (i) Agriculture, including agricultural education and research, protection against 

pests and prevention of plant diseases; (ii) Animal husbandry and veterinary, that is to say, preservation, 

protection and improvement of stock and prevention of animal diseases, veterinary training and practice, 

cattle pounds; (iii) Co-operation; (iv) Cultural affairs; (v) Education, that is to say, primary education, 

higher secondary including vocational training, adult education, college education (general); (vi) 

Fisheries; (vii) Flood control for protection of village, paddy fields, markets and towns (not of technical 

nature); (viii) Food and civil supply; (ix) Forests (other than reserved forests); (x) Handloom and textile; 

(xi) Health and family welfare, (xii) Intoxicating liquors, opium and derivatives, subject to the provisions 

of entry 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule; (xiii) Irrigation; (xiv) Labour and employment; (xv) Land 

and Revenue; (xvi) Library services (financed and controlled by the State Government); (xvii) Lotteries 

(subject to the provisions of entry 40 of List I of the Seventh Schedule), theatres, dramatic performances 

and cinemas (subject to the provisions of entry 60 of List I of the Seventh Schedule); (xviii) Markets 

and fairs; (xix) Municipal corporation, improvement trust, district boards and other local authorities; 

(xx) Museum and archaeology institutions controlled or financed by the State, ancient and historical 

monuments and records other than those declared by or under any law made by Parliament to be of 

national importance; (xxi) Panchayat and rural development; (xxii) Planning and development; (xxiii) 

Printing and stationery; (xxiv) Pubic health engineering; (xxv) Public works department; (xxvi) Publicity 

and public relations; (xxvii) Registration of births and deaths; (xxviii) Relief and rehabilitation; (xxix) 

Sericulture; (xxx) Small, cottage and rural industry subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List 

I of the Seventh Schedule; (xxxi) Social Welfare; (xxxii) Soil conservation; (xxxiii) Sports and youth 

welfare; (xxxiv) Statistics; (xxxv) Tourism; (xxxvi) Transport (roads, bridges, ferries and other means of 

communications not specified in List I of the Seventh Schedule, municipal tramways, ropeways, inland 

waterways and traffic thereon subject to the provision of List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule with 

regard to such waterways, vehicles other than mechanically propelled vehicles); (xxxvii) Tribal research 

institute controlled and financed by the State Government; (xxxviii) Urban development—town and 

country planning; (xxxix) Weights and measures subject to the provisions of entry 50 of List I of the 

Seventh Schedule; and (xl) Welfare of plain tribes and backward classes: 

Provided that nothing in such laws shall- 

(a) extinguish or modify the existing rights and privileges of any citizen in respect of his land at the date 

of commencement of this Act; and 

(b) disallow any citizen from acquiring land either by way of inheritance, allotment, settlement or by any 

other way of transfer if such citizen is otherwise eligible for such acquisition of land within the Bodoland 

Territorial Areas District 

(2) All laws made under paragraph 3 or under this paragraph shall in so far as they relate to matters 

specified in List III of the Seventh Schedule, be submitted forthwith to the Governor who shall 

reserve the same for the consideration of the President. 

(3) When a law is reserved for the consideration of the President, the President shall declare either that 

he assents to the said law or that he withholds assent therefrom: 

Provided that the President may direct the Governor to return the law to the Bodoland Territorial 

Council, together with the message requesting that the said Council will reconsider the law or any 

specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such 

amendments as he may recommend in his message and, when the law is so returned, the said Council 

shall consider the law accordingly within a period of six month from the date of receipt of such 

message and, if the law is again passéd by the said Council with or without amendments it shall be 

presented again to the President for his consideration.” 

40 


(a) the allotment, occupation or use, or the setting apart, of land, 

other than any land which is a reserved forest for the purposes of 

agriculture or grazing or for residential or other non-agricultural 

purposes or for any other purpose likely to promote the interests of 

the inhabitants of any village or town: 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

(h) 

(i) 

(j) 

Provided that nothing in such laws shall prevent the compulsory 

acquisition of any land, whether occupied or unoccupied, for public 

purposes by the Government of the State concerned in accordance 

with the law for the time being in force authorising such acquisition; 

the management of any forest not being a reserved forest; 

the use of any canal or water-course for the purpose of agriculture; 

the regulation of the practice of Jhum or other forms of shifting 

cultivation; 

the establishment of village or town committees or councils and 

their powers; 

any other matter relating to village or town administration, including 

village or town police and public health and sanitation; 

the appointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen; 

the inheritance of property; 

marriage and divorce; 

social customs. 

(2) In this paragraph, a “reserved forest” means any area which is a reserved 

forest under the Assam Forest Regulation, 1891, or under any other law for 

the time being in force in the area in question. 

(3) All laws made under this paragraph shall be submitted forthwith to the 

Governor and, until assented to by him, shall have no effect. 

4 4 . Administration of justice in autonomous districts and autonomous regions.-(1) 

The Regional Council for an autonomous region in respect of areas within such 

region and the District Council for an autonomous district in respect of areas 

within the district other than those which are under the authority of the Regional 

Councils, if any, within the district may constitute village councils or courts for 

the trial of suits and cases between the parties all of whom belong to Scheduled 

Tribes within such areas, other than suits and cases to which the provisons of subparagraph 

(1) of paragraph 5 of this Schedule apply, to the exclusion of any court in 


Constitution (Amendment) Act, 2003 (44 of 2003), s. 2 , so as to insert the following sub-paragraph after 

sub-paragraph (5), namely: —“(6) Nothing in this paragraph shall apply to the Bodoland Territorial 

Council constituted under the proviso to sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 2 of this Schedule.” 


the State, and may appoint suitable persons to be members of such village councils 

or presiding officers of such courts, and may also appoint such officers as may 

be necessary for the administration of the laws made under paragraph 3 of this 

Schedule. 

(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the Regional Council for an 

autonomous region or any court constituted in that behalf by the Regional 

Council or, if in respect of any area within an autonomous district there is 

no Regional Council, the District Council for such district, or any court 

constituted in that behalf by the District Council, shall exercise the powers 

of a court of appeal in respect of all suits and cases tribal by a village council 

or court constituted under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph within such 

region or area, as the case may be, other than those to which the provisions 

of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 5 of this Schedule apply, and no other 

court except the High Court and the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction 

over such suits or cases. 

(3) The High Court shall have and exercise such jurisdiction over the suits and 

cases to which the provisions of sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph apply 

as the Governor may from time to time by order specify. 

(4) A Regional Council or District Council, as the case may be, may with the 

previous approval of the Governor make rules regulating- 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

the constitution of village councils and courts and the powers to be 

exercised by them under this paragraph; 

the procedure to be followed by village councils or courts in the trial 

of suits and cases under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph; 

the procedure to be followed by the Regional or District Council 

or any court constituted by such Council in appeals and other 

proceedings under sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph; 

the enforcement of decisions and orders of such Councils and courts; 

all other ancillary matters for the carrying out of the provisions of 

sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of this paragraph. 

(5) On and from such date as the President may, after consulting the 

Government of the State concerned, by notification appoint in this behalf, 

this paragraph shall have effect in relation to such autonomous district or 

region as may be specified in the notification, as if- 

(i) 

in sub-paragraph (1), for the words “between the parties all of whom 

belong to Scheduled Tribes within such areas, other than suits and 

cases to which the provisions of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 

5 of this Schedule apply,”, the words “not being suits and cases of 

the nature referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph (5) of this 

Schedule, which the Governor may specify in this behalf,” had been 

substituted; 

42 


(ii) sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) had been omitted; 

(iii) in sub-paragraph (4)- 

(a) 

(b) 

for the words “A Regional Council or District Council, as the 

case may be, may with the previous approval of the Governor 

make rules regulating”, the words “the Governor may make 

rules regulating” had been substituted; and 

for clause (a), the following clause had been substituted, 

namely:- 

“(a) the constitution of village councils and courts, the 

powers to be exercised by them under this paragraph and the 

courts to which appeals from the decisions of village councils 

and courts shall lie;”; (c) for clause (c), the following clause 

had been substituted, namely:- 

“(c) the transfer of appeals and other proceedings pending 

before the Regional or District Council or any court 

constituted by such Council immediately before the date 

appointed by the President under sub-paragraph (5);”; and 

(d) in clause (e), for the words, brackets and figures “subparagraphs 

(1) and (2)”, the word, brackets and figure “Subparagraph 

(1)” had been substituted.] 

5. Conferment of powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Code 

of Criminal Procedure, 1898 5 on the Regional and District Councils and on 

certain courts and officers for the trial of certain suits, cases and offences.- (1) 

The Governor may, for the trial of suits or cases arising out of any law in force 

in any autonomous district or region being a law specified in that behalf by the 

Governor, or for the trial of offences punishable with death, transportation for life, 

or imprisonment for a term of not less than five years under the Indian Penal Code 

or under any other law for the time being applicable to such district or region, 

confer on the District Council or the Regional Council having authority over such 

district or region or on courts constituted by such District Council or on any officer 

appointed in that behalf by the Governor, such powers under the Code of Civil 

Procedure, 1908, or, as the case may be, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as 

he deems appropriate, and thereupon the said Council, Court or officer shall try 

the suits, cases or offences in exercise of the powers so conferred. 

(2) The Governor may withdraw or modify any of the powers conferred on a 

District Council, Regional Council, court or officer under sub-paragraph 

(1) of this paragraph. 

5. See now the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974). 


(3) Save as expressly provided in this paragraph, the Code of Civil Procedure, 

1908, and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall not apply to the 

trial of any suits, cases or offences in an autonomous district or in any 

autonomous region to which the provisions of this paragraph apply. 

[(4) On and from the date appointed by the President under sub-paragraph 

(5) of paragraph 4 in relation to any autonomous district or autonomous 

region, nothing contained in this paragraph shall, in its application to 

that district or region, be deemed to authorize the Governor to confer on 

the District Council or Regional Council or on courts constituted by the 

District Council any of the powers referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of this 

paragraph.] 

6. Powers of the District Council to establish primary schools, etc.-(1) The 

District Council for an autonomous district may establish, construct, or manage 

primary schools, dispensaries, markets, cattle pounds, ferries, fisheries, roads, 

road transport and waterways in the district and may, with the previous approval 

of the Governor, make regulations for the regulation and control thereof and, in 

particular, may prescribe the language and the manner in which primary education 

shall be imparted in the primary schools in the district. 

(2) The Governor may, with the consent of any District Council, entrust either 

conditionally or unconditionally to that Council or to its officers functions 

in relation to agriculture, animal husbandry, community projects, cooperative 

societies, social welfare, village planning or any other matter to 

which the executive power of the State extends. 

7. District and Regional Funds.- (1) There shall be constituted for each autonomous 

district, a District Fund and for each autonomous region, a Regional Fund to which 

shall be credited all moneys received respectively by the District Council for that 

district and the Regional Council for that region in the course of the administration 

of such district or region, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of 

this Constitution. 

(2) The Governor may make rules for the management of the District Fund, or, 

as the case may be, the Regional Fund and for the procedure to be followed 

in respect of payment of money into the said Fund, the withdrawal of 

moneys there from, the custody of moneys therein and any other matter 

connected with or ancillary to the matters aforesaid. 

(3) The accounts of the District Council or, as the case may be, the Regional 

Council shall be kept in such form as the Comptroller and Auditor-General 

of India may, with the approval of the President, prescribe. 

(4) The Comptroller and Auditor-General shall cause the accounts of the 

District and Regional Councils to be audited in such manner as he may 

think fit, and the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor-General relating 

to such accounts shall be submitted to the Governor who shall cause them 

to be laid before the Council. 

44 


8. Powers to assess and collect land revenue and to impose taxes.- (1) The Regional 

Council for an autonomous region in respect of all lands within such region and the 

District Council for an autonomous district in respect of all lands within the district 

except those which are in the areas under the authority of Regional Councils, if any, 

within the district, shall have the power to assess and collect revenue in respect of 

such lands in accordance with the principles for the time being followed by the 

Government of the State in assessing lands for the purpose of land revenue in the 

State generally. 

(2) The Regional Council for an autonomous region in respect of areas within 

such region and the District Council for an autonomous district in respect 

of all areas in the district except those which are under the authority of 

Regional Councils, if any, within the district, shall have power to levy and 

collect taxes on lands and buildings, and tolls on persons resident within 

such areas. 

(3) The District Council for an autonomous district shall have the power to 

levy and collect all or any of the following taxes within such district, that is 

to say- 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments; 

taxes on animals, vehicles and boats; 

taxes on the entry of goods into a market for sale therein, and tolls 

on passengers and goods carried in ferries; and 

taxes for the maintenance of schools, dispensaries or roads. 

(4) A Regional Council or District Council, as the case may be, may make 

regulations to provide for the levy and collection of any of the taxes specified 

in sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) of this paragraph and every such regulation 

shall be submitted forthwith to the Governor and, until assented to by him, 

shall have no effect. 

9. Licenses or leases for the purpose of prospecting for, or extraction of, 

minerals.- (1) Such share of the royalties accruing each year from licenses or leases 

for the purpose of prospecting for, or the extraction of, minerals granted by the 

Government of the State in respect of any area within an autonomous district as 

may be agreed upon between the Government of the State and the District Council 

of such district shall be made over to that District Council. 

(2) If any dispute arises as to the share of such royalties to be made over to a 

District Council, it shall be referred to the Governor for determination and 

the amount determined by the Governor in his discretion shall be deemed 

to be the amount payable under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph to the 

District Council and the decision of the Governor shall be final. 

10. Power of District Council to make regulations for the Control of moneylending 

and trading by non-tribals - (1) The District Council of an autonomous 

district may make regulations for the regulation and control of money-lending or 


trading within the district by persons other than Scheduled Tribes resident in the 

district. 

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, 

such regulations may- 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

prescribe that no one except the holder of a licence issued in that 

behalf shall carry on the business of money-lending; 

prescribe the maximum rate of interest which may be charged or be 

recovered by a money-lender; 

provide for the maintenance of accounts by money-lenders and for 

the inspection of such accounts by officers appointed in that behalf 

by the District Council; 

prescribe that no person who is not a member of the Scheduled 

Tribes resident in the district shall carry on wholesale or retail 

business in any commodity except under a license issued in that 

behalf by the District Council: 

Provided that no regulations may be made under this paragraph 

unless they are passed by a majority of not less than three-fourths of 

the total membership of the District Council: 

Provided further that it shall not be competent under any such 

regulations to refuse the grant of a licence to a money-lender or a 

trader who has been carrying on business within the district since 

before the time of the making of such regulations. 

(3) All regulations made under this paragraph shall be submitted forthwith to 

the Governor and, until assented to by him, shall have no effect. 

11. Publication of laws, rules and regulations made under the Schedule.-All laws, 

rules and regulations made under this Schedule by a District Council or a Regional 

Council shall be published forthwith in the Official Gazette of the State and shall 

on such publication have the force of law. 

12 6 . Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of Assam 

to autonomous districts and autonomous regions in the State of Assam.- (1) 

Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution- 

6. Paragraph 12 has been amended to its application to the State of Assam by the Sixth Schedule to the 

Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1995 (42 of 1995), s.2, as under paragraph 12, in sub-paragraph (1), 

for the words and figure “matters specified in paragraph 3 of this Schedule”, the words, figures and letter 

“matters specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 3A of this Schedule” shall be substituted.; Paragraph 

12 has been amended in its application to the State of Assam by the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution 

(Amendment) Act, 2003 (44 of 2003), s. 2, as under, —in paragraph 12, in sub-paragraph (1), in clause 

(a), for the words, figures and letter “matters specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 3A of this Schedule”, 

the words, figures and letter “matters specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 3A or paragraph 3B of this 

Schedule” shall be substituted 

46 


(a) no Act of the Legislature of the State of Assam in respect of any of 

the matters specified in paragraph 3 of this Schedule as matters with 

respect to which a District Council or a Regional Council may make 

laws, and no Act of the Legislature of the State of Assam prohibiting 

or restricting the consumption of any non-distilled alcoholic liquor 

shall apply to any autonomous district or autonomous region in that 

State unless in either case the District Council for such district or 

having jurisdiction over such region by public notification so directs, 

and the District Council in giving such direction with respect to any 

Act may direct that the Act shall in its application to such district or 

region or any part thereof have effect subject to such exceptions or 

modifications as it thinks fit; 

(b) 

the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any Act of 

Parliament or of the Legislature of the State of Assam to which the 

provisions of clause (a) of this sub-paragraph do not apply, shall 

not apply to an autonomous district or an autonomous region in 

that State or shall apply to such district or region or any part thereof 

subject to such exceptions or modifications as he may specify in the 

notification. 

(2) Any direction given under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph may be 

given so as to have retrospective effect. 

12A. Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of 

Meghalaya to autonomous districts and autonomous regions in the State of 

Meghalaya.-Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,- 

(a) 

(b) 

if any provision of a law made by a District or Regional Council in the State 

of Meghalaya with respect to any matter specified in sub-paragraph (1) of 

paragraph 3 of this Schedule or if any provision of any regulation made by 

a District Council or a Regional Council in that State under paragraph 8 or 

paragraph 10 of this Schedule, is repugnant to any provision of a law made 

by the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya with respect to that matter, 

then, the law or regulation made by the District Council or, as the case may 

be, the Regional Council whether made before or after the law made by the 

Legislature of the State of Meghalaya, shall, to the extent of repugnancy, be 

void and the law made by the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya shall 

prevail; 

the President may, with respect to any Act of Parliament, by notification, 

direct that it shall not apply to an autonomous district or an autonomous 

region in the State of Meghalaya, or shall apply to such district or region 

or any part thereof subject to such exceptions or modifications as he may 

specify in the notification and any such direction may be given so as to have 

retrospective effect. 


12AA. Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of Tripura 

to the autonomous district and autonomous regions in the State of Tripura.- 

Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,- 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

no Act of the Legislature of the State of Tripura in respect of any of the 

matters specified in paragraph 3 of this Schedule as matters with respect 

to which a District Council or a Regional Council may make laws, and 

no Act of the Legislature of the State of Tripura prohibiting or restricting 

the consumption of any non-distilled alcoholic liquor shall apply to the 

autonomous district or any autonomous region in that State unless, in 

either case, the District Council for that district or having jurisdiction over 

such region by public notification so directs, and the District Council in 

giving such direction with respect to any Act may direct that the Act shall, 

in its application to that district or such region or any part thereof, have 

effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as it thinks fit; 

the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any Act of the 

Legislature of the State of Tripura to which the provisions of clause (a) of 

this sub-paragraph do not apply, shall not apply to the autonomous district 

or an autonomous region in that State, or shall apply to that district or such 

region, or any part thereof, subject to such exceptions or modifications, as 

he may specify in the notification; 


direct that it shall not apply to the autonomous district or an autonomous 

region in the State of Tripura, or shall apply to such district or region or 

any part thereof, subject to such exceptions or modifications as he may 



12B. Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of Mizoram 

to autonomous districts and autonomous regions in the State of Mizoram.- 

Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,- 

(a) 

(b) 

no Act of the Legislature of the State of Mizoram in respect of any of the 

matters specified in paragraph 3 of this Schedule as matters with respect 

to which a District Council or a Regional Council may make laws, and no 

Act of the Legislature of the State of Mizoram prohibiting or restricting 

the consumption of any non-distilled alcoholic liquor shall apply to any 

autonomous district or autonomous region in that State unless, in either 

case, the District Council for such district or having jurisdiction over such 

region, by public notification, so directs, and the District Council, in giving 

such direction with respect to any Act, may direct that the Act shall, in its 

application to such district or region or any part thereof, have effect subject 

to such exceptions or modifications as it thinks fit; 

the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any Act of the 

Legislature of the State of Mizoram to which the provisions of clause (a) of 

this sub-paragraph do not apply, shall not apply to an autonomous district 

48 


(c) 

or an autonomous region in that State, or shall apply to such district or 

region, or any part thereof, subject to such exceptions or modifications, as 

he may specify in the notification; 


direct that it shall not apply to an autonomous district or an autonomous 

region in the State of Mizoram, or shall apply to such district or region 

or any part thereof, subject to such exceptions or modifications as he may 



13. Estimated receipts and expenditure pertaining to autonomous districts to be 

shown separately in the annual financial statement.- The estimated receipts and 

expenditure pertaining to an autonomous district which are to be credited to, or is 

to be made from, the Consolidated Fund of the State shall be first placed before the 

District Council for discussion and then after such discussion be shown separately 

in the annual financial statement of the State to be laid before the Legislature of the 

State under article 202. 

14 7 . Appointment of Commission to inquire into and report on the administration 

of autonomous districts and autonomous regions.- (1) The Governor may at 

any time appoint a Commission to examine and report on any matter specified by 

him relating to the administration of the autonomous districts and autonomous 

regions in the State, including matters specified in clauses (c), (d), (e) and (f) of 

sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 1 of this Schedule, or may appoint a Commission 

to inquire into and report from time to time on the administration of autonomous 

districts and autonomous regions in the State generally and in particular on- 

(a) the provision of educational and medical facilities and 

communications in such districts and regions; 

(b) 

(c) 

the need for any new or special legislation in respect of such districts 

and regions; and 

the administration of the laws, rules and regulations made by the 

District and Regional Councils; and define the procedure to be 

followed by such Commission. 

(2) The report of every such Commission with the recommendations of the 

Governor with respect thereto shall be laid before the Legislature of the 

State by the Minister concerned together with an explanatory memorandum 

regarding the action proposed to be taken thereon by the Government of 

the State. 

(3) In allocating the business of the Government of the State among his 

Ministers the Governor may place one of his Ministers specially in charge 


constitution (Amendment) Act, 1995 (42 of 1995) , as under paragraph 14 , in sub-paragraph (2), the 

words “with the recommendations of the Governor with respect thereto” shall be omitted 


of the welfare of the autonomous districts and autonomous regions in 

the State. 

15 8 . Annulment or suspension of acts and resolutions of District and Regional 

Councils.-(1) If at any time the Governor is satisfied that an act or resolution of a 

District or a Regional Council is likely to endanger the safety of India or is likely 

to be prejudicial to public order, he may annul or suspend such act or resolution 

and take such steps as he may consider necessary (including the suspension of 

the Council and the assumption to himself of all or any of the powers vested in or 

exercisable by the Council) to prevent the commission or continuance of such act, 

or the giving of effect to such resolution. 

(2) Any order made by the Governor under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph 

together with the reasons there for shall be laid before the Legislature of 

the State as soon as possible and the order shall, unless revoked by the 

Legislature of the State, continue in force for a period of twelve months 

from the date on which it was so made: 

Provided that if and so often as a resolution approving the continuance in 

force of such order is passed by the Legislature of the State, the order shall 

unless cancelled by the Governor continue in force for a further period 

of twelve months from the date on which under this paragraph it would 

otherwise have ceased to operate. 

16 9 . Dissolution of a District or a Regional Council.(1) The Governor may on the 

recommendation of a Commission appointed under paragraph 14 of this Schedule 

by public notification order the dissolution of a District or a Regional Council, 

and- 

(a) 

(b) 

direct that a fresh general election shall be held immediately for the 

reconstitution of the Council, or 

subject to the previous approval of the Legislature of the State 

assume the administration of the area under the authority of such 

Council himself or place the administration of such area under 

the Commission appointed under the said paragraph or any other 

body considered suitable by him for a period not exceeding twelve 

months: 

8. Paragraph 15 has been amended in its application to the States of Tripura and Mizoram by the Sixth 

Schedule to the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1988 (67 of 1988), s. 2, as under,- 

(a) in the opening paragraph, for the words “by the Legislature of the State”, the words “by him” shall be 

substituted; 

(b) the proviso shall be omitted. 

9. Paragraph 16 has been amended in its application to the States of Tripura and Mizoram., as under,- 

(a) in sub-paragraph (1), the words “subject to the previous approval of the Legislature of the State” 

occurring in clause (b), and the second proviso shall be omitted; 

(b) for sub-paragraph (3), the following sub-graph shall be substituted, namely:- 

“(3) Every order made under sub-paragraph (1) or sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph, along with 

the reasons therefor shall be laid before the Legislature of the State.” 

50 


Provided that when an order under clause (a) of this paragraph has 

been made, the Governor may take the action referred to in clause 

(b) of this paragraph with regard to the administration of the area in 

question pending the reconstitution of the Council on fresh general 

election: 

Provided further that no action shall be taken under clause (b) of 

this paragraph without giving the District or the Regional Council, 

as the case may be, an opportunity of placing its views before the 

Legislature of the State. 

(2) If at any time the Governor is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which 

the administration of an autonomous district or region cannot be carried 

on in accordance with the provisions of this Schedule, he may, by public 

notification, assume to himself all or any of the functions or powers vested 

in or exercisable by the District Council or, as the case may be, the Regional 

Council and declare that such functions or powers shall be exercisable by 

such person or authority as he may specify in this behalf, for a period not 

exceeding six months: 

Provided that the Governor may by a further order or orders extend the 

operation of the initial order by a period not exceeding six months on each 

occasion. 

(3) Every order made under sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph with the 

reasons therefor shall be laid before the Legislature of the State and shall 

cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which 

the State Legislature first sits after the issue of the order, unless, before the 

expiry of that period it has been approved by the State Legislature.] 

17 10 . Exclusion of areas from autonomous districts in forming constituencies in such 

districts.- For the purposes of elections to the Legislative Assembly of Assam or 

Meghalaya or Tripura or Mizoram, the Governor may by order declare that any 

area within an autonomous district in the State of Assam or Meghalaya or Tripura 

or Mizoram, as the case may be,] shall not form part of any constituency to fill a 

seat or seats in the Assembly reserved for any such district but shall form part of a 

constituency to fill a seat or seats in the Assembly not so reserved to be specified in 

the order. 

******* 11 


Constitution (Amendment) Act, 2003 (44 of 2003), s. 2 , so as to insert the following proviso, namely: 

“Provided that nothing in this paragraph shall apply to the Bodoland Territorial Areas District. 

11. Paragraph omitted by amendment 1972. 


19 12 . Transitional provisions.- (1) As soon as possible after the commencement of 

this Constitution the Governor shall take steps for the constitution of a District 

Council for each autonomous district in the State under this Schedule and, until a 

District Council is so constituted for an autonomous district, the administration 

of such district shall be vested in the Governor and the following provisions shall 

apply to the administration of the areas within such district instead of the foregoing 

provisions of this Schedule, namely:- 

(a) 

(b) 

no Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State shall apply to 

any such area unless the Governor by public notification so directs; 

and the Governor in giving such a direction with respect to any 

Act may direct that the Act shall, in its application to the area or to 

any specified part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions or 

modifications as he thinks fit; 

the Governor may make regulations for the peace and good 

government of any such area and any regulations so made may 

repeal or amend any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the 

State or any existing law which is for the time being applicable to 

such area. 

(2) Any direction given by the Governor under clause (a) of sub-paragraph (1) 

of this paragraph may be given so as to have retrospective effect. 

(3) All regulations made under clause (b) of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph 

shall be submitted forthwith to the President and, until assented to by him, 

shall have no effect. 

20. Tribal areas.- (1) The areas specified in Parts I, II _,IIA and III of the table 

below shall respectively be the tribal areas within the State of Assam, the State of 

Meghalaya, the State of Tripura and the State of Mizoram. 

(2) Any reference in Part I, Part II or Part III of the table below] to any district 

shall be construed as a reference to the territories comprised within the 

autonomous district of that name existing immediately before the day 

appointed under clause (b) of section 2 of the North-Eastern Areas 

(Reorganisation) Act, 1971: 

12. Paragraph 19 has been amended in its application to the State of Assam so as to insert the following 

sub-paragraph after sub-paragraph (3), namely “(4) As soon as possible after the commencement 

of this Act, and Interim Executive Council for Bodoland Territorial Areas District in Assam shall be 

formed by the Governor from amongst leaders of the Bodo movement, including the signatories to the 

Memorandum of Settlement, and shall provide adequate representation to the non-tribal communities in 

that area: Provided that Interim Council shall be for a period of six months during which endeavour to 

hold the election to the Council shall be made. Explanation.---For the purposes of this sub-paragraph, the 

expression “Memorandum of Settlement” means the Memorandum signed on the 10th day of February, 

2003 between Government of India, Government of Assam and Bodo Liberation Tigers.” 

52 


Provided that for the purposes of clauses (e) and (f) of sub-paragraph (1) 

of paragraph 3, paragraph 4, paragraph 5, paragraph 6, sub-paragraph 

(2), clauses (a), (b) and (d) of sub-paragraph (3) and sub-paragraph (4) 

of paragraph 8 and clause (d) of sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 10 of this 

Schedule, no part of the area comprised within the municipality of Shillong 

shall be deemed to be within the Khasi Hills District. 

(3) The reference in Part IIA in the table below to the “Tripura Tribal Areas 

District” shall be construed as a reference to the territory comprising the 

tribal areas specified in the First Schedule to the Tripura Tribal Areas 

Autonomous District Council Act, 1979. 

TABLE 

Part I 

1. The North Cachar Hills District. 

2. The Karbi Anglong District. 

3. The Bodoland Territorial Areas District. 

1. Khasi Hills District. 

2. Jaintia Hills District. 

3. The Garo Hills District. 

Tripura Tribal Areas District 

1. The Chakma District. 

2. The Mara District. 

3. The Lai District. 

Part II 

Part IIA 

Part III 

20A. Dissolution of the Mizo District Council.-(1) Notwithstanding anything in this 

Schedule, the District Council of the Mizo District existing immediately before the 

prescribed date (hereinafter referred to as the Mizo District Council) shall stand 

dissolved and cease to exist. 

(2) The Administrator of the Union territory of Mizoram may, by one or more 

orders, provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:- 

(a) the transfer, in whole or in part, of the assets, rights and liabilities of the 

Mizo District Council (including the rights and liabilities under any 

contract made by it) to the Union or to any other authority; 

(b) the substitution of the Union or any other authority for the Mizo District 

Council, or the addition of the Union or any other authority, as a 

party to any legal proceedings to which the Mizo District Council is 

a party; 


(c) the transfer or re-employment of any employees of the Mizo District 

Council to or by the Union or any other authoriy, the terms and 

conditions of service applicable to such employees after such transfer 

or re-employment; 

(d) 

(e) 

the continuance of any laws, made by the Mizo District Council and in 

force immediately before its dissolution, subject to such adaptations 

and modifications, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as the 

Administrator may make in this behalf, until such laws are altered, 

repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent 

authority; 

such incidental, consequential and supplementary matters as the 

Administrator considers necessary. 

Explanation.- In this paragraph and in paragraph 20B of this 

Schedule, the expression “prescribed date” means the date on which 

the Legislative Assembly of the Union territory of Mizoram is duly 

constituted under and in accordance with the provisions of the 

Government of Union Territories Act, 1963. 

20B 13 . Autonomous regions in the Union territory of Mizoram to be autonomous 

districts and transitory provisions consequent thereto.-(1) Notwithstanding 

anything in this Schedule,- 

(a) 

every autonomous region existing immediately before the prescribed 

date in the Union territory of Mizoram shall, on and from that 

date, be an autonomous district in that Union territory (hereafter 

referred to as the corresponding new district) and the Administrator 

13. After paragraph 20B, the following paragraph has been inserted in its application to the State of Assam 

by the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1995 (42 of 1995), s. 2, namely:-“20BA. 

Exercise of discretionary powers by the Governor in the discharge of his functions.-The Governor in 

the discharge of his functions under sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) of paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (1), (6), 

sub-paragraph (6A) excluding the first proviso and sub-paragraph (7) of paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 

(3) of paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (4) of paragraph 4, paragraph 5, sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6, 

sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (4) of paragraph 8, sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 9, 

sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 10, sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 14, sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 

15 and sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of paragraph 16 of this Schedule, shall, after consulting the Council of 

Ministers and the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council or the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council, 

as the case may be, take such action as he considers necessary in his discretion.” (2). After paragraph 

20B, the following paragraph has been inserted in its application to the States of Tripura and Mizoram, 

by the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1988 (67 of 1988), s. 2, namely:- “20BB. 

Exercise of discretionary powers by the Governor in the discharge of his functions.-The Governor, in 

the discharge of his functions under sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) of paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (1) and 

(7) of paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (4) of paragraph 4, paragraph 5, 

sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6, sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 7, sub- paragraph (3) of paragraph 

9, sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 14, sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 15 and sub-paragraphs (1) and 

(2) of paragraph 16 of this Schedule, shall, after consulting the Council of Ministers, and if he thinks 

it necessary, the District Council or the Regional Council concerned, take such action as he considers 

necessary in his discretion.” 

54 


(b) 

thereof may, by one or more orders, direct that such consequential 

amendments as are necessary to give effect to the provisions of this 

clause shall be made in paragraph 20 of this Schedule (including 

Part III of the table appended to that paragraph) and thereupon the 

said paragraph and the said Part III shall be deemed to have been 

amended accordingly; 

every Regional Council of an autonomous region in the Union 

territory of Mizoram existing immediately before the prescribed 

date (hereafter referred to as the existing Regional Council) shall, on 

and from that date and until a District Council is duly constituted 

for the corresponding new district, be deemed to be the District 

Council of that district (hereafter referred to as the corresponding 

new District Council). 

(2) Every member whether elected or nominated of an existing Regional Council 

shall be deemed to have been elected or, as the case may be, nominated to 

the corresponding new District Council and shall hold office until a District 

Council is duly constituted for the corresponding new district under this 

Schedule. 

(3) Until rules are made under sub-paragraph (7) of paragraph 2 and subparagraph 

(4) of paragraph 4 of this Schedule by the corresponding new 

District Council, the rules made under the said provisions by the existing 

Regional Council and in force immediately before the prescribed date shall 

have effect in relation to the corresponding new District Council subject 

to such adaptations and modifications as may be made therein by the 

Administrator of the Union territory of Mizoram. 

(4) The Administrator of the Union territory of Mizoram may, by one or more 

orders, provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:- 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

the transfer in whole or in part of the assets, rights and liabilities 

of the existing Regional Council (including the rights and liabilities 

under any contract made by it) to the corresponding new District 

Council; 

the substitution of the corresponding new District Council for the 

existing Regional Council as a party to the legal proceedings to 

which the existing Regional Council is a party; 

the transfer or re-employment of any employees of the existing 

Regional Council to or by the corresponding new District Council, 

the terms and conditions of service applicable to such employees 

after such transfer or re-employment; 

the continuance of any laws made by the existing Regional Council 

and in force immediately before the prescribed date, subject to 

such adaptations and modifications, whether by way of repeal or 

amendment, as the Administrator may make in this behalf until such 


(e) 

laws are altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or 

other competent authority; 

such incidental, consequential and supplementary matters as the 

Administrator considers necessary. 

20C. Interpretation.- Subject to any provision made in this behalf, the provisions of this 

Schedule shall, in their application to the Union territory of Mizoram, have effect- 

(1) as if references to the Governor and Government of the State were references 

to the Administrator of the Union territory appointed under article 239, 

references to State (except in the expression “Government of the State”) 

were references to the Union territory of Mizoram and references to the 

State Legislature were references to the Legislative Assembly of the Union 

territory of Mizoram; 

(2) as if- 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

in sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 4, the provision for consultation 

with the Government of the State concerned had been omitted; 

in sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 6, for the words “to which the 

executive power of the State extends”, the words “with respect to 

which the Legislative Assembly of the Union territory of Mizoram 

has power to make laws” had been substituted; 

in paragraph 13, the words and figures “under article 202” had been 

omitted. 

21. Amendment of the Schedule.- (1) Parliament may from time to time by law 

amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any of the provisions of this Schedule 

and, when the Schedule is so amended, any reference to this Schedule in this 

Constitution shall be construed as a reference to such Schedule as so amended. 

(2) No such law as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph shall be 

deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution for the purposes of article 

368. 

56 


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