On Viewing Rhetoric As Epistemic: Ten Years Later.

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cognizing one's traditions as such, recognizing
that traditions need to be lived to be
traditions, and, further, teaching one tbat
one's traditions are only traditions.
Ironically enough, one inteqpretation.of
relativism rather than casting individuals
a&ift in a standard-Iess world, fixes tleo
in a strict determinism. This sort of relativism,
often called "historicism," emphasizei
the immediacy of one's own history and that
of one's particular culture. 'We are what we
are because of what our forebears have been;
s'e act as we must given the expectancies our
particular lives have endowed us with and in
accordance with the limits of our societal
noffns. Other persons and other societies
differ from us because of their cultural
deterrninants. \ro culture can claim anv rational
priority and any contest of interests
mtut be settled by s'hatever tests of sheer
strength t}at may be brought to bear in
the circumstances.
One need not deny historical detern:inism.
One only need to denl', and I have tried
consistently to do so, the rigidity of sudr
determinations. Shifts in cuhural consciousness,
both revolutionary and evolutionary,
seem consistently present in human experieoce.
Furthermore, n'hat q'e call "a culture"
or "a society" is marked only rnore-or-less
distinctly; or, to put the matter a little differentll',
there are rnembranes that bound the
circumferences of such bodies, but these
membranes are permeable.
lr{y suggesting that there are tq'o dimensions
of relativism-that among societies and
that s'ithin a socieg'-probably has not relieved
the tension felt by those q'ho use the
word as a pejorative or who fear being so
labelled. And there is a third dimension.
Even those u'ho take the position that
there rnust be some unifed hierarcJry of
stable standards in order to achieve decent
individual and social liles s'ill agree that
such standards must be applied in specific
sets of circumstances. few w;ll argue that in
practice, at least, applications are seldonr, if
RHETORIC AS EPISTEMIC 265
ever, possible in such a way that the standards
are engaged without discornfort Somi:
degree of discomfort seems inevitable in the
very necessity of having to make a judgment
Tlri existence of some set of circunstances in
the guise of a case to be settled seerns to
suggest rather strongly the human participatioa
of relating standards to partianlar, concrete
events. Of coiuse one might say wishfully
that if we possessed knowledge of the
propet sort then no sudr cases would arise
for the judgment of sorne parts of society
by other parts. The dialogue in Plato's
Gorgias is actuated to a rnajor degree around
the proposition attributed to Socrates that
the wrongdoer should prefer punishrnent to
escaping punishment. I call that argument
q'ishful since it may be interpreted as relieving
members of a society of the burden of
making judgments of others. That burden
is particularly beary if one is convinced of
the contiogen cy of any judgment.
, None of the foregoing is intended to
deprecate self-criticism. Rather I hold that
a community to sustain itseif, both through
reafirmation and reform, must be forrned
of rnernbers r*'ho n'iil take the responsibiliiy
of examining critically the binding forces,
the norms, of the community and of recognizing
that the traditjons accepted and extended
eotail living consistently with the
social demands. The task is not lightened by
recognizing that social demands can be repressive.
On the other hand, as important as
self-criticism may be, we should also recognize
that a community may impose its dernands
quite invidiously by insisting on
self-criticism as an instrurnent of social conformity.
Rhetorical relativism is not an easy process
promising dependable outcomes. It may be
just as well that the very label tends to make
us fearful, for that emotion may be an indication
of reluctance to impose solutions
rather than to create and share them jointly.
The attitude suggested is that appropriate to
talting the responsibility of persuading others
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