On Viewing Rhetoric As Epistemic: Ten Years Later.

I
9 t
27, *'4, aJi'..*

RHETOIJC
AS EPISTEMIC
s,ho may be identiied by their sirnilarities son at least for a rnoment Dossess as a living
in attempting to att'troir"'itfitt*it
r*t' ;;;At what migtrt othJrwise pass for a
tion for rhetoric; r,. #.*,r"I*-Ji.ny
oo ffi;:'Til
knowledge that rhetoric
;i* i"*ta "ttcai achieving is that of commit'
the.work of Richard Mcl(eon's
Mv 1967 t"^y **'l"ling rather than -tnt' nt* words are o*t'qotktd as that
"I
de6niti'e; oeither i, ttiPr'"i"g# ;-6"i,it.. I ;;;. And few conceptso vitally oeed fresh'
Ji ,Silll,':ffi"Ht ;-+i ;1j"" -*:#[,iffiJ
"s.::Tl'J-x #"f, filli.lT,,*,tf:::il.
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2t9
: i*1,,:"lS'Th*:T^;.* pi,,*,,
An early reader or,iT"Jft3 t-'ii ;*' ffi'*:;#.:;ff';|::X "JK
1*i*ir in;'.1:-%::'."ilt"*1fl::fd ;;;i,;"n or this essav.
a fair one; the answer
ical. The questions
"'#;;;
raised constaotrv uv 'Jt"'
f"ol *to
io "*tnt
or dissentn'Iy one must know
"na toU'"got' r"n'ttJi*r':]t-^^"':L.iJf3{'$tT;t;
in discussing -y rloi-t'*y'
in scrence the agreeiltlt
;*.I;Jj.f a*'.:t'ili1 l"'",t T:JJT ;Ji.q::4:i "i"I*' i'rp' "I'"r
dirnension of tbe *"; ;;;J ,nioric l-i'J .on.loiion iust because the obsen'ers
"
;;il F ;q, rfii,Hi;}n:.:::kt i; j, ;:T[:i; i'::r:q':,?.:"','ll
The questions' topic taken uP agiln
t'p"tti^tty"po;ntll,lt-og-ut.*
I expressed as iil;;
knowledge
"itt-t'
-9*.tt -'-o,:t-1
recognized the potnt'or-tt:*- ' .'"5.--'--; ,^ -^r .rhiral: ot creatrng
thor-oughly ,.tr,i.,;riii^"ni'n^J i..rn.d.to ."i.tf,;*f ; it has the potential of creattng
d i strust r er atiri sm' ;';'' :;J; ;" +:.t-11
:"flTin';;tl rl' l*''
5i?:"T;;l;
Lii-i*t.u, wishfulness, and e'er sheer
tion posed for this paper.
chaos. -;;ry
t L^---.
surp.rise the essay I sketched turned
Is THB' Oxr Vav or KNowrxc
.";;; lt-'m;t the basically ethical thrust on Mar'rv?
;;-;. earlier article' lry erytftft:-':11
Many. Thus it is important to seek to
J. io at this point that tt t"1: : ,,"r.;..*d ;.,od.
"tttn "' a tiay not
rhetoric t' of knor*'ing n<
darnentallv ttnictl' dimension.
""
"1 -::-::l
""it"*a
"i'y
thoughts
that rheto'ic 'e\*'t'l fie way'This answer is ambiguous' Are the
""a "aloil oi assertei "rnaoy r'ays" siorplv a multiplicity?
This essay r...r,j'.Ji"'u" "".*"*pt.
its or'n thesis' I s'iff;'+1'lY',Ti *'n;:? **-" E:iffi:.i'iiitf
;it,*;:#f T,'*':irl"lq":.ifr*fir*f .*l;:$J':l:'i':,."J.
*??*o"ta sav that there is a pruraritv
;:X *;m*n::::1'ilir'."':i:':
o.orked oJt in the :i ;;' F.", :f .::lll
;::^;m U:"JJ,''Y. :"",111.i.'J':
;X#l'*ii:Tffi:J:11"JTi9,11'"' festion I cannot 'n'*"' I suspect that anv
Often the f"'hnt's that'$'pifies what as'are of and seeking 1e lrrork
]t'*t'ttaty
\nowing
t' r"' t''ip' tn" #11
"'''"ai.'iao't ff.'Ji1:l:i;,"":t#'ff:-:::tt""st";1l
s..on Rh€roric. as a.'rrav e{. rTr':F;rt ,,:l,n* j:.::t.:',"'J,g,"'il'::r}?'i;
I became a$late "i'"*tt
i t"* consider an ordinate to' and
,iu
ig;-riiii.,ltffit$:1,:Xlrr3'1i"'"i,??i
1975.
uo,a.,[n" territory. Jean Piagei believes that
I nl

260
CENTRAL STATES SPEECH JOURNAL
"eadr discipline sooner or later has to work
out its on'n episternology." e Whether or not
the "drearq" which does not seeo to Piaget
unattainable, that is, "'traasdisciplinarity,'
q'hich v:ould not only cover interactions or
reciprocities between specialized'research
projects, but would place these relationships
within a total system without any 6rm boundaries
between disciplines," l0 is indeed attainable,
it seems to me better to concentrate
on various ways of knowini without com'
mitting ooeself in advance to some ardre'
techtonic ideal.
Of course traditionally, the notion of
"knowing' that is not also bound to a final
uoity is defectile. That position might be
readily admitted except that it has tended
to stop thought alongany line other than that
that nrakes some imrnediate claim to rectify
the defect. The result is s'hat Piaget, and
rnany otJrers, call "reductionism"; just sudr a
tendenq' is now s'idely held as unsatisfactory.
Pluralism, on the other hand, can be
taken as just another name for relativism,
and once one has the latter label, it is the
slightest step to insert the modifier "tnere"
or even "vicious" before it. The ground on
n'hich q'e rnay deal with dismissing or condemning
a rhetorical relativism s'ill be the
concern of the third section of this essay.
In conduding this section, there is aoother
ambiguity to consider: if the epistemic potential
of rhetoric is one among a plurality of
rla)'s of kno*'ing' is it a constituent of some
acts of knowing or of all acts of knou'ing?
Ansu'ering that rhetoric may be a constifuent
of any act of knos'ing is perhaPs a more
guarded claim than to say "all"; that answer
is consistent rx'ith the notion of plurality
since it does not preclude other constituents
nor demand sonre proper scheme in which it
e "The Epistcmology of Interdisciplinary Relationships,"
id InrerdfucipliaairT: Ptoblems ol
Teacbing and Retearcb in Uniuertitieq ed. L€o
Apostel, et al., Paris: O6ce of Economic Co-
Operation and Development Publications, 7972,
^ 1 to
'
10 Ibid., p. 7)8.
must fnd ie subordinatq articulated place.
The daim is ooe tci potentiality rather than
actuality. That is to say, that a rhetorical
perspective will give one a purchase not
otherwise available on q'hat may be known,
but it is not dernanded to say tbat one
"knows" at all. Rather, the attitude suggested
by Hart and Brirks, "rhetorical sensitivity,"
may be usefully extended to say that if persons
take seriously the possibilities that may
be opened by rhetorical interchange and their
commitments to the reality of social life,
then developing the seositivity necessarF to
seek rhetoric as a way of knorving is to enable
one to take rnore fully the responsibilities
generated by living s'ith others.
As Grace de Laguna writes, "There is a
sense in which the hun:an being is born into
a rx'orld constituted as human through the
actitities of his forbears, and sustained by
the interrelated activities of his felloq.
beings. But it is not bil unless he makes it
his, and it is only by enlarging his o'r'n
being, to internalize the structure of this
n'orld n'ithin hinrself, that it becomes his
lx'orld." 11 Discovering and validating are
reciprocal processes. Rhetoric is oni q'ay
that ordinary human beings may quicken
these. In seeing rhetoric from this angle as
a u'ay of knowing, among other s'a)'s, one's
vision s'ill be n:uch too limited by taking a
speaker-oriented rhetoric only. An active
auditor r*'ho seeks speakers is as real as
speakers s'ho seek audiences; if there is a
new, social rhetorig it must be rooted 6rmly
in an enlarged notion of rhetorical roles.r2
Wsar Sonr or KNowNc Dors
RnrroRrc Srrrc ro AcHrrvr?
If the recourse to a plurality of epistemol-
1r Oa Existence and tbc Hlman World (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 104-
10t.
r: I havc tried to make this point several times.
See my "On Nor Dcfning 'Rhe1oric,"' Pbilotopby
and Rbetoric, 6 (Spr. 1973), 90, and tbe "col-
Ioquy" between Ehninger and oyself (n. t,
above). This thrust is clearly discernible in
Cronkhite's essay (n. 4, above) and, although oot
aln'ays explicitly, in the other q'ork I referred
to at rhe outset of this essav.
102

RHETORIC AS EPISTE}IIC
ogi€s in claiming an episternic role for
rbetoric is to poteotidity, the ctaim of knov'
ing rhetoricaity it th"t of creatiog actuality'
Seeing in a situation possibilities that are
possibilities for us and deciding to act uPon
iome of these possibilities but not others
must be an irnportant constituent of what
\\'e rlean by human knowledge. The plural
pronoun in the foregoing sentence-is-vital.
As social beings, our possibilities and choices
must often, perhaps almost always, be joint'
Tn'o qualifcations are irnportant to tfe
claim made for rbetorig and both should be
apparent from what I've argued already, but
perhaps need to be made explicit: ceating
situations as decisive and deciding arlong
alternatites are not tbe concern of rhetoric
exclusitely; seeing possibilities and maling
decisions are not seguential steps in the sense
of Srst all of the one and then all of the
other but rather repeated phases that may be
constaatly enriched in rhetorical interchange'
It is precisely in understanding how human
action is decisit'e that rhetoric makes its con'
tribution to knowing.
The position talien here, obviously, is one
thet is Lecoming increasingly comnron: real'
ity is socially constructed-ls But if one takes
that position certain concomitants must be
faced. Our freedom to decide questions, and
indeed, rvhat we take to be problems Plesent'
ing guestions to us for decision, are to sorne
degree 6xed by historical forces that predate
any of the lives of tbe actual persons that
rnay be involved at decisive moments. The
fact of having a culture with its traditibns
does not seem problematic at all; what may
be problematic is the very notion of freedom
to Jecide guestions. Yet we notice that traditions
do not simply exist, they are liled. A
26L
culture may precede and persist after any
finite number of persons living in that culture
at a particular time, but that culture
must be lived to be a culture.
In short, q€ can corne to grips with our
tradition; it is from one aogle simply $ere'
transparent because it is pen'asive. But the
living of cultural demands makes them
opaque to some degree so that they reflect, so
to speak, what they are and what we are'
Wtiat ;s rellected v'ill inevitably contain disparate
features, and those features are what
iu" .^tt treat as problen:s-to-be-soh'ed and
take ourselves as decisive. Therein lies our
freedonr, which, altlrough scarcely absolute,
is nonetheless experienced and attested to in
social drange.
The opacity of living is n'hat bids fo*h
rhetoric. A remark in passing by Hans'Georg
Gadan'rer seens to n:e to be an in:portant
insight: the "concePt of clarity beloirgs to
the tradition of rhetoric." 1a But few terms
are mole relative than that one nor call forth
nrore strongly a human element. Nothing is
clear in and of itself but in some context for
some Persons.
Rhetoric may be darifying in these senses:
understanding that one's traditions are one's
os,n, that is, are co'substantial rvith one's
oq'n being and that these traditions are
forrnatite in cne's otl'n liviog; understanding
that these traditions are malleable and
that one s'ith one's fellows rnay act decisively
in s'ays that continue, extend, or truncate
the values inherent in one's culture; and
understanding that in acting decisively that
one pariicipates in 6xing forces that will
continue after the PurPoses for which they
have been immediately instrurnental and
nill, to some extent, bind others who will
:3
inherit the n:odi6ed traditions. Such under'
Perbaps the best knos'n book that derelops
the idea in detail is Peter L. Berger and Thomas standing is genuinely knowing and is knor*'
Luclimann. The Social Conttruction ol Reality ing that becomes 6lled out in some particu'
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co''
iq6e). See aiso Ernest G. Bormann, "Fantasy and tars by participating rhetorically.
Rbet6rical Vision: Tbe Rhetorical Giticism of If one sees rhetoric as a way of embracing
-social Reatity," Qtarterly !orrnal.of S4lec!, J8
(Dec.7972). 196'407. Jo! onc rhetortcrans de'
.rielopment o? a schemi rhat is postulated directly taTrutb and Alethod, 2nd Ed., 1961, e-d.
on o'hrt is becoming more and more strongly a Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York:
corlrerstone of contemporary thought.
The Seabury Press, 1975).
I a3

262 CENTRTL STATTS SPEECH JOURNAT
a tradition such that one is able to accept or
reject some of its demands and simultaneously
to recognize that these decisions biod
oneself to otlrers as well as to the past ia
seeking chaoge, then the reasoos s'hy rhetoric
is oaly potentially a way of knowing
rnay also be seen. The possibility of failure
is constant. Failure may result simply from
ineptness or from the force of circunstaoces
that defeat the best of intentions and efforts.
But failure may also arise from ethical shortcomiogs.
The task of tlre rhetorical theorist
is to specify the values that will mark an
ethical rhetoric and continually to try to
rescue these from the realm of easy dich6.
The indirect method of each of these three
sections is an efrort to meet that task. The
values will be labelled expliciily in the conclusion.
Thus far I have used the terms "knon'ing"
and "understanding" as if they q'ere inter-
common intersubjectire devices of science ne
see at least dimly the epistemic role of rhetorig
for all of these depend on communities
changeable. Although I may have been correct
in respect to ordinary usage in doing so, exist automatically "in nature," so to speal:.
of experience and connritment that do not
still the words do carry somewhat different but are fornred as all comn:unities are
rveights, or can be made to deviate some*'hat formed, by tlre interactions of plople. Altlrough
many aspects of the interactions that
from one another, and the nuances that seem
to me to cling to "uoderstanding" make me n:al:e scientifc comn:unities, e.g., the "invisible
colleges" that some historians and socio-
prefer it to ascribe to rhetoric as epistemic.
By "knosving" n'e may stress a sense of Iogists of science are fioding so significant
from-the-outside-in, taking knowledge as an
external ancfror point that rnay bring one
ioto a consistent relationship v'ith the world
that is rnore than oneself. By "understanding"
we rnay stress the sense of from-theinside-out,
taking understdnding as a human
and personal capacity to embrace s'hat is
outside the self, creating rather than finding
meaning in the s'orld.
The problem is the ancient one of the
objective and the subjective. Today it is
nearly cornrnonplace to assert that those
terrns are af.ter all dialectical terms; neitl:er
makes sense rn'ithout the other. An object is
an object only to a subject; and a subject can
be subject only if it is able to contrast itself
n'ith.,.to differentiate itself from, objects. No
one need doubt the pon'er of "being objective"
since that attitude has been a driving
force behind modern science and tcchnctogy.
But it is an attitude that places subjects io
certain relationships for certain reasons, in
short, the zubjective remains and is often
today recognized in the intersubjectite. fntersubjectivity
in science is continually appealed
to in sudt devices as "agreement arnong
obsen'ers," "replication of experirnenb,"
and 'professional standards of judgment."
Again a. diatectic is suggested in the opposite
expressions of intersubjectivity as the matter
n'as put in the introduction of this essay.
It n'ill not do, hos'eter, to press the opposites
in the dialectical tension rather thrn
the integration possible in individual a:tions.
Those actions, indeed even of scientists,
create traditions and comrnunities. In the
these da1's,l5 are not rhetorical, other aspects
are.
Stephen Toulmin has ren:arked sharply on
the strange dupleness that inflicts our peiceptions
of what we call linowledge on the
one hand and our sense of self as "knower"
on the other. "In principle," he *'rites, "a
proper grasp of our epistemic situation
should reinforce confdence in the bestfounded
of our beliefs; in practice, it often
Ieaves us in a beg'ildered and universal
skepticism." ro The way out of this impasse,
Toulmin suggests, is "to bring to light . . .
15 Sec for example the "Postscript-f 969" to
Thomas Kuhn, Tbe Sttuctsrc of Sciintifc Repolutiant,.2nd
Ed. (Chicago: Univ. of Chiiago press,
1969), pp. 176-177,
's Human Understanding: Tbe Collectiz,e IJse
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"l^4

RHETORIC AS EPISTEMIC 263
fan) epistemic self-portrait: the partia:Iar
picture of human beings as active intelli'
gences which govems his stance toward the
objects of human understanding." 17 My
daim is that any "epistemic self'portrait"
that approaches completenesi must include
rhetoric.
'\tr7hat sort of knowledge does rhetoric seek
to achieve? fie understanding of what it
means to be persuaded and to persuade.r8
Such an understanding is both general and
specific: general, ia that one's on'n grasp of
oneself as a social being with others in society
is essential to being human, and specific
in that one must continually face concrete
sihrations in which one will act to aftrm
son:e commitments. None of these statements
is n:eant to deny that one will continually
behave scarcely aware of the patterns that
behavior takes let alone with highly conscious
grasp of the reasons for those Patterns.
But the fact that much, probably nrost, of
our behavior is rvell fixed through complex
reinforceorents does not mean that s'e cannot
become focally al'are of these patterns and
their consequences. .tiThen we do become so
an'are, tben we can act critically, and usually
rhetorically, to reafirnr or modify tlrem, in
short, to b:come n:ore fully committed.
In an analysis much like the one here,
Thon,as Farrell pictures the Cartesian bequeatbed
attitude of detachment as descriptile
of modern science. Farrell would rnove
beyond that attitude in assessing the rhetorical
dimension of social knowledge as taking
a community of belief as necessary.le The
requisite attitude to balance detacbtnent in
tz lbid., p. 3.
18 Hcnry \7. Johnstone, Jr., has written that
"man is a petsuiding and'pirsuaded animat, and
. . . v.'henever he steps outside the forum in
which rhetoric loses swiy. he is in dangcr of losing
his human dignity." "The Relevancc of Rhetorjc
to Philosophy and of Philosophy to Rhetoric,"
Quarteill fournal of Speecb,52 (Feb. 1966),45.
:e"Knos'ledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical
Theory," Qaarterly Jounal ol Speecb, 62 (Feb.
1976), see esp., 6-7, altbough thc entire essay is
highly pertinent to grasping the idea of rhetoricas-eoistemic.
knowing would be attacbtneil in uoderstandin&
Although modern science is founded on
the firm belief that experience must be instructivg
Haas-Georg Gadaner argues that
the $'pical attitudes of science leave "experience"
incompletely understood; he undertakes
to rectify tbe situation. Among his
remarks, this ooe is particulatly trseful: "Experience
teaches us to recogoize reality. Ifhat
is properly gained from all elperiencg then,
is to know what is. But 's'hat is', here, is
not this or that thing but 'what cannot be
done away q'ith'. . ." 20 \Phat cannot be
dooe away with in a community is commitment
to the norms of that community. Commitn:ent
and rhetoric stand in a reciprocal
relationship: commitment generates rhetorig
and rhetoric generates commitment
Is Rgrronrc.'lr- REL.{Trvis}{ Vrcious?
No. One may, of course, eat gluttonously
or quote Shakespeare 6lled with vain pride
in the sound of one's own voice. Likenise
one may argue with s'anton disregard for the
fabric of social comn:itments or, pcrhaps, in
blithe ignorance of the possibilities of either
reaffirrnation or reform. But the grafuitous
abuse of rhetoric seen:s of tess concern to
thoughtful people than the sheer relatilism
of the point of view that takes rhetoric as
episternic. For tbese people, relativism seems
to make abuse not simply an occasional occurrence
but likely. At least sucJr objections
are t1'pical of tlre discussions I hate often
had n'ith colleagues and students since my
effort in L967.
The difficulty rests in the belief that rela.
tivjsm obviates the lery idea of knon'ledge.
From this point of view knowledge must be
a priori, that is, s'e must know in sorne general
or unitersal sense, before q'e can know
at all in any specifc sort of way. This point
of view seerns to be entailed in the traditional
way of putting the question, What is
knos'ing? The question itself suggests that
.sTtr:h
cnd .\ttthod, p. 120.
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the best answer, perhaps the ooly answer, is when that injury is wide scale finding ex'
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defning knowing as a state-of-being and, in pression in social and econornic dominance
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dariffing the answer, indicating the condi- or violencg is ordinarily rooted in the cer- "tii.l-;:tlL:*i;:i=:.-..:l:li.;.':l;i;'-.'.i'i;
tions for that state. However, such moves tainty of some corffnanding Truth takeo as *ri::l:iii:'.5,ii;'-A:','-:...r.-.-i.'..:.;:
inlolve us in ao infnite regress unless n,e axiornatic. The fact that one group, especially
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take sorne conditions as clear and necessary, at sorne later point in time, is indined to
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that rt is, as axiornatic.
give unpleasaoi
unpleasaDt o"..t narles to the ideas rdeas of ot order orde!
:iliiliiiiiilt..:#i=it-..,-+i"
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An axiomatic point of view can be taken that have driven-othe-ts:-for erample,,blam- ";ii:ii:i.;i:;.:j'--,,.i"'i:i,.,:,,.-,:.:
as either substantial or nrethodological. It ing the horor of religious *"rs ot mistaken ;;;;i=;i;i,..-:i.rt:::.j:.:l.L:.:::';:'.
temologrhashaditsgreatestmodernimpact, tainty as enabling extrerne actions. If one
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ternologl nad rts greate$ mooefn lmPact, tarnry a5 €naDirng cxlrerllc aLlruus. u uus ."..j:-:-:::
;iii;;i
that is, in the ideal of "scientifc method." may repair to standards of judgmenthat are
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\7hat bas been the predomioant interpreta- fixed outside the individual conscience or
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tion of such a method, however, is sharply even the interests of an iotmediate com-
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under attack today.21 nruoity, then one does not bear the burden .-. '. :.:.,
',,,;
Taking prior axion:s, io either a substan- of responsibility in making decisions. It is
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tial or a methodologicrl sense, precludes that relief from individual or conrmunal
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rhetoric's claim to being episteniic.^And the responsibility that is the chief attraction of
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in:plications of a rhetoric based on sorne s'hat is sonretimes called, I believe mis-
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prior, enabling sense of Truth are ones that takenly, "objective
'
reality."
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i.rron, in oui 6.ld have ofien accepted un- Although clearly I cannot detail an accritically;
this point I argued tn Dd. count-book for human history and must leave . .
Fundamentalli', the objeciion to relativisni my appeal to the reader's os'n sense of hisis
that no standards for judgment are pos- tory, ei'eo in the abstract it seems to me that
sible and therefore sheer chaos js loosed contingency is much less to be feared in
among humankind since reduced to opinion creating chaos, wantonly or whimsicalll', than
:
alone no opinion can claim legitimately any the spirit of axiomatic detad-rment. j, .;, ..-.,,.,,,.,.,..
priority over any other opinion.
A second line of argument to relieve the ,. .. . '
At least tno counter-irguments may be stign:a of relativism runs precisely contrary ' , -. :':.,'-,r;,,,,..,
'1
posed againsthe abstract and deductite fear to tlre supposed self-evident assumption on
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of relativism; both arguments appeal to com- n'hich the stigmatizing rests. Relativism, sup-
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rnon erperience and both seem to nre potent. posedllt, tneans a standard-less society, or at
, , ' . '' . .' , . .1' ',
-,-'--.'.':'..'.;'.
Although no one needs to doubt the leastamazeof differiogstandards,andthus
- -;-
setere shock of s,hat is oftend called "sense- a cacaphony of disparate, and likely selfish, .
'
'
less crime," the greater portion of elil in the interests. Rather than a standard-lessociety,
.,
'.
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-. ' '
. , ",
history of humankind stems from what its n'hich is the same as saying oo society at all, , .' . - i.':" ''
perpeirators take to be quite good sense. The relati'r'ism indicates circumstances in which - . .' - ':: ''.i'
justification of injury io oth.rr, especially standards have to be established coopera' ..,.1:.,'"'.'r",',''--'
':-": -'i'-'
tively and renen'ed repeatedly. Since agree-
:':-
:1 The literature that might-be ciledJrere js
ment seems to be at least as common in the ...
tast.ThebooliscitedabovebyKuhnandToulmin a -rt r!--, . | ?.r
in-ip...1".o'ii""'lill"ii-*. r"i e'r'eq,lxy rx'orld as disagreernent t_n!,
";;-'r;t.r'ant:
{ut!*: . .., , ,-...
fl-d-,11.,.oA:g:^,1''l1,Tq:9:1{,-{"-*:'11:d.il necessary to the working out of individual ''.. ';..-,' '.- - .'.'
Daniet J. O'Keefe, "Lolical Empiricism and thl
: : : ,,-: --_ ,_ ^r--_^-:-r- -t-, -t -^-:^L:^^ . i.,.
st"ai-"i-ir'..o co.'i"i?'"ti;;i:';;;;;;'^\";;: interests even in the most simple of societies, . . . , i. ' .
t^if*, 1:-9:l-]!l1l:-!u,e-]I 1f:,t:',1*:'.: relativism s'ould be likely to quidien a sense . ,' i lcI4(l r rJrrr
.., , . ri
of the current reassessment mav be sc.en in thc
essay-review by Gerald R. Millei, "The Person as ot conmttment tO C!€atlng agreernent.
Actor-Cognitive. Ps1'chotogy. ol_ rhe Attack," To accept relatiyism Coes not mean start-
Qaarreiy lotrnnl of Speecb,62 'J' w' (Feb. \t'p' 1976),82- t/twt' o'- l
s7.
ing continually from scratch but ratl-rer re-
1n6

,.:.-:
cognizing one's traditions as such, recognizing
that traditions need to be lived to be
traditions, and, further, teaching one tbat
one's traditions are only traditions.
Ironically enough, one inteqpretation.of
relativism rather than casting individuals
a&ift in a standard-Iess world, fixes tleo
in a strict determinism. This sort of relativism,
often called "historicism," emphasizei
the immediacy of one's own history and that
of one's particular culture. 'We are what we
are because of what our forebears have been;
s'e act as we must given the expectancies our
particular lives have endowed us with and in
accordance with the limits of our societal
noffns. Other persons and other societies
differ from us because of their cultural
deterrninants. \ro culture can claim anv rational
priority and any contest of interests
mtut be settled by s'hatever tests of sheer
strength t}at may be brought to bear in
the circumstances.
One need not deny historical detern:inism.
One only need to denl', and I have tried
consistently to do so, the rigidity of sudr
determinations. Shifts in cuhural consciousness,
both revolutionary and evolutionary,
seem consistently present in human experieoce.
Furthermore, n'hat q'e call "a culture"
or "a society" is marked only rnore-or-less
distinctly; or, to put the matter a little differentll',
there are rnembranes that bound the
circumferences of such bodies, but these
membranes are permeable.
lr{y suggesting that there are tq'o dimensions
of relativism-that among societies and
that s'ithin a socieg'-probably has not relieved
the tension felt by those q'ho use the
word as a pejorative or who fear being so
labelled. And there is a third dimension.
Even those u'ho take the position that
there rnust be some unifed hierarcJry of
stable standards in order to achieve decent
individual and social liles s'ill agree that
such standards must be applied in specific
sets of circumstances. few w;ll argue that in
practice, at least, applications are seldonr, if
RHETORIC AS EPISTEMIC 265
ever, possible in such a way that the standards
are engaged without discornfort Somi:
degree of discomfort seems inevitable in the
very necessity of having to make a judgment
Tlri existence of some set of circunstances in
the guise of a case to be settled seerns to
suggest rather strongly the human participatioa
of relating standards to partianlar, concrete
events. Of coiuse one might say wishfully
that if we possessed knowledge of the
propet sort then no sudr cases would arise
for the judgment of sorne parts of society
by other parts. The dialogue in Plato's
Gorgias is actuated to a rnajor degree around
the proposition attributed to Socrates that
the wrongdoer should prefer punishrnent to
escaping punishment. I call that argument
q'ishful since it may be interpreted as relieving
members of a society of the burden of
making judgments of others. That burden
is particularly beary if one is convinced of
the contiogen cy of any judgment.
, None of the foregoing is intended to
deprecate self-criticism. Rather I hold that
a community to sustain itseif, both through
reafirmation and reform, must be forrned
of rnernbers r*'ho n'iil take the responsibiliiy
of examining critically the binding forces,
the norms, of the community and of recognizing
that the traditjons accepted and extended
eotail living consistently with the
social demands. The task is not lightened by
recognizing that social demands can be repressive.
On the other hand, as important as
self-criticism may be, we should also recognize
that a community may impose its dernands
quite invidiously by insisting on
self-criticism as an instrurnent of social conformity.
Rhetorical relativism is not an easy process
promising dependable outcomes. It may be
just as well that the very label tends to make
us fearful, for that emotion may be an indication
of reluctance to impose solutions
rather than to create and share them jointly.
The attitude suggested is that appropriate to
talting the responsibility of persuading others
1^?

: -- -.:.- . .- -,- I
). :-'r. .. r-..:;'.'-. t' :."."- . : . :'
266 . CENTRAL srATEsPtEcH:JouRNAL
i,:':i.' .'..;; "-t".;1';.-.t..- ..-,:''.
and;.concomitantly, being. open to perzua- munjgy is.assured..Put difierently: rhetoric i' i:'.,';-;,.t..;,-...:..'.:'1,'.,:.
sion.. .. - ...- /l:.=:::;'-.,:.i!::;i:.i:i1'.''q;.:'.irt,
: : rntf b. the art'of persuasioq thai is, it.cnay
:.;,
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beseenfromoneangleasapracticalcapaciry
i:i'.11::;r: .':-,,-.
.: . :
coNclusloN, .. to find oeans to ends on specific occasions; ;i:l:,i;ji::litl;,1;i:;;1.;,-.];..qi.1"r-.,
,, l" tgg, I argued that understanding rlrer- but rhetoric must also b. rio rnore broadly
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oric-as-epistemiienthiledthreevalues:-toier-
a human potentidity to'uaderstand the
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anc6, wiil,.and iesponsibitity; In answeriog human conditioo. : .. :' til;,1;:,li;:i.:i:!.t*r,;.r.,i.ir;iii;r1i,.
"
the three guestioosihat I posed'at the'outset It is the broader scope of rhetoric that has
JL,:.-i,:,i:i;ti:.:';i;i.;'"'':,;'';':"'':
oT this essay, I have tried to argue in such interested rhetoricians-intensely in the lasb - l:"i"'i"'-''''"-::'''
a \eay as to reamirh tlrese valuei in tum as decade. Recently Donatd P. verene has writ.
iii:ftii;ttiii,*t,:ii;,.i,
the logical outcomes of the analysis in eadr ten that."the philosophy of science and ilr-e ".:',,.t.';-'.:,.:l:::;,1:.i:iii'l:".ii,::i:i;
of 'thi threi sections abore.'Tiese .,,"loes scienies has become a defoite field of phi-
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should haie meanings for individuals, but losophical ioquiry; a counterPart to this,- "
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they haYe meaning only in a riality that is philosophy oi th. humanitiei, has not de'
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social. If Gadamer is correct in saying that veloPed-" 23 Verene q'ould see such a phi'
"thi experience bf meaning .,*,hich-takes losophy develoPed, and it is in this relation i-
place io understdndiog alo,ays includes ap- that vien'ing rhetoric as epistemic becomes 2. ::'".;r;:';:'.-.:';;,;::,i
,i.'-'1:'::''.:':
'"::' " :':
'r'ital
plication,"22 then ihetoriC as a meanS of concern
-..'.'.
i,.-...-,,,'.:.t',',i.::::. ;..,'
n:eans of acting effectively s'ithin a conl-
- zs "Vico^'s philosophy gt_ Humaniltic Imaginaj
tion: Its Significance for Theory of Knowledge,"
ttitj.o"'""1' in press (scheduled for Fall'
2?Trtrb and rIcrbc,d., p. 145.
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