child support 101/102 - The Gitlin Law Firm

7. Net Income: Subtract federal, state and FICA from the adjusted gross
income. Finally, subtract the deductions allowed per §505 as well as the total
child care credit (discussed below).
C. Health Care Premiums: IRMO Stone, 191 Ill.App.3d 172, 138 Ill.Dec. 547, 547
N.E.2d 714 (4th Dist. 1989), was the first case to hold that the deduction for health and
hospitalization insurance premiums is not limited to children covered by the support order but
includes all premium amounts paid. In IRMO Davis, 287 Ill.App.3d 846, 223 Ill.Dec. 166, 679
N.E.2d 110 (5th Dist. 1997), the appellate court held that the trial court erred in not allowed a father
a deduction in determining child support for health insurance premiums he paid for himself.
The provision of §505(a)(4) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, however,
differs in its treatment of health care premiums as a deduction in determining net income where the
court order provides for health insurance per §505.2(b). This statute appears to limit the deduction
to the "portion of the premiums for which the supporting party is responsible in the case of insurance
provided through an employer's health insurance plan where the employer pays a portion of the
premiums" in determining net income.
D. Prior Obligations of Support: The issue here is whether prior obligations of support
refers to prior families or prior support orders. This refers to a family that is first in time as
compared to another family. IRMO Zukausky, 244 Ill.App.3d 614, 184 Ill.Dec. 367, 613 N.E.2d 394
(2d Dist. 1993). IRMO Potts, 297 Ill.App.3d 148, 231 Ill.Dec. 692, 696 N.E.2d 1263 (2d Dist.
1998), GDR 98-80. However, a dissent by Justice Cook (in the 2005 Einstein v. Nijim decision)
attacked the reasoning of the Potts case. The Cook dissent stated:
It has been suggested that the language of section 505(a)(3)(g) allowing the deduction
of "[p]rior obligations of support or maintenance actually paid pursuant to a court
order" (750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3)(g) (West 2000)) carries forward the rule that a divorced
spouse's obligations to the first family must be met before the obligations to the
second family can or will be considered. Potts, *** I would suggest that use of the
term "prior obligations" simply expresses the desire that child support be calculated
based on the current situation and not on consideration of future obligations or
attempts to predict what may happen in the future.
Potts's statement of the "first family" rule is not supported by the cases it cites. In re
Marriage of Zukausky, 244 Ill. App. 3d 614, 624, 613 N.E.2d 394, 402 (1993),
mentions the rule but goes on to say "[t]he court should not ignore the supporting
parent's obligations to a second family and should consider that factor in deciding the
appropriate modification award for the first family." Roqueplot v. Roqueplot, 88 Ill.
App. 3d 59, 63, 410 N.E.2d 441, 444 (1980), involved a petition to modify child
support after the petitioner married a woman who had five children. Support of other
children may be disregarded where there is no legal or moral obligation to provide
it. In re Marriage of Vucic, 216 Ill. App. 3d 692, 704, 576 N.E.2d 406, 414 (1991).
A significant recent case where there are children by a previously relationship is Slagel v.
Wessels, 314 Ill.App.3d 330, 247 Ill.Dec. 765, 732 N.E.2d 720 (4th Dist. 2000). The question in that
case is whether the court may deviate downward from the support guidelines in a case where there
is a prior support obligation. Slagel involved a fact pattern in which the mother’s previous husband
had died and as a result she had custody of three children by a previous marriage. Therefore, there
was no support obligation of the mother. In rejecting a rote application of the guidelines, the opinion
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