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ICTS Brown Bag Seminar<br />

• Successful Completion: Participants must complete an<br />

<strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>form</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>receive</strong> a <strong>certificate</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>completion</strong><br />

• Contact Hours: 1 contact hours is available <strong>to</strong> those<br />

who meet the successful <strong>completion</strong> requirements<br />

• Sponsorship & Commercial Support: This activity has<br />

<strong>receive</strong>d no sponsorship or commercial support<br />

• Conflict <strong>of</strong> Interest: No conflicts <strong>of</strong> interest were<br />

identified<br />

• Non-Endorsement: Accreditation approval refers only <strong>to</strong><br />

MONAs continuing education activities and does not<br />

imply MONA or ANCC Commission on Accreditation<br />

endorsement <strong>of</strong> any commercial products<br />

• Off Label Use: There will be no discussion <strong>of</strong> uses <strong>of</strong><br />

products other than what is approved by the FDA.<br />

• Expiration: Contact Hours expire on November 17, 2013<br />

1<br />

• Principles <strong>of</strong> Patient Safety—An Overview<br />

• Reporting <strong>of</strong> Events<br />

• Demonstration <strong>of</strong> WUSM ERS<br />

Research Coordina<strong>to</strong>rs August 2012<br />

2<br />

1


Definition<br />

Patient Safety<br />

- Absence <strong>of</strong> preventable harm: avoidance <strong>of</strong> errors<br />

in clinical care resulting in injury <strong>to</strong> our patients<br />

3<br />

Harm—Scope <strong>of</strong> the Problem<br />

•More than 1 million preventable adverse<br />

events occur in the US each year<br />

•An estimated 44,000-98,000 people die in<br />

hospitals each year from preventable<br />

medical errors<br />

Institute <strong>of</strong> Medicine. 1999. To Err is Human: Building a safer health system.<br />

Many mark the release <strong>of</strong> To Err is Human by the Institute <strong>of</strong> Medicine as the first major<br />

study in patient safety and an attempt <strong>to</strong> <strong>of</strong>fer ideas on what can be done in prevention.<br />

The IOM <strong>to</strong>ok the Harvard study and extrapolated its findings <strong>to</strong> create the <strong>of</strong>ten quoted<br />

“44,000 – 98,000” statistic.<br />

4<br />

2


Yearly Attributable Deaths<br />

45,000<br />

40,000<br />

35,000<br />

30,000<br />

25,000<br />

20,000<br />

15,000<br />

10,000<br />

5,000<br />

0<br />

MVA Breast Cancer AIDS Medical Errors<br />

Even using the lower number from the IOM study, Medical Errors killed more<br />

Americans than car accidents and breast cancer. There is no indication that<br />

the annual rate <strong>of</strong> deaths from errors decreased since 1999.<br />

5<br />

AHRQ 2001<br />

High Pr<strong>of</strong>ile Deaths from Medical Errors<br />

Chemotherapy overdose<br />

Betsy Lehman, 39<br />

Dana Farber<br />

ABO compatibility<br />

checking error-- transplant<br />

Dehydration and oversedation<br />

Growth hormone<br />

overdose<br />

Josie King, 18 months<br />

Johns Hopkins<br />

Jesica Santillan, 17<br />

Duke<br />

6<br />

Sebastien Ferrero, 3<br />

U. Florida<br />

3


Traditional Approach <strong>to</strong> Error<br />

Personal responsibility and theory <strong>of</strong> “bad<br />

apples"<br />

• Error is a character flaw<br />

• Focus on the incident and the individual<br />

• Punishment and Remediation<br />

7<br />

Patient Safety Approach <strong>to</strong> Error<br />

• Humans make mistakes, even if we’re careful and well-intentioned. The<br />

goal <strong>of</strong> Patient Safety is not <strong>to</strong> eliminate human error, but <strong>to</strong> create safe<br />

systems <strong>to</strong> prevent them from reaching the patient.<br />

• Ask “How did it happen” not “Who did it’?<br />

• Systems or processes that depend on perfect human per<strong>form</strong>ance are<br />

fatally flawed.<br />

• Most adverse events result from a cascade <strong>of</strong> failures in a flawed<br />

system<br />

8<br />

4


Pioneers in Patient Safety<br />

“We can’t change<br />

the human<br />

condition, but<br />

we can change<br />

the conditions<br />

under which<br />

humans work.”<br />

9<br />

James Reasons’ “Swiss cheese” Model<br />

Some holes due<br />

<strong>to</strong> active failures<br />

Hazards<br />

Harm<br />

Other holes due <strong>to</strong><br />

latent system fac<strong>to</strong>rs<br />

Successive layers <strong>of</strong> defenses, barriers, & safeguards<br />

• No single individual error (active error) is sufficient <strong>to</strong> cause an accident<br />

• The majority <strong>of</strong> medical errors are caused by faulty systems, processes and<br />

conditions that lead people <strong>to</strong> make mistakes or fail <strong>to</strong> prevent them<br />

• Latent conditions = system faults that increase the probability <strong>of</strong> individuals making<br />

errors<br />

10<br />

5


Why has it taken so long <strong>to</strong> make things safer?<br />

• We don’t treat the delivery <strong>of</strong> healthcare as a science<br />

• Most errors don’t harm patients/failure <strong>to</strong> capture and learn<br />

-“no harm, no foul” usually brings a sigh <strong>of</strong> relief, not action<br />

• Need <strong>to</strong> overcome the culture <strong>of</strong> medicine which expects<br />

perfection instead <strong>of</strong> expecting error and planning for it<br />

-get away from the idea that your own effort drives everything<br />

-healthcare is a team sport: overwhelming evidence that diverse input<br />

improves outcomes<br />

• Some <strong>of</strong> us still believe smart people, working hard, will not<br />

make mistakes<br />

• We map the human genome and transplant hearts and lungs,<br />

but we don’t wash our hands<br />

11<br />

Human Fac<strong>to</strong>rs<br />

Examines activity by way <strong>of</strong> component tasks and<br />

considers it in terms <strong>of</strong>:<br />

Physical demands: fatigue, illness, substance abuse, stress<br />

Skill requirements: inexperience, fear, procedural shortcuts<br />

Mental workload: boredom, cognitive shortcuts, reliance on memory<br />

Team dynamics: stress, shift work<br />

Device design: equipment/programs<br />

Environment:<br />

fixed: lighting, heat, unnatural workflow space<br />

controllable: noise, interruptions, motion, clutter<br />

We know errors result when these fac<strong>to</strong>rs are violated<br />

12<br />

6


Human Fac<strong>to</strong>rs Principles<br />

• Avoid reliance on memory—seven digits is our max<br />

• Decrease reliance on vigilance<br />

• Increase verbal feedback/structured communication<br />

• Standardize what you can, and only that; use<br />

pro<strong>to</strong>cols & checklists wisely<br />

• Use constraints and forcing functions <strong>to</strong> create a<br />

safety net <strong>to</strong> save you from yourself<br />

• Reduce hand<strong>of</strong>fs and standardize content<br />

13<br />

When the posted speed limit is 65mph, how fast do you drive? What impacts your speed?<br />

•Time <strong>of</strong> day?<br />

•Whether it’s a speed trap?<br />

•Are you late picking up kids from daycare?<br />

•Is the weather bad?<br />

Even the best intentioned are pressed <strong>to</strong> step over known safety precautions in medicine, resulting<br />

in “practice creep”.<br />

14<br />

7


• Report<br />

How Do We Respond <strong>to</strong> Errors?<br />

—Report and Learn<br />

• Track and trend <strong>to</strong> learn<br />

• Devise strategies <strong>to</strong> build a better safety net <strong>to</strong><br />

prevent future events<br />

• Talk <strong>to</strong> each other openly and remember the<br />

substitution test<br />

15<br />

Traditional Voluntary Reporting in Hospitals<br />

Lost Opportunities <strong>to</strong> Learn from Physicians<br />

• Key Findings:<br />

Hospital staff did not report 86% <strong>of</strong> events <strong>to</strong> incident reporting systems<br />

Physician accounted for less than 2% <strong>of</strong> reports<br />

Hospital Incident Reporting Systems Do Not Capture Most Patient Harm. January<br />

2012 OEI-06-09-00091<br />

• Low physician reporting is problematic because it hinders the ability <strong>to</strong><br />

identify and mitigate risks. Physicians view health care through a unique<br />

lens, which allows them <strong>to</strong> identify certain types <strong>of</strong> hazards and certain<br />

contributing fac<strong>to</strong>rs better than others.<br />

Noble, DJ, Pronovost, Underreporting <strong>of</strong> Patient Safety Incidents Reduces Health<br />

Care’s Ability <strong>to</strong> Quantify and Accurately Measure Harm Reduction P. J Patient Saf 2010; 6:24<br />

16<br />

8


How <strong>to</strong> Build a Healthy Reporting Culture<br />

You Have <strong>to</strong> Start Somewhere/Anywhere<br />

□Teamwork<br />

□Open p communication<br />

□Management Support<br />

No blame but<br />

accountability<br />

Co-workers save others from<br />

learning first- hand errors<br />

Safety<br />

Culture<br />

Willing and able <strong>to</strong> report<br />

Observations are<br />

welcome and<br />

solicited<br />

Clinical changes visible<br />

and feedback frequent<br />

17<br />

What <strong>to</strong> Report?<br />

18<br />

9


Most Common Ambula<strong>to</strong>ry Events<br />

Which May Result in Harm<br />

•Failure <strong>to</strong> in<strong>form</strong> patient <strong>of</strong> clinically significant test result<br />

•Wrong test ordered or test not ordered when appropriate (ex: no HIV testing<br />

prenatally)<br />

•Wrong medication, wrong dose ordered, or medication not ordered when appropriate<br />

•Failure <strong>to</strong> moni<strong>to</strong>r high risk medication (ex: Warfarin/INR; Insulin)<br />

•Failure <strong>to</strong> notice dispensing errors (medication reconciliation not done)<br />

•Wrong treatment ordered<br />

•Tests ordered but not done<br />

•Errors arising during the per<strong>form</strong>ance <strong>of</strong> a clinical task<br />

•Wrong, delayed or missed diagnosis<br />

•Wrong treatment decision<br />

•Scheduling the wrong surgery or wrong site surgery<br />

•Errors in communication between physicians, services<br />

•Failure <strong>to</strong> respond <strong>to</strong> a consultation or communicate with referring physician<br />

resulting in delay or harm<br />

•Failure <strong>to</strong> schedule a test when requested by another service<br />

•Failure <strong>to</strong> moni<strong>to</strong>r tests ordered but not scheduled by patient<br />

19<br />

Siteman East Chemotherapy Infusion Map<br />

20<br />

10


OB Triggers<br />

‣ Maternal Mortality<br />

‣ Maternal cardiopulmonary arrest<br />

‣ Excessive maternal blood loss (roughly >1500cc)<br />

‣ Stillbirth <strong>of</strong> a baby admitted alive (excluding extreme prematurity or lethal anomalies)<br />

‣ Cord pH


When you learn <strong>of</strong> an event<br />

• Report it in the system at http://ers.wusm.wustl.edu<br />

• If the event is serious and harmed the patient, notify<br />

WUSM Risk Management at 362-6956, as you usually<br />

• Refer <strong>to</strong> WUSM ERS Guidelines for more in<strong>form</strong>ation<br />

23<br />

The type <strong>of</strong> thinking that got us in<strong>to</strong> these problems<br />

will not be the type <strong>of</strong> thinking that will get us out.<br />

Albert Einstein<br />

24<br />

12


Accessing the WUSM Event Reporting System<br />

Open Internet Explorer and navigate <strong>to</strong>:<br />

http://ers.wusm.wustl.edu<br />

• Your domain will create a shortcut on your desk<strong>to</strong>p or save the link <strong>to</strong><br />

your favorites.<br />

• If you are signed on <strong>to</strong> the secure WUSM computer network, you<br />

should not be prompted for your username and password.<br />

• WUSM ERS is optimized for Internet Explorer, Version 7.0 and above.<br />

Other web browsers, such as Firefox, Google Chrome, and Safari,<br />

can be used <strong>to</strong> enter events, but functionality is limited.<br />

• If you are not on the secure WUSM computer network, use Citrix or a<br />

Virtual Private Network (VPN) connection <strong>to</strong> access ERS.<br />

25<br />

Discussion<br />

26<br />

13

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