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Rolling stock
of HSTs was designed to last only until
2013-2015. It could be coupled with a ‘pick
and mix’ approach towards buying off-theshelf
electric trains that are already in service
around the world.
‘Existing stock will need to be
replaced in the short-to-medium-term.
Their specification would ideally allow
manufacturers to tender a development of
their existing product range.’
Music to the ears of Bombardier,
Siemens, CAF, Alstom and the Chinese CSR.
They could be back in the game.
‘It seems likely that more than half of
the benefit on the East Coast route, and
probably around three-quarters of it on the
Great Western routes, could be captured for
between 40 per cent and 60 per cent of the
cost.’
Now to the really illuminating
conclusions and recommendations. They are
spot-on in line with the observations of Rail
Professional over the last year and, indeed,
the industry in general. ‘In particular,’ says
Foster, ‘there is a pressing need to ensure
that experienced railway engineering
managers, with commercial experience, are
actively involved in the key decisions of the
procurement process.’
Ouch! So the DfT should employ people
who know what they are talking about, ‘and
reduce its reliance on external advisers’.
Michael Roberts of the Association
of Train Operating companies says the
government has spent £21m in consultancy
fees since 2005, ‘and has so far failed to
produce a single train.’
The report concludes that buying
alternative trains ‘could provide sufficient
benefits… with a lower cost and risk profile
than IEP. These alternatives warrant serious
scrutiny.’
So the report is saying the DfT was so
focused on its narrow pursuit of a one-sizefits-all
brand new bespoke design that it
didn’t bother to see cheaper, simpler, quicker
solutions.
So complex was the discussion with
Hitachi after it won preferred-bidder
status that Foster admitted: ‘my team and I
sometimes struggled to make sense of the
multiple changes to programme specification,
and their effect on the BCR upon which
value-for-money is based.’
In 2009 when Hitachi was named
preferred bidder, the order was for 10-car and
five-car trains. It now includes seven, eight
and nine-car formations.
‘In short, there is a good deal about the
programme as it stands that is unresolved,
unproven, uncertain and carries risk.’
In the private sector, a report this critical
of an eye-wateringly expensive, 30-year
project would, without doubt, lead to the
sacking of the chief executive and the
resignation of the board directors responsible
for such massive errors of judgement.
Understatement
‘There are,’ says Foster with polite
understatement, ‘some issues around DfT’s
management approach and its engagement
and communication with the railway
industry.
‘In summary, industry stakeholders feel
unengaged and distanced from IEP.’
Put another way, he believes civil servants
in Marsham Street simply did not pay
attention to what rail professionals at First
Great Western, Atoc and Network Rail were
telling them.
It had all started out so well. When
the project was called HS2, the level of
consultation with train and track operators
was well-regarded. ‘The turning point
is felt to have been the launch of formal
Artist’s impression of
Hitachi’s design, for which
Agility Trains was named
preferred bidder
AUGUST 2010 PAGE 23