- Page 1 and 2: #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia @Cha
- Page 3 and 4: Thomas Elkjer Nissen (ed.) #TheWeap
- Page 5: LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1. The inf
- Page 9 and 10: CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Social Netwo
- Page 11 and 12: everyday social interaction are now
- Page 13 and 14: particularly effective in this rega
- Page 15 and 16: the basis for discussing the theory
- Page 17 and 18: the Clausewitzian sense. With acade
- Page 19 and 20: and mobilizing for war. Contemporar
- Page 21 and 22: the troop contributing nation (TCN)
- Page 23 and 24: meaning (perception) of social netw
- Page 25 and 26: This definition is, admittedly, bot
- Page 27 and 28: predominately in mobile phones and
- Page 29 and 30: Many definitions of cyber-warfare e
- Page 31 and 32: A large challenge, though, is the q
- Page 33 and 34: same. Nonetheless, it can be argued
- Page 35 and 36: ever changing. Mostly with the deve
- Page 37 and 38: aggregating common interests from a
- Page 39 and 40: 4 Interactive Social network media
- Page 41 and 42: user behaviour when it comes to soc
- Page 43 and 44: a web-TV show (streaming), a podcas
- Page 45 and 46: them in the framework of social net
- Page 47 and 48: Levels of Narratives As mentioned a
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- Page 51 and 52: calculated and professional social
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Today, social network media pervade
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CHAPTER 4 EFFECTS-BASED THINKING ON
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use of social network media in five
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and behaviour (on- and offline). Fi
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Systemic analysis Holistically look
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attacks on websites (example Blog),
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negative connotation. 16 In most we
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Mobilize Convince Organize and enco
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NATO’s research project (SAS-050)
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CHAPTER 5 THE WEAPONIZATION OF SOCI
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organisations and insurgent groups
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strategy, Hezbollah effectively was
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the introduction of new technology
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inform and affect the discourse or
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(ISR) assets to conduct Bomb Damage
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Much of the key to influencing in s
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human rights organisations offering
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In connection with Unconventional W
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targeted, for example, and the risk
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are now also using social network m
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The content can also simply contain
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secondly, that it is all about fusi
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fit into the characteristics of con
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parties, a much more direct access
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CHAPTER 6 PERSPECTIVES “You may b
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specialists, created the Syrian Ele
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eputation. In the end, it is about
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network media services continually
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when the war is over, it is more th
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“Digital and communications compa
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social network media for military p
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misusing, law as a substitute for t
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also state actors will most likely
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION The character
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The bottom line is, however, that s
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Betz, David: Cyberpower in Strategi
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Fielding, Nick and Cobain, Ian: Rev
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Jones, Nigel and Baines, Paul: Losi
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NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP)
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Seaboyer, Anthony: The Evolution of
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Other sources: Curriculum for the M
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CHAPTER 2: 24 Fra W. I. Thomas, The
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slideshare.net/escpexchange/kaplan-
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86 Dan Bloom: ISIS use US journalis
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113 See Dennis Murphy: Fighting Bac
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148 SecDev Group: Syria Cyber Watch
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195 See http://twitter.com/tos 196