Our Ref: DWI/2/10 Event 30/10 Date: 9 June ... - Derry City Council
Our Ref: DWI/2/10 Event 30/10 Date: 9 June ... - Derry City Council
Our Ref: DWI/2/10 Event 30/10 Date: 9 June ... - Derry City Council
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286 distribution mains;<br />
880 communication pipes; and<br />
180 fittings.<br />
A significant number of bursts occurred on private property and these do not form part<br />
of this assessment. It is estimated that 80% of the additional water demand caused by<br />
the freeze/thaw leaked from domestic and business water pipes.<br />
3. Conclusions<br />
3.1 I note that, due to the complex nature and extent of this incident, and given the scale<br />
and operational demands, the company’s main priority was the restoration of water<br />
supplies and the delivery of alternative interim supply arrangements.<br />
3.2 While undertaking the many activities to restore supplies NI Water has also a duty to<br />
ensure that public health is protected through the provision of safe drinking water<br />
supplies and that appropriate mitigation measures are put in place to manage any risk<br />
of supplying water which could constitute a potential danger to human health.<br />
3.3 The post incident assessment undertaken by my inspectors is based on the currently<br />
available information and provides comment and makes recommendations on how<br />
NI Water carried out its drinking water quality regulatory duties. Since my initial<br />
assessment letter was issued seeking assurances, further information requirements<br />
and making recommendations to NI Water, several follow up actions are underway or<br />
have been completed.<br />
3.4 The follow up actions in Annex 2 are considered necessary to give the assurance that<br />
any key learning points from this incident are carried forwards to ensure regulatory<br />
compliance and uphold public confidence. It is necessary for NI Water to ensure that<br />
risks to public health are being robustly managed to prevent the potential<br />
contamination of drinking water supplies, particularly when normal operational<br />
conditions do not prevail. Pending satisfactory completion of the remaining follow up<br />
actions, the Inspectorate will proceed to close this incident file.<br />
3.5 The following paragraphs provide summary detail on the main aspects of the<br />
Inspectors assessment of this incident.<br />
3.6 Incident management<br />
3.6.1 NI Water had in place a Major Incident Plan (MIP). This provides the necessary<br />
framework to manage sufficiency and supply issues. Roles, responsibilities, tasks and<br />
activities are identified with the scientific adviser playing a key role in water quality<br />
matters.<br />
3.6.2 NI Water needs to have its MIP supported by the application of good operational<br />
procedures and that record keeping is carried out robustly throughout any incident.<br />
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