Security of Tunnels & Underground Space - istss
Security of Tunnels & Underground Space - istss
Security of Tunnels & Underground Space - istss
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<strong>Security</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Tunnels</strong> and <strong>Underground</strong><br />
<strong>Space</strong>: Challenges and Opportunities<br />
3 rd International Symposium on Tunnel <strong>Security</strong> & Safety (ISTSS)<br />
March 14, 2008<br />
Harvey W Parker<br />
President, Harvey Parker & Associates, Inc.<br />
Past President, International Tunnelling and <strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong> Association (ITA)
International Tunnelling and<br />
<strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong> Association (ITA)<br />
• Organization <strong>of</strong> Member Nations<br />
– NGO <strong>of</strong> the United Nations<br />
– 52 Member Nations + Affiliates<br />
– ITA Network ~ 20,000<br />
• ITA-COSUF<br />
– Committee on Operational Safety <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Underground</strong> Facilities<br />
– Open to organizations dealing with<br />
design, construction, operation, use<br />
& research <strong>of</strong> all underground<br />
facilities
Two Major <strong>Security</strong> Issues<br />
• Protect the Public & Facilities<br />
– Main Thrust<br />
• Existing Facilities<br />
• New Design & Construction<br />
• Use <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Underground</strong> as a Safe Haven<br />
– Safe Havens <strong>of</strong>fer more security than security risks
<strong>Underground</strong> as a Safe Haven<br />
• The <strong>Underground</strong> <strong>of</strong>fers Natural Protection to<br />
Whatever is Placed <strong>Underground</strong><br />
• Man has turned to the <strong>Underground</strong> every time he<br />
Wanted to Keep or Protect Anything for Future<br />
Use or Safe Disposal<br />
• Abundant Examples <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Underground</strong> used for<br />
Safety & <strong>Security</strong><br />
– Generally Unappreciated or Taken for Granted<br />
– Out <strong>of</strong> sight-out <strong>of</strong> mind
Development <strong>of</strong> Use <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Underground</strong> for Shelter & Safety<br />
• Adapted Caves to<br />
Specific Needs<br />
• Created Man-made<br />
<strong>Space</strong> for Safety<br />
– Graves – Classic “Six Feet<br />
Under”<br />
– Tombs<br />
– Storage<br />
– Transportation<br />
– Military<br />
– Work & Living <strong>Space</strong>
Graves & Tombs for <strong>Security</strong><br />
Range from small hand-dug pits & caves to<br />
sophisticated and richly decorated tombs<br />
Tepic, Mexico<br />
Ming Tomb, China<br />
Tutankhamun Tomb, Egypt<br />
(Source: Wikipedia)
Military Uses <strong>of</strong> <strong>Underground</strong><br />
• Bomb Shelters<br />
• Bunkers<br />
• Submarine Pens<br />
• Aircraft Hangers<br />
• Command Facilities<br />
• Civil Works<br />
– Sewage Treatment Plants<br />
– Oil Storage Caverns<br />
• Missile Silos & Bases<br />
• Abundant Networks <strong>of</strong><br />
Trenches & <strong>Tunnels</strong>
<strong>Underground</strong> Dwellings for <strong>Security</strong><br />
Mesa Verde, USA<br />
(Source Wikipedia)<br />
Cappdocia, Turkey<br />
(Source S.R. Nelson)<br />
Guadix, Spain<br />
(Source: Wikipedia)
<strong>Underground</strong> Storage for <strong>Security</strong><br />
(Source: FERC 2004)
<strong>Underground</strong> Storage <strong>of</strong> Fuel<br />
Kuji Oil Storage, Japan<br />
(Source: ITA)<br />
Solution Mined Salt Cavern<br />
(As large as 200 m by 1000 m)<br />
(Source: SMRI)
Storage <strong>of</strong> Food & Water for <strong>Security</strong><br />
Food Storage Morocco<br />
(Source: Sterling)<br />
Ancient Water Storage, Turkey<br />
(Source: ITA)
<strong>Underground</strong> Storage <strong>of</strong> Water<br />
(Source: Broch)
Comparative <strong>Security</strong> <strong>of</strong> above Ground Facilities
<strong>Security</strong> <strong>of</strong> Nuclear Facilities<br />
1) Waste Disposal<br />
Numerous programs worldwide to confirm feasibility <strong>of</strong><br />
underground storage <strong>of</strong> nuclear waste<br />
2) The Next Step:<br />
<strong>Underground</strong> Nuclear Power Plants for <strong>Security</strong> & Safety<br />
against accidents as well as natural and manmade hazards
<strong>Security</strong> Archival Storage<br />
(Source: ITA)<br />
Svalbard Global Seed Vault Norway<br />
(Storage for 2.25 Billion Seeds at -18 C)<br />
(Source: Global Crop Diversity Trust)
Superior Dynamic Resistance <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Underground</strong> Facilities<br />
• <strong>Underground</strong> facilities<br />
– <strong>Security</strong> advantage against dynamic forces<br />
– Behave very well in earthquakes<br />
– Have been demonstrated to be capable <strong>of</strong><br />
being hardened against large blasts
Unappreciated Financial Value <strong>of</strong> <strong>Security</strong><br />
Aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong><br />
• Safe Havens<br />
– Consider as <strong>Security</strong> Investments, not costs<br />
– Earthquake safety for lifelines<br />
• Invaluable<br />
– Weather<br />
– Forest Fires & Landslides<br />
– Intentional Acts<br />
• San Francisco Earthquake (1995)<br />
– Subway inspected & service restored within hours<br />
– Took rest <strong>of</strong> San Francisco many months to recover<br />
• Subway service during recovery time was INVALUABLE
Safe Haven Summary<br />
• Safe Havens reduce security risk rather than pose extra risks<br />
• Many Safe Havens <strong>of</strong> all kinds exist<br />
– New creative applications being developed frequently<br />
• Increase decision makers’ awareness <strong>of</strong> safe havens<br />
– Take better advantage <strong>of</strong> safe haven concept<br />
– Recognize and present financial advantage in proper perspective<br />
– <strong>Security</strong> investments, not costs<br />
• Lessons Learned from safe havens<br />
– Limited Access<br />
– Isolation<br />
– Life Cycle Financial Advantages<br />
• We must strive to maintain their special security advantage<br />
– Our adversaries are:<br />
• Resourceful<br />
• Constantly trying<br />
– We owe the public to keep ahead <strong>of</strong> adversaries
<strong>Security</strong> Challenges & Opportunities<br />
• Protect the Public & Facilities<br />
– Existing Facilities<br />
– New Design & Construction<br />
• Safe, Meaningful, Communication & Cooperation<br />
• Technology Transfer<br />
• Non-Technical Issues<br />
• Risk Management<br />
• Cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>Security</strong>
Typical Threats<br />
• Natural & Accidental<br />
– Fire in frozen food storage warehouse (1992)<br />
• Burned 5 months<br />
– Chicago Downtown Flooding (1992)<br />
• Freight tunnel damaged<br />
• Flooded all downtown basements<br />
– Flooding <strong>of</strong> Prague Subway (2002)<br />
• Extreme Flood<br />
• 17 stations & ~20 km tunnel flooded<br />
• Intentional<br />
– Sarin gas attack, Tokyo (1995)<br />
– Daegu subway arson, Korea (2003)<br />
– Moscow, Russia (2004)<br />
– London, UK (2005)
<strong>Security</strong> Challenges<br />
Time Sequence<br />
Deter<br />
Detect<br />
Defend<br />
Shield<br />
Evacuate<br />
Cleanup<br />
Rehabilitate<br />
Deny<br />
Delay<br />
Protect<br />
Isolate<br />
Mitigate<br />
Repair<br />
Restore
Deter & Protect <strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong><br />
• Difficult because <strong>of</strong> unknown threat and at an<br />
unknown time, a so-called “unknown-unknown.”<br />
• <strong>Tunnels</strong> & underground space not necessarily targets <strong>of</strong> choice<br />
– Yet an event or events could occur at anytime<br />
– Challenge is to use this time to develop countermeasures<br />
• Intentional acts<br />
• Global warming impact<br />
• <strong>Underground</strong> transportation tunnels, and underground space<br />
for public use appear to be more vulnerable and more difficult<br />
to protect
Challenge: Must Address ALL Threats<br />
• Not just transportation tunnels<br />
– All tunnels must be addressed<br />
– Water, Wastewater are critical lifelines<br />
• Different needs; different solutions<br />
– Utilities, storage<br />
– <strong>Underground</strong> space<br />
• Not just Civil/Structural risks:<br />
– Include management & training & public image<br />
– Include Communications & Control<br />
• Address Arson, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Explosive<br />
– Combinations<br />
• Must Address Flooding urgently<br />
– Natural flooding<br />
• Prague<br />
• Global warming<br />
– Manmade Hazards<br />
• Accidental flooding in Chicago<br />
– Make precautions before construction near existing tunnels<br />
• Intentional acts
Safe, Meaningful, Communications,<br />
and Cooperation<br />
• Most challenging aspect <strong>of</strong> security<br />
– But also potentially the most rewarding opportunity<br />
• Issues<br />
– Confidentiality<br />
– Compromising<br />
– Legal etc.<br />
• Industry is in dire need to openly communicate in secure<br />
forums<br />
– Currently restricted by legal confidentiality agreements<br />
– Clearly confidentiality <strong>of</strong> sensitive information MUST be preserved<br />
• Anything less plays into the hands <strong>of</strong> our adversaries
Needed: Open Communications- See TRB Reports
<strong>Security</strong> Development Research &<br />
Implementation<br />
• Compared to other security initiatives, the<br />
<strong>Underground</strong> Field is lagging<br />
– Generally tunnel security done by cities & agencies<br />
– Not well coordinated<br />
• Legal & confidentiality constraints<br />
– Not funded well enough
ITA Initiatives<br />
• Task Force on <strong>Security</strong><br />
• ITA is Well-Suited for Worldwide Action<br />
• Consistent with Current ITA-COSUF Activities<br />
– Fire and Life Safety Legacy<br />
• Mandate <strong>of</strong> our Industry<br />
– Provide a Worldwide Forum for:<br />
• Safe Information Sharing<br />
• Stimulating Protective Actions
Task Force Restraints<br />
• Enormous Potential Scope<br />
• Confidentiality Issues<br />
– Not wanting to write a manual for our<br />
adversaries<br />
– Confidentiality desires within projects, cities,<br />
nations<br />
• Legal Issues<br />
• Expectation that others are providing role<br />
• Probable Mistaken desire to avoid publicity
Develop Worldwide Forum<br />
• Similar to an <strong>Underground</strong> ISAC but not 24/7<br />
– Collect, Analyze & Disseminate Information<br />
• Past and Current Incidents<br />
• Facts, Suggestions, & Guidelines<br />
• Lessons Learned<br />
– Evaluate threats & defenses<br />
– Develop & Share Ideas<br />
• With Current Operators<br />
• Future Design & Construction<br />
– Stimulate<br />
• Operational & Design Actions<br />
• Funding<br />
• Research and Testing<br />
• Demonstrations<br />
• Forum requires Fail-Safe <strong>Security</strong> Protocols<br />
– Interchange can occur on one <strong>of</strong> several increasingly classified<br />
levels <strong>of</strong> security
Design Opportunities<br />
• Compartmentalization<br />
– How to compartmentalize without destroying function<br />
• Ventilation<br />
• Drainage<br />
– How & when to deploy<br />
• Optimize <strong>Security</strong> with Fire & Life Safety<br />
– Especially when upgrading<br />
• Water & Wastewater Opportunities: Detection & Diversion<br />
• Physical Mitigation<br />
– Fillets or rounded corners to ease cleanup<br />
– Fewer joints and cracks<br />
– Sacrificial Coatings<br />
• <strong>Security</strong> Management<br />
• S<strong>of</strong>ter non-technical side <strong>of</strong> security<br />
• How to Afford Increased <strong>Security</strong>
Transfer <strong>of</strong> Technology<br />
• Think “Out <strong>of</strong> the Box:” Consider Opportunities,<br />
not just risks<br />
• Share & gain ideas from outside our industry<br />
• Be bold & visionary<br />
– Lessons Learned in many fields<br />
• Mining industry<br />
• Bridge & Buildings<br />
• Even Shipboard fire information<br />
– Technology from Hot Air Balloons now adapted to<br />
tunnel fire safety & is being extended to security
Bold & Visionary Technology Transfer<br />
(Hot Air Balloons to Tunnel Fire Fighting)<br />
Courtesy <strong>of</strong><br />
Lindstrand<br />
Technologies
Future Needed Developments<br />
• Compartmentalization<br />
– Ventilation<br />
• Active & Passive<br />
– Drainage<br />
• Barriers<br />
– Integral or portable<br />
– Structural or non-structural<br />
– Purposes<br />
• Fire<br />
• Flooding<br />
• C,B,R<br />
– Applicability to utility tunnels<br />
• Non-Tunnel <strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong>s<br />
– Different, more complex ventilation schemes<br />
– Larger <strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong> Openings
RISK & CHOICES<br />
ARE PLENTIFUL
Risk Management<br />
•Use Systematic Risk Management<br />
• Powerful method<br />
– Right Attitude<br />
– Right Approach<br />
• Puts security issues into context with other risks<br />
and opportunities<br />
• Helps manage Thinking Out <strong>of</strong> the Box<br />
• Compare Cost to the Benefits<br />
• Evaluate Safe Haven Financial Advantages
Risk Management Workshops<br />
1) Identify Problem or Problem Category<br />
2) Assign likelihood (1-5)<br />
3) Assign Impact (1-5)<br />
4) Calculate Risk<br />
5) Identify Mitigation if needed<br />
6) Tracked with Risk Registers
Risk is Impact X Probability
Flexible Contracting Opportunities<br />
• Rapid changes<br />
– Methods considered in design may be obsolete by time<br />
construction complete<br />
– Manage with Risk Registers<br />
• Flexible Contracting Methods & Attitudes<br />
–Permit latest equipment can be installed at the last practical<br />
time<br />
• Cost effectively without undue penalty to Owner or Contractor<br />
– Permit equipment upgrades at any time while in service<br />
• Cost effectively with minimum disruption to service and to public<br />
• Pitfalls <strong>of</strong> Design-Build & Concessionaire Contracts<br />
– Owner may have to relinquish some decision authority
Prepare As-Constructed Reports<br />
• Previously desired for:<br />
– Future Expansion<br />
– Maintenance<br />
– Geological archive<br />
• Now extremely valuable<br />
– Assess vulnerabilities<br />
– Assess extent & seriousness if damaged<br />
– Plan quick & efficient repair & restoration<br />
• Usually emergency repairs needed<br />
– No time to guess what was already built<br />
• Must provide fail-safe protection for the data<br />
– Confidentiality<br />
– Limited access
Asset Management Program for <strong>Security</strong><br />
• To assess vulnerabilities, must:<br />
– Know what you have<br />
– Know the condition <strong>of</strong> the asset<br />
• Comprehensive Asset<br />
Management Program<br />
– Incorporate Building Information<br />
Modeling (BIM)<br />
(Source: ITA)<br />
• Consistent with need to plan<br />
underground space & operations<br />
• Must provide fail-safe data<br />
protection
Planning & Managing<br />
<strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong> for <strong>Security</strong><br />
• Cities should plan underground space in the<br />
same way they plan on the surface<br />
• Cities should know present situation<br />
– What exists underground<br />
– Where the features are<br />
– What is their condition<br />
– What are their vulnerabilities & their strengths<br />
• Cities must plan to Deter, Delay, Detect etc.
Cost <strong>of</strong> Tunnel <strong>Security</strong><br />
• Large & Unknown & significantly more than capital cost<br />
• Not previously budgeted<br />
• Should use life-cycle methodology & include:<br />
• Development costs<br />
• Operational inefficiency<br />
• Maintenance<br />
• Upgrading & replacement<br />
• Use Risk Management Methodology to Evaluate<br />
– Cost versus benefit<br />
– Make “What If” calculations<br />
• Safe Haven costs<br />
– Many <strong>of</strong> the costs should be considered as long-term “investments”
<strong>Security</strong> Summary & Conclusions(1)<br />
• Two (2) Major <strong>Security</strong> Issues<br />
– Protection for the Public & Facilities<br />
• Traditional tunnels pose many security challenges<br />
– Use <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Underground</strong> as a Safe Haven<br />
• Safe havens provide security, not extra risks<br />
• Threats<br />
– Natural & accidental<br />
– Intentional<br />
• All types <strong>of</strong> tunnels have different security needs<br />
– Transportation<br />
– Water & Wastewater<br />
– <strong>Underground</strong> space
<strong>Security</strong> Summary & Conclusions(3)<br />
• If you want to protect or save, preserve, or<br />
isolate something for a long time, put it<br />
underground<br />
• If you want to protect a lifeline from earthquakes,<br />
weather, fire, violence, or other hazard, go out <strong>of</strong><br />
your way to put it underground<br />
• Maintain Safe Havens’ security advantage
<strong>Security</strong> Summary & Conclusions(4)<br />
• Many challenges abound<br />
– Deter, Detect, Deny, Delay, Defend etc.<br />
–Most challenges are also opportunities<br />
• Need more open communications (TRB-like) and<br />
more pr<strong>of</strong>essional forums on security <strong>of</strong> underground<br />
space<br />
• Need network for sharing security issues in ways that<br />
promote open discussions & technology transfer<br />
– ISAC-like network<br />
– Yet still preserves appropriate confidentiality protocols
<strong>Security</strong> Summary & Conclusions(2)<br />
• ITA Represents the Worldwide <strong>Underground</strong> Industry<br />
–ITA-COSUF<br />
• Industry needs a Coordinated Tunnel <strong>Security</strong> Plan<br />
– Identify threats & vulnerabilities<br />
– Develop technology & operational methodology to reduce<br />
threat & vulnerability<br />
• Safe, Meaningful, ISAC-like sharing network<br />
– Includes all regions and kinds <strong>of</strong> tunnels<br />
– Share Information for Existing Facilities<br />
– Share Future Tunnel Design Considerations<br />
– Need several increasingly classified security levels
<strong>Security</strong> Summary & Conclusions(5)<br />
• Tunnel security industry should embrace risk<br />
management methodology<br />
– Systematic using Risk Registers<br />
– Puts security risks in context with other risks<br />
– Use for opportunities as well as risks<br />
•Use Life Cycle Cost Methodology<br />
– Safe Havens are security investments, not costs
<strong>Security</strong> Summary & Conclusions(6)<br />
• Major development issues include:<br />
– Traditional risks and challenges<br />
•C,B,R<br />
• Flooding<br />
– Urgent need<br />
– Accidental & intentional<br />
– Global warming<br />
– Non-technical programs, documentation & training<br />
• As Constructed Reports, Asset management & BIM<br />
• Technology Transfer Essential & Rewarding<br />
– Be bold and visionary<br />
• <strong>Underground</strong> industry is very strong and can<br />
respond to any and all security needs
Thank You and Good Luck<br />
(Source: Apollo 17)