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Security of Tunnels & Underground Space - istss

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<strong>Security</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Tunnels</strong> and <strong>Underground</strong><br />

<strong>Space</strong>: Challenges and Opportunities<br />

3 rd International Symposium on Tunnel <strong>Security</strong> & Safety (ISTSS)<br />

March 14, 2008<br />

Harvey W Parker<br />

President, Harvey Parker & Associates, Inc.<br />

Past President, International Tunnelling and <strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong> Association (ITA)


International Tunnelling and<br />

<strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong> Association (ITA)<br />

• Organization <strong>of</strong> Member Nations<br />

– NGO <strong>of</strong> the United Nations<br />

– 52 Member Nations + Affiliates<br />

– ITA Network ~ 20,000<br />

• ITA-COSUF<br />

– Committee on Operational Safety <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>Underground</strong> Facilities<br />

– Open to organizations dealing with<br />

design, construction, operation, use<br />

& research <strong>of</strong> all underground<br />

facilities


Two Major <strong>Security</strong> Issues<br />

• Protect the Public & Facilities<br />

– Main Thrust<br />

• Existing Facilities<br />

• New Design & Construction<br />

• Use <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Underground</strong> as a Safe Haven<br />

– Safe Havens <strong>of</strong>fer more security than security risks


<strong>Underground</strong> as a Safe Haven<br />

• The <strong>Underground</strong> <strong>of</strong>fers Natural Protection to<br />

Whatever is Placed <strong>Underground</strong><br />

• Man has turned to the <strong>Underground</strong> every time he<br />

Wanted to Keep or Protect Anything for Future<br />

Use or Safe Disposal<br />

• Abundant Examples <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Underground</strong> used for<br />

Safety & <strong>Security</strong><br />

– Generally Unappreciated or Taken for Granted<br />

– Out <strong>of</strong> sight-out <strong>of</strong> mind


Development <strong>of</strong> Use <strong>of</strong> the<br />

<strong>Underground</strong> for Shelter & Safety<br />

• Adapted Caves to<br />

Specific Needs<br />

• Created Man-made<br />

<strong>Space</strong> for Safety<br />

– Graves – Classic “Six Feet<br />

Under”<br />

– Tombs<br />

– Storage<br />

– Transportation<br />

– Military<br />

– Work & Living <strong>Space</strong>


Graves & Tombs for <strong>Security</strong><br />

Range from small hand-dug pits & caves to<br />

sophisticated and richly decorated tombs<br />

Tepic, Mexico<br />

Ming Tomb, China<br />

Tutankhamun Tomb, Egypt<br />

(Source: Wikipedia)


Military Uses <strong>of</strong> <strong>Underground</strong><br />

• Bomb Shelters<br />

• Bunkers<br />

• Submarine Pens<br />

• Aircraft Hangers<br />

• Command Facilities<br />

• Civil Works<br />

– Sewage Treatment Plants<br />

– Oil Storage Caverns<br />

• Missile Silos & Bases<br />

• Abundant Networks <strong>of</strong><br />

Trenches & <strong>Tunnels</strong>


<strong>Underground</strong> Dwellings for <strong>Security</strong><br />

Mesa Verde, USA<br />

(Source Wikipedia)<br />

Cappdocia, Turkey<br />

(Source S.R. Nelson)<br />

Guadix, Spain<br />

(Source: Wikipedia)


<strong>Underground</strong> Storage for <strong>Security</strong><br />

(Source: FERC 2004)


<strong>Underground</strong> Storage <strong>of</strong> Fuel<br />

Kuji Oil Storage, Japan<br />

(Source: ITA)<br />

Solution Mined Salt Cavern<br />

(As large as 200 m by 1000 m)<br />

(Source: SMRI)


Storage <strong>of</strong> Food & Water for <strong>Security</strong><br />

Food Storage Morocco<br />

(Source: Sterling)<br />

Ancient Water Storage, Turkey<br />

(Source: ITA)


<strong>Underground</strong> Storage <strong>of</strong> Water<br />

(Source: Broch)


Comparative <strong>Security</strong> <strong>of</strong> above Ground Facilities


<strong>Security</strong> <strong>of</strong> Nuclear Facilities<br />

1) Waste Disposal<br />

Numerous programs worldwide to confirm feasibility <strong>of</strong><br />

underground storage <strong>of</strong> nuclear waste<br />

2) The Next Step:<br />

<strong>Underground</strong> Nuclear Power Plants for <strong>Security</strong> & Safety<br />

against accidents as well as natural and manmade hazards


<strong>Security</strong> Archival Storage<br />

(Source: ITA)<br />

Svalbard Global Seed Vault Norway<br />

(Storage for 2.25 Billion Seeds at -18 C)<br />

(Source: Global Crop Diversity Trust)


Superior Dynamic Resistance <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>Underground</strong> Facilities<br />

• <strong>Underground</strong> facilities<br />

– <strong>Security</strong> advantage against dynamic forces<br />

– Behave very well in earthquakes<br />

– Have been demonstrated to be capable <strong>of</strong><br />

being hardened against large blasts


Unappreciated Financial Value <strong>of</strong> <strong>Security</strong><br />

Aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong><br />

• Safe Havens<br />

– Consider as <strong>Security</strong> Investments, not costs<br />

– Earthquake safety for lifelines<br />

• Invaluable<br />

– Weather<br />

– Forest Fires & Landslides<br />

– Intentional Acts<br />

• San Francisco Earthquake (1995)<br />

– Subway inspected & service restored within hours<br />

– Took rest <strong>of</strong> San Francisco many months to recover<br />

• Subway service during recovery time was INVALUABLE


Safe Haven Summary<br />

• Safe Havens reduce security risk rather than pose extra risks<br />

• Many Safe Havens <strong>of</strong> all kinds exist<br />

– New creative applications being developed frequently<br />

• Increase decision makers’ awareness <strong>of</strong> safe havens<br />

– Take better advantage <strong>of</strong> safe haven concept<br />

– Recognize and present financial advantage in proper perspective<br />

– <strong>Security</strong> investments, not costs<br />

• Lessons Learned from safe havens<br />

– Limited Access<br />

– Isolation<br />

– Life Cycle Financial Advantages<br />

• We must strive to maintain their special security advantage<br />

– Our adversaries are:<br />

• Resourceful<br />

• Constantly trying<br />

– We owe the public to keep ahead <strong>of</strong> adversaries


<strong>Security</strong> Challenges & Opportunities<br />

• Protect the Public & Facilities<br />

– Existing Facilities<br />

– New Design & Construction<br />

• Safe, Meaningful, Communication & Cooperation<br />

• Technology Transfer<br />

• Non-Technical Issues<br />

• Risk Management<br />

• Cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>Security</strong>


Typical Threats<br />

• Natural & Accidental<br />

– Fire in frozen food storage warehouse (1992)<br />

• Burned 5 months<br />

– Chicago Downtown Flooding (1992)<br />

• Freight tunnel damaged<br />

• Flooded all downtown basements<br />

– Flooding <strong>of</strong> Prague Subway (2002)<br />

• Extreme Flood<br />

• 17 stations & ~20 km tunnel flooded<br />

• Intentional<br />

– Sarin gas attack, Tokyo (1995)<br />

– Daegu subway arson, Korea (2003)<br />

– Moscow, Russia (2004)<br />

– London, UK (2005)


<strong>Security</strong> Challenges<br />

Time Sequence<br />

Deter<br />

Detect<br />

Defend<br />

Shield<br />

Evacuate<br />

Cleanup<br />

Rehabilitate<br />

Deny<br />

Delay<br />

Protect<br />

Isolate<br />

Mitigate<br />

Repair<br />

Restore


Deter & Protect <strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong><br />

• Difficult because <strong>of</strong> unknown threat and at an<br />

unknown time, a so-called “unknown-unknown.”<br />

• <strong>Tunnels</strong> & underground space not necessarily targets <strong>of</strong> choice<br />

– Yet an event or events could occur at anytime<br />

– Challenge is to use this time to develop countermeasures<br />

• Intentional acts<br />

• Global warming impact<br />

• <strong>Underground</strong> transportation tunnels, and underground space<br />

for public use appear to be more vulnerable and more difficult<br />

to protect


Challenge: Must Address ALL Threats<br />

• Not just transportation tunnels<br />

– All tunnels must be addressed<br />

– Water, Wastewater are critical lifelines<br />

• Different needs; different solutions<br />

– Utilities, storage<br />

– <strong>Underground</strong> space<br />

• Not just Civil/Structural risks:<br />

– Include management & training & public image<br />

– Include Communications & Control<br />

• Address Arson, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Explosive<br />

– Combinations<br />

• Must Address Flooding urgently<br />

– Natural flooding<br />

• Prague<br />

• Global warming<br />

– Manmade Hazards<br />

• Accidental flooding in Chicago<br />

– Make precautions before construction near existing tunnels<br />

• Intentional acts


Safe, Meaningful, Communications,<br />

and Cooperation<br />

• Most challenging aspect <strong>of</strong> security<br />

– But also potentially the most rewarding opportunity<br />

• Issues<br />

– Confidentiality<br />

– Compromising<br />

– Legal etc.<br />

• Industry is in dire need to openly communicate in secure<br />

forums<br />

– Currently restricted by legal confidentiality agreements<br />

– Clearly confidentiality <strong>of</strong> sensitive information MUST be preserved<br />

• Anything less plays into the hands <strong>of</strong> our adversaries


Needed: Open Communications- See TRB Reports


<strong>Security</strong> Development Research &<br />

Implementation<br />

• Compared to other security initiatives, the<br />

<strong>Underground</strong> Field is lagging<br />

– Generally tunnel security done by cities & agencies<br />

– Not well coordinated<br />

• Legal & confidentiality constraints<br />

– Not funded well enough


ITA Initiatives<br />

• Task Force on <strong>Security</strong><br />

• ITA is Well-Suited for Worldwide Action<br />

• Consistent with Current ITA-COSUF Activities<br />

– Fire and Life Safety Legacy<br />

• Mandate <strong>of</strong> our Industry<br />

– Provide a Worldwide Forum for:<br />

• Safe Information Sharing<br />

• Stimulating Protective Actions


Task Force Restraints<br />

• Enormous Potential Scope<br />

• Confidentiality Issues<br />

– Not wanting to write a manual for our<br />

adversaries<br />

– Confidentiality desires within projects, cities,<br />

nations<br />

• Legal Issues<br />

• Expectation that others are providing role<br />

• Probable Mistaken desire to avoid publicity


Develop Worldwide Forum<br />

• Similar to an <strong>Underground</strong> ISAC but not 24/7<br />

– Collect, Analyze & Disseminate Information<br />

• Past and Current Incidents<br />

• Facts, Suggestions, & Guidelines<br />

• Lessons Learned<br />

– Evaluate threats & defenses<br />

– Develop & Share Ideas<br />

• With Current Operators<br />

• Future Design & Construction<br />

– Stimulate<br />

• Operational & Design Actions<br />

• Funding<br />

• Research and Testing<br />

• Demonstrations<br />

• Forum requires Fail-Safe <strong>Security</strong> Protocols<br />

– Interchange can occur on one <strong>of</strong> several increasingly classified<br />

levels <strong>of</strong> security


Design Opportunities<br />

• Compartmentalization<br />

– How to compartmentalize without destroying function<br />

• Ventilation<br />

• Drainage<br />

– How & when to deploy<br />

• Optimize <strong>Security</strong> with Fire & Life Safety<br />

– Especially when upgrading<br />

• Water & Wastewater Opportunities: Detection & Diversion<br />

• Physical Mitigation<br />

– Fillets or rounded corners to ease cleanup<br />

– Fewer joints and cracks<br />

– Sacrificial Coatings<br />

• <strong>Security</strong> Management<br />

• S<strong>of</strong>ter non-technical side <strong>of</strong> security<br />

• How to Afford Increased <strong>Security</strong>


Transfer <strong>of</strong> Technology<br />

• Think “Out <strong>of</strong> the Box:” Consider Opportunities,<br />

not just risks<br />

• Share & gain ideas from outside our industry<br />

• Be bold & visionary<br />

– Lessons Learned in many fields<br />

• Mining industry<br />

• Bridge & Buildings<br />

• Even Shipboard fire information<br />

– Technology from Hot Air Balloons now adapted to<br />

tunnel fire safety & is being extended to security


Bold & Visionary Technology Transfer<br />

(Hot Air Balloons to Tunnel Fire Fighting)<br />

Courtesy <strong>of</strong><br />

Lindstrand<br />

Technologies


Future Needed Developments<br />

• Compartmentalization<br />

– Ventilation<br />

• Active & Passive<br />

– Drainage<br />

• Barriers<br />

– Integral or portable<br />

– Structural or non-structural<br />

– Purposes<br />

• Fire<br />

• Flooding<br />

• C,B,R<br />

– Applicability to utility tunnels<br />

• Non-Tunnel <strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong>s<br />

– Different, more complex ventilation schemes<br />

– Larger <strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong> Openings


RISK & CHOICES<br />

ARE PLENTIFUL


Risk Management<br />

•Use Systematic Risk Management<br />

• Powerful method<br />

– Right Attitude<br />

– Right Approach<br />

• Puts security issues into context with other risks<br />

and opportunities<br />

• Helps manage Thinking Out <strong>of</strong> the Box<br />

• Compare Cost to the Benefits<br />

• Evaluate Safe Haven Financial Advantages


Risk Management Workshops<br />

1) Identify Problem or Problem Category<br />

2) Assign likelihood (1-5)<br />

3) Assign Impact (1-5)<br />

4) Calculate Risk<br />

5) Identify Mitigation if needed<br />

6) Tracked with Risk Registers


Risk is Impact X Probability


Flexible Contracting Opportunities<br />

• Rapid changes<br />

– Methods considered in design may be obsolete by time<br />

construction complete<br />

– Manage with Risk Registers<br />

• Flexible Contracting Methods & Attitudes<br />

–Permit latest equipment can be installed at the last practical<br />

time<br />

• Cost effectively without undue penalty to Owner or Contractor<br />

– Permit equipment upgrades at any time while in service<br />

• Cost effectively with minimum disruption to service and to public<br />

• Pitfalls <strong>of</strong> Design-Build & Concessionaire Contracts<br />

– Owner may have to relinquish some decision authority


Prepare As-Constructed Reports<br />

• Previously desired for:<br />

– Future Expansion<br />

– Maintenance<br />

– Geological archive<br />

• Now extremely valuable<br />

– Assess vulnerabilities<br />

– Assess extent & seriousness if damaged<br />

– Plan quick & efficient repair & restoration<br />

• Usually emergency repairs needed<br />

– No time to guess what was already built<br />

• Must provide fail-safe protection for the data<br />

– Confidentiality<br />

– Limited access


Asset Management Program for <strong>Security</strong><br />

• To assess vulnerabilities, must:<br />

– Know what you have<br />

– Know the condition <strong>of</strong> the asset<br />

• Comprehensive Asset<br />

Management Program<br />

– Incorporate Building Information<br />

Modeling (BIM)<br />

(Source: ITA)<br />

• Consistent with need to plan<br />

underground space & operations<br />

• Must provide fail-safe data<br />

protection


Planning & Managing<br />

<strong>Underground</strong> <strong>Space</strong> for <strong>Security</strong><br />

• Cities should plan underground space in the<br />

same way they plan on the surface<br />

• Cities should know present situation<br />

– What exists underground<br />

– Where the features are<br />

– What is their condition<br />

– What are their vulnerabilities & their strengths<br />

• Cities must plan to Deter, Delay, Detect etc.


Cost <strong>of</strong> Tunnel <strong>Security</strong><br />

• Large & Unknown & significantly more than capital cost<br />

• Not previously budgeted<br />

• Should use life-cycle methodology & include:<br />

• Development costs<br />

• Operational inefficiency<br />

• Maintenance<br />

• Upgrading & replacement<br />

• Use Risk Management Methodology to Evaluate<br />

– Cost versus benefit<br />

– Make “What If” calculations<br />

• Safe Haven costs<br />

– Many <strong>of</strong> the costs should be considered as long-term “investments”


<strong>Security</strong> Summary & Conclusions(1)<br />

• Two (2) Major <strong>Security</strong> Issues<br />

– Protection for the Public & Facilities<br />

• Traditional tunnels pose many security challenges<br />

– Use <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Underground</strong> as a Safe Haven<br />

• Safe havens provide security, not extra risks<br />

• Threats<br />

– Natural & accidental<br />

– Intentional<br />

• All types <strong>of</strong> tunnels have different security needs<br />

– Transportation<br />

– Water & Wastewater<br />

– <strong>Underground</strong> space


<strong>Security</strong> Summary & Conclusions(3)<br />

• If you want to protect or save, preserve, or<br />

isolate something for a long time, put it<br />

underground<br />

• If you want to protect a lifeline from earthquakes,<br />

weather, fire, violence, or other hazard, go out <strong>of</strong><br />

your way to put it underground<br />

• Maintain Safe Havens’ security advantage


<strong>Security</strong> Summary & Conclusions(4)<br />

• Many challenges abound<br />

– Deter, Detect, Deny, Delay, Defend etc.<br />

–Most challenges are also opportunities<br />

• Need more open communications (TRB-like) and<br />

more pr<strong>of</strong>essional forums on security <strong>of</strong> underground<br />

space<br />

• Need network for sharing security issues in ways that<br />

promote open discussions & technology transfer<br />

– ISAC-like network<br />

– Yet still preserves appropriate confidentiality protocols


<strong>Security</strong> Summary & Conclusions(2)<br />

• ITA Represents the Worldwide <strong>Underground</strong> Industry<br />

–ITA-COSUF<br />

• Industry needs a Coordinated Tunnel <strong>Security</strong> Plan<br />

– Identify threats & vulnerabilities<br />

– Develop technology & operational methodology to reduce<br />

threat & vulnerability<br />

• Safe, Meaningful, ISAC-like sharing network<br />

– Includes all regions and kinds <strong>of</strong> tunnels<br />

– Share Information for Existing Facilities<br />

– Share Future Tunnel Design Considerations<br />

– Need several increasingly classified security levels


<strong>Security</strong> Summary & Conclusions(5)<br />

• Tunnel security industry should embrace risk<br />

management methodology<br />

– Systematic using Risk Registers<br />

– Puts security risks in context with other risks<br />

– Use for opportunities as well as risks<br />

•Use Life Cycle Cost Methodology<br />

– Safe Havens are security investments, not costs


<strong>Security</strong> Summary & Conclusions(6)<br />

• Major development issues include:<br />

– Traditional risks and challenges<br />

•C,B,R<br />

• Flooding<br />

– Urgent need<br />

– Accidental & intentional<br />

– Global warming<br />

– Non-technical programs, documentation & training<br />

• As Constructed Reports, Asset management & BIM<br />

• Technology Transfer Essential & Rewarding<br />

– Be bold and visionary<br />

• <strong>Underground</strong> industry is very strong and can<br />

respond to any and all security needs


Thank You and Good Luck<br />

(Source: Apollo 17)

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