A Paradise on the Oder? - Department of Scandinavian Studies

<strong>Paradise</strong> on theOder?de-emphasize by promoting an overarching “European” identitythat can encompass multiple ethnicities.A European border?Due to the high level of cross-border contact and interaction,the Polish/German border regions are also locationswhere the EU has most vigorously pursued policies aimedat de-emphasizing and Europeanizing national boundaries. “Bridge”towns such as Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) are often described aslaboratories of European integration, a position that makes themextremely important symbols for the project of EU expansion. Thesame symbolism is invoked on the Euro paper currency, which featuresevolving architectural styles of bridges on each successivelyhigher denomination.The processes of deterritorialization in the Polish/German borderregions are characterized by an increased emphasis on regionalinitiatives with the ultimate goal of creating what Martinez (1994)calls “integrated borderlands,” or border regions that have “no barriersto the flow of goods and people,” and “enjoy a relationship ofequality, trust and respect” (Donnan & Wilson 1999:51). To thisend, the EU has created cross-border “Euroregions” to help facilitatecultural and economic cooperation and integration between itsmember states, and has provided various regional funding initiativesaimed specifically at transnational and interregional cooperation. 5In Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder), these initiatives have funded culturalevents, educational activities, infrastructure development, and economicinvestment, all of which endeavor to promote contact andinteraction between and among Polish and German citizens livingin the border regions.Crossing over the bridge between Poland and Germany andthrough its passport and customs checkpoint is a regular (andsometimes daily) experience for many of Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder)’sresidents, who are conscious of crossing between two separatelyconstructed spaces. As one of the dominant architectural featuresof the cities, the bridge (Fig. 1) itself is symbolic of both Europeanconnection and national separation, and one of the first sights togreet an eastward traveler is a white and red border marker bearinga crowned white eagle, the national symbol of Poland. A localuniversity student remarked to me that there should be an officialmarker at the center of the bridge that indicates where one crosses“into the East,” a statement that acknowledges the deep histori-131

City & Societycal and cultural divisions that are often also encompassed by thePolish-German border (cf. Wolff 1994).Despite the cities’ proximity to one another (about a 5 minutewalk and usually no more than 5 minutes in the customs queue), theborder remains a distinct marker of difference, and the difficulty ofsuddenly encounteringand negotiatinga foreign culture isregarded by many asat least a minor hardship.Furthermore,when an individualcrosses through theborder checkpoint,he or she must formallydemonstrate anational citizenshipby twice presentinga national IDcard or passport forFig. 1. The bridge between Słubice (L) and Frankfurt(Oder) (R). [Photo by author] verification to boththe German and thePolish authorities 6 . Due to the close association of ethnicity withboth the cultural and legal definitions of citizenship in Poland andGermany 7 individuals living on both sides of the border routinelycombine the concepts of ethnicity and citizenship into the generalcategories of “Poles” and “Germans,” as a heuristic shorthand withwhich to make comparative generalizations about perceived similarityand difference.By advocating a transnational conception of identity andcitizenship, the EU endeavors to eliminate the transformativefunction of borders as the point where an individual moves fromidentification with an ethnic majority to an ethnic minority orfrom the position of a citizen to that of a foreigner (cf. Berdahl1999:4). Nevertheless, despite the fact that Polish and Germancitizens have been able to circulate freely across the border inSłubice/Frankfurt(Oder) since 1991, the border still correspondswith a strong ethnic and cultural distinctions. Therefore, whilemany of my respondents considered themselves to be residents ofthe locally transnational urban space of Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder),most would also admit to feeling more comfortable or more “athome” on one side of the border.132

<strong>Paradise</strong> on theOder?Transnational ConsumptionAs a cultural, ethnic and political frontier, the Polish/Germanborder forms what Gupta and Ferguson characterize as an“interstitial zone of displacement and deterritorializationthat shapes the identity of the hybridized subject” (1992:18). Byemphasizing policies of deteritorialization at its internal borders,the EU produces a context where the potential meanings of anemergent transnational and European identity are negotiatedthrough commonplace cross-border cultural interactions. Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) should therefore be understood as a culturally creativespace where “where [multiple subjectivities] coexist . . . eachwith its own gravity and density” (Rosaldo 1989:163), and wheremultiple ethnicities and identities meet and interact to create newsocial meanings.Given the EU’s emphasis on policies that promote an unrestrictedmarket, it is perhaps not surprising that in Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) shopping and the consumption of goods andservices are two of the foremost reasons for crossing the border ineither direction. Shopping is a fundamental border activity (cf.Donnan and Wilson 1999, Thuen 1998, Wilson 1993, 1995), andaccording to a study by Schultz, it is by far the primary reason forcross-border trips by residents of border cities throughout Europe,but especially in Eastern Europe (2002:26). For many individualsliving in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, shopping is often the way theyexperience the border, and as Berdahl (1999) describes in her ethnographyof the border between East and West Germany, the circulationof people and objects intrinsic to shopping and consumingacross a border provide important contexts for ascribing difference.Because the border between Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice is alsooften perceived as an ethnic boundary, the distinctions and socialrelations demonstrated through shopping frequently acquire ethnicdimensions, while the commodities procured during this “ritualpractice” are “used to constitute the complexity of contemporarysocial relations” (Miller 1998:8).During my interviews and conversations in Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder), shopping was a subject of tremendous discussion,especially with regard to relative prices and the best places to buyparticular items. Some items are demonstrably cheaper or easierto obtain on one side of the border. For example, gasoline is about20% cheaper on the Polish side, leading to long queues of automobilesat the border, especially on weekends and holidays. Cigarettesare also cheaper on the Polish side, as are many grocery items, such133

City & Societyas produce—most notably strawberries and asparagus—and bakedgoods. Cosmetics are often cheaper on the German side, while serviceproducts such as dentists, hair and beauty salons, restaurants,and “nightclubs” featuring dancers and often prostitution, arealmost always cheaper and are in greater abundance on the Polishside. The daily exchange rate further influences purchasing choices,and the carrying of two currencies is commonplace and often anecessity, leading to a prevalence of currency exchanges (kantor),especially on the Polish side. Because Poland is not projected toadopt the Euro until at least 2007, 8 this division of currency is alsoan indicator of difference, demonstrating in symbolic terms thatPoland is not quite ready to join the unified Europe represented bythe common currency.In addition to price, the quality and selection of goods areconstantly debated.Seeking bargains isone principal reasonfor crossing theborder, and visitingthe Polish bazaar(Fig. 2) to searchfor cheap prices ona wide variety ofitems ranging frombreads, meats, andcheeses, to bootlegCDs and DVDs, tofake designer jeans,is a popular activityFig. 2. The Słubice bazaar. [Photo by author]for many Germans.Trips between thebridge and the bazaar (a distance of about 1.5 kilometers) are asignificant source of revenue for Słubice’s oversized taxi service, alobby that until recently has reportedly blocked all attempts at creatinga unified public transit system between the towns. 9 The bestplace to purchase alcohol also varies by the type and quality thatis sought. Vodka is usually cheaper on the Polish side, while otherEU-produced spirits are often less expensive or easier to find on theGerman side. The consumption of beer, a product that is stronglylinked to local identity in both Germany and Poland (cf. Asher2003), is also divided by the border. Polish beer is cheaper andalmost exclusively served in Poland, while German beer is cheaper134

<strong>Paradise</strong> on theOder?and almost exclusively served in Germany (although both types areavailable in both countries).Ethnicity and hierarchy in the “European city”The practices of cross-border consumption in Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) facilitate not only the construction andmaintenance of national and ethnic differences betweenborder residents, but also help to organize these differences intohierarchies of political and cultural value (Appadurai 1986,Berdahl 1999, Bourdieu 1984[1979], Howes 1996). I was repeatedlytold that clerks in German stores often discriminate againstPoles by following shoppers through the aisles and treating themas potential thieves. Marek, a Pole who works in Słubice internetcafé, described his experience: “Germans don’t like Poles. Theydon’t look happy to see me when I go to McDonald’s [Note: Theonly McDonald’s in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice is on the Germanside of the border]. In shops they look at you like a thief.” Whilemany Germans reportedly condescend to Poles in Germany, manyPoles simultaneously judge some German consumers in Poland asmorally degenerate and occupying low social status, saying that theGermans who go to the bars and nightclubs in Poland are too poorto afford the German versions, and only travel to Poland so thatthey can afford to indulge.Nevertheless, the provision of inexpensive domestic services(e.g. cooking, cleaning, haircuts, prostitution) by Poles reinforcesa perception of German superiority, as well as the status of Polesas second class Europeans—the hired help in the “House ofEurope.” Or, as Bunzl argues of cross-border Austrian sex tourismin Prague, these practices produce fields and discourses of stratifiedneocolonial hierarchies between colonizing and colonized subjects(2000:89). In Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice this neocolonial hierarchyis expressed by the process of mapping the producers of servicesas Polish and their consumers as German. With its emphasis onthe open market, the EU has created a transnational, cross-borderspace in which the consumption of services is possible, and hasenabled the development of these hierarchies. One wry Polishjoke perhaps sums up many Poles’ view of their positioning in theEU best of all: “Once Poland joins the EU every Pole will have aMercedes . . . to wash.”One German I spoke to complicated the strict conceptionof the colonized/colonizing binary of Polish/German relations.Invoking the experience of Frankfurt(Oder)’s residents within…the provisionof inexpensivedomesticservices …byPoles reinforcesa perceptionof Germansuperiority,as well as thestatus of Polesas second classEuropeans—the hired help inthe “House ofEurope.”135

City & Society…restrictionson the freedomof movement inthe EU createa hierarchy ofsocial classesthat are linkedto ethnicityGermany, he characterized his impression of their attitude towardsPoles by explaining, “West Germans look down on East Germans,East Germans look down on Poles.” Likewise, several of my respondentsobserved that Poles also have a superior attitude towardUkrainians. Oksana, a Ukrainian teaching at a Słubice secondaryschool, described her experience in Poland, “Poles think it is thePromised Land [for Ukrainians] . . . . There is more money herethan in Ukraine for my profession, [but] I’m not looking for aPromised Land.” Introducing additional ethnic and national groupsinto a binary German/Polish hierarchy demonstrates the relationshipof Europeanization to the EU’s eastern expansion. Wilsonemphasizes, “European identity is about both ‘being’ and ‘becoming’European” (2000:139). Using this concept, “European-ness”and Europeanization can be represented as a continuum betweenthe “non-European” and “European,” with countries located atdifferent points along the line depending on how fully they haveaccepted and internalized the institutions, governing practices, andvalues of the EU.In everyday terms, this hierarchy takes the form of differentialmobility and access to spaces. While Poles are allowed to travelfreely throughout Germany and the EU, they are not yet allowedto freely immigrate to Germany or most other EU member statesfor a “transition” period of up to seven years. 10 Similarly, the EUrequired Poland to reintroduce visas for Ukrainians on October 1,2003, ending the bilateral policy of visa-free travel between the twocountries. 11 Poland currently provides these visas free of charge toUkrainian citizens, and has retained a comparatively liberal policytowards travel from Ukraine, while Germany forbids Ukrainiansfrom entering Germany without additional (and difficult toobtain) visas. For Ukrainians living in Słubice, this bars themfrom the German half of the urban space, returning the Słubiceof their experience to its pre-1991 status as an isolated small townrather than an integral part of a transnational “Europastadt” (miastoeuropejskie—a European City). 12As Borneman observes, liberty is increasingly measured by theability to travel (1998:173). I would argue that this is especiallytrue in a globalizing space such as the EU, which bases its coreprinciples on the freedom of movement. 13 Therefore, restrictionson the freedom of movement in the EU create a hierarchy ofsocial classes that are linked to ethnicity. While East Germansmight be mapped as second-class Germans, they are still first-class“Europeans” enjoying full rights to freedom of movement withinthe EU. With their movement within the EU qualified for a “tran-136

<strong>Paradise</strong> on theOder?sition period” of up to seven years, Poles are currently positioned assecond-class “Europeans,” but are moving toward first-class status.With no rights to movement in the EU, Ukrainians are positionedas third-class “Europeans” or excluded altogether. At the EU-widelevel, Balibar argues that this exclusion of the citizens of non-EU“third countries” is creating an underclass of “foreign foreigners”who are permanently “at the service of Europe” (2004:44).Linguistic BordersLanguage, one of the fundamental markers of modern conceptionsof nationality (Anderson 1983), remains not only perhapsthe most accurate and obvious marker of difference andmembership within an ethnic group in Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder)(cf. Kelleher 2003:76-78), but also often acts as a cultural limit onpersonal mobility. Language proficiency is also one of the primarygatekeepers for fluidly functioning in the cities’ cross-border, transnational,Europeanized space. One of the first things an outsidernotices in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice is the constant negotiation oflanguage and the everyday necessity of translation for, and the (atleast superficial) accommodation of, monolingual “foreigners” fromacross the border. In Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, language acquisitionis often a one-way street: Poles are expected to learn German, whilevery few Germans learn more than a few words of Polish. GermansI spoke with often justified this to me by the argument that Polescan gain economically from learning German, while Germans havelittle to gain from learning Polish. Schultz estimates that about25% of Poles in Słubice have a command of German, while lessthan 5% of Germans in Frankfurt(Oder) have a command of Polish(2002:17). Similarly, in the entire Polish-German border region,only five German Gymnasium offer Polish as part of their Abiturexams (Dascher 2003:39). Many Poles view this lack of interest inthe Polish language as a further example of German cultural arroganceand neo-colonial attitudes toward Poland.The importance of linguistic competence in Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder), and within the EU generally, has made languagea consumptive domain. In Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder), languageclasses, tutors, and translators abound, as do “tandem” partnerships,a practice in which two people meet regularly to “trade” languageskills by teaching one another a different language (usually Germanfor Polish or German/Polish for English). However, at Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder)’s cross-border university, Europa UniversityViadrina/Collegium Polonicum, German remains the working lan-137

City & Societyguage of most classes and students. Nevertheless, it is not uncommonfor conversations to be conducted in two or three languagessimultaneously, usually in some combination of Polish, German,and English, depending on the group’s composition and linguisticabilities (a practice that is similar to Shore’s (2000:188) observationsat the European Commission). Students have dubbed theunique combination of Polish and German spoken casually at theuniversity as (from German) Viadrinasprache. One example of thislanguage is the phrase “na Hof” meaning “on the courtyard of thedormitories,” which combines a Polish preposition and a Germannoun (minus the Polish declension).Despite the prevalence of multilingualism among the studentsin Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder), language continues to be an extremelycontentious issue for many individuals, and contributes to thepolarization of social groups. In social situations at the university,groups tend to fracture around language divisions-—a fact thatis lamented by some and accepted by others. Krzysztof, a Polishgraduate student, observed that he believes language deeply influencesindividual attitudes, and that given the two countries’ historyof conflict, a third language is often better for Polish-Germanrelations (usually English). Krzysztof expresses a common opinionamong EU elites, who view the ability to speak multiple languagesas a way for the next generation of transnational “Europeans“—arole the students at the university are explicitly being educatedto fulfill 14 —to supersede the ethnic and nationalist differences ofmonolingual individuals. Nevertheless, Krzysztof also emphasizedthe importance of maintaining an ethno-linguistic identity bycriticizing some of his fellow students for denying their Polishnessand becoming “more German than the Germans” when they moveacross the border to Frankfurt(Oder).Karl, a German living in Słubice told me (in a mix of Germanand English) of the double bind he experienced after moving toPoland saying, “[In Poland] I talk like normal. Some people say,‘you are in a foreign country, you shouldn’t speak German,’ butI don’t think it is foreign. I live here. Poles say I am kurwa (awhore) 15 for it. Germans say I am kurwa for living here.” By movingto Poland, Karl acts contrary to the colonized/colonizer positioningof Poland vis-à-vis Germany, and reverses the hierarchal flow ofindividuals from East to West. Likewise, by refusing to use Polish,he also embodies the colonizer arriving from the West to exploitthe East. In this manner, Karl is seen as a “whore” by both sides,even as he is ostensibly enacting the European principle of freemovement between countries.138

<strong>Paradise</strong> on theOder?In order to be accepted in a new community, it is often advantageousto strategically utilize the markers and characteristics of adifferent nationality or ethnicity, depending on the social situation.Within the transnational context of the EU, this “situationalethnicity” (A. Cohen 1974, R. Cohen 1978), is an especially usefultool for achieving social and political gains. In her analysis ofPolish immigrants in Berlin, Morawska observes that one of theprincipal distinctions between immigrant communities is theirlevel of engagement with the culture of their new communities(2003). Contrasting the “trudna polskość” (difficult Polishness) ofthose who fail to assimilate and thus become torn between Polandand Germany, with the “pragmatic Europeans” who engage withGerman language and culture, Morawska argues that these groupsexhibit generational, educational, and class differences, with the“Europeans” tending to be younger, better educated, and of ahigher socioeconomic class (2003:176,179). Similar distinctionsare typical of the processes of Europeanization in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, 16 demonstrating the continued importance of ethnic andnational identifications even within a transnational “European”space.The EU CampaignsAs Poland’s EU accession referendum approached, it becamevirtually impossible to avoid the advertising of the “VoteYes” and “Vote No” campaigns while walking throughSłubice’s public spaces. New posters appeared almost every morning,as different groups battled for space on public notices columns,kiosks, boarded up buildings, and shop windows (Fig. 3).Although Frankfurt(Oder)’s public space remained unaffected bythese campaigns, for residents of Słubice the routine experienceof Frankfurt(Oder) itself is perhaps the most powerful example ofthe potential that the EU might provide. There is a qualitative differencein two cities’ appearances, especially in their commercialcenters, where Frankfurt(Oder) has had the advantage of post-1989 modernization projects, financed largely by West Germany.Frankfurt(Oder) thus appears less “socialist,” more affluent, moremodern, and more “colorful” (cf. Galbraith 2004:63) than Słubice,despite sharing endemic problems of high unemployment andeconomic stagnation. Because Frankfurt(Oder) shares a commonexperience of socialism with Słubice, but has had the advantageof a fourteen year head start within the EU as result of GermanUnification in 1990, the differences in appearance of the two cities139

City & Society140reinforces not only the benefits of the EU, but also the conceptuallocation of socialist Eastern Europe as evolutionarily inferior to thefree market capitalism Western Europe (cf. Todorova 2005).In Słubice, two principal themes dominated the advertisingcampaigns preceding the EU referendum: Poland’s location androle within “Europe,” and the vision of abetter future. The referendum campaignof Unia Wolności (Freedom Union), aliberal and pro-European political party,was one dominant player in the pro-EUefforts, and its central advertising platforminvolved two main slogans, both ofwhich approach the location of Polandwithin “Europe” directly. Its first postershows a priest holding a Bible and reads,“A Pole. A Catholic. A European.”(Polak. Katolik. Europejczyk.). This advertisementis targeted especially at thosewho see a more liberal Europe as a threatto conservative Polish Catholic values,while underscoring the EU’s inclusivenessby arguing that it is self-evidentthat one can simultaneously identify asPolish, Catholic and European. Eachof Unia Wolności’s advertisements alsopresents the slogan “Poland in Europe,Logical” (Polska w Europie, Logiczne),arguing that it is perfectly logical andrational that Poland should be consideredpart of Europe, or more specifically,part of Western Europe as defined by the EU zone.Unia Wolności’s second advertisement has two variations, oneof a couple kissing between two automobile windows, and one ofa couple a couple kissing while standing in a sleeping bag (Fig.4). Both feature the slogan “Better to be in the middle“ (Lepiejbyć w środku). None of my respondents were able to answer withcertainty exactly what it is better to be in the middle of, and itis somewhat unclear precisely what these advertisements wereadvocating. There are several possible answers, none of whichseems particularly related to the couples. One answer might be inthe middle of EU’s decision-making processes in Brussels, wherePoland entered as a relatively powerful player in comparison to itspopulation. Another answer might be between Berlin and Moscow,Fig. 3. “No” campaign posters. Liga Polskich Rodzin’s “In theEU it will be better” in on the bottom right (see below). [Photoby author]

which is often cited as a potential economic benefit for Poland,while another the answer might simply be in the middle of the EUeconomic area.Many posters and advertisements of the “No” campaign alsofocused on the idea of Poland’s location within Europe and the EU.Instead of concentratingon the possibleadvantages of joiningthe EU, these adver-<strong>Paradise</strong> on theOder?Fig. 4. Unia Wolności’s ś “Better to be in the middle” poster. [Photo by author]tisements highlightPoland’s loss of sovereigntyafter joiningthe EU’s transnationalgoverning structure.One of these postersshows a giant EU–fisheating a small Polishfish and reads, “Don’tlet yourself be swallowedup” (nie daj sięzjeść). A similar advertisementshows a mapwith Poland’s locationcut out, and a sign withthe Polish flag reading“at one time, Poland”(kiedyś Polska). Bothindicate a fear thatPoland will be consumedby the greaterpower of the EU.Another strategyof the anti-EU campaignis to equate the international system of the EU to theinternational system of the Soviet Bloc, most commonly using theimage of the circle of EU stars surrounding a hammer and sickle,or replacing the stars of the EU with small hammers and sickles.These images make use of Poland’s experience of Soviet politicaldomination after World War II, an experience that remains vividfor many Poles. In this manner, the attempt is made to demonstratethat Poland will again be dominated by a foreign power, and a morepowerful neighbor. The politicians of Liga Polskich Rodzin (Leagueof Polish Families), a Christian-nationalist party and a prominent141

City & Societyplayer in the anti-EU campaign, also made this argument byexplicitly equating Brussels to Moscow and the EU to the USSR,especially in their parallel internationalist and utopian (albeit ideologicallydissimilar) political visions (Czernicka 2004:11).142Pursuing UtopiaAsecond theme of the pro-EU campaign, and perhaps itsmost central argument, focuses on the progression towarda better and more perfect future through the processes ofEuropeanization. This theme was addressed by a series of pro-EUadvertisements often found at post offices and public buildings thatexplicitly argue that the future will be better in Poland once it joinsthe EU. These posters have a standard format, each showing a pictureof an archetypical person representing a particular segment ofthe Polish population, and a quote attributedto that person saying, “I vote yes,because . . .” (Tak głosuję, bo) followed bya reason specific to the group that personrepresents. A student: “because a youngperson has ideas without borders” (bomłodzież ma pomysły bez granic). A motherwith her child: “Because our world canbe better” (bo nasz świat może być lepszy).A businessman: “Because I know what todo so that it will be better” (bo wiem, cozrobić żeby było lepiej). An old man andwoman: Because we have waited for somany years. (bo tyle lat na to czekaliśmy)A farmer: “Because a good farmer plansfor the future“ (bo dobry gospodarz myśli naprzyszłość) (Fig. 5). Each of these examplesemphasizes a utopian vision for thefuture, as well as the personal agency ofa particular voting category for achievingthis vision. For the older couple, it recallsthe experience, hardships and sacrificesFig. 5. “Because a good farmer plans for the future.“ [Photo of the socialist past, for the students, theby author]breaking down of borders and potentialopportunities, and for the businessman and farmer, the responsibilityof working to make the future better.Conversely, Liga Polskich Rodzin employed a fairy tale motifto call the utopian promises of the EU a fantasy. The first is one of

<strong>Paradise</strong> on theOder?Pinocchio, the quintessential fairy-tale liar (see Fig. 3), holding asign reading: “In the EU it will be better” (W UE będzie lepiej)—thepervasive slogan of the “Yes” campaign. This poster suggests notonly that Poland will become a puppet of the EU, but also that the“Yes” campaigners are already the puppets of an unseen master. Asecond fairy-tale poster is a scene from Snow White in which thewitch, disguised as an old woman and dressed in an EU-flag cloak,offers Snow White, dressed in Polish white and red, an apple thathas been secretly poisoned. In this case, the apple bears a Eurocurrency symbol. An ominous slogan reads, “Don’t let yourself bedeceived” (Nie daj się oszukać). The central theme of both thesefairy tale advertisements is that appearances can be deceiving,and what might look inviting and wholesome, like an apple orthe European Monetary Union, might actually be dangerous andharmful, and the people offering them might only be interested inbenefiting themselves.The borders of EdenLocal politicians and municipal administrations in Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) have demonstrated a relatively high commitmentto creating a transnational urban environment,and in 1993 an agreement was reached between the two cities thatmandated a meeting schedule between the mayors, formal cooperationbetween the town councils, as well as infrastructure (commonwater supply, sewage, and energy), economic, and cultural integration(Słubice Municipal Government 2005). In 1997, Słubice andFrankfurt(Oder) also created a common urban development plan,the first transnational plan of its kind in of either country (SłubiceMunicipal Government 2003).Perhaps the most public example of the commitment to crossborder cooperation took place in 2003, when the two city administrationsundertook the “Europagarden 2003,” an ambitious projectto promote integration between the cities through cross-bordercultural exchange and urban renewal. Funded by both EU regionalfunds and the municipal governments, the Europagarden can beconsidered part of a broader pro-EU strategy and demonstrates alocal enactment of the utopian vision the EU promotes of a borderlessEurope. Lasting from May to October, the Europagardenimplemented a multifaceted group of events, projects and festivals.Most of the Europagarden’s cultural events took place on the IsleZiegenwerder, a small island in the German side of the Oder Riverthat was developed into a large park with several performance ven-143

City & Societyues. From June through August, the island featured an event showcasingEurope’s cultural and artistic diversity on every Thursdaythrough Sunday, including performances by musicians, films, theater,fashion shows and art installations.Other events were aimed at simply giving people a reason tocross the border and interact. For this purpose, two of the largersummer festivals, Johannisnacht (Nocy Świętojańskiej, (SummerSolstice) 21 June) and Oderfest (13-15 June) were held in Słubice.Several of the Oderfest’s events concentrated on bringing peopletogether through sporting competition, and included a boxingtournament, a tennis tournament, a chess tournament and a soccertournament, in which residents of the two cities competed againstone another and drew significant crowds of spectators.To contribute to the long-term recreational and aestheticquality of Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, the Europagarden also builtor refurbished nine parks—six in Frankfurt(Oder) and three inSłubice—and refinished the Słubice soccer stadium. By strivingto improve Słubice and Frankfurt(Oder) both aesthetically andsocially, the Europagarden embodies the utopian vision of the citiesas transnational, multi-ethnic, and “European,” by endeavoring toturn the two divided cities into a one integrated city that is a moreperfect place to live.Another of the Europagarden’s events, a twelve-day longseries of art projects and seminars for local students, collectivelycalled “Eden,” made the examination of the utopian ideal its centraltheme. One of its exhibits, “Eden Schildern” (Eden Pictures),consisted of a series of photographs made by students, which werelaminated and hung around the Isle Ziegenwerder on trees andlampposts. The pictures were all taken in Frankfurt(Oder) andSłubice, and the photographers were instructed to find the mostbeautiful thing in the ugliest area, or the ugliest thing in the mostbeautiful area. A caption was then added, usually in Polish andGerman, which played with <strong>Paradise</strong>/Eden and border themes suchas, “granice Ednu/die grenzen von Eden” (the borders of Eden), showinga picture of a German border marker within the garden space ofthe Isle Ziegenwerder, and “wie kommt der Tod ins Paradies/jak śmierćsię clostaje do raju” (How death comes to paradise), showing thepassport checkpoint on the bridge between Frankfurt(Oder) andSłubice. These photographs not only underscore the difficulties ofthe border, such as multiple languages and cultural differences, butalso observe that even in the transnational “paradise” of the EU oldborders and differences persist: The first photograph by showing thenational border marker (perhaps metaphorically the “ugliest” thing144

<strong>Paradise</strong> on theOder?on the island), and the second by explicitly connecting the deathof paradise with the border’s passport control.ConclusionsThe threat of the continued existence of physical, culturaland ethnic borders to achieving a better “European” futurein Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) articulates well with the EU’sconception of itself as a perpetual “work in progress,” in which“no one waits for Europe to exist, one builds it every day” (Abeles2000:38). In Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder), a recurring theme among thecities’ residents is the perception that the two cities are collectivelyundergoing an “identity crisis” as they try to decide what it meansto be a “European City”. This crisis is provoked by the EU’s consciousprojects of Europeanization and deterritorialization, which,through the opening of borders, promote a sometimes-uncomfortableconfrontation between individuals participating in everydaycross-border interactions. By resolving these confrontations, residentsof the Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) can enact both the identityof the ethnically defined nation-state and the hybridized identity ofa “European” citizen. These identities are not necessarily mutuallyexclusive, but instead are negotiated and contested through thepractices and social situations in which they are performed.Although it constitutes only one event in the ongoing processof Europeanization, Poland’s EU referendum and its surroundingcampaigns, demonstrate many of the key themes of the “European“idea, particularly emphasizing “Europe” as a cultural communityand the utopian vision for the future of the European Union.Voting “Yes” in the referendum represented one act of identificationwith these goals. In this respect the population of Słubice’svoivodship, Lubuskie, exhibited high support for the EU, voting84% “Yes”—some of the highest support anywhere in Poland(Gazeta Wyborcza 2003c). Even the “No” campaign accepted theidea of the EU as a community, focusing its argument on dispellingthe proposition that life in Poland would continue to get better ifit joined the EU.Given the divisive and potentially explosive history of thePolish/German border—a history that has been characterized byconfrontations and negotiations between asymmetric power relationsthat reinforce ethnic identification and division—the level ofintegration and cross-border cooperation and contact that has beenachieved in Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder), despite its many problemsand conflicts, is a powerful example of the ability of normalizing145

City & Societyprocesses of the EU’s institutions and policies to overcome nationaldifferences. Within Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder), the deregulation ofcross-border movements for people, goods, services and capitalmandated by the EU has created a functionally transnational spacein which individuals (or at least all EU citizens) can circulatefreely across national borders. Nevertheless, even amidst the deterritorializedspace of Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) the border crossingremains a strong node of territoriality and continues to regulate anddemarcate ethnic and national identities even as its de-emphasiswithin the EU enables the formation of transnational, “European”identities.The EU’s borders are both locations where nationalist and ethnicdifferences are most easily reinforced and where an individualcan most easily inhabit the transnational space of the “European.”Residents of Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) demonstrate new transnationalidentities that complicate and challenge the idea of ethnicallyand territorially defined nation-states and their associatedethnicities as markers of difference. Therefore, even as the EU’stransnational institutions and governing practices create newconduits for expressing identity, they simultaneously reinforce theUnion’s internal differences. If a transnational “European” identityis to exist as a long-term continental identity, as the EU is pursuingthrough its policy actions, it must find ways to encompass multipleand competing nationalities and ethnicities rather than supersedethem, and must develop a “tolerance for contradictions, plurality,and the juggling of cultures” (Rosaldo 1989:216). Simultaneously,if the EU and the creation of a “European identity” can be understoodas “works in progress,” then Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice is onelocation where the work is being done, as are many multi-ethnicand transnational locales throughout “Europe,” each of whichpresent not only unique dilemmas and challenges for the EU toincorporate, but also variable expressions of what being “European”means (cf. Pagden 2002, Malmbourg & Strath 2002).NotesAcknowledgements: I would especially like to thank Michał Buchowski,Toralf Kliensorge, Sebastian Mayer, Witold Nowiński, Monica Gariup,and Jarosław Janczak for their hospitality, assistance, and friendship duringmy fieldwork in Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder). I would also like to thank MattiBunzl, Zsuzsa Gille, William Kelleher, and Mahir Saul for their critiquesof earlier versions of this essay, as well as two anonymous reviewers. Thisresearch was funded by two grants form the European Union Center at146

<strong>Paradise</strong> on theOder?the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, to which I am very grateful.In the interests of confidentiality, all names in this essay have beenreplaced with pseudonyms.1 The Posnanian War of December 27, 1918 to June 28, 1919 and theSilesian War, which was fought sporadically during the summers of 1919-1922 (Davies 1982:394).2 This line was proposed by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzonduring the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920 and the post World War Ipeace negotiations (Davies 1982:504). It approximates the Nazi-Sovietdemarcation line of 1939.3Due to the chaotic circumstances of this region at the end of WorldWar II, the precise number of German expellees remains impossible todetermine.4 Słubice’s name derives from a Slavic settlement in the Middle Agescalled Śliwice, which the Piasts ceded to Brandenburg along with the restof the Lubuska region in 1250 (Urząd Miejski w Słubicach 2003:5).5 Euroregions are cross-border regional institutions that the EUuses to assist in the administration of transnational regional funds andpolicies. Euroregions are not official governing bodies, but are insteadvoluntary associations of municipal and local governments that can generallybe considered civil society institutions. For a detailed discussionof the Euroregion that includes Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder), “EuroregionPro Europa Viadrina,” and the EU funding that supports it, see Asher(2004).6 Since Poland has not yet been admitted into the Schengen Conventionthe border controls remained in place in Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) evenafter Poland’s accession to the EU.7 96.7% of Polish citizens identify as ethnically Polish while 91.5%of German citizens identify as ethnically German (CIA World Factbook2005).8 This is the earliest date that Poland is projected to fulfill the debt toGDP ratio, interest rate, and inflation requirements of the 1997 Stabilityand Growth Pact that will allow it to participate in the third and finalstage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), at which time theEuro currency is adopted for general use.9 In 2005, a plan was adopted to complete a tram line connectingSłubice to Frankfurt(Oder) by 2008. Other Polish-German border cities,such as Görlitz-Zgorzelec, have successfully implemented integrated publictransportation systems.10 In the case of Germany and the fourteen other pre-2004 EU members,a two-year transitional period on immigration can be implemented,during which national measures constraining immigration can be appliedunilaterally by a current member state on a new member state. These policieswill be reviewed every two years, but may be applied for up to seven(European Commission 2002:6).11 Ukraine has maintained its visa-free policy towards Polish citizens.12 Although both the German and Polish terms are used, it is common147

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