- Page 4: AcknowledgementsI wish to thank Jer
- Page 9 and 10: Chapter 1: Background and Review of
- Page 11 and 12: A number of terms relating to vario
- Page 13 and 14: nearly all flights originate from o
- Page 15 and 16: While the year of the bag fee may h
- Page 17 and 18: would not be able to capture all co
- Page 19 and 20: essentially sorts consumers into gr
- Page 21 and 22: entrepreneurs to become alert to ne
- Page 23 and 24: Furthermore, because the responses
- Page 25 and 26: (such as food) than for checked bag
- Page 27 and 28: Goetz, Andrew R. & Vowles, Timothy
- Page 29 and 30: Chapter 2: Why, and Why Now? The Th
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- Page 39 and 40: Figure 2.1: U.S. Airlines Available
- Page 41 and 42: participants are unable to reach a
- Page 43 and 44: also during this time that Southwes
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- Page 47 and 48: Interview data also indicate that n
- Page 49 and 50: undertaken by the first mover. None
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Gale, Ian L. & Holmes, Thomas J. 19
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Chapter 3: Airline Considerations f
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evenue. Such an analysis is outside
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to fly shorter routes where it comp
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prices and willingness to pay for u
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company. Two interviewees discussed
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ecognized that increased cost-consc
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In the neoclassical framework, comp
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As certain airlines attempt to use
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Chapter 3 ReferencesAirline Weekly.
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Chapter 4: Consumer Response and We
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load factors did start to rise abov
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Figure 4.2: DOT Airline Complaints
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enjoyed monopoly positions as the o
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characterize this negative pressure
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legacy airlines and AirTran Airways
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Armstrong and Vickers (2010), whose
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interviewee mentioned that fewer th
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Changes in Product QualityWhile the
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Figure 4.5: Plot of Mishandled Bagg
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ecent congressional opposition to a
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a way, airlines may move closer to
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constrained by aircraft weight limi
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Martin, Hugo. 2010. ―Spirit Airli
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airline industry. First, they claim
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It should be mentioned that Congres
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Thus the travel necessity argument
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not mandate some sort of quality st
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If ancillary revenues did become ta
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Thus, government applying a tax to
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consumers with information about fe
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flight(s) she wishes to purchase. I
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While an information disclosure req
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usiness to a no-fee carrier, provid
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Gillen, David W., Morrison, William
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ConclusionsThis paper has analyzed
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as well as elucidate additional nua