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ROYAL COLLEGE OF DEFENCE STUDIESSEAFORD HOUSE PAPER2010/11India-Afghanistan: Strategic StakesAir Commodore D Choudhury

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ROYAL COLLEGE OF DEFENCE STUDIESIndia-Afghanistan: Strategic StakesA DISSERTATIONBYAir Commodore D ChoudhuryIndian Air ForceJuly 2011© Indian Air Force, 2011

Taliban, caused a major diplomatic setback to Indian interests in Afghanistan. Toreiterate India’s commitment, the PM promised an additional $500 million in aid overand above the already promised $1.5 billion. This makes India the fifth largest donorafter US, UK, Japan and Canada, a little known or appreciated fact internationally,especially in the West. Since 2001 India has been significantly involved in a softpower oriented approach, which has focussed on re-building and infrastructuredevelopment, aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. A UScentricfocus on the war against terror in Afghanistan tends to marginalise India’sinterests and involvement. The world view is inevitably through the lens of theindispensable partnership between Pakistan and International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF) operations and hence, often misses a big part of the regional dynamicsof South Asia. The resilient post-Taliban Indian re-engagement and presence inAfghanistan, despite Pakistan’s anti-India rhetoric, US discomfort, as well as physicalattacks against its embassy and killing of Indians provides an insight into the strategicdimension of the Indo-Afghan relationship.The paper will analyse why Afghanistan is strategically important to India, andwill do so by examining the relevant drivers of her strategic interests in the region.India’s security interests, concerns for regional peace and stability, and her economydriven by expanding energy interests, will be examined here. A study of India'sapproach to strategy and strategic culture will form the precursor to an analysis of itsAfghanistan strategy. This will be studied in the context of Indo-Afghan relationspost-9/11. Thereafter, the efficacy of the strategy will be analysed in a regionalperspective along with the associated challenges. Finally, the strategy will becorrelated with India’s interests in order to establish a future trajectory inAfghanistan.A Few FundamentalsIn the context of the India’s Afghanistan strategy, some fundamental aspectsneed definition. Strategy has many definitions and interpretations. Sullivan andHarper explain its essence as an intellectual construct ‘linking where you are todaywith where you want to be tomorrow in a substantive manner’. 4 Yager describes it as4 RCDS Booklet, Thinking strategically, (3 rd Ed., Oct 10), p9.2

a ‘process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions in the world where chance,uncertainty and ambiguity dominate’. 5 In the context of a nation-state, strategybecomes grand strategy and takes a wider overview to encompass much more thanstrategy at a military level. Liddell Hart perceived the role of grand strategy as thecoordination and direction of all resources of a nation or a group of them towards the‘political object of the war’. 6 This explanation was ideally suited for a Westphallianworld where wars were regularly fought amongst states as means of achieving statepolicy. In today’s context however replacing the phrase ‘political object of the war’ inHart’s explanation with ‘national aspirations’ would possibly be more relevant. TheUnited Kingdom has found the term ‘National Strategy’ more appropriate to direct thecoordinated application of diplomatic, economic and military instruments of nationalpower in pursuit of national policy aspirations. 7 Sullivan and Harper’s ‘where you aretoday with where you want to be tomorrow’ combined with Yager’s ‘adaptation toshifting conditions’ are most suited for this paper.National interest usually defines the end in analysing and establishing a nation’sforeign affairs and policy. From a realist perspective it seeks to define the bestinterests of a nation in an anarchical world where threats and risks to a nation stateabound. Determination of national interests is a challenge where some argue that bestinterests are objectively determined in the context of a state within an internationalsystem and deduced from history and foreign policy study. Others however feel thatnational interest is subjectively interpreted by the government of the day in otherwords a political perspective. 8 The concept today more often than not is associatedwith political realists who seek to differentiate national interest from idealist andmoralist standpoints or even multi-lateral institutions which in their perspective mightweaken the states independence. Given the conflict of interests of all the players inAfghanistan and the risks involved, India’s national interest is best served from arealist perspective.Another term which needs clarification is soft power. Joseph Nye, who proposedthis concept, defines it as the ability of a state to influence the actions of another5 RCDS Booklet, op.cit, p9.6 Ibid, p6.7 British Defence Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (JDP 0-01) (3 rd Edition) August 2008.8 Peter Byrd, Oxford Dictionary of Politics.3

through persuasion or attraction, rather than coercion. 9 As Nye has previously argued,power can be wielded in three ways: threat of force (stick), inducement of payments(carrot) or shaping the preferences of others. 10 Soft power eschews the traditionalforeign policy implements of carrot and stick, relying instead on the attractiveness ofa nation’s institutions, culture, politics and foreign policy, to shape the preferences ofothers, 11 an approach which describes India’s current Afghanistan strategy.LEGACY OF INDO-AFGHAN RELATIONSUnderstanding the legacy of India’s ties with Afghanistan is important, as it givesa sense of why post-independence India chose to maintain a close relationship, withwhat was once considered the buffer state against Russian influence on the BritishEmpire. Understanding the historical legacy is also essential to understand theoverarching factors of the regional dynamics in South Asia. A study of a geographicalmap reveals Afghanistan’s strategic importance. It is a region through which northernand southern silk routes from China and India converged into ancient Bactra, or Balkhas it is known today, situated in Afghanistan. Whoever controlled the region couldtherefore control the ancient East-West trade and it has also been the invasion routeconnecting the empires of Central Asia, the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent.As Stephen Tanner puts it: “Afghanistan’s claustrophobic passes have borne mutewitness to armies of Persians, Greeks, Mauryans, Huns, Mongols, Mughals, British,Soviets, and Americans–among others–including many of the most famous captainsin history”. 12For India, this was the borderland region between the empires that ruled India,Iran and Central Asia. In 305 BC Chandragupta Maurya captured the region, todaycalled Afghanistan, from the Greeks by defeating Seleucus. Both sides came to anagreement with the Mauryan Empire controlling the southern region up to Kandahar.9 Willson, E. III, ‘Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power’, Annals of the American Academy ofPolitical and Social Sciences, 616, March 2008, pp. 110-124.10 Joseph Nye, Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power, ( New York: Basic Books,1990)11 Joseph Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science, 616, March 2008, pp94-109.12 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan, (USA: Da Capo Press, 2002), p2.4

Afghanistan’s location on the ancient Silk Route 13This subsequently extended into areas known today as Kabul, Kandahar and Gazni.Under Emperor Asoka of the Mauryan dynasty, Buddhism spread to the region andAfghanistan became a part of the Indian empire as a centre of Buddhist art andculture. 14 The Gandhara School, born out of a fusion of Indo-Greek styles, was basedhere and the 53 meter tall Bamiyan Buddha, which was destroyed by the Taliban, boretestimony to the Buddhist influence in the region. According to Olaf Caroe, Indianempires have periodically ruled the region totalling over 650 years. 15 In subsequentcenturies, no nation has been able to hold or rule this crossroad of empire. It has alsobeen the playing field of the Great Game between Britain and Russia during theBritish colonial rule of the Indian subcontinent.The more modern ties between India and Afghanistan go back to the anticolonialmovements of late 1920s, when the Pashtun spiritual and political leader,Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, formed an alliance with India’s Mahatma Gandhi and the13 http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=Great+Silk+Road&qpvt=Great+Silk+Road&FORM=IGRE14 Stephen Tanner, op. cit., pp56-57.15 Olaf Caroe, The Pathans: 500BC-1957AD, London: Keegan Paul International, 1958, pp450-462.5

Indian National Congress. The Khan, who was responsible for the anti-British‘Khudai-Khidmatgar’ movement, was fondly called the ‘Frontier Gandhi’ by India. Inaddition to the Nobel Prize for peace, he was awarded India’s highest award, theBharat Ratna in 1987. Upon his death in 1988, both sides of the Afghan civil wardeclared a truce, to allow his burial in Jalalabad. 16 His legacy was to cement India’spost-1947 engagement with Afghanistan, especially with the Pashtun ethnic group.Another significant aspect of the Frontier Gandhi’s and the Pathan’s historic ties withIndia are the 52 million strong Pashtu population who reside on both sides of one ofthe world’s most disputed border–the Durand Line; a contentious issue betweenAfghanistan-Pakistan. While this does not affect India directly, the Pashtun issuenevertheless impacted indirectly on Indo-Afghan relations given the history of Indo-Pak problems, as New Delhi maintained close ties with Kabul. 17 ,It was not just the India-educated Afghan elites alone who were responsible forboth nations in maintaining strong cultural and diplomatic ties through the period ofmonarchy in Afghanistan. The intrepid Pathan dry fruit sellers who roamed far andwide in India have a special place in Indian hearts, immortalised by the film‘Kabuliwallah’, based on a short story by Rabindranath Tagore. Post-independence,Indian films and songs have been immensely popular amongst the Afghan population.In the pre-Taliban years, movie halls were segregated into men’s and women’ssections for screening the popular Hindi movies. In post-Taliban Afghanistan with allthe movie halls destroyed, pirated movie and music CDs, as well as Hindi televisionstranslated into Dara, 18 provided a momentary escape from the everyday harsh realityfor the Afghan people, strengthening their links with the India. In addition to history,an understanding of the emotive links which underpin the relationship between thetwo peoples is equally essential to understand the relationship between the twonations.During the 1950s both the Soviet Union and the US invested significantly inAfghanistan, building dams, roads, airfields, schools and irrigation systems. The16 Rajmohan Gandhi, GhaffarKhan: Non Violent Badshah of the Pakhtuns, (New Delhi: Penguin,2004).17 Harsh Pant, ‘India’s Challenge in Afghanistan: With Power Comes Responsibility’, ContemporaryReadings in Law and Social Justice, Volume 2(1), 2010, p37.18 http://www.huffingpost.com/shashi-tharoor/indian-strategic-power-so_b_20778.5.html6

Soviets focussed their efforts in the northern regions while the Americansconcentrated on the south in an effort to revive the Helmand River. 19 Afghanistanwas the missing link to the anti-communist US chain which ran from Europe throughTurkey, Iraq, and Iran up to Pakistan. It used the Central Treaty Organisation(CENTO) and the South East Asia Organisation (SEATO) to complete the chain inorder to deny the Soviet's strategic yearning for a warm water port and prevent themfrom gaining access to the Indian Ocean. Afghanistan was left out of CENTO due toits hostility with Pakistan and close ties to the Soviets. 20 India was the significantother 'gap' in the chain, as it used the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to retainautonomy and stay out of the Cold War alignments. 21 This automatically also broughtKabul and New Delhi closer, as two nations who stayed out of the superpower camps.The US arming of Iran and Pakistan and a refusal to extend military assistanceto Afghanistan proved to be a strategic mistake as Afghanistan promptly sought thesame from Moscow. President Khrushchev complied happily by not onlyreorganising the Afghan Army and Air Force extensively, but also by providingextensive economic aid, both totalling over $ 2.25 billion up to 1979. 22 In subsequentyears Afghanistan went through a series of Governments ranging from MohammedDaoud, who was King Zahir's cousin and brother in law, to the Soviet backed NurMohamed Tarakki. In 1973 Daoud took over again in a bloodless coup only to beoverthrown and killed in 1978 with Tarakki returning to power. As the pro and anticommunistforces collided, revolts broke out across the country, eventually leading tothe Soviet invasion in December 1979.Through the entire period of flip-flops in the Afghan government, India choseto support whoever was in power since Kabul was under Soviet influence. Yet, whenthe Soviets moved into Afghanistan, Moscow had not even bothered to inform Indiabeforehand, 23 possibly because with the pro-Soviet Indira Gandhi being a fore-runnerin the elections, Moscow did not expect any problems. 24 However, with the end of the19 Stephen Tanner, op. cit., p226.20 Ibid. p226.21 David M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp45-46.22 Stephen Tanner, op.cit. p.226.23 Stephen Philip Cohen, India-Emerging Power, (Washington DC: Brooklyn Institution Press, 2001),p249.24 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1980/01/The-Soviet-Invation-of-Afghanistan7

Janata Party government and the Congress party returning to power, it caused 'a deepsense and unease' amongst many with the 'arrival of a superpower on the regionaldoorstep'. 25 The event also exacerbated concerns as it would inevitably lead to a USre-arming of Pakistan with a consequent knock on effect on Indo-Pak relations. India'sconcerns were borne out by the US National Security Adviser Brzezinski's proposalthat 'Washington should work to reinforce the resilience against Soviet advances byproviding more aid to Pakistan' and that it should 'keep the Afghan issue alive bysustaining the resistance'. 26During this period India secured oil from the Soviet Union for the first timeand it increased to account for 70% of exports to India. Fearing a loss of influence inIndia, the Politburo made particular efforts to offer Soviet goods, willing to pay theeconomic price for continued influence. 27 The consequent support of the Sovietinvasion and occupation in Afghanistan also put India in a difficult situation affectingits international standing and credibility. 28 During this period India watched the USinvolvement with deepening concern, as the CIA engaged the ISI actively andPakistan moved increasingly towards Islamic fundamentalism under President Zia-ul-Haq, which in turn spread to Afghanistan. The 1988 Soviet pull out led to thecommunist Najibullah government rule, which was again supported by India, till itsfall in 1992. India also supported the interim government which came to power butslowly lost ground with increasing Taliban influence until their take over in 1996.India refused to recognise the Taliban and had to pay the price of Islamist extremismin the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). During the period 1995 to 2000, about80,000 young men from the proliferation of madrassas in Pakistan, trained inAfghanistan. These, along with the many Islamic militants from around the worldwho had gathered in Afghanistan, participated in battles in Afghanistan, Kashmir andthe Central Asian Republics. 29 The final ignominy of the Taliban years was thehijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC 814 from Kathmandu, by the five Pakistaniterrorists of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) in connivance with the ISI, which25 Robert W. Bradnock, India's Foreign Policy since 1971, (London: Royal Institute of InternationalAffairs, 1990, p.102.26 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Game Plan, (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press), p.265.27 Robert W. Bradnock, op cit., p105.28 P. S. Ghosh and R. Panda, ‘Domestic Support for Mrs. Gandhi’s Afghanistan Policy: The SovietFactor in Indian Politics’, Asian Survey 23, no. 3, and pp.261-3.29 Neamatollah Novjumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, (New York; Palgrave, 2002), p131.8

landed at Kandahar. India was forced to negotiate with the Taliban and release threeterrorists in exchange for the surviving passengers. 30The fall of the Taliban caused India to move back quickly into Afghanistan tosupport the Karzai headed interim government and re-open the Indian Embassy inKabul. Since then it has made extensive efforts to become Afghanistan's mostimportant partner for reconstruction; efforts which have sustained and increased overthe last ten years.DRIVERS OF INDIAN STRATEGYHaving seen the historical linkages, the strategic aspects of Indian interests inAfghanistan need to be established next. These are not easy to identify in the absenceof an articulated national security strategy. According to Shekhar Dutt, the previousDefence Secretary: “India’s primary strategic objective is the improvement of thesocio-economic conditions and opportunities, within a secular democratic framework,for its one billion people”. 31 He also explains that security is no longer an exclusivemilitary dimension as in the Cold War era and that today it is an inclusive concept.Ensuring India is not subjected to anxiety or intimidation in the global comity,whether political, economic or military, became an essential objective. 32Conventional SecurityRegional security has been a primary concern for India since independence.India's position in South Asia makes it ideally positioned to be the driver of peace,stability and prosperity in the region. It has something in common with each of itsimmediate neighbours, but unfortunately the neighbouring states do not share suchmagnitude or depth among themselves. 33 According to Sood, while India’s30 C. Christine Fair, India in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints, CenturyFoundation Report, p3.31 Shekhar Dutt, Inaugural speech at seminar on ‘Defence, Security, and Diplomacy: India’s NationalInterests’, India International Centre, New Delhi, 24 Feb 2007.32 Ibid.33 Rajen Harshe, 'South-Asian Regional Cooperation: Problems and Prospects', Ed by Rajen Harsheand K.M. Sethi, Engaging the World: Critical Reflections on India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi:Orient Black Swan, 2009), p321.9

ecognition as a rising economic power is global, it is not so in a region whereeconomic development has become hostage to security issues. 34 Unfortunately forIndia, six of its neighbours rank among the first 26 dysfunctional states in the world.Afghanistan ranking sixth and Pakistan tenth are closely interlinked with Indiansecurity concerns. 35 On the issue of conventional security, India and Pakistan havinggone to war four times, each time initiated by the latter, it is natural for India to lookat Afghanistan through the Pakistan lens, both internally and externally.Internally, the biggest concern is the impact of the security situation in Kashmirshould the Taliban return to power. The situation in Kashmir had sporadic problemsbut was fundamentally stable till the 1980s when there was a sudden rise in militantextremism. This was attributed to the ISI's active involvement in Pakistan's strategy ofa proxy war to destabilise Kashmir and keep India under pressure. According toRobert Gates, US Defence Secretary and former director of CIA, 22 per cent of allterrorists operating in J&K were either from Afghanistan or were trained there. 36 TheUS came close to declaring Pakistan a state sponsor for terrorism in 1992-93, and thisresulted in moving the militant groups to bases in the FATA of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 37 The Jalalabad Shura, and subsequently the Taliban, was paidfor their protection and Islamic parties were made responsible for their training andfunding. 38 Kashmir became the main factor behind Pakistan's support to the Taliban,and Mullah Omar was to say in 1998: ‘we support the jihad in Kashmir’, andadmitting that Afghans were fighting Indian forces. 39 In 1996 the Indian intelligenceagency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), assessed that a Taliban consolidationwould not only disadvantage India, but reduce its manoeuvrability in Afghanistan andCentral Asia whilst also enhancing Pakistan's position in the region. 40 Presently, Indiais internally beset with a Maoist insurgency, which Dr Manmohan Singh considers'the biggest internal security challenge ever faced by the country'. Under the34 Vikram Sood, 'India and Regional Security Interests' Ed by Alyssa Ayres and C. Raja Mohan, PowerRealignments in Asia: China: India, and the United States, (New Delhi: SAGE, 2009), p252.35 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings36 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/geopolitics/Resurrecting-Afghanistan.html37 Hassan Abbas, Inside Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, New America Foundation,www.Newamerica.net38 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p186.39 Ibid.40 S. Iftikar Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, (London: Bennet & Bloom, 2006), pp247-248.10

circumstances she can ill afford the additional burden of a conflagration in thesecurity situation in J&K.Map of Afghanistan showing its strategic location. 41From a military perspective there are several security considerations for India inAfghanistan and all relate to Pakistan. While some may not directly relate toAfghanistan, they do shape the Pakistani military’s mind set and therefore impact onIndian security. In view of Pakistan's elongated geography, its military analystscontended that due to the lack of space and depth in the hinterland, a pro-PakistanTaliban government would provide the necessary strategic depth against India. 42 Theappreciation does not stand to scrutiny; simply because the idea of the Pak Army41 Downloaded from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html42 Ahmed Rashid, op cit., p186.11

'falling back' across its western border into Afghanistan implies a conventional all outwar in which India has advanced deep into Pakistani territory. According to its statednuclear first use posture, ‘penetration of Indian forces beyond a certain defined line orcrossing a river’ is the first condition among the six under which Pakistan would usenuclear weapons. 43 Therefore, well before the opportunity of exploiting the strategicdepth, the conflict would have become nuclear, and there would not be enough timeavailable to fall back, before India's second strike response.Pakistan also fears that a pro-Indian government in Afghanistan would enableIndia to create a ‘strategic encirclement’ and allow it to exude pressure on Pakistanfrom both sides. This is equally presumptuous, as it envisages Indian forces beingairlifted using foreign airspace, to assemble in Afghanistan for a subsequent attackfrom the west on Pakistan. The scale of the logistics necessary for such an operationis not viable, simply because of the sheer numbers involved. To do so, the IndianArmy would have to thin out its deployment from the Chinese front, which it isunlikely to do. Also, this envisages a situation where Afghanistan not only permits itssovereign territory for India to wage war on Pakistan, but it does so through itsPashtun territory into the Pashtun areas across the border, an extremely unlikelyscenario. One might therefore interpret the Pak military’s perception, of usingAfghanistan as a strategic depth or India's use of it for 'encirclement', as neither validnor a strategic driver for India's interest in Afghanistan.From an Indian military perspective, ‘strategic depth and ‘strategicencirclement’ are scenarios created to justify Pakistan’s presence in Afghanistan. 44This is the real strategic concern, since presence of the Pakistani military inAfghanistan, and a pro-Pakistan government, directly affects India’s security,economic and energy interests in the region. The other serious concern is use ofAfghan soil as camping and training grounds for militants, which the Pakistani Armycould exploit asymmetrically against India, while keeping them out of its reach. It is astrategic agenda established in 1993 by Interior Minister General Nasirullah Babar, 45an agenda easy to pursue if the Taliban returns to power. Notwithstanding the invalid43 T.M. Ashraf, Aerospace Power: The Emerging Strategic Dimension, (Peshawar: PAF Book Club,2003), p148.44 http://www.subcontinent.com/research/afghanistan/af_indian_stakes_may_2011.html45 Neamatollah Nojoumi, op cit., p131.12

encirclement concept, the idea of a friendly Afghanistan as a strategic option forIndia, remains a cause for concern to the Pakistani military, forcing them to remaindeployed on its western border in case of a conflict with India. This indirectconsequence, definitely finds resonance with the Indian military.Second, the Soviet era had tied down two Pakistani Army Corps on its westernfront, which with the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, became available for deploymentagainst India. This possibly encouraged her to launch the asymmetric proxy war of athousand cuts in J&K. 46 Similarly today, the Pak Army's engagements in FATA insupport of the US operations, eases the pressure on India's western borders. An earlyISAF pullout from Afghanistan will therefore inevitably impact Indian security. The'Durand Line' factor causing the Afghanistan-Pakistan hostility, lends to a two frontsituation, which makes the continued existence of a viable independent Afghanistanstrategically vital for India’s external security, on its western border.Finally, a Taliban resurgence could lead to a domino effect in Pakistan, whichis currently facing its own internal security challenges after the 'Osama hit' by USSpecial Forces. With increasing attacks on the Pak military, the recent attack of theKarachi naval base being a classic example, the possibility of its nuclear weaponsfalling into the hands of non-state actors remains a global nightmare.Energy SecurityAccess to energy is an indispensable element of national progress and thelimited resources of fossil fuel are no longer able to keep pace with the world’sdemands. Nader Elhefnawy argued that, with the international oil productionreaching its peak, the consequences would be resource conflict and even statefailure. 47 In this seeming bleak future, emerging powers like China and India areacutely aware that energy is the key to their future prospects. In recent years, in spiteof its considerable resources, Beijing has come to rely more on imported energy as oilaccounts for 50% of its imports, which is likely to grow to 80% by 2030. 48 India on46 Maj Gen GD Bakshi, Resurrecting Afghanistan, Indian Defence Review, 24.4 Oct / Dec'09.47 N. Elhefnawy, ‘The Impending Oil Shock’, Survival 50:2 (2008), pp37-66.48 Andrew B. Kennedy, ‘China's New Energy Security Debate’, Survival, 52:3, 2010, p138.13

the other hand has only 0.3% of the world's oil reserves 49 and its energy demands aregrowing exponentially. According to the McKinsey report of 2005, by the year 2020India's oil import demand will go up from 89 Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent(MTOE) per day to 160 MTOE 50 . With present consumption at two million barrelsper day which will quadruple by 2025, India is slated to become the largest importerof oil by 2050 51 . Significantly, seventy percent of India’s crude is imported and it allarrives by sea, which pushes up the costs. Similarly, natural gas will continue to be inshort supply, as its domestic discoveries in the Krishna Godavari Basin are nowherenear enough, the future needs will have to be met through imports. India presentlydepends on Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Iran and Kuwait for 60% of its oil imports whichare all by sea. Diversification of its sources by making inroads into other countries istherefore a key strategic interest.According to Robert Kaplan, due to the natural gas from Turkmenistan and otherenergy pipeline routes between Central Asia and the Subcontinent which will one dayflow through it, makes Afghanistan a ‘particularly critical country’ as it is aboutsecuring the future of the region 52 . Therefore, India’s greatest strategic interest lies ineasy access to the energy rich Central Asian states, through Afghanistan as anoverland conduit, to the Iranian coast. From there it is a short sea journey to ports inGujarat where Indian refineries, as well as pipeline networks for further inlanddistribution, already exist. Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are of criticalimportance, not only for their hydrocarbons, but also for the prospect of the muchcheaper option of transporting it through pipelines. But both proposals of the Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan (IPI) pipeline and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India(TAPI) pipeline run through Pakistan. This places India at a strategic disadvantage asit offers Pakistan the leverage over Indian energy requirements.49 http://www.indiastatistical.wordpress.com/2006/10/03/Indian-energy/scenario50 McKinsey Quarterly 2005 Special Edition: Fulfilling India's Promise.51 Rohit Singh, ‘Pipeline politics’, Indian Defence Review 24.2-Apr/Jun/09.52 Robert Kaplan, Monsoon, (New York: Random House, 2010), pp12-14.14

The strategic road connecting Chabahar port in Iran, to Kandahar and Herat in Afghanistan, through theZaranj-Delaram highway. 53The only other viable land route is from Central Asia-Afghanistan to Chabaharport in the southeast coast of Iran and thereafter by sea to India. This is the strategicreason for India to have invested heavily in the development of the port and theconstruction of the Zaranj-Delaram highway in Afghanistan, which allows access toit. Afghanistan itself has close to 50 million cubic meters of gas deposits. Prior to theSoviet invasion it generated $300 million in exports, primarily to Russia. A stableAfghanistan is therefore fundamental to India's future energy security and a vitalstrategic interest.Economic DriverThe Indian economy managed a truly remarkable turn around from an almoststagnant Hindu rate of growth of 1.5-3%, to a stable and consistent rate of 8-9.5%,despite enormous challenges 54 . Subramanian and Rodrick argue that there are goodunderlying reasons for expecting India's output to grow close to 7 percent a year. Thesource of optimism is attributed to high productivity, demographics and the quality ofits institutions. 55 But to fulfil the aspirations of the largest democracy of the world isno easy task. It will mean that economics will have to be a key driver in the future.53 Downloaded from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html54Xenia Dormandy, ‘India's Key Foreign Policy Issue’, www.belfercenter.org/india55 A. Subramanian and D. Rodrick, 'Why India Can Grow at 7 percent a Year or More: Projections andreflections', Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 39, No.16, pp1591-96, April 17-23.15

India learnt from the mistakes of the insular foreign policies of her Cold War years,when she launched her ‘Look East Policy’ in 1991, in an effort to benefit from therapidly growing South Asian market. The policy grew in stature as Dr. ManmohanSingh put it: ‘India's Look East Policy is not merely an external economic policy; it isalso a strategic shift in India's vision of the world and India's place in the evolvingglobal economy’. 56In the similar vein, Indian interests today include the Central Asian Region (CAR)as she actively engages these states. It already has observer status in the ShanghaiCooperation Organisation, which includes China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. According to Malone ‘it is centred on a region with whichIndia has rich historic links and one that offers wealth of natural resources’. 57 . Indiawas one of the first to establish diplomatic missions in all the CAR States and seeks toforge multifaceted ties. Already 30% of all the medicines consumed in this area areof Indian origin. 58 India’s trade with the CAR countries is likely to exceed in 2010-11 from the modest sum of 2009-10, 59 and Afghanistan is central to India's economicaccess to the region. Afghanistan’s preferential trade agreement with India, allows 50-100% trade tariff concessions on dried and fresh fruits, seeds, medicinal herbs andprecious stones, has led to a rise in the Indian-market share of products. 60 India isalso Afghanistan’s largest export partner and accounts for 23.5% of its total exports.On the other hand Pakistan is the largest import partner with 36%, while India is mere6.9%. But for the presently limited ban on overland trade transit imposed by Pakistan,where Afghan goods can transit to India but the reverse cannot, India has a significanttrade potential with Afghanistan.According to Raman, there are two fundamental reasons for Pakistan’s traderestrictions. First, it gives Pakistan the leverage of economic hegemony overAfghanistan by cutting down Indian competition. Second, is that the Afghan trade56 C.S. Kuppuswamy, ‘India's Look East Policy-A Review’, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no.3662, 12 Feb 2010.57 David M. Malone, op.cit. p214.58 Kanwal Sibal, 'Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Prospects' Presentation at the Geneva Forum2003.59 http://commerce.nic.in/tradestats/indiatrade.asp?id=1.60 Hedayat Amin Arsala, Afghanistan’s Economy: The Government’s Plan, Robert I. Rotberg, op. cit.,pp.149-150.16

transit through Pakistan and Karachi port, is an extremely lucrative revenue source.Hence, allowing trade through India and the Mumbai port, would direct affectPakistani economic interests. He also posits that the real reason behind the restrictionis that many of the road transport companies are owned by Pakistani Army, ISI andretired officers. 61 Even with the present restrictions, Indo-Afghan trade could easilydouble from $520 million in 2008-09 to one billion dollars if both countries exploitedbusiness opportunities. According to a study, Afghanistan offers ample opportunity insectors like construction, agro-business, energy and mining, natural resources, textilesand carpets, transports and logistics, chemical and pharmaceutical products, bankingand financial services, telecom services, real estate and tourism. 62Regional InfluenceIndia has always been a nation deeply aware of the rich cultural heritage of its5000 year old civilisation. It possibly gives its people a sense of destiny, of theirrightful place in the world. Its position, as argued by Cohen, occupies its owngeographical space between the Himalayan range and the Indian Ocean and istherefore one of dominance and detachment. 63 This rings true as dominance anddetachment, have somehow played out in India’s strategic and foreign affairs outlook.Pursuit of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), which was an effort to preserveautonomy, avoid falling into any of the cold war power-blocs, and keeping the superpower struggle out of the Indian Ocean, 64 seemed to give India a sense of detachment.On the other hand, the 1971 war leading to the creation of Bangladesh, intervention inSri Lanka in 1987 and Maldives in 1988, gave its neighbours a perception of regionaldominance. Bradnock rightly argued that “it is one of the paradoxes of the region thatthe view of India as the dominant power, is universally shared by its neighbours, buttotally disavowed by India itself”. 65 However, sustained economic growth has putIndia in a position where it can become a significant power. According to Pant, theinternational community will assess its capacity to emerge as a great power based on61 B Raman, ‘Indo-Pak: Economic Ties: Ground Realities’, South Asia Group, Paper no 1173 26 Nov2004.62 http://www.mydigitalfc.com/plan/indo-afghan/trade-has-potential-double-1/billion-23263 Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power, (Washington DC: Brookings, 2001), p55.64 Robert W. Bradnock, op cit., p39.65 Ibid. p39.17

its strategic capability to handle the regional instability. 66 He goes on to argue that, asa major donor of aid to Afghanistan, India is establishing its credentials as a majorpower. While this may be so, its efforts are consistently challenged and countered byPakistan, which consistently attempts to deny India any footprint in Afghanistan.Pakistan has so far succeeded in manoeuvring the US to consider it as a key partner,effectively marginalising India's significant soft power contributions.On the other hand, India has been a regional player of some significance inAfghanistan since the days of support to the Northern Alliance (NA), against theTaliban. It ran a 25 bed hospital at Farkhor, provided technical support and spares forMi-8 helicopters of the NA and upgraded Ayni Airbase in Tajikistan, which is capableof undertaking fighter operations, thereby establishing a regional presence. It has astrategic importance since it allows India to respond rapidly to any threats emergingfrom Pakistan and also a significant capability to inject Special Forces into hostiletheatres in the event of a military confrontation with Pakistan. 67 Today, India'sendeavour is to remain a significant player by maintaining its presence and enablingits future prospects. It has grown out of the shoes of third world leadership and wantsto play on the world stage. 68 However, unless there is stability in the neighbourhood,India will not be able to expand its regional influence to become a credible power.This is in stark contrast to China, which exercises a significant influence in theneighbouring South East Asian region. With the automatic China-India comparison,India will always fall short in the global perspective, without a credible regionalpresence. It has in the recent years, improved relationships with Bangladesh and SriLanka, maintained good relations with Bhutan and is actively engaged with Myanmar.While Pakistan is the key factor for stability in the region, any improvement of itsrelations with India, would be a long drawn out affair. Afghanistan hence presents anopportunity, because if India manages to establish a positive influence with long termprospects, then it could compel Pakistan to engage with India in a more positivemanner. This could significantly improve not only regional stability but also India'sregional standing.66 Harsh V Pant,’ India's Challenge in Afghanistan: With Power Comes Responsibility’, ContemporaryReadings in Law and Justice, Vol.2(R), 2010 p 59.67 http://www.eurasiaview.com/indias-presence-in-afghanistan-implications-for-pakistan-analysis13042011/68 Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, ‘Indian Foreign Policy and Contemporary SecurityChallenges’, International Affairs 87:1, 2011, p103.18

Islamic FundamentalismSince the islamisation of his nation by President Zia-ul-Haq, Islamistfundamentalist elements have found the space to expand in Pakistan. The influence ofAbdullah Azzam and his protégé Osama Bin Laden, in the Jihad against the Soviets,was the turning point in the changes that were to follow in the region. The effects ofIslamic extremism spilled over from Afghanistan onto the Balkans, and haveconsequently become a major issue in the former Soviet states of Central Asia. Asthese States gained independence, political Islam which had survived undergroundduring the Soviet rule, came out in the open. 69 While Islam is a dominant factor inthe region, extremism is a security threat and viewed with concern, especially with theexternal penetration of Islamist ideologues with connections between IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan and Al Qaeda, and their links to Afghanistan andPakistan. 70 According to Harjeet Singh, the authoritarian regimes of Uzbekistan,Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have taken steps to curb political Islam in the denselypopulated Fergana Valley, which spreads across these regions. As a result, it issuffering from ethno-religious tensions, increasingly leading to acceptance of anorthodox Wahabi strain of Islam. 71 Another factor of Islamic extremism is theUyghur population of the adjacent Xinjiang province of China. 72 Frederick Starrcontends that China explicitly identifies Afghanistan and the three independent statesof Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as the new threats to Chinese territorialintegrity. 73 With ethnic affiliations in all the neighbouring Central Asian nations,coupled with the heavy hand of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army, the separatistmovement is becoming increasingly radical, with arming and training of militantslinked to the Taliban and ISI. 7469 Vitaly Naumkin, Between Pen and Rifle: Radical Islam in Central Asia, (Oxford: Rowman &Littlefield, 2005).70 International Crisis Group, 'Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb-ut-Tahrir', AsiaReport, no.58, June 30, 2003 p31.71 Col Harjeet Singh, ‘The New Great Game’, The Indian Review, 24.2 Apr/Jun09.72 http://www.ustkip.org/en/ustkip-haberler-en/77-china-xinjang-province.html73 S. Fredrick Starr, ‘Regional Development: The Afghan Pivot, Building a New Afghanistan, Ed by.Robert I. Rotberg, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007, p.158.74 Gaye Christoffersen, ‘ Strategic Insight, Constituting the Uyghur in US-China relations’,http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centres/ccc/publications/online Journal/2002/sept02/eastAsia.pdf19

Afghanistan remains a key factor in the spread of Islamic extremism, as itaffects all the nations with significant Muslim populations. The Muslim population ofIndia being over 180 million, exceeding that of all the Arab nations put together 75 , itis only natural for India to be deeply concerned. In recent years, four Indian Islamicextremist groups, the Al Umma, Deendar Anjuman, the Students' Islamic Movementof India (SIMI) and the Indian Mujahedeen (IM) have been actively involved interrorist attacks. Although some of these groups have been banned by the IndianGovernment, it has not acknowledged the threat from the Indian Jihadist terrorism toprevent alienation of the mainstream Muslim population. With established links to Al-Qaeda, some of the Kashmiri Jihadist groups, especially the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),have shifted focus outside Kashmir. 76 With the LeT having extended their support tothe SIMI and the IM in the past, there is now concern about their direct links withTaliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. India has long been a victim of terrorism, andaccording to Stanisland, has emerged as one of the world's most consistent targets forIslamist militants. Though the Mumbai attacks 2008 attracted the most globalattention, they were merely a more recent and dramatic milestone in a series of bloodyterrorist incidents. 77 Thus an increase in Islamic extremism within India, is inexorablylinked to its proliferation emerging from Afghanistan, and has become a key strategicinterest for India.CONFLICT IN SPHERES OF INFLUENCEIndia-Afghanistan relations are almost inevitably linked to the India-Pakistanfactor, internationally, amongst governments, media and analysts. Therefore theIndia-Afghanistan-Pakistan connection is a vital piece of the jigsaw for understandingthe regional dynamics, and its enormous challenges. Peace, stability and prosperity inthe region today can only be possible with the resolution of the conundrum of thisinexorably interlinked relationship. There are several reasons for Afghanistan to havebecome the challenge it has for India and Pakistan. First, the active role played in theSoviet eviction gave Pakistan a strategic opportunity to exercise influence over its oldadversary, Afghanistan, thereby denying India the same. The collapse of the Soviet75 http://www.themuslims.in/index.html76 Alexander Nicolli and Sarah Johnstone, ‘Islamic Extremism in India’, www.iiss.org/stratcom77 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18979/improving_indias_counterterrorism_policy_after_mumbai.html20

Union and the emergence of the Islamic Central Asian States, were also perceived asa window for a ‘breakthrough in Central Asia’ for Pakistan’s ‘regional ambitions’. 78The next is Pakistan’s continued support of the Taliban, provided an idealopportunity to destabilise India in Kashmir non-militarily, in a period when Indianinfluence in Afghanistan was at an all time low. According to Bob Woodward, Indiahas borne the brunt of Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Kashmir valley in 1989 in theaftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. 79 In the subsequent years,Pakistan actively stayed engaged using the US global war on terror to its advantage,in terms of continued military aid, totalling $13.40 billion since 2002. 80 It hassuccessfully created a high level of US dependency on it by permitting utilisation ofits bases, assets and infrastructure to combat the Afghan Taliban, as well as toprosecute drone strikes against militants in the FATA. 81 Exploiting this dependency,Pakistan has aggressively sought and exploited every opportunity, to diminish theIndian soft power footprint and influence, while claiming that the Indian consulates inAfghanistan are being used for spreading ferment in Baluchistan. 82 The PakistaniArmy Chief views Afghanistan as a strategic requirement of Pakistan for Afghanistanto provide strategic depth if not by direct control then at least by a friendlygovernment. 83 With doubts regarding the US, Pakistan prefers to hedge its bets byretaining ties to militant groups with violent anti-Indian and anti-Western agendas. 84In the initial years, both Afghanistan and India roughly assumed similar foreignpolicy postures 85 in order to retain autonomy, which ended for Afghanistan when itcame under the Soviet sphere of influence. The historical links ensured strong tiespost-Indian independence, for almost five decades until the pro-Pakistan Talibancame into power. Not surprisingly, post-Taliban India was quick to revive her old78 Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, (London: I B Taurius & Co.Ltd., 2004).79 Bob Woodard, Obama’s War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010, pp99-100.80 Direct overt US aid and military reimbursements to Pakistan, FY 2002-2011, prepared forCongressional Research service.81 Daniel Markey, ‘From AfPak to PakAf’, Policy Options Paper, Council on Foreign Relations, 2009,pp.2-6.82 Robert D. Kaplan, Behind the Indian Embassy Bombing, The Atlantic, August 2008.83 Dr. Subhash Kapila, ‘India: Strategic Imperatives for an Indian AfPak Policy’, Paper no. 3649, SouthAsia Analysis Group, 04 Feb2010. Also, http://siyasipakistan.wordpress.com/2010/02/02/84 Daniel Markey, op.cit. p6.85 Harsh V. Pant, op cit. p37.21

friendship and has for the last ten years gone to great lengths to strengthen it in spiteof many challenges. Its significant efforts in stabilisation and development havelargely been marginalised mainly due to US interests. According to Gen Stanley McChrystal:“Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan, includingsignificant development efforts and financial investment. In addition the currentAfghan government is perceived by Islamabad to be pro-India. While Indianactivities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence inAfghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage countermeasuresin Afghanistan or India”. 86This is exactly what Pakistan wanted as it effectively linked India to it andAfghanistan. It not only helped therefore to give it a ‘justifiable cause’ for it to remainengaged in Afghanistan and its future, it also helped to internationalise the perceptionthat the Indian presence as the basis for regional tensions in Afghanistan, and hence aroad block in Pakistani support to the US led ISAF operations. It succeeded inmanoeuvring the US by becoming an indispensable partner and key player in theregion. By suggesting brokering a deal with Taliban, it has not only remained in themainstream of US Foreign Policy in Afghanistan, but has forced President Karzai toengage Pakistan thereby increasing its leverage. Whilst India, on the other hand mayhave considerable goodwill and support amongst the Afghan people, it has very littletraction inside the country as all its efforts are security dependant, over which it hasno control.QUESTION OF A STRATEGIC CULTUREIndia's strategic interests in Afghanistan are therefore valid and justifiedespecially since they are linked to her security, energy requirements, economicgrowth, stability and regional influence. Having identified them and analysed theirvalidity, before we move onto India's strategy in the region, it is important to examineif India does strategy. Is there a national strategic vision? George Tanham does notthink so. According to him, Indians seem to arrive at strategic concepts rather than86 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-09-23/india/28093904_1_climate-change-pakistanicountermeasures-afghanistan-or-india22

through a thinking process. 87 He attributes the dearth to historical and culturalaspects, as well as to the Hindu philosophy of life, where the future is unknown andtherefore cannot be planned for.Several factors have contributed to this seemingly ad-hoc approach to strategicaffairs. Many have argued that the absence of a strategic culture is due to the longperiods of disunity and turmoil amongst the various kingdoms within the subcontinent,interspersed with limited periods of unity, under the various empires inIndian history. On the other hand, to Malone the historical concept of empires is acolonial construct, which has helped to portray the ongoing legacy of the Raj as anEmpire. 88 Either ways, the ancient empires were also relatively significant periods ofunity, peace and prosperity in a turbulent sub-continent, which could not have beenpossible if there was a complete absence of strategic vision amongst the ruling elite.Kautilya’s ‘Arthashastra’, is a little known treatise on statecraft, economic policy andmilitary strategy dating back to the Mauryan Empire (321-185 BC), with a ruthlesslyrealist approach which in comparison, according to Weber, renders Machiavelli’s‘Prince’ harmless. 89 The treatise rediscovered in 1915, has many references to itthrough history in several of the empires and kingdoms of ancient India and doesindicate a strategic culture. However, since philosophy is held in high esteem and isconsidered the highest plane of learning, strategy in the East often takes aphilosophical approach, which is contrary to the pragmatic Western way, and possiblyleaves an impression of a lack of strategic thinking. A significant factor contributingto its seeming absence is that during the entire colonial period of two centuries,strategic thinking was, for obvious reasons, not encouraged amongst the ‘natives’.Thus, post-independence the deficient culture was apparent in India’s approach toforeign affairs and strategy.The deficit of a strategic culture among the political elites especially onmatters of foreign policy and defence has been attributed to Nehru by the formerMinister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh. 90 Post-independence, Nehru hadconcurrently served as the PM and minister for external affairs. Therefore foreign87 George Tanham, ‘Indian Strategic Culture’, The Washington Quarterly15/1, (Winter 1992), p.129.88 David M. Malone, op.cit, p24.89 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthashastra90 Jaswant Singh, Defending India, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), pp1-58.23

policy and strategic planning was his exclusive domain. Though his successorsappointed separate ministers for looking after the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA),the trend of close control over foreign policy continued through the tenures of Indiraand Rajiv Gandhi, where only a close circle of advisors were in the decision-makingloop and the consensus of the polity was not always sought. The country had to paythe price for the inevitable shortcomings of such a personality-oriented approachtowards strategic affairs. The Chinese debacle of 1962 under Nehru and the SriLankan misadventure under Rajiv are two classical examples where poor strategicappreciation and an immature approach to foreign affairs caused national shame andinternational embarrassment.Harsh Pant rightly contends that the major consequence of the absence of astrategic culture was a perceptible lack of institutionalisation of the nation’s foreignpolicymaking. 91 After Rajiv, subsequent prime ministers enabled the MEA to gaingreater prominence, but foreign affairs continued to remain dependant on the vagariesof party politics of the government in power. This ‘tenure based’ outlook to foreignaffairs, coupled with the lack of an institutionalised strategic culture, inevitablycontributed to short-termism. Pant also contends that the delay in establishing aNational Security Council, and not structuring and empowering it adequately, hasrendered it largely ineffective in threat assessment, national security management andthe development of a coherent strategy 92 . He appears to be justified in view of theinability of successive governments to adopt a comprehensive long term view towardsresolution of security concerns, and relationship-improvement with its neighbours;which, has confined India to the first circle of Raja Mohan’s ‘Three Circle GrandStrategy’. 93According to Mohan, the world is divided into three concentric circles withIndia at the centre. The innermost circle encompasses India's immediateneighbourhood where it sought primacy and veto over the actions of outside powers.In the next circle the extended neighbourhood is enclosed which includes Asia and theIndian Ocean Region where it sought to retain her interests by balancing the influence91 Harsh V. Pant, ‘A Rising India’s Search for a Foreign Policy’, Orbis 53/2, (March 2009), p260.92 Harsh Pant, Op Cit., p261.93 C. Raja Mohan, India and the Balance of Power, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, Issue 4 July 1, 2006, Vol.85, Issue 4.24

of other powers. The outermost circle encompasses the global stage where it tried totake her place a as a key player in international peace and security. Afghanistan is inthe inner fringe of the second circle-a region where India is effectively trying tobalance the influence of other players. The big challenge is identifying India'sstrategy in the region especially since Indian politicians do not announce foreignpolicy doctrines 94 . It can only be deduced from the nuanced 'policy' statements ofleaders, diplomats and issued statements in the media. Where does Afghanistan fitinto this outreach? According to Cohen, Afghanistan has been a part of India’sstrategic scheme of things for some time. He argues: “For fifty years, India has usedAfghanistan to counter Pakistan. Whether or not this was a conscious application ofthe ‘mandala’, it was a classic expression of realpolitik. India's enemy’s enemy,Afghanistan, had become a friend”. 95In the Kautilyan ‘mandala’ theory of sphere of influence, interest andambition, every king must consider his realm to be at the centre of a concentric circleof kingdoms or mandalas (rings), which include possible enemies and allies. Itassumes a world of eternally warring states, and propagates perpetual preparednessand punishment. 96 While Kautilya can be considered a forerunner of the Realisttradition as it predates Machiavelli, Hobbes and Waltz, his work finds practically nomention in Western theories of International Relations (IR). And even more sadly itfinds very few takers in Indian academia. Even Raja Mohan’s strategy of three circles,which draws from the mandala theory is only a recent construct, which in any case ismore of an effort to explain India’s approach to strategy, and provides only the ‘how’as against the ‘why’. Therefore, the possibility of it being used as a deliberate strategyby India is remote indeed. While Cohen’s interpretation of a Kautilyan approach of‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ may seem to apply to Afghanistan in the Indo-Pakistani perspective, it does not stand scrutiny as a national strategy. India has beenfundamentally ‘inward looking’ as a result of the Nehruvian approach to externalaffairs flowing from internal affairs, governed by the five Panchsheel principle whichwere about respecting sovereignty and non-interference in other’s affairs. 97 It has94 C Raja Mohan, op cit., p1.95 Stephen P Cohen, op. cit. p249.96 Navnita Chadha Behra, Non-Western International Relations Theory, Ed by Amitav Acharya andBarry Buzan, (Routledge: London 2010), p102.97 Robert W. Bradnock, op cit. p17.25

never sought to use the ‘enemy’s enemy’ approach as a strategy in IR. Even India’ssigning of the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971 was more tocounterbalance the US-support to Pakistan from the 1965 Indo-Pak war onwards,rather than an ‘enemy’s enemy’ strategy. Though Moscow had advanced the offer ofthe friendship treaty in 1969, India did not sign it till two years later 98 .Given the significance of Afghanistan in the Indo-Pak relations, has India beenfollowing what appears to conform to Liddell Hart’s strategy of ‘Indirect Approach’?After all, since independence India has nurtured a close relationship with Kabul. Inview of its adversarial relationship with Pakistan, it makes perfect strategic sense tofactor in its Indo-Afghan friendship to shape its Indo-Pak relations. While Hart’sstrategy was essentially applied to military campaigns, during the course of hisreflections on it he realised, that indirect approach had a much wider application in allspheres of life. 99 The strategy which aims at bringing about success indirectly, in thiscase to resolve India’s issues with Pakistan cannot be considered to apply, as theproblems have on the contrary been exacerbated by the Indo-Afghan friendship.Of late, there has been an increase in strategic thinking with a proliferation ofwriters and academics, both civilian and military, the emergence of many reputableorganisations and think tanks and an increase in the ‘sophisticated commentary onforeign relations’. 100 Unfortunately, their utilisation by the political and bureaucraticelites and integration into the system is at best informal and very nascent. However,there is a realisation of the need and the government has recently announced thesetting up of an Indian National Defence University to undertake long term strategicstudies, and create synergy between academia and the government. 101 In the recentyears there has been a concerted effort towards elevating India’s standing in theregional and international sphere. There has been a significant and consistent efforttowards ‘reshaping the neighbourhood’ and ‘reclaiming its standing’ in the near98 Robert W. Bradnock, op cit p99.99 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, The Indirect Approach, (London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1967), pp18-19.100 David M. Malone, op.cit. p300.101 http://www.hindustantimes.com/rssfeed/newdelhi/Cabinet-approves-Indian-National-Defence-University/Article1-543068.aspx26

abroad parts of Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central and SE Asia and the Indian OceanRegion. 102Many in the Indian establishment consider New Delhi's policy towards Kabul asaltruistic. Malone posits that this assessment overlooks the calculus of India’s interestin preventing Kabul from tilting towards Islamabad, and allowing itself to besubsumed by Pakistan into its security space. 103 According to Pant on the other hand,India’s strategy in Afghanistan is a multipronged one, driven by its growing regionaland global ambitions. He argues that structural factors have propelled India toredefine her Foreign Policy in the neighbourhood, and the Afghanistan policy, is ineffect an attempt to reshape the strategic environment according to its own interest.There are a range of factors which are responsible for India following an unusuallyproactive strategy in Afghanistan. The Indian PM's recent statements have clearresonance of a strategy when he assured the Afghan leadership that India will stand bythe war torn nation ‘through thick and thin’. What makes this significant is the resolvein New Delhi to ensure the extensive investment in Afghanistan is not lost, when theUS inevitably pulls out. It is also a commitment towards strengthening the Afghangovernment, to stand up to Pakistan's overtures of installing a pro-Islamabadgovernment. This is a change in India's approach which resonates with Pant'sstandpoint. As a consequence of its consistent economic growth, there is an awarenessof the possibility of becoming a great power. This would allow her a greater regionalinfluence, including the Indian Ocean, as Dr. Manmohan Singh's policy statement afew years ago at an annual Military Commanders' Conference reflects: “India'sgrowing international stature gives it strategic relevance in the area ranging from thePersian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca. India has exploited the fluidities of theemerging world order to forge new links through a combination of diplomaticrepositioning, economic resurgence and military firmness”. 104102 David M. Malone, op.cit. p65.103 Ibid. p65104 http://www.indiadefence update.com/news.119.html27

PRESENT STRATEGYThough India has been engaged in Afghanistan since independence, the breakof the Taliban years made the re-engagement a challenge, as Pakistan was able toexploit the strategic space to its advantage. In the absence of an articulated Afghanpolicy,India’s strategy in Afghanistan can however be identified by its actions overthe last few years. New Delhi clearly opted for soft power to ‘win’ back the supportof the Afghan people, a classic Nye approach - influence through attraction.Diplomatic EngagementPost-Taliban, New Delhi was quick to re-establish diplomatic ties by settingup it's embassy in Kabul and consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar andJalalabad. President Karzai has visited India on four occasions including a state visitin 2006, while the Indian PM has already visited Afghanistan twice. There have beenregular visits by foreign ministers amongst other ministerial level visits from bothsides, close to forty meetings on reconstructions in Afghanistan and more than twentyin India, to which both sides have been party. There have also been more thanfourteen agreements, which have been signed during the various visits, onestablishing India-Afghanistan foundation, capacity development, human resourcedevelopment, education, rural development, healthcare, agricultural research, civilaviation and media. 105Political ApproachA strong political relationship underwrites India's engagement with the Karzaigovernment since the latter’s establishment. Though India had consistentlymaintained that it did not recognise ‘good’' Taliban, there has been a significant shiftin this approach hinted at by the Indian Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao, at theInternational Institute of Strategic Studies when she said: “Any integration process inAfghanistan should be Afghan led and should include these who abjure violence, give105 http://www.meakabul.nic.in/?201528

up armed struggle and terrorism and are willing to abide by the values of democracy,pluralism and human rights as enshrined in the Afghan Constitution”. 106The PM’s recent support towards reconciliation was confirmation of arealignment of strategy, which is resonant of Yager’s definition. According to theissued joint declaration some significant factors emerge: Both sides have elevatedtheir bilateral ties to a strategic-partnership, indicating a long-term commitment; Itwas not directed against any other state or group of states, clearly implying that it wasnot against Pakistan or a Pakistan-China grouping; and combating terrorism thatthreatens the two countries and the region was a shared commitment, which was topossibly make clear the stand on the Pak-Taliban nexus. Both leaders shared theirvision of Afghanistan as an independent, democratic, stable and prosperous countryand that the strategic-partnership between them is based upon sovereignty, equality,and territorial integrity, non-interference in their internal affairs, mutual respect andbenefit; an indication of non-acceptance of Pakistani interference 107 . Having seen thepitfalls of an interventionist foreign policy approach of the West, India's reassertion ofthe Panchsheel Policy in the region, was an affirmation of her soft power approach.Reconstruction and Capacity DevelopmentIt is in the area of reconstruction and capacity development, where India hasmade her presence truly felt in Afghanistan and amongst its people. Indian efforts area combination of major infrastructure projects, smaller community based developmentprojects, education, capacity development and public health. The 218 km long Zaranj-Delaram highway, connecting the Kandahar-Herat highway to the Iranian port ofChabahar, provides a shorter and supplementary access for Afghanistan to the sea.106 India's role in Afghanistan, IISS Strategic Comments, Volume 17, comments 22, June 2011.107 http://www.strategicbriefings.com/2011/geopolitical/india's-stakes-in-afghanistan/29

Major Indian Projects in Afghanistan 108The consequent increase in trade transit volume and container / truck traffic, hasincreased revenue collection. In addition to 58 km of supplementary roads, India hasalso constructed the 202 km long Pul-e-Khumrri to Kabul power transmission linewith substations which passes over the 4000 metre high Salang range. The SalmaDam Project on the Hari-Rud river 164 km east of Herat town, which commenced in2004 will be commissioned this year and generate 42 MW of electricity, providingirrigation to 75,000 hectares of land. Additionally, providing equipment for powergeneration and supply, digging of tube wells, and rehabilitation of reservoirs,constitutes the ongoing reconstruction efforts. Other assistance includes constructionof the Parliament building, exchange and training staffers for Parliament and election108 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125061548456340511.html30

commission, the gifting of 400 buses, 200 mini-buses and 105 utility vehicles, threeairbus aircraft with spare support to Ariana Airlines, setting up of telecommunicationinfrastructure, and TV up and down link facilities. 109On the humanitarian side, Indian Medical Missions (IMM) has been establishedat Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar which provide services tonearly 360,000 patients. It also rehabilitated and expanded the largest paediatrichospitals in Afghanistan. Capacity building for Afghan doctors and paramedics isalso provided. India has been supplying 100 grams of high protein biscuits to 2million school children everyday, 250,000 metric tonnes of wheat, and a wide rangeof small and community based development schemes with budgets of less than $1million which can be implemented quickly in less than twelve months haveestablished. These are grass roots level projects, implemented by local contractorswhich create a sense of partnership and ownership in local communities, particularlyin the vulnerable southern and eastern provinces. Presently eighty four projects areunderway in nineteen provinces. These include the construction of schools, toilets,health clinics, veterinary clinics and bore-wells. Since 2006, 500 Afghan studentshave been selected annually for undergraduate and post-graduate university educationin India, including girls. 110Under the Indian Technical and Cooperation programme, over 500 placementsare offered to Afghan public officials in professional institutes of their choice forcapacity building skills ranging from urban development and poverty reduction toagriculture and IT. The Self Employed Women Association NGO provides vocationaltraining to a thousand women on social empowerment through economic selfreliance.Indian civil-servants have been deputed to the Afghan government asmentors and guides for the development of training modules for Afghan civilservants. 111 The distribution of the projects across the various regions of the countryis clearly meant to reach out to all tribal and ethnic groups.109 http://www.meakabul.nic.in/pdfs/partnership.pdf110 Ibid.111 Ibid.31

People-Centric ApproachIndia's historic links with the Pashtu people suffered a setback in the years ofits support to the Northern Alliance. Setting up of the four consulates, IMMs and thesoft power approach is meant to reach across all ethnic groups. While the support ofPresident Karzai, a Pashtu, alone will not revive the historical links and goodwill ofthe Pashtu people, the support of the reconciliation process will be a start. AsPresident Karzai begins negotiations with the Taliban, the ability to isolate thePakistan sponsored radical elements and integrate the mainstream elements into thesystem will be critical for winning back the Pashtu support.In spite of significant dangers, such as the two bombings of the Indian Embassy,leading to several deaths including the Defence Attaché, it has acted with restraint anddid not blame the Pakistan government. The spate of suicide attacks, the constantdanger of kidnapping and fatal attacks did not erode India's commitment, and onlyserved to force the international community to revisit the close ties between the ISIand the Taliban. It also strengthened the support from the Afghan government and itspeople towards Indian efforts. While India deployed its high altitude trained Indo-Tibetan Border Police to defend its diplomatic assets and infrastructure projects, 112 ithas refrained from putting boots on the ground. Though the ISAF operations are underthe UN charter, and despite India's vast experience in UN peacekeeping, the Pakistanfactor has kept her out of the active troop deployment. This has strengthened thechances of success of her soft power approach significantly. Clearly, the Indianengagement is a grassroots upwards approach, aimed at connecting with the heartsand minds of the Afghan people at every level across all ethnic and tribal crosssections.STRATEGY ANALYSISTo analyse the strategy followed by New Delhi, it will necessarily entail anexamination of the challenges faced by India, and the biggest is the effect ofAfghanistan on the India-Pakistan confrontation. It has shifted the confrontational112 www.scribd.com/doc/14876173/the-India-factor-in -Afghanistan32

focus from Kashmir to Afghanistan argues Christine Fair, as India increasinglyestablishes her presence while Pakistan is accused of using its violent proxies such asJalaluddin Haqqani to attack Indian interests and personnel. 113 The US reliance on theNorthern Alliance since the Bonn Conference fuelled Pakistan's concerns aboutIndia’s proxies in Kabul. Rehabilitation of discredited warlords pushed Pakistan tosupport the Afghan Taliban. 114 According to Fahmida Ashraf, Pakistan gainedinfluence and support in Afghanistan whereas India was marginalised. Post 9/11provided India with an opportunity to isolate Pakistan and get the internationalcommunity to declare it a terrorist state. Having failed to do so, India campaigned forsupport to the Northern Alliance to prevent the formation of a pro-Pakistan AfghanGovernment. 115 These views underscore Pakistan’s India-centric focus inAfghanistan.Kaplan argues that the war in Afghanistan is part of Pakistan’s larger strugglewith India and goes along with the strategic depth and encirclement theories. Someanalysts like Rubin and Rashid have even linked Pakistan’s support to Taliban to theunresolved security competition with India over Kashmir. 116 These perceptions arepossibly misplaced and emerge from a Cold War pro-Pakistan western mindset, whichunfortunately tend more often than not to view the Kashmir issue essentially from aPakistani lens. Post 9/11, US perceptions about India underwent a dramatic change,to the point where today it supports India’s view that Kashmir is a bilateral issue withPakistan. 117 On the other hand, Pakistan’s increased efforts to out-manoeuvre Indiaand discredit it in Afghanistan, is an effort to keep their anti-Indian paranoiainternationalised. General Kayani’s belief of Afghanistan as a strategic depthreaffirms Pakistan's India-centric perception. 118 Fair argues that Pakistan’s fears ofIndia are neuralgic and unlikely to be alleviated even if the Kashmir issue were todisappear. 119 Interestingly, during the entire visit to Kabul, the Indian PM did notonce bring up Pakistan in his speech or statements. Clearly the strategy was to let the113 C. Christine Fair, India in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints, CenturyFoundation Report, www.tcf.org114 Ibid.115 Fahmida Ashraf, ‘India-Afghanistan Relations Post 9/11’, ISSI Journal XXVII, No.2, Summer 2007116 Barnet R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, 'From Great Game to Grand Bargain, Ending Chaos inAfghanistan and Pakistan', Foreign Affairs, 87, 2009.117 http://www.theindiadaily.com/us-wants-india-pakistan-to-solve-kashmir-issue-bilaterally/118 Pakistan: Facing Up to Insurgency, Strategic Survey IISS 2010.119 C. Christine Fair, op. cit.33

Pakistani paranoia play out in the open, and be seen internationally as so. Indianresilience and tenacity to stay engaged has been made concrete by New Delhi’s newoutlook, making it clear that it will not get pressurised by Pakistan, and that it willstay engaged as a stabilising factor, in view of its long term interests in the region.So far, the US has been reluctant to allow a greater Indian role due to thecalculus of reassuring Pakistan. The increased economic and military aid, andWashington’s moves to embrace Islamabad as a strategic dialogue partner, whilepressurising India to lower its Afghan profile, had worried it in the past. 120 Of latehowever, there has been increasing impatience in the US, with Pakistan’s approach tosupport the war. The ‘Osama hit’ and Pakistan’s seeming complicity of his presencein Abbotabad, has affected US perceptions. This change in perception provides awindow of opportunity for a change of role for India. With China and Russia, her twogreatest rivals being keen on pushing the US out of the region, India is the onlyreliable partner for long term stability in Afghanistan. Managing the US perspectiveof India’s role is therefore the challenge.China is an adversary and a competitor to India’s economic rise, in the region.With the $3.5 billion investment in the Aynak Copper mine, China has firmlyestablished its footprint in Afghanistan. Large oil and natural gas deposits in thenorthern regions make it attractive for Beijing’s increased iron ore and energyrequirements. However, Afghanistan has remained relatively low key in contrast toChina’s high involvement in Central Asia, Pakistan and Iran. In keeping with itsattempt to develop the troubled Xinjiang region, China has in the past years investedextensively in the Karakoram Highway in Pakistan, the Gwadar Port and the multimilliondollar pipeline from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang (Uyghur Autonomous Region).Its relatively low profile, in all likelihood, is to prevent any conflict of interests withthe US in the short term, clearly looking at the long term which is linked to a futureUS exit. Given the close Sino-Pak friendship, and Pakistan encouraging the Karzai120 India: Economic Progress, Regional tensions, The Annual Review by World Affairs, IISS StrategicSurvey 2010.34

government to look towards Beijing in place of Washington, China remains achallenge for India in Afghanistan. 121The return of the Taliban to power is a concern which India cannot gloss over.When the Karzai government commences talks with the Taliban, it needs to be bornein mind that whether ‘good’ or ‘bad’, the Taliban are fundamentally opposed toIndia. 122 It is active in three tiers: The first is the Quetta Shura founded by MullahOmar and active in Helmand and Kandahar; The second is the Haqqani Shura whichis considered a strategic asset of the ISI by Gen Kayani 123 and operates in Khost,Logar, Paktia and Paktika; The third tier is Hizb-e-Islami Shura based in the NorthWest Frontier Province and operates in Waziristan. 124 All these groups have hadclose ties with the ISI, 125 and can be exploited to target India asymmetrically. It was,after all, the Haqani group which targeted the Indian Embassy in 2008. In spite of itsreservations, India’s support for an Afghan led approach indicated that it was willingto trust Karzai’s instincts on the reconciliation process, and chose not to get directlyinvolved; a clear message to the international community in contrast to Islamabad’sdirect approach. The scale of Indian efforts in Afghanistan has definitely unnervedPakistan, and by adhering to a soft power approach, New Delhi has managedperceptions internationally that it is not seeking to antagonise Islamabad. Rashid’sview that the soft power campaign is ‘designed to win over every sector of Afghansociety, give India a high profile with Afghans, gain maximum political advantageand of course undercut Pakistani influence’, 126 appears to have succeeded. An ABCNews/BBC poll released in early 2009 indicated that 71% of Afghans viewed Indiafavourably while, only 8% said the same of Pakistan.In keeping with Nye’s tools of soft power, 127 India has always consistentlytied her engagement in Afghanistan to historical and cultural links. It has never lost an121 Anatol Lieven, ‘China is Key to America's Afghan Endgame’, International Herald Tribune, 26May 2011.122 Harsh V Pant, op.cit. p60.123 Afghanistan, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) Publication, (New Delhi: Har Anand,2010), p55.124 Maj Gen GD Bakshi, ‘Resurecting Afghanistan’, Indian Defence Reivew, 24.4, Oct/Dec 09.125 Indian Strategy in Afghanistan, The India Research Group, www.tirgroup.org. p18.126 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (USA: Penguin, 2008).127 Joseph Nye, Soft Power, the Means to Success in World Politics, (New York: Public Affairs 2004)pp 11-12.35

opportunity to bring to the forefront the cultural linkages, whether at the political,diplomatic or the grass root levels. The reiteration of its support to Kabul, withoutinterference in the process of reconciliation, strengthens India’s positioninternationally and regionally. Its foreign policy has shown tenacity and resilience insupporting the soft power approach. But will this approach alone be enough to impactfavourably on Indian interests? The very dependency on ISAF for protection of itsdevelopmental efforts contradicts it and the approach also has its share of critics. Thestrategy of ‘hearts and mind’ approach has ‘foreclosed’ on other modes of influenceargues Sullivan 128 . According to Kapila, it is New Delhi’s political and strategictimidity, that have not recognised that being a big power entails shouldering militaryresponsibility, in the security environment in South Asia. He argues that whenever theUS exit takes place, India will be forced with ‘hard options’ which cannot be ‘kneejerk’ reactions. It would have to undertake extensive contingency planning exercisesat the political, strategic and military levels in order to ensure nation securityinterests. 129 The security situation inside Afghanistan has been a challenge to operatein, with twenty Indian nationals having been killed so far, as the Taliban continues totarget Indian efforts. The ISAF draw down will adversely impact Indian projects andincrease the pressure on the Indian endeavours.Former Secretary in the MEA, Rajiv Sikri, argues: ‘Although India’s securityremains deeply affected by what happens in Afghanistan; India’s disadvantage is thatit is not involved in its security in any meaningful way’. 130 The real dilemma is, doesIndia continue on the soft path or will it need to resort to hard power to preserve itsstrategic interests? India has displayed its hard power capability in the past in 1971,when due to West Pakistan's imposition of martial law, over ten million refugees fromEast Pakistan flooded India, causing it to intervene militarily and create Bangladesh.The Sri Lankan intervention in 1987 was about hard power realpolitik, though theIndian Peace Keeping Force unfortunately got embroiled in counter-insurgencyoperations due to a poor political mandate and subsequently withdrew. In 1988, Indiaintervened in Maldives at the request of President Gayoom, besieged by a coup, by128 Tim Sullivan,’ India's Afghan Endgame’, Centre for Defence, http://www.defencestudies.org/?p=2251129 Dr Subhas Kapila, ‘Afghanistan: India's Contingency Plans for the Day After’, Paper No.3576,South Asia Analysis Group, 29 Dec 2009.130 Rajiv Sikri, http://www.defensestudies.org/cds/india%e2%80%99s-afghan-endgame-and-what-itmeans-for-the-u-s/36

apidly air landing troops within twelve hours. Unfortunately, these hard power actsended up causing concern amongst its immediate neighbourhood with India beingperceived as a regional hegemon. Ironically, this is an image it has always eschewedfrom due to the legacy of the Gandhian ‘moral’ idealism and the Nehru inspiredPanchsheel approach to foreign affairs. As a result India failed to capitalise on thesehard power acts to establish a positive regional influence. But these were over twodecades ago.Has the Indian approach towards exploiting hard power changed? The last majormilitary operation was Kargil but that was purely an act of self defence. India hasemployed its military effectively, which has won four out of its five wars, displaying acapability to execute intervention operations. But it has steadfastedly refused to sendtroops abroad except under the UN Charter, and this remains its stated position up tonow. Interestingly, in the Indian military outlook, boots on the ground in Afghanistandoes not feature as a strategy. 131 While this could possibly be due to the military’sadherence to the governmental stand, is a military involvement in its best interests?From the Indian perspective most definitely not, as it will feed the Pakistani military'sgreatest fears. Also, it appears that the long history of the consequences of fighting inAfghanistan has not been lost on the Indian leadership.So far India has adopted a soft power approach, the best it could under thecircumstances, and reconnected with the people of Afghanistan. It has also beeneffective in shaping a positive perception internationally, especially the US. TheIndian resilience, in spite of the physical attacks and the loss of lives, displays astrategic commitment and tenacity. The significant amount of aid and support is amessage, of not only how important Afghanistan is to it, but also New Delhi’s statureas a significant power. Despite the absence of a common border, India has establisheditself as a regional stakeholder in Afghanistan’s future, internationally. Alongside thereconstruction, India has not only managed to successfully create the strategicinfrastructure for its over-land access to Central Asia, it has also ended Afghanistan’sdependency on Pakistan for sea-access by connecting Afghanistan’s main ring-road to131 Maj Gen G. D. Bakshi, op. cit., pp113-114.37

Iranian ports. 132 Despite Pakistan’s rhetoric and efforts, by not reacting or counteringthem, India has been successful in enhancing its international image. It has alsonegated the perception of Indian presence being a stumbling block in Afghanistan’sstability. India has also shown strategic flexibility by its support for the reconciliationprocess, a major shift from its previous position. These are clear indications of astrategy at work, possibly the only viable one so far. It has been effective in keepingIndian strategic interests in the region alive, albeit at a cost. But it is also clear, thatthe present strategy is not enough for its future trajectory in the region.STAKE HOLDER’S ANALYSISWith India's interests and strategy in context, and in keeping with Afghanistanand Pakistan’s perspectives, the involvement of other stake holders in the region willnecessarily form the basis of any assessment of her future trajectory in the region. TheUS remains the key player in the region as the primary global power, with its interestsclearly elucidated by Secretary of state Hillary Clinton at the Council for ForeignRelations in Washington: “In Afghanistan and Pakistan, our goal is to disrupt,dismantle and ultimately defeat Al-Qaeda and its extremist allies and to prevent theirreturn to either country”. 133 A mid-course correction to the US policy has included anemphasis on saving the state of Pakistan. While combating extremism represented byAl-Qaeda, the US also has a larger geo-political interest in South West Asia, as it notonly provides access to Central Asia, China and Russia, but to Iran and West Asia.Economic prospects in the region are secondary, from the point of view of access toenergy and strategic minerals, while denial of home bases and access to Weapons ofMass Destruction from Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to terrorist groups, remain a keyshort term objective. Though it supports India, the US is presently constrained ingiving it a greater role in the region.The European Union looks at the region from the perspective of maintainingsolidarity of its traditional western alliance with the US. Islamic extremism is anincreasing concern with a sizeable Islamic population in several countries; narcoticsand international crime are other areas of concern with their flow into Europe. It is132 Robert Kaplan, op. cit., p14.133 www.cfr.org.38

also keen to expand its economic interests in the CAR states from being primarily anaid provider. From a strategic perspective, EU policy in Afghanistan is a test forexpansion of influence into CAR states, Iran, China and West Asia. This willsignificantly impact its relations with Russia and a favourable balance of power in theregion could be a future tool in leveraging Moscow. 134 Its support of India willhowever follow the US lead.While Russian interests in Afghanistan go back to the Great Game, until now,its approach has been one of ‘wait and watch’. However, the recent trilateral andquadrilateral meeting with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan has put a new spininto the regional dynamics, with Moscow de-linking its relations with New Delhi andIslamabad. The joint undertaking of economic projects and Russia's willingness toinvest in the energy sectors of the three countries brings Russia back into the game.Recognising Pakistan’s ‘contribution’ to the world community in counteringterrorism, and promised support for its entry to the SCO, indicates it does not want thequest for peace in Afghanistan to become a solely US enterprise. Pakistan in returnhas promised Russia access to warm seas. 135 The Russian engagement, in view of thegrowing anti-US lobby in Pakistan, could see a reversal of the Cold War poweralignments in the region. While Russia has been a steady partner of India in the past,there has been some redefining of the relationship between the two countries. ThoughRussia would be supportive of India’s role in Afghanistan, a legacy from the Sovietera, its engagement with Pakistan will definitely be a factor in it.China remains the inscrutable player in the region. Its stakes notwithstanding,Beijing has also played ‘wait and watch’ so far. While it would like to see the end toUS involvement in the region, it does not want to get involved actively in Afghanistanin spite of its economic interests. Though it may have successfully bought off theTaliban to safeguard its interests in the past, it would be a mistake to assume the samein the future since it has a history of turning on its benefactors. 136 Beijing's ability totake on large projects is an attraction for Kabul, but the US and EU presence on itsdoorstep, especially in close proximity to it's troubled Xinjiang province is definitely134 CENJOWS Publication, op.cit.135 http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/article2007979ece.136 Anatol Lieven, 'China is the key to America's Afghan Endgame', International Herald Tribune, 26Mar 2011.39

a cause for concern for China. On the other hand, China is keen to get access to theIndian Ocean by through development of the Gwadar port on Pakistan's Makarancoast. This will enable an overland trade access via Pakistan, to China through theKarakoram highway and rail link. 137 While in favour of a stable Afghanistan in viewof its economic interests and concerns at Islamic extremism, it is willing to wait outthe US engagement before acting. Given China's strategic partnership with Pakistan,it would not support an enlarged Indian role.Iran shares a border with Afghanistan and a legacy of problems with Pakistanover Taliban and Sunni extremism. The US presence in Afghanistan is possibly thedeepest concern given its conflict with Iran. On the other hand it is eager to engagethe CAR states and Afghanistan economically to enhance its profile in the region. Italso has serious concerns about the security of the Hazara Shias in Afghanistan,whom it actively supports. Afghanistan had been the arena for a clash of ideologicalinterests between a Shiite Teheran and Sunni Saudi Arabia; Iran almost went to warwith the Taliban with the killing of fourteen Iranian diplomats and the massacre ofHazaras at Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998. The active support of the Taliban has been thecause of Tehran’s deep distrust towards Pakistan. 138 Iran would be supportive of anIndian role but it needs to engage Tehran, especially in view of the fact that the onlyaccess which India has to the CAR, is through Iranian ports. China has engaged Iraneffectively with the signing of the multi-billion dollar contact for the development ofYedavaran oil fields in Iran. 139 India had lost some traction with Iran for votingagainst it in the International Atomic Energy Agency and needs to rebuild its bridgeswith Tehran, in view of the common interest of not wishing to see a Pakistan backedgovernment in Kabul 140 .Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, with common borders withAfghanistan, are also stake holders in the region. While their greatest concern isIslamic extremism spilling over into the Fergana valley 141 , they are also keen to137 Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, ‘Afghanistan in Chinese Strategy in South and Central Asia’, China BriefVolume: 8 Issue10.138 Ahmed Rashid, op.cit pp196-206.139 http://www.irantracker.org/global-business-in-iran/projects/Sinopec-nioc-yadavan-oil-field.140 Harsh V. Pant, India's Relations with Iran: Much Ado about Nothing, Washington Quarterly, winter2011, pp 62-65.141 http://enewsfergananews.com/article.php?id=23140

expand trade and economic links into South East Asia. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan arehighly supportive of India since the days of India’s support to the Northern Alliance.STAKE HOLDER AND CONGRUENCE MATRIXFACTORSUPPORTOPPOSEUNKNOWNECONOMIC AIDAll players less Pakistanand ChinaPakistanChinaDEVELOPMENTAll players less Pakistanand ChinaPakistanChinaCIVIL GOVERNANCE&OTHER TRAININGAll players less Pakistanand ChinaPakistanChinaMILITARY PRESENCENilUS, EU, China, PakistanAfghanistan, Russia, IranMILITARY TRAININGUS, EU, AfghanistanPakistan, ChinaRussia, IranTo summarise the analysis of the stake holders, there is a broad convergence ofinterests, policies and support with all players of the region, limited convergence withChina and practically nil with Pakistan. There is convergence on the issues ofpreventing a Taliban government in Kabul, and a need to check the spread of Islamicextremism, narcotics and associated international crime. There are common views onthe need for stability in the region, building an effective Afghan state, and promotionof trade and economic linkages. According to Ashley J. Tellis, all regional stateshave some impact on Afghanistan’s future, but amongst them all, the only nationwhich pursues goals that are identical to those of the US, and almost matches theintensity of convergence, is India 142 . According to him ‘Pakistan the most critical USally in the war in Afghanistan pursues far more divergent aims relative to Washingtonand Kabul than the high American dependence on Pakistan would lead one toassume’. In Pakistan’s military dominated national security perspective, a Taliban142 Ashley J. Tellis, Implementing a Regional Approach to Afghanistan, Report by CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, p.102; www.CarnegieEndowment.org.41

epresented government in Kabul is in its best interests, as it would have adequateleverage to deny India any significant role. An effective central state in Afghanistanis also not in its interest, as a secular Pashtun majority government, would keep theissue of Afghan territorial claims on its Pashtun-dominated lands, alive. 143 Therefore,Pakistan’s long term goals of becoming Kabul’s principal agent make it the regionalspoiler especially for US, Indian, Iranian and most importantly Afghanistan’sinterests.FUTURE TRAJECTORYGiven India’s justified strategic stakes, its stand alone soft power approach,the seeming stirrings of a long term strategic vision but with no clear cut policy, it israpidly reaching a situation where it may end up getting squeezed out of Afghanistan.This would affect its standing regionally and internationally, especially when theworld expects more out of India, as President Obama said in his speech to the IndianParliament in 2010 visit, ‘with increased power comes increased responsibility’ 144 . Itwill also seriously affect India’s long term economic and energy interests in CentralAsia. Finally, it will remain hostage to Pakistan’s strategy, which will not onlyimpact on Indo-Pak relations, but also adversely affect the regional stability.So what is the future trajectory for India in Afghanistan? It appears thatPakistan has succeeded in its strategy by emerging as the peace-broker between theTaliban and the Karzai Government. While the Afghans have welcomed the Pakistanisupport, two issues which emerge are: the Taliban’s acceptance of President Karzai’sred lines of it dissociating from the Al-Qaeda and accepting the AfghanConstitution; 145 and Pakistani military’s ‘pound of flesh’ from the Afghangovernment for negotiating with the Taliban. Where does it leave India? There havebeen growing views that if New Delhi wants to retain a political future and avoidgetting squeezed out, it needs to reach out to the Taliban 146 . It appears to have doneso, and this would explain the Indian PM's changed approach for support of the143 Ashley J. Tellis, Ibid.p105.144 http://www.ndtvcom/article/india/full-text-obamas-address-to-parliament-65093145 http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-06/20/U-S-confirms-afghan-taliban-talks-as-karzaicriticizes-motives.html146 India's Role in Afghanistan, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol 17, Comment 22 - Jun 201142

econciliation process, as well as the confidence of leaving it entirely in Afghanhands, despite Pakistan's role as the interlocutor.147The strategic partnershipdeclaration between the two also indicates confidence of a long term engagement.This strategic partnership provides the opportunity for India to enhance itsregional commitment. It needs to set the stage for its long term interests by exploitingthe strategic spaces available under the circumstances by adopting a three prongedapproach. India must build on the gains of the confidence and trust it has generatedamongst the Afghan people. It has sent the right signal by promising to stand by themand must ensure it continues to do so in the future. For this it needs to continue itsstate building and stabilisation efforts and recommence the new construction projectswhich were stopped two years ago, 148 by capitalising on the available securityenvironment until the ISAF final pullout. Meanwhile, it must step up its contributiontowards building a strong and capable Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan AirForce, which is vital for peace and stability, by enhancing the training and support.This would strengthen the hand of the indigenous Afghan government and enable it tocope with the challenges of reduction of ISAF forces in the future. It would also serveto improve the security environment for India’s continued engagement in the country.The Indian government also needs to educate its home population about its nationalinterests in Afghanistan, in order to elicit a wider support for trade and economicengagements. Encouraging a greater investment and contribution by the Indianbusiness community, in the significant trade and investment opportunities, would go along way in strengthening the Afghan economyNext, India needs to enhance its regional profile by shaping the internationalperception in its favour, as there is an excellent opportunity here for a display ofregional responsibility and leadership. This can be achieved by shifting from a‘Pakistan-centric’ focus in Afghanistan to a ‘Pakistan-inclusive’ regional approach.Pakistan’s strategy has to be moved away from its zero-sum game approach withIndia, by including Islamabad in the economic future of the region. It has to becajoled into it, and this is where China could play a key role given its influence onPakistan. This cannot happen on an Indian initiative, because of the Indo-Chinese147 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-shifts-afghan-policy-ready-to-talk-to-Taliban/596851/148 IISS Strategic Comments, op cit.43

dynamics, but can most certainly be brokered by the US. If India engages China alongwith the US, it provides the necessary strategic manoeuvring space for leveragingPakistan and creating the conditions for stability in Afghanistan. Despite the followon effects of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the Indian PM has made it clear that therecently resumed peace talks with Pakistan will continue. This sets the ground for anIndian engagement with China on the Afghan issue. Since the US remains thedominant player, and given the Chinese reluctance to impose a ‘US version of peaceprocess’, 149 a US-China-India engagement on Afghanistan, which includes Pakistan,would certainly be in everyone’s interests, including China.Finally, India must actively exploit the circumstances to promote andcoordinate a regional approach towards a comprehensive Afghan solution. It has themost convergence with all the stake holders in the region, and the greatest with theUS. It is the only stake holder who has the ability and credibility to engage the otherson the common issue of Afghanistan. The US is presently in a position, wherein, it isincreasingly appears that a regional solution is the only viable option to cover theirexit strategy and prevent a reversal of all its efforts in Afghanistan. With PresidentObama's commitment to a draw down of forces due to the domestic pressures in theUS, India is uniquely positioned to broker a regional effort. Control of terrorism,Islamic extremism and drugs trafficking, common interests to all, could be woven intothe regional security factor. The scope for an international agreement between US,UK, EU, Russia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and obviously Afghanistan, centred onregional security, stability, and economic development has a future. With the US,Russia, China, Iran, India and Pakistan acting as guarantors, an internationalagreement would find resonance amongst all players except probably for Pakistan, butleaving it with little choice except come to terms with it. A US engagement of Iranthrough India is a possible win-win situation for all three - the caveat being thebalance between being Iran’s commitment to a stable Afghanistan, which is in itsinterests, as against its conflict of interest with the US, which is much deeper.Inclusion of Iran by the US in a regional strategy will be a leap of faith, which couldbe a possible game charger for the region. It could create a window for thawing thestand off between the two and enable a de-polarisation of Iran which would have a149 Anatol Lieven, op. cit44

huge positive impact both on Iran and an extremely concerned Gulf, Middle East andWest. This also provides India an excellent opportunity to be an interlocutor forIran’s inclusion, which will enable it to strengthen its ties with Iran, in consonancewith India’s regional strategic interests. Pakistan will not be happy, but it is time forthe US to make some game-shifts as Islamabad is already hedging its interests byengaging Moscow.CONCLUSIONIndia’s relations with Afghanistan not only have a historical legacy, but haveunderpinning layers of cultural, social, political and economic connections as well.Since Indian independence in 1947, both nations have maintained close ties especiallythrough the Cold War years. The Taliban ruled years was the only period whenIndia’s relationship with Afghanistan suffered, as it refused to recognise thegovernment in power because of its active involvement in militant extremism inKashmir. India, however, continued its support to the Afghan people through the NAduring the period, and was quick to re-establish full links after the fall of the Taliban.It however had lost some traction with the Pashtun majority, having supported theTajiks and Uzbeks in the past. Pakistan’s support of the Taliban during their Jihadagainst the Soviets created the strategic space for an expansion of its influence intoAfghanistan – with whom it has an adversarial relationship. Afghanistan’s refusal torecognise the Durand Line, the fears of an independent ‘Pashtunistan’ on its westernborder and India’s close ties with Kabul, was the primary reason for Pakistan to seekand maintain control over Afghanistan. The turn of events, precipitated by the 9/11attack on the US, released significant effort to the defeat the Taliban, with the activehelp and support of Pakistan. Meanwhile Indian quietly sought to establish a strategicpresence by engaging in humanitarian efforts, reconstruction and infrastructuredevelopment.Indian strategy in Afghanistan essentially flows out of its overarching nationalinterest of regional peace and stability. Being surrounded by six among the first 26dysfunctional states in world, which include Pakistan and Afghanistan, automaticallymakes security the primary concern. Externally, the Pakistan–Afghanistan calculusultimately plays out on India’s western border, both in terms of Pakistani army45

deployments, as well as border incursions of militants, trained in camps which havemoved from Pakistan occupied Kashmir to the FATA on the west. Internally, the spillover of Islamic extremism from the region also remains a serious concern for Indiawith its 180 million Muslims. India is also acutely aware that a continued economicgrowth is the only way ahead towards fulfilment of the aspirations of the largestdemocracy of the world, a factor which underpins all its strategic and foreign affairs.Therefore India’s strategic interests in the region are directly linked to its economicgrowth and energy needs of the future. Consequently, a stable Afghanistan is vital notonly for access to the energy rich CAR states, but the significant economic and tradepotential of the region as well. Not in the least is India’s aspirations for great powerstatus, for which an enhanced regional influence and image, is a precursor.The absence of a coherent national strategy, a region-centric foreign policyand a nascent strategic culture in India, were essentially due to the inward focussedapproach of the past. Despite these constraints, India has shown remarkableconsistency in its engagement of Afghanistan, especially in the recent years. Whilethe soft power oriented approach pursued was probably the only pragmatic strategypossible in the war torn nation, its commitment and resilience has however allowedIndia, to earn the valuable goodwill amongst the Afghans, create a responsibleinternational image and establish it as a responsible regional player in Afghanistan’sfuture. India has also succeeded in creating the necessary strategic infrastructure foran overland access to Central Asia, while simultaneously managing to removeAfghanistan’s dependency on Pakistan’s sea ports. Though India is at a cross road inits regional influence, the circumstances also provide a window for it to adapt itsAfghan strategy by building on the gains of state building and stabilisation, as well asprotecting Indian interests by assisting in capacity building of the Afghan military.With congruence of interests it has with the US, it is opportune for India to enhanceits regional profile and shape the international perception in its favour, by shifting to a‘Pakistan-inclusive’ regional outlook. It will not be smooth sailing, given Pakistan’sreservations and its Chinese support. However, the circumstances of the regionalinterests of the stakeholders are strongly in India’s favour for brokering a regionalsolution, which is not only in its best interests, but also the only long-term viableoption for peace, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan.46

India has not been able to exploit the regional dynamics to its best longterm interests in the past, having at times been perceived as a regional hegemon. Inthe recent years, China’s economic rise and rapid expansion of influence is reshapingthe regional and international geo-political dynamics. India with its sustainedeconomic growth, enhanced international profile and non-aligned democraticcredentials, is increasingly viewed as a growing power of consequence. Its remarkableprogress despite its challenges, both internal and those associated with being in atough neighbourhood, has enhanced the credibility of its capabilities. Despite itsunwillingness, it is increasingly seen as a counterbalance to China in Asia and theIndian Ocean region, and a greater regional presence is therefore vital for India’sfuture. In keeping with its national interests, Afghanistan provides a unique windowof strategic opportunity for India to realise its aspirations of a great power and arightful place in the international high table. India’s ability to adapt its presentstrategy in Afghanistan will play a key role towards realisation of its aspirations.47

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