Intermezzo 3.2: Did speculation push up food prices <strong>and</strong> create a bubble?When a phenomenon such as high food prices isdifficult to explain <strong>and</strong> affects many peoplenegatively, “speculators” are often blamed. Theywere blamed in 1958 when onion prices soared, inthe first half of the 1970s <strong>and</strong> again in 2008. Isthere any ground for this?Hedging <strong>and</strong> speculation: two sides of thesame coinWhat the media <strong>and</strong> politicians label as speculationis a critical market function. Economists definespeculation as buying <strong>and</strong> selling to make profitsfrom price changes. This is in contrast to buying<strong>and</strong> selling for use, to generate income as aninvestment, or to add value through transformationor transportation. Speculation in commoditiesinvolves buying <strong>and</strong> selling futures contracts –pieces of paper. Without it, traders would have tobuy, sell – <strong>and</strong> store – the actual commodities.A futures contract guarantees the price its holderwill pay or receive for a good at a certain deliverydate. This is very useful for farmers in reducing risk,particularly when there is a time lag betweenspending on inputs, such as seeds <strong>and</strong> fertilizer,<strong>and</strong> receiving revenues from harvested crops sales.When a farmer decides what to grow, s/he wouldlike to know, or even lock in, the price s/he willreceive for the crop. A farmer can do this byhedging in the futures market. The farmer sells afutures contract that commits her/him to deliver,say, 1 MT of wheat six months from now at acertain price. If the actual price in the market ishigher at the delivery date, the farmer will lose onthe futures contract, but gain by selling the crop ata higher price than expected. If the actual price inthe market is lower at the delivery date, the farmerwill gain on the futures contract, but lose by sellingthe crop at a lower price.For every seller, there is a buyer. What the farmersells, a speculator buys. A futures contract transfersthe price risk from the farmer to the speculator. Thecommodities underlying futures contracts areseldom delivered. On large futures markets, such asin Chicago or London, there is very active trade infutures contracts, which traders buy <strong>and</strong> sell beforethey expire. Most traders offset their contractsbefore they expire, with each party to the originalcontract selling/buying an opposite futurescontract.Because the contracts are not related to actualdeliveries, the number of futures contracts isunlimited. In a way, futures contracts are bets onthe future price of a commodity. The volume ofunderlying commodities exceeds the volumeactually harvested (OECD, 2008).There are thus two kinds of participants in futuresmarkets. The hedgers are the farmers, commercialtraders <strong>and</strong> processors who want to hedge againstthe price risks they face, <strong>and</strong> who are heavilyinvolved in actual deliveries of commodities. Thespeculators are the non-commercial traders whoseek profits through speculation <strong>and</strong> are often notinvolved in delivering commodities. Hedgers <strong>and</strong>speculators are two sides of the same coin.Speculation <strong>and</strong> pricesDo prices quoted in futures contracts have aneffect on spot prices? For actual deliveries, thefutures price should be equal to the spot price plusthe storage <strong>and</strong> insurance costs of holding thecommodities until the contract expires. As thatdate approaches, the spot <strong>and</strong> futures pricesshould converge. Arbitrageurs make sure that thishappens. If, for example, the futures price isconsidered too high, arbitrageurs will sell a futurescontract, buy the commodity, store it <strong>and</strong> deliver itwhen the contract expires, making a profit bydoing so (OECD, 2008).One anomaly of the commodities markets is thatspot <strong>and</strong> futures prices do not always converge atthe time of delivery, for example in the maize,wheat <strong>and</strong> soybean markets (OECD, 2008).Another anomaly is that the difference betweenspot <strong>and</strong> futures prices seems to be widening.These anomalies reduce the usefulness of thefutures market in transferring risk, <strong>and</strong> are difficultto explain. A lack of convergence could be causedby storage problems, but some argue that largeamounts of new money from institutional investorsare distorting the markets. Further research isneeded, but the coincidence of these anomalieswith the influx of new money has raised suspicions.A speculative bubble?The amount of money that institutional investorsput into commodities has increased rapidly inrecent years. The number of futures contractsdoubled or tripled between the end of 2004 <strong>and</strong>2006 (see the figures on page 47). In early 2008,45
3 High food prices: trends, causes <strong>and</strong> impactsso-called index funds, used by institutionalinvestors to track a representative index ofcommodities, were holding US$120 billion ofagricultural futures contracts, according to oneestimate (Young, 2008).Push <strong>and</strong> pull factors seem to be at work. Lowreturns on stocks <strong>and</strong> bonds, low interest rates <strong>and</strong>financial turmoil in developed country housingmarkets have pushed money into commodities.Investors have been attracted because, historically,returns on commodities have compared well with<strong>and</strong> been negatively correlated to returns on stocks<strong>and</strong> bonds, providing good portfolio diversification<strong>and</strong> risk reduction (Garton <strong>and</strong> Rouwenhorst,2004).Some economists believe that speculation can beexcessive or destabilizing, giving rise to aspeculative bubble. The fundamental characteristicsof bubbles are usually the same, <strong>and</strong> include risingprices, leading to profit opportunities <strong>and</strong>attracting more investments. More investmentpushes up prices, creating positive feedback, <strong>and</strong> abubble. The critical characteristic of a bubble is thatit cannot be supported by fundamental economicfactors, <strong>and</strong> generates a psychological element,often described as a mania, hysteria or irrationality(Kindleberger, 2000; Shiller, 2000).A mania can easily become a panic, transformingthe bubble into a crash. There are also positivefeedback loops. When prices <strong>and</strong> profits decline,the value of collateral declines as well. Loansbecome more difficult to obtain, <strong>and</strong> peoplewithdraw money, exacerbating the price decline. Afamous example of this boom–bust scenario is thetulip mania in the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s in the 1630s.Another is the housing bubble, whose bursting inthe US triggered the current global financial crisis.It is difficult to distinguish a bubble fromfundamental economic factors. As explained in thischapter, a number of structural dem<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> supplyfactors can explain the worldwide rise in foodprices of recent years. Many of these factors havebeen changing rather gradually, however, making itdifficult for them to explain a jump in rice prices (ofThai, 5 percent broken) from less than US$400/MTin January 2008 to about US$1,000/MT in May2008, or an increase in wheat prices (of US hardred winter) from about US$200/MT in May 2007 tomore than US$500/MT in February 2008, followedby a fall to about US$250/MT in May 2008.It is particularly difficult to distinguish a bubblefrom fundamental factors before it bursts.Uncertainty about the future creates plenty ofspace for psychology. An important feature offutures markets is that market participants do notknow the true value of the contracts or assets theyare trading. As a result, they act on averageopinion. Traders act according to what everybodyelse believes. If everybody believes that a particularasset a trader owns is overvalued, s/he will be wiseto sell, irrespective of whether s/he agrees or not.This kind of mechanism can easily create herdbehaviour – <strong>and</strong> bubbles <strong>and</strong> crashes.New information – true or false, positive ornegative – can lead to reactions <strong>and</strong> overreactionsin commodity markets. One expert suggests a linkbetween the emergence of speculative bubbles <strong>and</strong>the advent of newspapers in the 1600s (Shiller,2000). He draws attention to information cascades,when one story, perhaps at first judged minor,leads to others. Through these cascades, averageopinion changes <strong>and</strong> bubbles can emerge. Mediacoverage of the biofuel expansion <strong>and</strong> rising foodprices seems to follow this pattern: a Googlesearch for “biofuel food price” got 3,070,000 hitson 25 July 2008, 85 percent of them dating fromthe previous year. It is too early to drawconclusions, however, <strong>and</strong> scholars will have todetermine the precise unfolding of events <strong>and</strong> thefactors that contribute to it.Is there evidence that a speculative bubble hasbeen building? Some facts imply there is. First,large amounts of new money from institutionalinvestors have moved into commodity markets (seethe figures on page 47). Second, the share of noncommercialtraders has increased in many of thesemarkets (S<strong>and</strong>ers, Irwin <strong>and</strong> Merrin, 2008). Third,index traders expect prices to increase for 90–98percent of the contracts they hold (“longpositions”), compared with 20–65 percent ofcommercial traders who think that prices willdecline (“short positions”) (S<strong>and</strong>ers, Irwin <strong>and</strong>Merrin, 2008), even though the percentage ofcontracts outst<strong>and</strong>ing (“open interests”)attributable to index traders has been relativelystable (S<strong>and</strong>ers, Irwin <strong>and</strong> Merrin, 2008). Fourth,there is some evidence that the ratio of volume toopen interests influenced futures prices for rice <strong>and</strong>wheat, <strong>and</strong> that the ratio of non-commercialpositions to short positions influenced futuresprices for maize <strong>and</strong> soybeans (von Braun, Robles<strong>and</strong> Torero, 2008).However, other facts imply the opposite. First,commodity prices have also increased forcommodities not traded on futures market, such asedible beans <strong>and</strong> durum wheat, or not commonlyincluded in index funds, such as rice. Second, some46
- Page 1 and 2: World Hunger SeriesHunger and Marke
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7 Vulnerability, risk and markets
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Lessons learned from the 2005 food
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SharecroppingIn sharecropping syste
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Poor households can also reduce the
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To respond to a shock, family membe
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Intermezzo 8.1: Market analysis in
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Part III Actions and the Way Forwar
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Resource compendiumTable 1 - Hunger
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Resource compendiumUndernourishment
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Resource compendiumDietary energy c
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Dietary energy consumption (kcal/pe
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Part V AnnexesAbbreviations and acr
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Abbreviations and acronymsUNCTADUND
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GlossaryEntitlementsThe set of alte
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GlossaryPurchasing powerThe quantit
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BibliographyBehrman, J.R., Alderman
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Bibliographyde Brauw, A. & Hoddinot
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BibliographyFarina, E.M.M.Q. & Rear
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BibliographyJayne, T.S. & Jones, S.
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BibliographyMittal, A. & Mousseau,
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BibliographySen, A. 1981. Poverty a
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BibliographyWFP. 2004. WFP and Food
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Methodology for mapsCountry boundar
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“Left to their own devices, marke