Summer 2007 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T. Michael MoseleyCommander, Air Educationand Training CommandGen William R. Looney IIICommander, Air UniversityLt Gen Stephen R. LorenzChief, Professional JournalsLt Col Paul D. BergDeputy Chief, Professional JournalsMaj James C. UlmanEditorMaj Roger BurdetteProfessional StaffMarvin W. Bassett, Contributing EditorJames S. Howard, Contributing EditorDebbie Banker, Editorial AssistantSteven C. Garst, Director of Art and ProductionDaniel M. Armstrong, IllustratorL. Susan Fair, IllustratorAnn Bailey, Prepress Production ManagerAir and Space Power Journal Web SiteCatherine Parker, Managing EditorThe Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), AirForce Recurring Publication 10-1, published quarterly,is the professional journal of the United States AirForce. It is designed to serve as an open forum for thepresentation and stimulation of innovative thinking onmilitary doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness,and other matters of national defense. The views andopinions expressed or implied in the Journal are thoseof the authors and should not be construed as carryingthe offcial sanction of the Department of Defense,Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, AirUniversity, or other agencies or departments of the USgovernment.Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or inpart without permission. If they are reproduced, the Airand Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line.http://www.af.milhttp://www.aetc.randolph.af.milhttp://www.au.af.milAir and Space Power Journal401 Chennault CircleMaxwell AFB AL 36112-6004e-mail: aspj@maxwell.af.milVisit Air and Space Power Journal onlineat http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil.

Summer 2007 Volume XXI, No. 2 AFRP 10-1Senior Leader PerspectivesTransforming Air Force Education for the Long War and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, USAFAirpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Maj Gen Allen G. Peck, USAFLeadership: An Old Dog’s View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C. R. AndereggFocus AreaDeveloping Airmen: Educating and Training Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional JournalsFeaturesInventory Management of Officers with Advanced Academic Degrees:The Case for a New Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Lt Col Raymond W. Staats, PhD, USAFLt Col Marty Reynolds, USAFMaj Aaron D. Troxell, USAFDefining Information Operations Forces: What Do We Need? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53Maj Timothy P. Franz, USAFMaj Matthew F. Durkin, USAFMaj Paul D. Williams, PhD, USAFMaj Richard A. Raines, PhD, USAF, RetiredLt Col Robert F. Mills, PhD, USAF, RetiredIntellectual Modernization of the C-5: Making the Galaxy Expeditionary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Col Mark C. “Marshal” Dillon, USAFLeadership by the Socratic Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80Maj Aaron A. Tucker, USAFThe Mandate to Revolutionize Military Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90COL Bradley E. Smith, USAA Model for Managing Decision-Making Information in theGIG-Enabled Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100Maj Samuel D. Bass, USAFMaj Rusty O. Baldwin, PhD, USAF, RetiredDepartmentsPrelaunch NotesIntroducing the Chinese ASPJ and Presenting the Latest ChroniclesOnline Journal Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Ricochets and Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1620

The MergeTactical Satellites: The Rest of the Story . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .LTC Bob Guerriero, USATactical Satellites: It’s Not “Can We?” but “Should We?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lt Col Edward B. “Mel” Tomme, USAF, RetiredThe Inadvisability of Posthumously Promoting Billy Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, RetiredPIREPLeading from the Front, Rear, and Center: A Squadron Commander’s Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lt Col Christopher T. Daniels, USAFQuick LooksPreferential Treatment for Military Members Based on Personality Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1st Lt Ryan Kaiser, USAFFit (and Ready) to Fight: Strengthening Combat Readiness throughControlled-Aggression Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2d Lt Nickolas Stewart, USAFDoctrine NoteRevised USAF Doctrine Publication: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7,Special Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lt Col Alexander M. Wathen, USAF, RetiredVignetteWhat Difference Can You Make? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CMSgt John P. Hearn, USAF, Retired27303437647888109Book ReviewsLeading Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .John P. KotterReviewer: Dr. Richard I. LesterAir Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importanceof USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Alan J. Vick et al.Reviewer: Maj Paul A. Hibbard, USAFFortress France: The Maginot Line and French Defenses in World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .J. E. Kaufmann and H. W. KaufmannReviewer: CSM James H. Clifford, USA, RetiredLas Metáforas de una Guerra Perpetua: Estudios sobre Pragmática delDiscurso en el Conflicto Armado Colombiano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Fernando Estrada GallegoReviewer: Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAFInside the Iron Works: How Grumman’s Glory Days FadedGeorge M. Skurla and William H. GregoryReviewer: Col Joseph J. McCue, USAF, Retired112113114115. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007model of research and teaching that has dominatedWestern education for centuries. in thismodel, professors conduct research to pushtheir fields forward. they produce books andarticles that they subsequently teach to theirstudents and, in the process, become bettereducators themselves. this procedure, whichsystematically turns out better students, faculty,and ideas, has played a significant role inthe explosion of knowledge in the West and islargely responsible for the lightning pace ofinnovation in science and technology today.Military education, however, differs frommost academic fields in a number of ways. First,although hundreds or thousands of schoolsoffer instruction in most fields of study, in theUnited states only a handful of joint/serviceschools teach military art and science. Furtherrestricting the breadth of the field, for themost part only those schools associated withcertain service sponsors have faculties knowledgeableabout particular domains of war.thus, for instance, we have only one air warcollege, one land war college, and one navalwar college, a situation that places an enormousburden on service-school faculties to researchand publish work related to the type ofwar for which their service is responsible. inmost fields of study, if professors do not publish,they can fall back on books and articlespublished elsewhere to stay current and educatetheir students. At service schools, however,they are often the only game in town.A second difference between militaryschools and the majority of civilian schools involvespure versus applied research. in mostfields of study, professors write for academicaudiences. Promotion, tenure, and other benefitscome from moving academic debates forward.in the civilian world, outside of business,law, and engineering schools, writing for policymakers and practitioners may even have negativeconnotations since it might appear to sullyan instructor’s credentials as an unbiased observer.in military education, however, thisrelationship is reversed, with practitioners constitutingour most important audiences. Militaryschools conduct, or should conduct, theirmost highly regarded research for policy makersin Washington, generals in the field, andstudents in the classroom. though important,purely academic work does not have the prideof place it enjoys at civilian schools.A third difference involves urgency. theideas that we in a military university explorethrough research and the lessons we teach oftenpay off—for good or ill—much faster thanin other fields of study. For instance, a school’sdecision about whether to drop classes onconventional war and add lessons on insurgencythis semester or to wait for another yearcan mean the difference between life anddeath; its results will show up on the battlefieldwith the next graduating class. this factcan place more pressure on our schools tochange curricula and on military professors todevelop new areas of knowledge and expertisethan is the norm at civilian schools.A fourth difference concerns the need toeducate a larger portion of our workforce.Both civilian and military sectors desire moreeducated workers, but we have a stronger impetus.in modern warfare, particularly duringtimes of rapid change, education acts as a massivepower multiplier. today the Us militaryneeds flexible and innovative thinkers almostas much as it needs bombs and bullets. yetrealistically, until fairly recently, we have hadenough resources to educate only a small fractionof the force. the issue of increasing thesize of the educated force carries high stakes.The Need for ChangeCurrently the United states finds itself inthe midst of geopolitical changes that tax theflexibility of our system of military education.After 9/11, the nation’s military schools workedto integrate lessons on terrorism into theircurricula. As the war in iraq heated up, theyadded seminars on insurgency. yet today ourschools face an underlying problem vastlygreater than updating curricula and changinglessons. essentially, we confront adaptableenemies who sometimes innovate faster thanour own capacity to do so. stateless organizationalstructures, ongoing cyber wars, andremote-controlled improvised explosive devicesare only the most recent outputs of our

TRANSFORMING AIR FORCE EDUCATIONenemies’ idea-generating systems. Using innovationsproduced by these systems, they havefound ways to circumvent our ponderous ColdWar military apparatus and have pinned downour forces across the globe. their flexibility attimes trumps our material advantages. All toooften our enemies appear to be winning thiswar of innovation.to answer our opponents, we must improveour system’s ability to produce and disseminatenew ideas. this new system must havetwo parts: it must systematically generate relevantnew ideas, injecting them into nationaldebates, and it must develop adaptive, innovativestudents who can continue the processafter they leave our military schools.Air University has begun to play a role inthis war of ideas, but doing so requires significantchanges. the core of our strategy here atMaxwell AFB, Alabama, calls for reenergizingthe university model of research and teachingthat so effectively propels innovation in thecivilian sector. this approach is not new to theAir Force. throughout the 1930s, the Air Corpstactical school employed it in an effort toconfront the specter of a rising Germany andJapan and to develop new uses for emergingairpower technology. Using a combination oftheory, history, and field research, instructorsat the school wrote the plan employed by theUnited states in World War ii and educatedAirmen who developed strategies used by theAir Force for the next half century. Unfortunatelyat some point during the Cold War, AirUniversity reduced its emphasis on this spiritof innovation and outreach to national policymakers. For the most part, the Air Force outsourcedservice-related research on militarystrategy to independent think tanks, and theuniversity became mainly a teaching school.this neglect of innovation has proved costlyto the nation as well as to our faculty and students.Although the Air Force remains theworld leader in developing military technology,it lags behind the Army in its ability to produceand disseminate thoughts about how touse its new technology and ideas. By onecount, for every book published on airpowertoday, five appear on ground-centered militarysolutions. in 200 the strategic studiesinstitute—the Army War College’s in-housethink tank—produced 3 monographs, butduring the same period, Air University’s tinythink tank produced only two. When it comesto injecting ideas into national debates, we findourselves similarly behind. For example, ofthe military experts regularly featured on Foxnews and Cable news network, soldiers outnumberairmen five to one, and the vast majorityof newspaper articles on airpower derivefrom interviews with ground-power experts.this lack of research production also has secondaryconsequences. today the percentageof Air University professors with a strong graspof air, space, and cyberspace theory and historyis small compared to the percentage ofland-power experts at Army or Marine schools.At times this dearth of experience shows up inthe classroom. i firmly believe that each militaryschool has a duty to develop and disseminatenew ideas about the ways its service canassist the nation and contribute to the jointfight in the long war. Air University has notdone as well as it could in this area.Transforming AirUniversity for Warto bring us back into the war of ideas, AirUniversity has begun changing the way it doesbusiness. We are treating this endeavor as partof the war effort. success will require an integratedcampaign involving numerous approaches.First, we are reorganizing our commandstructure. Although the Air Force originallycolocated its schools at Maxwell AFB specificallyto develop synergies, at present littleoverlap exists among the schools. Primarily, acommand structure with too large a span ofcontrol drives this lack of lateral communication.By centralizing staffs and decreasing suchspans, we hope to increase synergy among theschools and enhance their accountability toour Air Force, the joint community, and thenation.the second set of changes involves providingour instructors with greater resources andincentives to publish on topics related to air,

TRANSFORMING AIR FORCE EDUCATION9become even more apparent. Accordingly,over the last year we have substantially increasedour offerings in these areas. to supportthe Air Force’s new cyber mission, the AirForce institute of technology will soon supplementits current graduate curriculum in cyberoperations with a 12-month program in cyberwarfare. Much like the Air Corps tacticalschool’s efforts to pioneer air war in the 1930s,this hands-on initiative engages faculty andstudents in a combined effort to develop technologyand doctrine for fighting in cyberspace.We have also added to the number of coursesin other relevant fields such as counterterrorism,counterinsurgency, space, and cyber warfare.Finally, we are currently in the process of revampingour Air and space Basic Course to doa better job of building the confidence and awarrior ethos that will serve our junior officersfor the rest of their careers.Lastly, we are taking steps to add dramaticallyto the number of students we educate.through partnerships with civilian schools,we have been able to exponentially increasethe educational opportunities for enlisted Airmen.By 200 we will begin to offer them theopportunity to pursue a bachelor’s degree.Our new distance-learning program will soonallow us to give all officers a chance to pursuean Air University master’s degree by the 12thyear of their careers. We are also attemptingto create a new Air University PhD in strategicstudies—the first of its kind in the Us military—thatwill greatly increase the pool ofdoctorate-holding officers from which the AirForce will draw its future senior leaders. Beyondthis, we are making major changes inour education of junior officers and in ournoncommissioned officer academies as well astaking advantage of new cyber technology todevelop communities of practice for squadroncommanders. Our goal in all of this is to increasevastly the number of flexible and innovativethinkers in the Air Force.Conclusionin sum, the United states has only now begunto come to grips with the nature of thelong war and what lies beyond. Winning thiswar will require us to leverage our existingstrengths. it will require new equipment, newtactics, and, from time to time, even newstrategy. But it also requires something more.Our best hope for succeeding in this strugglelies in developing a system that institutionalizesinnovation. More than anything else, weneed new ideas as well as men and womenwho, understanding the problems we face, caninnovate and adapt to overcome them. thesystem of military education we continue topioneer at Air University will take a significantstep toward developing this system and, overthe long run, defeating our opponents. qNote1. victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: LandmarkBattles in the Rise of Western Power (new york: Doubleday,2001), chap. .

Airpower’s Crucial Rolein Irregular WarfareMaj Gen allen G. Peck, USaFBecause the dominance ofamerica’s airpower in traditional warshas not been lost on those whothreaten our national interests, wecan logically expect them to turn increasinglyto irregular warfare (iW). the ongoing conflictsin iraq and afghanistan reflect the waysthat us military power has had to adapt andtransform to meet new challenges presentedby enemies who have respect for our conventionaldominance and the determination tofind exploitable seams in our capabilities.although the capabilities and effects thatamerica’s airpower brings to the fight are notas visible to the casual observer as the maneuversof ground forces, airpower (including operationsin the air, space, and cyberspace domains)remains an invaluable enabler for thoseforces. airpower can also serve as a powerfuliW capability in its own right, as it did early inoperation enduring Freedom in afghanistan.no one should dismiss iW as falling strictlywithin the purview of ground or special operationsforces. understanding the iW environmentand, in particular, airpower’s immensecontributions is critical for america’sfuture air Force leaders, who will prove instrumentalin ensuring that the service continuesadapting to an ever-changing enemy andbringing relevant capabilities to bear in anever-changing fight.The Irregular Warfare Environmentdoctrine defines iW as “a violent struggleamong state and non-state actors for legitimacyand influence over the relevant populations.”1 iW includes counterinsurgency operationsand foreign internal defense (Fid)(providing support to/for a regime, typicallyagainst internal foes) as well as support for insurgencyoperations. For example, al-Qaeda10

AIRPOWER’S CRUCIAL ROLE IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 11and associated movements, in their quest forpower and territory, will likely resort to iWmethods, attacking perceived vulnerabilitiesin order to influence relevant audiences whileavoiding direct confrontation with us, allied,or partner-nation forces. this type of warfareoften takes a markedly different form fromtraditional, conventional warfare, requiringthe addition of iW capabilities to the “tool kit”from which us forces can pull. at the sametime, however, the air Force cannot afford tolose its acknowledged edge in traditionalwarfare, which has enabled past military successesand will prove necessary in the future tomaintain america’s position as the world’ssuperpower.the long-war aspect of iW poses challengesto america’s center of gravity—its willingnessto bring considerable resources to bear andremain engaged in an extended fight. historically,democracies tend to grow weary of fightingrelatively quickly, as reflected in this country’sexperiences in the civil War, Vietnam,and the present conflicts in iraq and afghanistan.indeed, the network of radical islamicextremists has produced a plan for a 100-yearstruggle, and democratic nations under theirattack are showing signs of fatigue just a fewyears into the battle. 2 this long-war aspect hasimplications for today’s air Force; for instance,junior officers, operating today at the tacticallevel, may well be responsible for the strategicaspects of tomorrow’s war. not only must ourairmen have knowledge of airpower capabilitiesin iW, but also they must articulate airpowerconcepts as well as educate the joint and coalitioncommunities on the weapons and skillsthat airpower brings to the fight.Airpower’s Asymmetric Advantagesin an iW environment, the traditionallyrecognized ability of airpower to strike at theadversary’s “strategic center of gravity” willlikely have less relevance due to the decentralizedand diffuse nature of the enemy. 3 theamorphous mass of ideological movementsopposing Western influence and values generallylacks a defined command structure thatairpower can attack with predictable effects.still, airpower holds a number of asymmetrictrump cards (capabilities the enemy can neithermeet with parity nor counter in kind).For instance, airpower’s ability to conduct precisionstrikes across the globe can play an importantrole in counterinsurgency operations.numerous other advantages (including informationand cyber operations; intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance [isR]; andglobal mobility) have already proven just asimportant. these capabilities provide ourfighting forces with highly asymmetric advantagesin the iW environment.innovation and adaptation are hallmarksof airpower. cold War–era bombers, designedto carry nuclear weapons, can loiter for hoursover the battlefield and deliver individual conventionalweapons to within a few feet of specifiedcoordinates. Fighter aircraft, designed todeliver precision weapons against hardenedtargets, can disseminate targeting-pod videodirectly to an air Force joint terminal attackcontroller who can then direct a strike guidedby either laser or the global positioning system(GPs). unmanned systems such as thePredator, once solely a surveillance platform,now have effective laser designation and thecapacity for precision, kinetic strike. airborneplatforms offer electronic protection to groundforces, including attacking insurgent communicationsand the electronics associated withtriggering improvised explosive devices (ied).exploiting altitude, speed, and range, airborneplatforms can create these effects, unconstrainedby terrain or artificial boundariesbetween units. Forward-thinking airmen developedthese innovations by using adaptivetactics, techniques, procedures, and equipmentto counter a thinking, adaptive enemy.to be sure, our iW adversaries have theirown asymmetric capabilities such as suicidebombers, ieds, and the appropriation of civilianresidences, mosques, and hospitals as stagingareas for their combat operations. however,they lack and cannot effectively offsetunfettered access to the high ground that superiorityin air, space, and cyberspace provides.

12 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007Airpower’s Contributions—Today and Tomorrowus airpower, in its myriad forms, is currentlyoperating simultaneously in multipletheaters, producing invaluable combat andenabling effects across the board. For instance,the air Force has engaged in a wide spectrumof combat operations in southwest asia formore than 15 years, and over 25,000 airmenare currently deployed to us central command’sarea of responsibility. airpower’s capabilitieshave been—and will continue to be—integral to the success of us military power inthis theater and in the global war on terrorwrit large, a fact often overlooked in accountsthat focus on the more readily visible aspectsof war. nevertheless, when properly integratedwith other military and civil efforts under therubric of iW, airpower consistently delivers effectscritical to winning the overall joint fightand meeting the campaign’s overarching militaryand political objectives.a number of the fundamental tenets of airpowerhave proven particularly valuable in enablingthe air Force to bring its most potentasymmetric strengths to bear in ongoing operations.Perhaps first and foremost amongstthese is the application of airpower via centralizedcontrol and decentralized execution. thisimperative for centralizing planning and directionwhile decentralizing tactical-employmentdecisions has as much applicability to iW as totraditional warfare operations. the rationalefor this fundamental belief should roll off aprofessional airman’s tongue as easily as, say,a marine officer would justify the inviolabilityof the marine air-ground task force. By incorporatingall assets under a single commander,air Force forces and joint force air componentcommander ( JFacc), the air componentcan both effectively and efficiently allocatelimited airpower resources to cover competingrequirements from multiple war-fightingcommanders across the theater while maintaininga vigilant focus on broader goals. thefire hose of effects available from airpower operationscan be focused where and whenneeded, according to the priorities establishedby the joint force commander. decisions regardingparticular employment methods andtactics will reside at a lower level, closer to thefight and to the knowledge of what is needed.today, air-component forces provide thefollowing: kinetic effects from fighters, bombers,and unmanned systems; isR that uses avariety of air-breathing, space, and nontraditionalsensors; electronic-warfare platforms; andairlift/airdrop capabilities, which can rangepractically anywhere across iraq and afghanistan,provided they have not been “pennypacketed”to individual units. most of airpower’scontributions in iraq focus on support forground forces, but unique abilities allow it toconduct both interdependent and independentoperations.in this regard, airpower offers a widespectrum of asymmetric capabilities that wecan focus and direct as necessary, creatingeffects such as kinetic destruction, persistentisR collection/dissemination (includingair-breathing and space-based as well asmanned and unmanned), infiltrating/exfiltratingforces and supplies, and attackson computer networks and support infrastructures.all of this is available on an asneededbasis, almost without regard for geographyor artificial surface boundaries.since the beginning of operations iraqiFreedom and enduring Freedom, centralcommand’s air component has flown over ahalf million combat and combat-support sorties.though impressive, that number does not tellthe whole story. First, many of these sorties areof long duration, supplying unprecedentedpersistence and presence overhead, ultimatelyenabled through a combination of air refuelingand forward basing. one cannot underestimatethe criticality of being able to choosefrom among a variety of weapons and toolsand respond rapidly, particularly in an iW environmentin which the enemy very often dictatesthe time, place, and nature of attacks.second, and more importantly, sortie countsor similar metrics cannot readily depict manyof the effects that the air Force brings to thefight. although impressive, statistics representonly one part of the air Force’s contributionin today’s war. We must not overlook either

AIRPOWER’S CRUCIAL ROLE IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 13the robust intelligence analysis and disseminationcapabilitiesthatleveragetheunprecedentedcollection afforded by today’s air Force systemsor the communications-enabling functions thatmake global warfare as seamless as if it were inour own backyard.Employing Airpower’s Capabilitiesspace-based assets rank among the leastunderstood and recognized of the air Force’swar-fighting contributions. Vital intelligence,communications, weather, and navigation capabilitiesall rely heavily on assured access tospace. space-based force multipliers are provingimmensely valuable at the lower end ofthe conflict spectrum. take for example theGPs—it is not only critical to providing guidancefor precision munitions but also vital toreporting the geolocation of friendly troops,insurgents, and civilians. Precision location allowsmore rapid responses for close air support,combat search and rescue, casualty evacuation,and prosecution of time-sensitive targets.Yet, a determined, capable adversary couldchallenge access to space, as the chinese remindedthe rest of the world with their recentantisatellite demonstration.intelligence made available by air and spaceforces serves as a critical enabler in iW. in traditionalwarfare, larger yields and/or quantitiesof weapons can compensate for targetinguncertainties, but this is generally not the casein counterinsurgency operations, in which unintendedcollateral damage can underminesupport for the government and become a recruitingtool for the insurgency. currently,over both afghanistan and iraq, space-basedand air-breathing assets alike continuouslymonitor the situation on the ground, helpingidentify insurgents as well as their organizationalnetworks, supporters, and lines of communicationand supply. these platforms collectand disseminate a variety of intelligence(signals, communications, imagery, movingtarget,full-motion-video, etc.), all integral tothe fight. overhead assets also contribute significantlyto the emerging field of forensicanalysis, which involves backtracking from ongoingevents to determine the sources fromwhich they emanated (e.g., tracing back fromexplosions of ieds to locate the bomb-makingorganizations and facilities that support them).in both iraq and afghanistan, airborne assetshave developed the capacity to respond quicklyto determine the launch points of mortar orrocket attacks, identify suspicious individuals/vehicles and mark them with laser designatorsfor apprehension by ground forces, or, in manycases, destroy them outright. as with other airpowerapplications, centralized control of intelligenceplatforms (which minimizes duplicationof effort and ensures support for thejoint force commander’s highest-priority requirements)enables effective and efficientuse of limited isR assets—key elements of thecoalition’s asymmetric advantage in iW. Forexample, effective isR enables the air componentto bring airpower to bear in support ofsmall coalition or indigenous ground-forceunits, magnifying their organic capabilities.Precision strike, another highly effectivetool of counterinsurgency, permits us to eliminateinsurgents in close proximity to civiliansor friendly ground forces, thus giving coalitionforces a significant firepower advantage.highly accurate guidance systems, cockpitselectablefuzes, and munitions of various explosiveyields allow airmen to deliver intendedeffects precisely while limiting unintended effects.of course, in certain situations we mayneed to attack large areas with less discriminateuse of firepower—a task for which airpoweris also well suited.air mobility offers another edge in counterinsurgentoperations. our forces exercise thisadvantage over surface-bound iW adversariesby transporting personnel and cargo while bypassingcontested lines of communications,air-dropping supplies, and quickly evacuatingthe wounded. in iraqi Freedom and enduringFreedom last year, the air component flewover 50,000 airlift sorties, transporting over1,000,000 personnel and 90,000 pallets ofcargo that otherwise would have moved viaslower, more vulnerable ground-based meansof transportation. the mobility advantage alsoenables the infiltration, resupply, and exfiltra­

14 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007tion of relatively small ground units. By providinghumanitarian assistance, medical support,and transportation for governmentofficials to remote areas, airpower can promotethe government’s credibility and improvethe quality of life for its population.these types of operations, which directly affectand are immediately visible to the populationin question, can have significant effects inthe overall campaign against the insurgents.coupled with relatively small numbers ofcoalition and indigenous forces, airpower canbring a full spectrum of effects to bear, fromhumanitarian to electronic to kinetic. in somecases, the mere visible or audible presence ofairpower can demonstrate commitment to apopulation and support to a government aswell as shape the behavior of insurgents by reducingtheir freedom of movement and denyingthem sanctuaries.Assisting Partner Nations’ Air Forcesthe air Force’s Fid, which includes militaryprograms that support partner nations’strategy for internal defense and development,primarily seeks to develop and sustainthe airpower capabilities of those nations. Bybuilding partnerships in this way, the unitedstates helps shape the strategic environmentand impede potential terrorists from gaininga foothold in these countries. ultimately, increasingpartner nations’ ability to counter irregularthreats allows them to fight more effectively,enhance their legitimacy, and reducetheir dependence on us forces.currently the air Force provides educationand training essential to resurrecting the airforces of iraq and afghanistan. despite gettingoff to a slow start, the nascent iraqi airforce is conducting rudimentary isR and mobilitymissions. operating al muthana airBase (a section of Baghdad international airport),it plans to take over activities at severalother bases. us forces continue to train iraqisin support functions needed to maintain andprotect their aircraft and bases. Furthermore,they are helping develop an indigenous abilityto provide air surveillance and air traffic controlover sovereign airspace—an essential partof any coalition exit strategy since partner nationswill need support from coalition airforces until they can independently conducttheir own operations and defend their airspace.in this age of increasing emphasis oniW, the air Force’s Fid capabilities will likelyreceive greater emphasis and resources.Planning, tasking, executing, and assessingcombat operations are the JFacc’s forte.clearly, planning and executing phase four(stabilize) and phase five (enable civil authority)operations pose unique challenges for the aircomponent. 4 an understanding of how to helprebuild a partner nation’s airpower (includingcomplexities of legislation and fundingfor foreign military assistance, aspirations ofpartner nations, and opportunities for coalitioncontributions) constitutes one potentialiW emphasis area for educating and trainingairmen. the air Force’s Fid force structuremay also need a relook with an eye towardsimproving the capacity to rebuild partner nations’air forces; for example, it is no coincidencethat the most successful asset of theiraqi air force, the c-130, is the only aircrafttype it has in common with the us air Force.Developing Airmen for Irregular WarfareForce development is a function of education,training, and experience, with an objectiveof producing adaptive, creative, andknowledge-enabled airmen. our airmen notonly must know and articulate what their servicebrings to the iW fight today, but also mustthink “outside the box”—an ability that willenable them to lead and direct the air Forceof the future. our service must continue toadapt and leverage its asymmetric capabilitiesagainst those adversaries engaged in iW againstthe united states and its allies. Fortunately,adaptability and an inherent capacity for thinkingabove the fray are ingrained in the geneticcode of airmen. Likewise, flexibility is builtinto the platforms with which they wage war.developing bright, innovative, highly capable

AIRPOWER’S CRUCIAL ROLE IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 15leaders who will continue this tradition of flexibilityis essential to ensure that airpower maintainsa place at the fore of iW conflicts.our airmen must receive training and educationin the capabilities and limitations ofairpower; moreover, they must unapologeticallyarticulate airpower concepts and doctrineto the joint community, members of otherservices, and personnel assigned to other governmentagencies. numerous ongoing initiativesfocus on educating our airmen on aspectsof iW in which us airpower plays a directrole and makes a direct contribution, such asthe effort initiated by the air Force chief ofstaff to identify and/or train airmen who havea solid understanding of foreign cultures andlanguages. in addition, expanded training programsfor new recruits, increased emphasis onpredeployment training for combat-supportpersonnel, and enhanced flying training foraviators and Battlefield airmen based on warfightinglessons learned all reflect the newrealities of iW. Just as airmen can survive andkill the enemy at great distances from the air,so must they have the training and motivationto survive and kill at close range on theground.air Force doctrine will also play a significantrole in educating airmen. consisting ofthe fundamental principles by which militaryforces guide their actions in support of nationalobjectives, doctrine shapes the mannerin which the air Force organizes, trains, equips,and sustains its forces, preparing war fightersfor future uncertainties and giving them acommon set of understandings on which tobase their decisions. currently the air Force isrevising the existing version of aFdd 2-3.1,Foreign Internal Defense, 10 may 2004, and de-veloping a new doctrinal keystone publication:aFdd 2-3, Irregular Warfare, which will codifyhow the air Force approaches iW, includingits capabilities and contributions to counterinsurgencyoperations. this document will alsoform the basis of our service’s position as thejoint community tackles the important businessof writing doctrine on counterinsurgency.all of the aforementioned initiatives are designedto create a core of iW leaders and expertsupon which the air Force can rely.Conclusionamerica and its military are at war; the currentthreat posed by global terrorists, potentiallyarmed with weapons of mass destruction,is as great as previous threats to our way of lifeposed by nazism, fascism, and communism.coalition and partner-nation forces join theunited states in this effort. the us air Forceprovides air, space, and cyber power as part ofthe joint and coalition war-fighting team, dedicatedto winning the conflicts in iraq and afghanistanwhile simultaneously protecting thevital interests of our nation and the coalitionin which it operates. airpower, in all its forms,brings a vast array of direct-effect weapons andjoint-force enablers to the fray, a fact not alwaysclearly recognized or portrayed in thepress. although it is not so important that audiencesproperly attribute progress in theglobal war on terror to particular componentsor services, it is important that air Force airmenknow and articulate our resident asymmetriccapabilities and that they use theirknowledge and expertise to ensure that ourservice remains as relevant to tomorrow’s fightas it is to today’s. qNotes1. “irregular Warfare Joint operating concept,” draftversion 1.0, January 2007, 4.2. Rear adm William d. sullivan, vice-director, strategicPlans and Policy, Joint chiefs of staff, Fighting the LongWar—Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism, briefing slide9, February 2006, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jcs/jcslongwar_12jan06_j5.pdf (accessed 15 January 2007).3. the strategic center of gravity is a source of powerthat provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action,or will to act.4. Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operations, 17 september2006, iV-25 through iV-29, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf.

LeadershipAn Old Dog’s ViewC. R. AndeReggGray in the muzzle and gimpy inthe hips, i slowly walk to the rag rugnext to the hearth where i turn intwo tight circles, ease myself down,haunches first, and then stretch my front legsout, putting my chin on them. i’ve pulled allthe sleds there are to pull. to all the placesthere are to pull them to, stretching from thewildest frontiers to the fanciest boomtowns.two dogs, four dogs—even eight- and 12-dogteams. Straining at the harness until it cuts,paws filled with razors of ice, and breath huffingin huge clouds of steam. With my brothers’shoulders brushing against mine, we havelunged and pulled together, and together wehave felt the reward of nothing more complicatedthan brotherhood—the simplest of wordsand the hardest to achieve. i look up at you,fresh from your initial training and eager tomake your first pull across the high passes,and i think, “i could tell you everything, butthen where would be the fun in discoveringfor yourself?” But some of it i must tell youbecause i want you to be better than i.Our world is harsh. a mistake can cost alife. Or even a whole team, tumbling as oneinto the maw of a crevasse, gone forever in theblink of an eye. and we neither get nor seek16

LEADERSHIP 17mercy from the cruel opponent against whomwe struggle—the blinding white cold that isalways hoping that we will slip. yet we pull together,my brothers and sisters and i, and wetake care of each other. it is the reward of ourkind to feel unseen bonds of buddy love whilewe pull the load to the end of the track. andsometimes there is a pat on the head, but it isnot the worldly rewards we seek. We pull becausewe are bred to it, and trained to it, andbecause an old man near the sea might havesaid, “it is a lovely thing to do.”although we struggle through blizzards andsoaring mountain passes as a team, we dependon the leader. Our leader may not be thestrongest or the swiftest or the smartest, buthe or she has proved one thing over andover—we will follow.as i lie here, feeling the fire’s warmthsoothe the aches and ravages of a lifetime onthe trail, i can reflect on the virtues—and thepitfalls—of being the leader. things that youmust learn, finally, on your own. But i canhelp you learn them more quickly if you willlisten and understand the words of the olddog that has pulled from every position on theteam and—yes, even a few times, a few glorioustimes—has lived the joy of pulling fromthe lead and getting the job done.Before you can earn the respect to lead us,you must first be an excellent follower, andthe excellent follower is always first: the firstout of a warm bed, the first away from thebreakfast bowl, the first ready to harness up,and the first to encourage the dog beside himor her. Most importantly, though, you must bethe first to study. What is the meaning of theweather? the high clouds? the south windand the north? how does the team pull on thesoft snow? the wet? the ice? One must knowour enemy, the cold, better than we know ourown pack.it is not enough, though, to be the first as afollower; you must also be the last. the last tocomplain. the last to sit down. the last to sleep.and always, always, the last to ask, “Why me?”as you study, it is natural that you seek outthe best teacher, and his name is Failure. Welearn nothing from our successes. a shortromp on a soft trail with a light load is quicklyforgotten. Do you think i am a leader? Look atthe scars on my face—the missing tip of myear, gone to the single swipe of a viciousmother whose cub i bothered. this is not theface of success; this is the face of life, of lessonslearned, and, alas, relearned. you will sufferthese failures too. and each of them willmake you stronger and able to pull longer andharder than ever. Until time catches up withyou—and there’s no cure for that.along the way, though, continue to study.Make time to study. See how the inuit’s dogsrun, but the trapper’s are different—perhapsnot as fast but with more stamina. While youpull as a follower, learn from them; learn fromthem all. you must study how the sled skids inthe turn and how those in front, behind, andbeside you react. Does your brother shy fromthe knife of the cold wind? Does your sister pullyou off balance? there is precious little time tolearn before you will be thrust into the front.you will learn that there are different kindsof lead dogs. Some look at their team as ablessing, a team that can get the job done anddone safely. Others look at the team as a burden,a group of ne’er-do-wells that need to beconstantly nipped. But i don’t have time tothink about the snarlers and nippers becausetheir teams, sadly, fail when the stakes arehigh. i want you to know what i know before icurl up and sleep while you go out into thecutting wind.as the lead dog, you must work the hardest.the house dogs think that the lead position isthe easiest—that the traces in the rear must bethe tautest while the lead dog needs only to“guide” the team, his harness loose and comfortable.this might work on a clear day overan easy trail, but not when the job is tough.recall your days in the back, when every ounceof strength from the whole team was needed.a slacker is a liability; a leader who is a slackercould be a calamity.as the lead dog, you must be the disciplinarian,even sometimes during the run—butthe best time is later, away from the team. rememberthat your goal is to improve behavior;a chastened dog will pull hard to regain hisspot on the team, but a humiliated dog is ruinedforever. Before you growl at the errant

18 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007one, look first to yourself. Did you train theoffender properly? Did you provide the rightequipment? almost all of us will pull ’til ourhearts burst; if one does not, then it is moreoften the fault of training or equipment ratherthan attitude. But discipline when you must;no one else will do it because it is your job.the character you build as a follower is theone that comes through as a leader when thetrail is icy, the wind is brutal, and the sled istop-heavy. it is no time to be a loner, or sloppy,or shortsighted. take heart from my experience:a leader can build character in the team.he or she need only show its members thebenefits of hard work, courage, selflessness,devotion, and excellence, and to these thingsthey will respond with their whole hearts.you must know what you stand for beforethe trail becomes difficult. Do you believe inyour man? in your team? Will you die in thetraces for them? ask these questions now becausewhen the white bear circles your campat night and then rushes in, a howling, slashingspecter of evil, it is too late. you must beready to fight in an instant or risk whimperingaway with your tail between your legs.i have saved for last the most importantthing you must learn, and that is integrity. theleader is the first into the traces and the lastout. the leader eats last and eats least. theleader treats every member of the team withmeticulous fairness. the leader encouragesaffection for the team but never for himself orherself. the leader is honest, and this bearsrepeating—the leader is honest. More thanany power the leader has, the leader is mostjudicious with the authority to lead the teaminto harm’s way.now you must go and lead the team while irest. you have studied hard and learned muchduring your life as a follower. During the longwinter nights, you have curled up close to theteam and heard the telling and retelling ofthe stories of how our proud breed evolvedinto the best that anyone has ever seen. yourdreams have felt the agony of crossing thehigh passes and the joys of pups in the spring.your history will make you wise, and your heritagewill make you proud. Do not be afraid tofail. as the scars accumulate on your head, letthem remind you of the difficult life you havechosen and the glorious battles it brought.i trust you. qAs your secretary, I am committed to boosting your regional, cultural,and language skills to make you a more capable ambassador so thatyou can help build lasting, long-term relationships with our alliesand coalition partners.—hon. Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the air Force

APJLt CoL PauL D. Berg, uSaF, ChieF, ProFeSSionaL JournaLSIntroducing the Chinese ASPJ andPresenting the Latest Chronicles OnlineJournal ArticlesThe US Air Force began publishingthe english version of Air and SpacePower Journal (ASPJ ) in 1947. To expandits language and cultural outreach,the service launched Spanish and Portugueseeditions in 1949 as well as Arabic andFrench ones in 2005. We are now pleased toannounce the imminent debut of the ChineseASPJ, designed to encourage professional dialoguebetween Chinese-speaking military andgovernment members worldwide.each ASPJ editor is a regional expert andnative speaker who tailors his journal’s contentto audience interests. The new ChineseASPJ editor, Mr. Guocheng Jiang, has impressivecredentials. he grew up in China, livingthrough both the Great Famine of the early1960s and the Cultural revolution of the late1960s. in the 1970s, he was “reeducated” inthe countryside for three years before becominga “worker-peasant-soldier” student at theShanghai institute of Foreign Languages. 1 inthe subsequent era of economic reform, Mr.Jiang became deeply involved in several highprofileindustrial projects in partnership withforeign companies. As a journalist and chiefinterpreter, he covered foreign technologicaldevelopments and authored several pioneeringpapers about contract negotiation andwriting. After earning his first master’s degreefrom Nanjing Normal University, Mr. Jiangtaught english to graduate students. he thenjoined Yilin Publishing house, where he woretwo hats—one as a technical editor and anotheras the author of two books about economictopics. his book Gate to GATT receivedimmediate acclaim in business and languageteachingcircles. 2 Mr. Jiang later emigrated tothe United States, where he attended Johnshopkins University and completed a secondmaster’s degree in 1996. he then worked forabout 10 years in the US publication and softwareindustries. his extensive experience inChina and the United States will help himpromote the constructive exchange of ideasbetween the Chinese and American militaries.For the inaugural edition of the ChineseASPJ, Mr. Jiang has selected and translatedpreviously published articles about militarytransformation, strategy, and education. he issoliciting articles from Chinese-speaking airmenworldwide and will publish them in upcomingquarterly issues as they become available.The established ASPJ editions serve theneeds of military services in over 90 countriesworldwide, where air forces, armies, and naviesuse the Journal’s articles for instructionalpurposes in academies and staff colleges. Officialsof foreign governments also find themuseful. We hope that the new Chinese ASPJwill prove equally valuable.All ASPJ editions promote professional dialogueamong airmen throughout the world sothat we can harness the best ideas about air,space, and cyberspace power. Chronicles OnlineJournal (COJ ) complements the printed editionsof ASPJ but appears only in electronicform. Not subject to any fixed publicationschedule, COJ can publish timely articles anytimeabout a broad range of military topicsand can accommodate articles too lengthy forinclusion in the printed journals.19

20 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007Articles appearing in COJ are frequently republishedelsewhere. The various ASPJ editionsroutinely translate and print them. Bookeditors select them as book chapters, and collegeprofessors use them in the classroom. Weare pleased to present the following recentCOJ articles (available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc.html):• Lt Col richard S. Tracey, USA, retired,“Trapped by a Mindset: The iraq WMDintelligence Failure” (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/tracey.html)• Maj Joseph T. Benson, USAF, “Weather andthe Wreckage at Desert-One” (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/benson.html)The ASPJ staff seeks insightful articles andbook reviews from anywhere in the world. Weoffer both hard-copy and electronic-publicationopportunities in english, Spanish, Portuguese,Arabic, French, and Chinese. To submit anarticle in any of our languages, please referto the submission guidelines at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/howto1.html. To write a book review, pleasesee the guidelines at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/bookrev/bkrevguide.html. qNotes1. The term reeducated refers to a national movementfrom 1968 to 1975 that called for sending millions ofurban students to the countryside for reeducation bypeasants. These students faced tremendous challenges.Worker-peasant-soldier students reflected Mao Tse-tung’spolicy, in effect from 1972 to 1976, of sending youths withpractical job experience to college without requiring collegeexaminations.2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT) later became the World Trade Organization.APJWe encourage you to send your comments to us, preferably via e-mail at aspj@maxwell.af.mil. You may alsosend letters to the Editor, Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112­6004. We reserve the right to edit the material for overall length.SERVICE BEFORE SELF ORSELF-SERVICE?i liked Dr. David Mets’s excellent, to-the-point,and insightful article “Service before Self or SelfService? Some Fodder for Your reading on theProfessional ethics of Air Warriors” (Spring2007). i especially liked the quick-referencerundown on which authors are moral absolutistsand which are relativists, as well as the reasonswhy; the pros and cons of each book, author,and premise; and, most importantly, why thatbook (or another by the same author) is relevantfor warriors. Additionally, Dr. Mets’s writingstyle is easy to read. Most often, articles onphilosophy are full of complex topics furthercomplicated by convoluted language designedto make the author seem smart rather thanget his point across. Such is not the case here,and i appreciate it. even a knuckle-draggingfighter pilot walked away more informed.Lt Col Peter S. “Shadow” Ford, USAFTyndall AFB, FloridaAN UNTAPPED RESOURCE FOR STABI­LIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTIONin his article “An Untapped resource for Stabilizationand reconstruction: The United

RICOCHETS AND REPLIES 21States Air Force” (Spring 2007), Maj WilliamFischer does an admirable job of summarizingthe challenges of postconflict operations anddiscussing roles and responsibilities of themilitary as they relate to those operations. hiscall for a reassessment of military roles in stabilityand reconstruction (S&r) operationsafter the shooting stops is most timely. Perhapsmost noteworthy, his identification ofthe need for greatly expanding the combinedcivil-military training experiences highlights aglaring deficiency in current Department ofDefense (DOD) training practices. Disappointingly,the article falls flat at the end. The On-Scene Commanders’ Course is specifically designedfor crisis-management requirementsduring and immediately after an isolated incident.Over time, the course has evolved to meetthe doctrinal training requirements for an onscenecommander (OSC) to operate as delineatedwithin the National incident ManagementSystem (NiMS). Particularly relevant to the author’srecommendation to expand the course isthe fact that the OSC’s function fades away asan incident stabilizes and as criminal investigativeservices and infrastructure-reconstitutionteams begin their restorative efforts. S&r activitiesfall into what the NiMS calls “consequencemanagement.” These actions requirea diverse set of actors and may last a few weeks,in the case of a Class A F-16 mishap, or severalyears, as demonstrated in both post-Saddamiraq and the post-Katrina Gulf Coast. Put simply,the On-Scene Commanders’ Course doesnot prepare leaders to function in consequencemanagement. The cat-herding skills requiredof a consequence-management leader are currentlymore available in the diplomatic corps andcommercial construction-program managementfirms than in the DOD’s officer corps. Thereare more effective ways to train field-gradeand future general-officer leaders to functionin consequence management. Serving multiyearassignments with the US Agency for internationalDevelopment or while “loaned” tothe State Department at embassies/consulatesin developing countries would help preparecurrent junior-level and midlevel officers tofunction in S&r. And we should immediatelyincorporate S&r training in the curricula ofthe service academies while using the reserveOfficer Training Corps program to bring inofficers—to both the active and reserve components—whoare academically trained in theskills needed in S&r operations. i realize thatmy proposal would necessitate a years-long,multibillion-dollar program of retraining andculture change, but throwing the rudder hardoverwhile at flank speed only violently rearrangesthe occupants and equipment ondeck. Course changes take time. i applaudMajor Fischer for making a plausible initialproposal. A vigorous debate is now needed todevelop his ideas.JOINT CLOSE AIR SUPPORTTRANSFORMEDLt Col Allen R. Naugle, USAFSan Antonio, TexasLt Col richard Bohn’s article “Joint Close AirSupport Transformed” (Spring 2007) has afew shortcomings. As Colonel Bohn begins hisargument, he briefly mentions the joint closeair support ( JCAS) memorandum of agreement(MOA) signed by all the services and USSpecial Operations Command (USSOCOM)in September 2004. We agree with the authorthat the existence of that MOA clearly indicatesjoint military interest in JCAS. however,the MOA’s actual text offers very little guidancefor tactics, techniques, and procedures.rather, it deals almost exclusively with standardizationof joint terminal attack controller( JTAC) training, certification, and currency.Colonel Bohn mischaracterizes the intent ofthe MOA.he also misses some key elements in his discussionregarding Air Force JTAC support toconventional Army units and the joint community’sspecial operations forces (SOF). inhis math, only Air Force tactical air controlparty (TACP) units supply non-SOF qualifiedJTACs to SOF. in reality, Air Force SpecialOperations Command (AFSOC) is tasked viaUSSOCOM to organize, train, and equipspecial-tactics combat controllers to performthe JTAC mission. JTAC-certified combat controllershabitually integrate with Army, Navy,and coalition SOF and have conducted JCAS

22 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007operations with distinctive success since thevery beginning of Operations enduring Freedomand iraqi Freedom. To meet increaseddemand on the current and future battlefield,AFSOC’s special-tactics forces are methodicallygrowing in number while maintaining exceptionalcapability. even prior to the global waron terrorism, AFSOC’s special operators earnedfierce reputations as quiet professionals throughexercises and contingency deployments withtheir joint SOF counterparts, but ColonelBohn overlooks AFSOC’s contributions to theJTAC mission.The author also states that “these Airmendo not have the training to operate like specialforces personnel” (p. 59). We deem it a disserviceto those courageous, highly qualifiedenlisted and commissioned-officer JTACs currentlyengaged in the fight alongside their SOFcounterparts to describe them as less than capableor somehow lacking in ability. We urgethe author to reconsider his assessment of thequality of Air Force JTACs.Maj Jerry Kung, USAFHurlburt Field, FloridaMaj Michael Martin, USAFMaxwell AFB, AlabamaLEADING THE TWENTY-FIRST­CENTURY AIR FORCEi just finished reading Lt Col Paul D. Berg’s“Focus Area” piece titled “Leading the Twentyfirst-CenturyAir Force” (Winter 2006) andcould not agree more. The very foundation ofour leadership must be the Air Force’s corevalues. in June 2004, we senior noncommissionedofficers (SNCO) at Altus AFB, Oklahoma,began a focused investment in ourpeople as we leveraged our skills, talents, andexperiences to transform our wing Airmeninto future strategic enlisted leaders. We SNCOslead from the front, take care of the troops,and serve as role models for our Airmen. AirForce instruction 36-2618, The Enlisted ForceStructure, 1 December 2004, says that SNCOsshould “be . . . active, visible leader[s]. Developtheir NCOs into better leaders and supervisors.Deliberately grow and prepare theirNCOs to be effective future SNCOs” (11). Ourultimate vision at Altus was to produce Airmenwho are even better than those currentlyon active duty. We sought to develop Airmenwhose very core is infused with the Air Forcecore values because that will prepare them toface the challenges of tomorrow’s volatile, uncertain,complex, and ambiguous combat environment.We accepted the challenge andpressed on towards the goal. Our consolidatedefforts produced a developmental infrastructurewe call Airmen’s Time. For more informationabout our efforts at Altus, see https://wwwd.my.af.mil/afknprod/ASPs/CoP/OpenCoP.asp?Filter=OO-eD-Ae-32. To learn how wecontinued our work at Ali Al Salem Air Base,Kuwait, seehttps://wwwd.my.af.mil/afknprod/ASPs/CoP/OpenCoP.asp?Filter=OO-eD-AC-24.CMSgt Thomas S. Narofsky, USAFAli Al Salem Air Base, KuwaitMOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGYAND NATIONAL SECURITYi read with great interest LCDr Thomas D.Vandermolen’s article “Molecular Nanotechnologyand National Security” (Fall 2006),which addressed mankind’s admirable degreeof technical development. i hope that thistechnical knowledge will be accompanied byhigh moral values so that its use may promotehuman development. Since i’m devoted tomedicine, i’m always interested in reading articlesabout technological advances, many ofwhich are occurring at an astonishing rate.Congratulations to Commander Vandermolenfor his excellent work.Dr. Manoel A. MoraesJohnson City, TennesseeEditor’s Note: Dr. Moraes read the Portuguese versionof Commander Vandermolen’s article, availableat http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-p/2006/3tri06/vandermolen.html.in his article “Molecular Nanotechnology andNational Security,” Commander Vandermolenrecommends intense regulation. At the sametime, he indicates fairly clearly that the UnitedStates would be seen as a pariah if it alone

RICOCHETS AND REPLIES 23gained molecular nanotechnology (MNT) capability.i’m not sure that i understand theeither/or position. it would seem to me that,given the strategic importance of MNT as anextraordinarily disruptive technology advance,which appears inevitable in some fashion, theUnited States should actually try to drive itsown “MNT Manhattan Project.” The developmentof nuclear capacity, coupled with ourmilitary, economic, and international regulatorycapacities, has governed our securitysince World War ii. Wouldn’t you rather havethe United States in the driver’s seat for thenext technological revolution? Thanks for thethoughtful article.Eric BauswellSan Jose, CaliforniaMOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGYAND NATIONAL SECURITY:THE AUTHOR RESPONDSAn “MNT Manhattan Project” (MMP) may be agreat idea, depending on its purpose. is its purposeto secure US influence in an internationalcontrolregime or to produce the world’s soleMNT superpower? The first goal is highly desirable,but the second is unlikely to succeedand could make the United States less, ratherthan more, secure.An MMP would be a tremendously difficultundertaking, even compared to the originalManhattan Project. Although the United Statesis arguably the current leader in overall nanotechnology(NT) research, some governmentand private programs outside the UnitedStates are leaders in their respective NT fields.Now consider that the research paths to producepractical MNT are unknown and almostcertainly numerous. To assure MNT dominance,our MMP would thus have to dominate everylikely research path, including currently unanticipatedones—a very expensive, unfocused,and therefore almost certainly doomed venture.Furthermore, attempts to hire or coerceexpertise from non-US programs will likelyalienate other nations and spur competition.The MNT Cold War would be on, and unlikethe Cold War that defeated the Soviet Union,an MNT Cold War would have to contend withpotentially dozens or hundreds of nonstate actorswho could upset the strategic balance.But assume that we “win.” Unless we arewilling to preemptively destroy the capabilitiesof our competitors, they will also reach the finishline. Since developing defenses againstMNT-based weapons appears more difficultthan creating the weapons themselves, we stillwon’t be “safe” from less-advanced competitors,including nonstate actors. Thus, even a successfulnoncooperative approach lands us inthe same situation as an international effort,only without the buy-in from other nations,making monitoring and controlling MNT thatmuch harder. if we are to launch an MMP, developinga workable, enforceable MNT regulatorystructure would be its worthiest goal.i am also indebted to Mr. Tihamer Toth-Fejel for kindly pointing out that Dr. ericDrexler was not, as i state in my article, thefirst person to coin the term nanotechnology.Prof. Norio Taniguchi of Tokyo Science Universityused it in his 1974 paper “On the BasicConcept of ‘Nano-Technology.’ ” (SeeWikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “NorioTaniguchi,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norio_Taniguchi.)LCDR Thomas D. Vandermolen, USNYokosuka Naval Base, JapanWHY RED FLAG IS OBSOLETEi commend Lt Col rob Spalding on his cogentand germane remarks in “Why red Flag is Obsolete”(Fall 2006), but his analysis stops justshort of a third and vital scenario: preengagementof main battle forces. Shaping the battlespaceis a catchphrase that many use but fewtruly understand. Joint doctrine addressesshaping the battlespace, yet previous tabletopand field exercises tended to neglect both thebattlespace shaping and poststabilization phases.To win a war, we must shape the battlespaceupon entry and exit, but battlespace shapingfor departure is always subject to unintendedconsequences.The two scenarios suggested by ColonelSpalding are useful for fully engaged air andspace campaigns. But we don’t start that wayin the global war on terrorism’s battlespace.

24 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007in fact, as Spalding mentions, the military iseconomically constrained. Therefore, beinggood stewards of taxpayer dollars, we shouldseek to make best use of what is already inplace. And aviation counterinsurgency is acombat-advisory mission that leverages bestuse of available host-nation air forces in theconduct of an internal or regional engagement.This is a mission legislated to specialoperations forces (SOF) under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense reorganizationAct.it has been my personal experience thatmain forces have a limited or even misinformedunderstanding of SOF personnel and their capabilities.Although SOF operates throughoutall phases of combat operations, these forcesare the initial battlespace shapers. For this reason,i propose to add a third scenario to enrichthe combat reality sought by ColonelSpalding. This scenario would work to1. develop understanding of needs, capabilities,and limitations between thephase-one SOF advisory forces and thephase-two main battle forces for campaignand tactical-level planners andleaders;2. develop understanding of capabilitiesand limitations of the Air Force’s newforeign area officers for main battleforcecampaign-level planners; and3. develop an understanding of how theSOF combat-aviation advisors enhancethe best use of available aircraft-tomissionmatching using existing hostnationairpower, and learn how to leveragethis force into the air tasking order.Kudos to Colonel Spalding for proposingto update red Flag with twenty-first-centuryreality! Whether riding Northern Alliancehorses, squaring off in M1A1 main battletanks, or flying F-15e Strike eagles, militarypower will always face the challenge of remainingappropriate, adaptive, and relevant.Maj David C. Hook, USAF, RetiredSan Antonio, TexasCLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLANDISLANDS AIR WARThanks to Maj rodolfo Pereyra for his illuminatingarticle “Clausewitz and the Falkland islandsAir War” (Fall 2006). Although i foundmost of his contentions valid and logical, ifailed to discern the Clausewitzian belief inthe linkage between politics and war. The author’scontention that the Clausewitzian definitioncan be applied for both countries inthe Falklands War could be viewed from anotherperspective—particularly in the case ofArgentina. The fact that the Argentinean militaryleadership resorted to war to “cover upeconomic difficulties” (112) strengthens thepoint that the instrument of war was abused inthis case.indeed, the relationship between war andpolitics is not as axiomatic as the fact that twoand two make four. Clausewitz’s deductionsabout war being subservient to politics werethe product of rational thinking and intensehuman experience as opposed to the surrealisticmode demonstrated by Argentinean generalGaltieri in the Falklands War. Arguably,the instrument of war was abused (by Argentina),in this case as an end for which it wasprobably unsuited. Moreover, politics was tailoredto rationalize the war. in other words,war preceded the politics. Such irrational orsubrational reasoning for waging war runscontrary to the Clausewitzian understandingof war in a true sense because it was used torationalize the irrational. Clausewitz alsowarned about such possibilities of abusing theuse of the military. indeed, he asserted that“policy is the guiding intelligence and waronly the instrument, not vice versa. No otherpossibility exists, then, than to subordinatethe military point of view to the political” (OnWar, rev. ed., ed. and trans. Michael howardand Peter Paret [Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1984], 607).Nevertheless, the increasing attraction towardswar as an end rather than a means(which i think is more appropriate in thiscase) is best explained by Martin van Creveld,who stated in his book The Transformation ofWar (New York: Free Press, 1991) that “war, far

RICOCHETS AND REPLIES 25from being merely a means, has very oftenbeen considered an end—a highly attractiveactivity for which no other can provide an adequatesubstitute” (218). The Argentinean actionis probably closer to van Creveld’s conceptionof war than to Clausewitz’s. Onceagain, thanks to Major Pereyra for an intriguingarticle.Wing Cdr Z. I. Khan, Bangladesh Air ForceDhaka, BangladeshMYTH OF THE TACTICAL SATELLITEi wholeheartedly congratulate Lt Col edwardB. Tomme, USAF, retired, for his article “TheMyth of the Tactical Satellite” (Summer 2006).i have spent a career in the military-launchbusiness, which has been and is now spendingsignificant dollars to develop the “responsivelaunch” capability for these mythical “tactical”satellites. One thing that seems lost on manypeople is the cost of the infrastructure to supportrapid launch. even inexpensive boosterscause launchpad damage that must be repaired,and they require trained crews thatmust be there and ready for unplannedlaunches. All the boosters and satellites mustbe prepurchased and maintained in storagein a flight condition. it can’t be done withmilitary crews as there is neither career growthnor continuous activity to maintain training.Thus, we pay contractors. This capability willcost hundreds of millions of dollars to preposition,and it might take weeks to launch aconstellation of six to 10 satellites. And whatwould happen if one of the boosters or satellitesfailed during the constellation deployment?Until we develop a true tactical capability, ourtactical-satellite demonstrations test strategicaugmentationsystems that can be deployed assecondary payloads on other strategic missionsor use current small boosters like Pegasus,Athena, and so forth.Col Michael T. Baker, USAF, RetiredRedondo Beach, CaliforniaAirmen provide America with air, space, and cyberspace dominance—the first and essential enduring requirement of a successful militaryoperation.—hon. Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force

ASPJLt CoL PauL D. Berg, uSaF, ChieF, ProFeSSionaL JournaLSDeveloping AirmenEducating and Training LeadersAccording to Air Force doctrinedocument (AFdd) 1, Air ForceBasic Doctrine, 17 november 2003,“the Air Force’s fundamental serviceto the nation is to develop, train, sustain,and integrate the elements of air and spacepower to execute its functions across the spectrumof operations” (73). the document enumeratesthree “core competencies” that lie “atthe forefront of the Air Force’s strategic perspectiveand therefore at the heart of the Service’scontribution to our nation’s total militarycapabilities and strategic vision,” the firstof which is “developing Airmen” (73). AFdd1 explains that because Air Force people representthe “ultimate source of combat capability,”the service has “dedicated [itself] to ensuringthey receive the education, training, and professionaldevelopment necessary to provide aquality edge second to none” by means of a“career-long focus on the development of professionalairmen” (74).A top Air Force priority, developing Airmenis a complex and time-consuming task.Professional Airmen require a flexible balancebetween broad education, which teachesthem how to think in creative, theoreticalterms, and specific training, which teachesthem how to perform practical tasks. An improperbalance between education and trainingmight degrade combat performance, butthe proper balance varies during the course ofa career and between different career fields.Early in a career, technical training could wellpredominate, but Airmen might later needmore education to prepare for the strategiclevelresponsibilities of higher ranks. Engineers,pilots, and public-affairs officers clearlyrequire different blends of education and training.Furthermore, the effectiveness of traininglends itself to measurement more easily thandoes the efficacy of education. For example,one can readily determine if maintenance techniciansare properly trained in aircraft repair,but how should one assess their educational development?We must continually develop ourpeople during their careers, even though theprecious time spent on education and trainingremains unavailable for fighting wars.Ultimately, developing Airmen means growingleaders. Successful Air Force leadershiprequires a harmonious blend of theoreticaland practical knowledge about diverse topics.the service’s emphasis on studying foreignlanguages and cultures adds another facet toAirman development. Even more developmentaldemands flow from the Air Force’s expandinginvolvement in the cyberspace domain.We must maintain our traditional technicalexpertise in air and space as well as our insightsinto leading Airmen while we preparepeople for these new fields. We do need technicalspecialists, but properly educated leaderswho can synthesize and guide others in implementingcreative solutions to complex, multidisciplinaryproblems are far more valuable.the successful development of tomorrow’sAir Force leaders demands a long-term commitmentand the expenditure of vast resources.Because the free exchange of ideas helps educateAirmen, Air and Space Power Journal, theprofessional journal of our service, dedicatesthis issue to advancing the professional dialogueabout how best to develop Airmen whoare ready to lead tomorrow’s Air Force. q26

In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.”In a similar spirit, Air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers can drawtheir own conclusions or join the intellectual battlespace. Please send comments to aspj@maxwell.af.mil.Editor’s Note: For a reply to this article, see “Tactical Satellites: It’s Not ‘Can We?’ but ‘Should We?’” by Lt Col EdwardB. “Mel” Tomme, USAF, retired, in this issue.Tactical SatellitesThe Rest of the StoryLTC BoB Guerriero, uSA*RetiRed AiR FoRce lieutenantcolonel edward tomme’s interestingarticle “the Myth of the tacticalSatellite” (Summer 2006) outlinessome of the challenges associated with employinga satellite in a tactical role. the authordoes an excellent job of describing the physicalconstraints of satellite operations due to orbitalmechanics and payload size, weight, and powerissues. However, the article includes some inaccurateassumptions about the nature of tacticaloperations and the potential value of atactical satellite for the war fighter on theground, thus leading to a wrong conclusion.colonel tomme begins his article by discussingwhat the term tactical means to a warfighter: “the warrior has a very specific understandingof what that technical term [tactical]means—applying to small-scale, short-livedevents, usually involving troops in contact.” 1From an Army perspective, tactical does have aspecific meaning, but it is not limited to coloneltomme’s. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90,Tactics, states that “the tactical level of war is thelevel of war at which battles and engagementsare planned and executed to accomplish militaryobjectives assigned to tactical units or taskforces” (emphasis in original). 2 FM 3-0, Operations,defines a battle as “a set of related engagementsthat last longer and involve largerforces than an engagement” and an engagementas “a small tactical conflict between opposingmaneuver forces, usually conducted atbrigade level and below.” 3 colonel tomme’sarticle implies that all tactical operations areengagements, lasting minutes or hours. in reality,they can last for days, weeks, months, orlonger. the planning in advance of such operationscan take equally as long.Any discussion of tactical satellites mustalso consider the operational level of war, definedby FM 3-0 as “the level at which campaignsand major operations are conductedand sustained to accomplish strategic objectiveswithin theaters.” 4 A tactical satellite mightprove most useful at this level. Because operationscan last anywhere from days to years, atheater commander could find the data andsupport provided by a tactical satellite extremelyvaluable. At the operational level of war, thecommander faces the challenge of linking thetactical employment of units to the fulfillment*the author is assigned to the directorate of combat development, Future Warfare center, US Army Space and Missile defensecommand, colorado Springs, colorado.27

28 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007of strategic objectives. to succeed, he or shemust leverage both strategic and tactical capabilities,including satellite assets.colonel tomme’s article also leaves thereader with the impression of tactical satellitesas a replacement for existing constellations ofsatellites: “A tactical war fighter needs persistentimagery. Getting a snapshot every hour orso is not very useful at the tactical level. . . . itis almost inconceivable to contemplate sendingcommanders into combat after tellingthem that they would only be able to communicatefive minutes out of every half hour.” 5Finally, when referring to the mission of thedefense Support Program (dSP), coloneltomme remarks that “it would still take between12 and 20 of them to provide continualglobal coverage.” 6 Because these statementstend to narrow the focus to tactical satellitesalone, as if they are the only assets available tothe war fighter, they inaccurately convey theidea that these satellites fail to meet war-fighterneeds. in reality, commanders have a myriadof capabilities available, each suited to a particularapplication, and tactical satellites couldcomplement these other capabilities.tactical war fighters do need persistent imagery,but they neither expect nor require thatit come from a tactical low earth orbit (Leo)satellite alone. A commander relies on thecollective ability of ground-based, fixed-wing,and space-based collectors to provide persistenceacross the spectrum. A tactical satellitethat complements other intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (iSR) platforms byproviding some specific pieces of information,even just once per day, could be extremelyvaluable to a commander. Similarly, no commanderexpects a Leo satellite to serve as aprimary means of tactical communications.Many other systems serve this function, but atactical satellite could augment these systemsby providing some specialized, intermittentcommunications and data access. Finally, noone considers tactical satellites a replacementfor the entire dSP constellation, with itsglobal missile-warning mission. instead, a tacticalsatellite could complement this constellationby offering an enhanced battlespacecharacterizationcapability. the dSP performsthis function now with its overhead nonimaginginfrared sensors, but missile warning naturallytakes precedence over battlespace characterization,thereby limiting the dSP’s utilityin that role.Finally, colonel tomme questions the valueof any tactical satellite to a tactical war fighter,maintaining that iSR missions are not practicalbecause “the gap times are much longer thanthe timescale of a tactical engagement.” 7 Healso argues that “sparse constellations of satellitesin Leo have no chance of providing auseful communications capability.” 8 in fact,tactical satellites in Leo or high-earth orbitscould perform many extremely valuable missionsfor theater commanders.An imagery intelligence or signals intelligence(SiGiNt) payload on a tactical satellite,directly downlinked to the theater and availablefor dynamic retasking by the theater collectionmanager, could make great contributionsby supplementing other resources available tothe commander. the advantage of the tacticalsatellite lies in its responsiveness to the theatercommander, who could receive direct supportfrom a space-based asset. one of the mostvaluable capabilities of space-based iSR platformsremains the ability to collect informationover denied territory without an adversary’sknowledge. the best use of such a tactical systemwould entail collecting intelligence overan area selected as the location of an imminentoperation, when that area is either deniedterritory or one that the commanderdoes not want to draw attention to. even onepass per day could provide useful and actionableinformation, especially during the monitoringof an area for changes during the daysleading up to an operation. ideally, we wouldtailor the payload to support operations in aparticular theater so that it would provide informationnot already collected by other sensors.Some examples include a nonimagingspectrometer that could detect the manufactureof weapons of mass destruction, a microwaveSiGiNt collector, or an infrared sensorthat might have a limited lifespan due to cryogencooling requirements.We can also envision valuable communicationspayloads for tactical satellites—even for

THE MERGE 29intermittent communications. take for examplea communications package that receiveslow-probability-of-detection transmissions fromcovert operators and then relays them throughother systems to a theater headquarters. By selectinga Leo asset to do this, we could use arelatively low-power ground transmitter andthus lower the probability of detection. A payloadof this type would stay overhead only intermittently,and an operator could send updatesjust at specific times and for limiteddurations. For a covert operation lasting daysor weeks, requiring only periodic updates tothe commander, this arrangement mightprove completely sufficient. including a lasercommunicationspayload on this satellitewould substantially increase the amount ofdata transmitted in a short time. We wouldnever use such a system to provide continuouscommunications; rather, when needed, itwould complement other means of communicationavailable. We could also utilize this typeof tactical satellite for long-term tracking offriendly or enemy personnel, vehicles, orequipment. Again, thanks to the low-power requirementsfor transmitting to a Leo satellite,small transmitters in enemy territory could goundetected for long periods of time and wouldconsume very little power. Granted, this systemallows only intermittent monitoring capability,but for long-term tracking of personnelor equipment movement, we do not always requireor desire continuous updates.We should not dismiss the value of tacticalsatellites. they can fill an important role ascomplements to other existing constellationsand assets while providing a level of responsivenessto theater commanders not availablefrom strategic systems. Realizing the potentialof these satellites will require the same level ofcreativity, determination, and perseverancethat has made our strategic constellations sosuccessful for over 40 years. qColorado Springs, ColoradoNotes1. Lt col edward B. tomme, “the Myth of the tacticalSatellite,” Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 2(Summer 2006): 90, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/sum06/sum06.pdf.2. Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Tactics, July 2001, par. 1-4,http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_90a.pdf.3. FM 3-0, Operations, June 2001, par. 2-12, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_0a.pdf.4. ibid., par. 2-5.5. tomme, “Myth of the tactical Satellite,” 92.6. ibid., 95.7. ibid., 96.8. ibid.We will begin the crucial part of preparing Airmen for combat operationsby increasing the emphasis on combat skills training during ourbasic military training courses, and we will reorient our continuingeducation training programs to emphasize language and culture.—Air Force Strategic Plan, 2006–2008

Tactical SatellitesIt’s Not “Can We?” but “Should We?”Lt CoL Edward B. “MEL” toMME, USaF, rEtirEd*The argumenT by LTC bob guerrieroin favor of tactical satellites, whichappears in this issue, is one of the fewattempts I have seen at a rationalrather than an emotional rebuttal to the argumentspresented in my article “The myth ofthe Tactical Satellite” and the in-depth studyfrom which that article was derived. 1 I appreciatethe thought that went into his rebuttal;however, he appears to have missed the pointof those works. In neither piece did I claimthat conducting such missions as communications,imagery collection, signals intelligence(SIgInT), or blue-force tracking was impossibleusing so-called tactical satellites. In fact, I devoteda large portion of those works to showingexactly how effectively we could performthose missions from space. What I claimed wasthat using tactical satellites to perform thosemissions was highly impractical when constrainedby a limited budget. The point of thatdetailed research was to give senior decisionmakers a tool with which to measure the actualopportunity cost of such an endeavor.according to Colonel guerriero, “a tacticalsatellite that complements other intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISr) platformsby providing some specific pieces of information,even just once per day, could beextremely valuable to a commander.” 2 The unstatedcorollary to his assertion suggests thatsuch a capability will also cost money—moneythat we could use elsewhere. undoubtedly,commanders on the ground would rarely turndown an additional satellite photo of theirarea of responsibility. having a gap-filling capabilityto compensate for the weaknesses ofother assets would also be a plus. however, beforecommanders sign up to own that capability,they should know the opportunity cost of gettingthat image and weigh it against their tacticallysized budgets. In a vast majority of tacticalsituations, some other means of obtaining thatphoto exist—means that are responsive to thetactical commander instead of being slaves toorbital mechanics. Those means are almostinvariably much more affordable, much lesspredictable to opposing forces, and thus muchmore effective. When such means are available,the rationale for going to space to getthat photo seems counterproductive. It’s notthat those missions can’t be done from space;it’s that in most cases, they shouldn’t be donefrom space. The opportunity costs are huge.The money that commanders would need tospend to buy a single satellite to produce thatone picture per day could buy quite a bit ofalternative equipment, including nonorbitalsystems that would likely prove more effectivesince they don’t spend most of their time halfwayaround the globe.Space-based assets have two things in theirfavor that in many cases mitigate their expense:freedom of overflight and relative immunityto threats of physical destruction. † The big operationaldrawbacks to satellites are excessivepredictability and extremely limited persistence.Those combinations of factors tend tomake satellites very useful in the strategic role.In contrast, tactical areas of interest are almostalways significantly less than global, in mostcases well within the footprints of nonorbital*Colonel Tomme’s final air Force assignment in 2006 was as deputy director, air Force Tactical exploitation of national Capabilities(TenCaP), where he directed programs designed to extract tactical effects from strategic overhead assets.†The recent Chinese antisatellite launch considerably dilutes this advantage.30

THE MERGE 31assets. Colonel guerriero states that “tacticaloperations . . . can last for days, weeks, months,or longer,” 3 implying that individual engagementsand battles between small maneuverforces can be linked in time and space to forma single tactical operation.* It is a near truismthat all military activity involving troops incontact does occur at the tactical level. It isalso fairly clear that when a series of battles orengagements starts to last “days, weeks, months,or longer,” the level of control should shift upto the operational or strategic levels of war. Itseems obvious that the longer an operationlasts, even though, in truth, it consists of a seriesof related tactical events, the further up thespectrum of war it must progress. Withoutsuch a progression of command attention, therationale for having higher levels of commandwould not exist. regardless of personal interpretationsof army doctrine, operations lastingfor significant periods and/or extending acrosssubstantial spatial extents would appear towarrant the attention of higher-level command,and hence should be classified collectively assomething other than tactical operations.Why is the definition of the level of war sogermane to the problem of the so-called tacticalsatellite? It all boils down to truth in advertising.advertising is how any product goes after customersand, ultimately, funding. Selection ofthe name tactical satellite appears to have its basisin sex appeal; the term sells the concept toan acquisitions staff desperately looking forways to enhance delivery of command, control,communications, computers, intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance effects to thelowest level of war fighter whose inability toreceive those effects adequately during OperationIraqi Freedom has been well documented.4 Who could refuse to buy a programthat promises to deliver tactically controlledspace effects directly to the front lines at anostensibly affordable price? unfortunately, thedeliverable effects publicly touted as the raisond’être for funding a tactical-satellite program,apparently designed to gain maximumattention from potential funding sources, appearunachievable within a constrained budget.The marketing campaign related to tacticalsatellites is uniform in its message of directtactical support. For example, the air ForceSpace battlelab and the army Space and missileDefense battle Lab demonstrated the innovativeVirtual mission Operations Center(VmOC), a program designed to allow controlof tactical satellites from the field, to airForce Space Command commanders. Thatdemonstration touted the use of untrainedenlisted personnel in a simulated field environmentoutside of the Fourteenth air Forceheadquarters building to show the system’s capabilityto give a tactical soldier the ability todirect satellite collections and access the productsin real time. The obvious implication ofthis demonstration was to show that the capabilitywould be pushed out into the foxholeswhere even the lowest-level soldier could taskorbital assets and immediately use the spacedata he or she had requested. article after articlein the press stressed directly taskable supportto warriors in the field with statementssuch as “We believe we will give the soldier onthe ground the ability to control a spacecraftpayload,” “Today’s technology is close to givinga foot soldier and the tactical warfighterthe kind of space capabilities needed,” and“[This capability will] directly benefit the troopon the ground.” 5 briefings by senior officialsin the air Force research Laboratory (aFrL)heightened anticipation among senior airForce leadership of direct tactical tasking andsupport from space. 6 an article on TacSat-3 inthe Air Force Times even bore the headline “Satellitein Works to beam battlefield Pictures toTroops.” That article went on to say, “When theair Force began beaming pictures of the battlespace from airplanes to small units of groundtroops, it was a breakthrough. now, the airForce research Laboratory is looking at doingthe same with pictures from satellites. . . . Thekey to the experiments is to show a satellitecan fly over the theater and that a soldier onthe ground can directly task the satellite and*extending this assertion to its logical but absurd conclusion, one could consider all of World War II a single tactical engagement.

32 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007get information.” 7 Without question, the marketingthrust is geared toward the idea thattactical satellites will provide direct support totactical war fighters.The problem with this coordinated marketingcampaign relates to the need for truth inadvertising, discussed above. In all likelihood,the effects tantalizingly advertised by tacticalsatelliteadvocates will not find their way to thefront lines at all. as shown in “The myth of theTactical Satellite,” the least expensive tacticalsatellite used for imagery will cost a commanderabout $500,000 per hour overhead inacquisition costs alone and will provide only astroboscopic glimpse of the battlefield, lessthan two minutes out of every five hours or so.Furthermore, per-hour cost isn’t the only issue.many years prior to actual need, seniorleaders will have to make decisions concerningwhich missions may require augmentation;planners must program resources to developand acquire the necessary single-purposesatellites and launch vehicles; and all this investmentmust then go into suspended animationfor an undetermined period of time toawait an unspecified tactical need in an unknowngeographical area.Those acquisitions and logistical costs addup quickly, but prioritization of access to theasset during the limited time it is overheadwill be an even more pressing problem. It isnaïve to believe that such prioritization willoccur at less than the operational level of command,if not higher. Colonel guerriero asmuch as admits this point himself when he describesthe operational level as the one at which“a tactical satellite might prove most useful.” 8additionally, anyone who has worked with imageryor SIgInT knows that substantial analysisgoes on before publication of any product becausethe raw data is difficult for amateurs tointerpret. getting these products to the fieldwould not be as simple as picking up developedphotos from Wal-mart. It is highly doubtfulthat the fabled sergeant in the foxhole directinga satellite to give him an image of theenemy over the next hill will ever exist, giventhe current physical and fiscal constraints ontactical satellites. even if he does not personallydirect the sensor, the odds that his need toobtain one of the very few images capturedduring a pass will rise to the top of the queueseem very low, considering the numerous, simultaneoustactical engagements likely to bein progress at the time. The resources are justtoo precious.One could certainly move a family’s householdgoods across the country with a fleet ofFerraris that one had to buy specifically forthat job and then garage them for an indefiniteperiod before the family even had ordersto move. Obviously, however, a number of moreoperationally and fiscally responsible paths tothe desired end state exist. Our goal shouldnot be to go to space just because we can.In conclusion, we must definitely look tospace when it offers the most effective way toaccomplish the mission. Without a doubt, amission requiring global coverage or evenoverflight of denied territory beyond the rangeof airborne or near-space sensors plays to thestrength of space. We could even envision missionsin which receiving information exfiltratedfrom Colonel guerriero’s small covertoperationsteam is important enough towarrant launching an asset costing several tensof millions of dollars. however in the vast majorityof realistic situations, given the existenceof so many more effective ways to support ourtactical warriors during the relatively shorttimescales and across the relatively small areasin which they operate, it appears that promotingthe theory of “space because we can” is anunaffordable, unresponsive, ineffective, andill-advised course of action. qColorado Springs, Colorado

THE MERGE 33Notes1. Lt Col edward b. Tomme, “The myth of the TacticalSatellite,” Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 2 (Summer 2006):89–100, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/sum06/sum06.pdf; and idem, The Strategic Natureof the Tactical Satellite, research Paper 2006-1 (maxwellaFb, aL: airpower research Institute, College of aerospaceDoctrine, research and education, n.d.), https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2006/CaDre/tomme.pdf (accessed 31 January 2007).2. LTC bob guerriero, “Tactical Satellites: The rest ofthe Story,” Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 2 (Summer2007): 28.3. Ibid., 27.4. Lt Col edward b. Tomme, The Paradigm Shift to Effects-Based Space: Near-Space as a Combat Space Effects Enabler, researchPaper 2005-01 (maxwell aFb, aL: airpower researchInstitute, College of aerospace Doctrine, researchand education, n.d.), https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2005/ari/CaDre_arI_2005-01.pdf (accessed17 January 2007).5. Patrick Chisolm, “micro-eyes in Space,” MilitaryGeospatial Technology 4, no. 3 (14 July 2006), http://www.military-geospatial-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1547 (quotation attributed to Peter Wegner, the aFrLresponsive-space lead) (accessed 12 December 2006);maryann Lawlor, “TacSat Delay Ignites Frustration,” SignalConnections 3, no. 9 (15 June 2006), http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIgnaL_article_Template.asp?articleid=1154&zoneid=188 (quotation attributed to PeterWegner) (accessed 2 February 2007); and michael Kleiman,“responsive Space Demonstrator ready to roll,” airForce Print news, 5 november 2006, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123030853 (quotation attributedto neal Peck, TacSat-2 program manager) (accessed 12December 2006).6. aFrL briefing, Dr. David hardy, “TacSat Demo Status:Senior Leader Vector Check,” Washington, DC, 22September 2004; and aFrL briefing, Col rex Kiziah,“Joint Warfighting Space,” Schriever III War game, nellisaFb, nV, 8 February 2005.7. bruce rolfsen, “Satellite in Works to beam battlefieldPictures to Troops,” Air Force Times, 13 november2006, http://www.airforcetimes.com/legacy/new/0-aIrPaPer-2320736.php.8. guerriero, “Tactical Satellites,” 27.More than ever, we depend on our allied Airmen to succeed, and theydepend on us. We must fly and fight as one. We teach, we partner, welearn—and in building friendships, we build trust. America’s securitytoday and in the future depends on building successful internationalpartnerships, one Airman at a time.—hon. michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the air Force

The Inadvisability of PosthumouslyPromoting Billy MitchellCol PhilliP S. Meilinger, USAF, retired*Itend to agree with Lt Col William J.ott’s argument in a previous issue of thisjournal regarding the inadvisability ofposthumously promoting Billy Mitchell(“Maj gen William ‘Billy’ Mitchell: a PyrrhicPromotion,” Winter 2006). Here’s my ownread on the matter.Yes, Billy Mitchell was a great airman—avisionary who saw a future for airpower thatfar transcended its use as a mere adjunct tosurface forces. In the current era of “militarytransformation,” those in uniform, of all ranks,are encouraged to “think outside the box”—not simply to devise improved methods of doingold things better and more effectively, butto imagine totally new methods, doctrines,and concepts of fighting and winning wars.Mitchell’s belief in airpower’s ability to transformwar was perhaps his greatest achievement.He passionately believed that airpoweroffered a new way to fight. Having seen thetrench carnage of World War I, he looked fora better way. Strategic airpower offered a totallydifferent path to victory. though Mitchell’s visionwas imprecise—often the case with prophets—his fundamental understanding of airpower’stransformational possibilities, as well as hisability to inspire a host of other airmen toshare that vision, marks him as a seminal andheroic thinker.Billy Mitchell was indeed a great airman.But should we promote him now, so manyyears after his death? In my view, only two reasonsjustify contemplating such a move: (1)because of continuing service to his countryand significant achievements not previouslyrecognized, or (2) because of a need to redressgross and obvious injustice.this sort of rationale has previously playeda part in promoting men long after they leftthe service. For example, in 1985 Jimmy doolittleand Ira eaker became full generals 40years after their retirement. not only had theyperformed magnificently in World War II, forwhich they were justly rewarded with threestarrank, but they had also continued toserve their country afterwards by becomingspokesmen for airpower—by serving on variouscommissions and panels, working in the airand space industry to advance the technicalboundaries of those mediums, and displayinga seemingly never-ending willingness to talk tomen and women of all ranks regarding thewonders of the air. as a junior air Force officer,I heard both men speak and found theminspirational.on the other hand, we must balance suchcriteria against the possible negative effectsfelt by others in uniform. In the case of the twomen noted above, I heard two other seniorairmen—both full generals long retired—expressdismay at the promotions of their oldcolleagues. they were not being petty but simplystating what seemed to them a simple fact:doolittle and eaker had retired at an early ageto enter business and earn substantially moremoney than they ever could have made in uniform.that was their reward. to promote themretroactively would slight the toil of all thepeople who stuck with their service duringlean times in the aftermath of war.It is useful to remember here that the militaryhas always taken the position that it doesnot consider promotion a reward for past actions—that’swhat medals and decorations arefor—but as a sign of the promise and poten­*the author is retired from northrop grumman and living in West Chicago, Illinois.34

THE MERGE 35tial that an individual possesses for futuretasks. In the case of Billy Mitchell, he contributedrelatively little after leaving the air Corpsin 1926. He lived for another decade, but intruth, he became largely a forgotten figure,seldom called upon by his country or his service.His one book, Skyways: A Book on ModernAeronautics, merely rehashed old ideas previouslypublished.as for the case of using a delayed promotionto right an obvious injustice, we must becareful. did the military or its justice systemtruly abuse the individual, or is the proposedpromotion merely an attempt to soften a decisionin today’s kinder and gentler world? Ifthe latter, then the concern is misplaced. themilitary justice system, with its necessary emphasison duty and responsibility, must be upheld.In the military, whose members’ livesdepend upon the decisions made by a commander,it is most unwise to undermine orsoften a system in which the consequences offailure are so high. the buck really does stophere for the military commander.In the case of Billy Mitchell, we must ask ifhis court-martial in 1925 for insubordinationwas an unjust act. no credible evidence supportsthat conclusion. Mitchell did in fact accuse hissuperiors in the army as well as senior admiralsin the navy of “incompetency, criminalnegligence and almost treasonable administrationof the national defense”—very harshwords for a group of men who had servedtheir country for decades and who had seencombat themselves, on several occasions. 1 athis court-martial, Mitchell’s attorney statedthat every american had a constitutional rightto express his or her opinion. this is pure rubbish.Military officers must abide by differentrules; they must follow orders and exerciseself-discipline. as for his charges of incompetenceand malfeasance within the service hierarchiesregarding the state of aviation at thetime, the truth tends to remain largely in theeye of the beholder. all of the branches complainedof fiscal strictures, and all feared thatthey did not have the resources to do theirjobs adequately.regardless, after reading through the transcriptof the court-martial, one must concludethat Mitchell quite simply did not know whathe was talking about regarding the status ofnaval aviation—and recall that his chargeswere made as a specific result of the crash ofthe US navy dirigible Shenandoah—or eventhat of his own service. Indeed, his performanceon the stand was an embarrassment.the court, composed of 10 general officers,found him guilty, and his punishment—suspensionfrom rank and duty for five years andforfeiture of all pay and allowances duringthat time—was reasonable. the prosecutorhad called for dismissal from the army andhinted at prison time. Instead the courthanded down a lenient sentence, taking intoconsideration Mitchell’s combat record in thewar. Pres. Calvin Coolidge lightened the sentenceeven further, granting him half pay forthose five years. But Mitchell elected to resign.after the air Force became independent in1947, it attempted to reopen the court-martial,hoping to reverse its findings. after review,however, service leaders concluded that Mitchellwas indeed guilty as charged.then there is the matter of Mitchell’s privatelife. Forget that he virtually deserted thechildren of his first marriage, philandered,and had drinking problems. the recent revelation—discoveredin dusty inspector-generalfiles long forgotten and brought to light bydouglas Waller in A Question of Loyalty, his biographyof Mitchell—of a domestic incidentbetween Mitchell and his first wife staggersthe imagination. the file tells of military policearriving at the Mitchell quarters after Mrs.Mitchell had suffered a gunshot wound in thechest during an altercation with her husband.She claimed that he shot her in a drunkenrage; he claimed that she shot herself in adrunken stupor. no one witnessed the event.Fortunately, the wound was not serious, butthey divorced soon after. even in a modern agethat tends to overlook personal immorality aslong as it doesn’t affect job performance, thisbehavior is a bit much. Is this the role modelwe wish to honor?In sum, Billy Mitchell was a great airmanwho served his country well in war and peace.He was rewarded for that service—in 1941Congress even struck a special gold medal in

36 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007his honor. But Mitchell also had deep flawsthat affected his performance as an officer, acommander, and a man. We must not forgetthis fact when we consider the issue of promotionso long after his death. qNote1. “Statement of William Mitchell Concerning the recentair accidents” (statement to the press, San antonio,tX, 5 September 1925), 1, http://www.afa.org/magazine/july2006/keep_billy.pdf.West Chicago, Illinois

38 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007and shaping of the organization’s constitution.this commitment tooled and geared theunit into motion, driving it to many victories.for example, our unit climate­assessmentgrade of 100 percent indicated that our teamworkhad reached an all­time high; furthermore,squadron leadership received a gradeof 99 percent. Ultimately, because of the frcleadership approach and unit commitment,we earned a “fully compliant” rating duringthe command’s unit­compliance inspection.commanders must have the competenceto lead their organizations. as a contractingsquadroncommander, i needed to understandevery aspect of the mission for our unit—unique in that it supported the air force’slargest f­16cJ fighter base and a numberedair­forceheadquarters directly involved inconducting wartime operations in southwestasia. i had to comprehend completely the nuancesof the wing’s and numbered air force’smission and vision as they pertained to itemsas small as a $20 commodity or as large as a$20 million communications system. transformingour business doctrine didn’t requirea great deal of thought, but tapping underutilizedresources to streamline processes presenteda substantial challenge. the expansionof our client base, realignment of flights, andinnovative focus on individual goals set unprecedentedbenchmarks. the squadron recordedthe highest dollar­obligation rates ever,climbing from number eight to number twoin the command within 12 months.My mentors and technical training preparedme well. people within my career field mustbe careful to avoid limiting their role and focusonly to executing the contract action. as acontracting professional, i underwent manyyears of training to do just that. however, iconfronted the task of finding the mechanismto implant leadership empowerment, professionaland personal trust, and sound decisionmaking at all levels. fortunately, i discoveredthat mechanism—the frc approach—andused it to lead and instill confidence.Leading from the Front:Be Willing to Take the Hits and Pass the Glorya commander has ultimateresponsibility forthe success of his or herunit. success means fulfillingthe mission insuch a way that membersof the unit derive asense of satisfaction fromhaving done so. thus,success for the squadrondepends wholly onall members’ daily actionsand interactionswith each other, in the unit, and outside theunit with customers, other base organizations,contractors, and senior leadership. how weact and interact with others directly affects ourperformance results, ability to accomplish themission, and capacity to gain satisfaction fromour work—ultimately, it determines the successof an organization. the following two sectionsoffer examples of how i implementedthe frc leadership style, using excerpts frommy annual letter to squadron members to remindthem that accomplishment, from top tobottom, requires a team effort.Leading from the Rear:Push Hard and Uplifti owe it to each ofyou to make sure wedo the right things sothat, collectively, we canachieve excellence inall we do. therefore, imust ensure• that you have every opportunity to enhanceyour professional developmentthrough attendance at formal trainingcourses, a robust on­the­job training program,job rotation, and full support ofthose activities that will maximize promotionpotential;

PIREP 39• that appraisals and performance reportsare completed on time, accurately and fullyreflecting work performed and resultsachieved during the rating period; and• that various team­building actions andaccomplishments maximize our ability towork together and with personnel outsidethe squadron.success is certainly nothing new to you. iintend to do everything i can to enhance youropportunities for even greater levels of successso that you perform the mission well andgain a real sense of satisfaction in the process.Executing our daily activities using core valuesas guidance puts us on the right path to reachingthis goal.Integrity FirstLeading from the Center: Become the Corethe Us air force’s core values—integrityfirst, service beforeself, and excellence in allwe do—provide the properguidance on how we shouldact and interact with others.they establish the appropriatestandards for success, deviationfrom which will surely resultin failure. the followingdiscussion focuses on my visionof how these core valuesrelate to everyday activities—my expectations and, just asimportantly, your expectationsof me—as we strive together toachieve success as a squadron.this core value, the basis for trust, connotes thewillingness to do what is right. it embodies theindispensable traits of courage, honesty, responsibility,accountability, justice, openness,self­respect, and humility. We should establishintegrity as the foundation of all our actionsand interactions. some important ways inwhich integrity ensures our success includecommitment, communication, and equal opportunityand treatment.Commitment. a commitment involves apromise to perform an act, often by a specifiedtime. We must be careful to make onlythose commitments we feel confident that wecan keep—and then we must dutifully fulfillthem. i understand that on occasion we maycome to realize that we cannot fulfill a commitmentwe have made in good faith; if thissituation arises, we must immediately communicatethis fact to all involved parties and cometo a mutual agreement on how best to resolvethe situation. We must remain responsible andaccountable. Unfulfilled commitments resultin distrust and undermine good working relationships.don’t underestimate the beneficialeffect of successfully keeping even the smallestof commitments.Communication. Open, honest, and clearcommunication is not only integral to makingand keeping commitments but also absolutelyessential to developing, maintaining, and enhancingour professional relationships. We relyon communication to establish expectations,provide status reports on our progress towardsmeeting those expectations, and then indicatewhen we believe we have met them. if expectationsare unclear, we need to ask for clarification.Effective communication results from clearlyconveying a message and ensuring that the recipientcompletely understands it. We have anobligation to our senior leadership, customers,and contractors to keep them informed, as wellas to ourselves to keep each other informed.and i have an obligation to you to listen andrespond to your concerns and suggestions. forthis reason, i maintain an open­door policyand strongly encourage you to talk with me atany time. if we can solve a problem or enhanceour working processes or environment, let usdo it—and let us do it now! Effective communicationenables us to learn from our mistakes,develop both professionally and personally,and avoid problems in the future. it also allowsus to tell our story so that others can understandour challenges and learn of our accomplishments.in short, communication is thelifeblood necessary for success.

40 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007Equal Opportunity and Treatment. i am anaggressive and obsessive advocate of providingequal opportunity to all of you and treating youfairly and consistently—and i expect you to dothe same. i will not tolerate discrimination orsexual harassment, and neither should you.Evidence of such behavior should be broughtto my attention immediately; tolerating suchbehavior will undermine good order and disciplineas well as impede our path to success.Service before Selfthis core value tells us that professional dutiestake precedence over personal desires. it encompassesthe concepts of rule following, respectfor others, discipline and self­control,and faith in the system. it also embodies theimportance of teamwork. No member of thissquadron is more important than any other,and no individual member can do everythingnecessary to ensure the unit’s success. if we donot internally work together as a team and externallypartner with senior leadership, customers,and contractors, we will not fulfill themission and we will not succeed. teamworkrequires honoring our commitments, effectivelycommunicating, and treating every person aswe would want to be treated. in addition, itmeans looking out for each other to ensureour personal safety and the security of ourwork environment, caring for our families andinvolving them in squadron activities, andproperly sponsoring new unit members andmeeting their needs. teamwork also meansstepping up to the challenge and filling inwhen we have absences due to illness, leave,temporary duty, or the performance of additionalduty.Excellence in All We DoExcellence directs us to develop a sustainedpassion for continuous improvement and innovationthat will propel us into a long­term,upward spiral of performance and accomplishment.to achieve the highest levels of excellence,performance, and accomplishment,we must do the following:• Maintain professional conduct and bearingin all of our daily activities.• sustain and enhance our customer focus,always remembering that we are a serviceorganization. Without our customers,the products and services we providewould become irrelevant. however, wemust balance our customer­oriented approachwith our responsibility to do thejob “right” by being good stewards of taxpayers’dollars and by following all applicablepolicies, regulations, and statutes.• take care of our physical and mentalwell­being by adopting a wellness lifestyle.therefore, i encourage you to participatein physical­fitness activities.• shun drug or alcohol abuse and ensurethat we provide appropriate assistanceand support to those who need help inthis area.• When possible, maintain and upgradeour working environment. We shouldtake pride in our facility’s appearance.• continue the formal and informal processesof planning and evaluating toidentify those areas in which we can improve,take the steps necessary to implementsuch improvement, and then measurethe results to guarantee that it has infact occurred.Conclusionas outlined above, i try to validate the frcapproach to leadership by strongly emphasizingour core values in order to gauge squadroncohesion and success. in a recent letter toairmen, secretary of the air force MichaelWynne and chief of staff Gen t. MichaelMoseley stated,as we remember, we must also reaffirm our commitmentto our core values—integrity first,service Before self, and Excellence in all Wedo—which are the bedrock upon which we operateand build our future. We must also resolveto reinvigorate our air, space and cyberspace

PIREP 41capabilities. so even while we’re engaged in thecurrent long War, we’re transforming ourselvesinto an information age force that will be able todominate across our domains and have dislocatingeffects at all levels of war in this relativelynew century. We’re building on our history andsoaring toward our horizon. 1as leaders, we must respond to this call to actionby sowing and cultivating the air force’sstrategic goals. that will require fortitude andimplementation of the frc concept as wetransform our organizations, thus ingrainingmission fulfillment and producing amazingresults.as commanders push the limits, we needperspective and advice from the people welead. i have learned that the frc­leadershipskill set must remain congruent with—as wellas capitalize and build upon—the leader’sown strengths and talents. Many issues commonlyaddressed as leadership, learning, ortransformational challenges are really an inevitablepart of commanding. indeed, in today’sair force, without experience in managingdifficult situations, no one can sustaineffectiveness for very long. the frc style ofleadership development emphasizes the relationshipbetween a leader and the people whomhe or she leads. is the follow­me leadershipmodel appropriate at times? Or is the giveand­take,person­centered model preferable?Well, it depends—on whether members of theorganization are committed and willing to followtheir leader. i found that my frc leadershipapproach, fused with the air force’s corevalues, proved quite effective because it createdan environment of collaborative assistancecapable of solving problems and encouragingdevelopment. it thus guaranteed success forindividuals, the organization, and leadership.for me, frocking held the key to leading andtransforming the squadron, executing its assignedtasks, and honoring the people andtheir families who unselfishly make sacrificesto fulfill our air force’s mission. qNote1. secretary of the air force Michael W. Wynne andchief of staff of the air force Gen t. Michael Moseley,“sEcaf/csaf letter to airmen: air force heritage,” 5October 2006, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/jvp.asp?id=274.I’m firmly convinced that leaders are not born; they’re educated,trained, and made, as in every other profession. To ensure a strong,ready Air Force, we must always remain dedicated to this process.—Gen curtis E. leMay, Usaf chief of staff, 1961–65

APJInventory Management of Officers withAdvanced Academic DegreesThe Case for a New ApproachLt CoL Raymond W. StaatS, Phd, USaFLt CoL maRty ReynoLdS, USaFmaj aaRon d. tRoxeLL, USaFEditorial Abstract: Every year the Air Force fills numerous graduate-level education positionsusing a decades-old system that seeks to project graduate-education requirements against upcomingadvanced academic degree (AAD) billets. The authors propose replacing this requirementsbasedsystem with a new model that considers Total Force development and capabilites-basedplanning. They assert that their model will ultimately demonstrate lifelong educational developmentfor individuals and strategic improvement for the Air Force.Each yEar hundrEds of militaryofficers receive advanced academicdegrees (aad), sponsored and fundedby the air Force. Because graduateeducation is costly in terms of both fundingand man-hours, we must take care to ensurethe relevance of these degrees to each officer’sprofessional development. however, the existingsystem that we use to select officers forgraduate education does not meet this intent.The Graduate Education Management system(GEMs), the current “bottom-up” billetbasedrequirements process, focuses on resourcemanagement and utilization rather than42

INVENTORY MANAGEMENT OF OFFICERS 43on education, professional development of officers,and health of the career field. 1 succinctlyput, the GEMs does not employ a strategicvision to ensure that the graduate educationof officers provides an appropriate set ofwar-fighting capabilities. rather, the system isprimarily designed to project and fill aadcodedbillets with officers possessing the specifieddegree and to provide an auditable trackingsystem for utilizing these officers. Thisarticle demonstrates the incompatibility of suchan approach with the concepts of Total Forcedevelopment as well as capabilities-based planningand proposes an alternative—the advancedacademic degree Inventory Management(aadIM) model.Background and IssuesThe GEMs generates unit-level aad requirements,validates and certifies billets, and projectsvacancies annually, doing so at the lowestlevel, where it is ostensibly easiest to identifythe need for aad education. The validatedlist then goes to the air Force’s career-fieldmonitors, responsible for reviewing, certifying,and prioritizing their functional area’s list ofaad billets. They act as points of contact fororganizational and unit functional managersas well as for the air Force Education requirementsBoard, which approves educationalquotas within available funding levels andplaces the remaining requirements on a prioritizedalternate list. The air Force Personnelcenter advertises the available aad opportunitiesand matches approved officers with agraduate-degree program. selected personnelattend the air Force Institute of Technology(aFIT) or other graduate institutions to obtainan aad with a follow-on assignment dictatedby the educational discipline. Officers serve asubsequent three-year payback tour in a validatedaad-coded billet, concurrent with a mandatoryactive duty service commitment. 2 The airForce intended that the GEMs fulfill the departmentof defense’s (dOd) requirement offully accounting for the utilization of graduateeducationresources; this system, along with astringent validation process, serves as the foundationof the system’s billet-based approach. 3however, in 1992 an audit by the air Forceaudit agency found that officers were servingin aad-coded follow-on assignments an averageof one and one-quarter years versus themandatory three years, and that aad-codedposition incumbency rates were only 40–50percent. 4 The audit apparently did not considerthe fact that officers found themselves ata competitive disadvantage by having to forgocareer progression and broadening opportunitiesto remain in an aad-coded billet forthree years. such a career risk has acted as adisincentive for officers to pursue fully fundedgraduate education. Local commanders clearlyunderstood this problem and compensated byreassigning officers at the expense of leavingthe aad billet vacant until the projected arrivalof the next aad officer. To address thissystemic problem, the report made the stunningrecommendation of cutting the numberof graduate students by 58 percent for fiscalyears 1995–98. 5 although in line with resourceutilization, this recommendation does not acknowledgean important aspect of an aad—professional development and career-fieldhealth. Today the unchanged GEMs remainsthe primary process for managing professionalgraduate education. In fact, the Reporton Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT): Studyfor Senate and House Armed Services Committees,submitted as required by the national defenseauthorization act of 2001, recommendedcontinuing the present system to manage advancededucation. 6In november 2002, a “chief’s sight Picture”called for taking officer development in a newdirection, both educationally and professionally.7 although initiatives for Total Force developmentnow address assignments, placementin professional military education, andselection of squadron commanders, it still doesnot cover the critical aspects of professionaldevelopment related to obtaining specializedgraduate education.The GEMs does not include any considerationof long-term requirements or the aggregateeducational health of various air Forcespecialty codes (aFsc). Lt col raymond staats

44 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007and Maj derek abeyta provide a case studywith respect to the space-and-missile careerfield, finding that, over the last 10 years, GEMsprocesses have significantly contributed to thenear-extinction of space-related aad billets,as well as graduate-level space educationwithin the air Force officer corps. 8 The spacecommission made clear in its final report thatit considered this an unacceptable situation. 9The introduction and formulation of TotalForce development have restructured how theair Force conducts education, training, andassignment processes. air Force Instruction(aFI) 36-2640, Total Force Development (ActiveDuty Officer), introduced the concept of developmentteams (dT), whereby each functionalcareer field manages and oversees the professionaldevelopment of officers, including education,by “providing input into the [developmentaleducation] selection process.” 10 TheGEMs has neither incorporated dTs into theaad process nor linked a coherent strategy toaad selection, career-field health, or professionaldevelopment. Instead it remains focusedon resource management and utilization,bottom-up requirements, and near-termplanning by exception. The inherent weaknessesof GEMs processes in the areas of professionaldevelopment, career-field educationalhealth, the role of dTs in professional education,and strategic planning point to the needfor a new approach—as embodied by theaadIM model.Education as aStrategic Capabilitydeveloping officers with enduring competenciesis the key to a strong, responsive, andskilled military force. similar to offering combatantcommanders a range of effects-basedcapabilities, having educated officers capitalizeson our most flexible, adaptive, and importantcapability—airmen. Education is an integralpart of officer development and an indispensableingredient in initiatives concerning TotalForce development. In their recent letter toall united states air Force officers, secretaryof the air Force Michael Wynne and chiefof staff of the air Force Gen T. MichaelMoseley stated, “In a smaller, leaner and moreexpeditionary-focused air Force, it is essentialthat our airmen have the knowledge andcompetency to accomplish our mission,” emphasizingthat “one of the most effective waysto develop this knowledge is through advancededucation.” 11 as the world becomes morecomplex, globally interconnected, and dependenton rapidly changing technology, not onlymust our officers possess advanced educationbut also each career field must have the correctmix of aads so that commanders havethe right personnel for the right situation.analysis of current aad compositions showsthat many career fields have officers with aninappropriate range of aad capabilities. Forexample, although 99 percent of lieutenantcolonels in the space-and-missile career field(aFsc 13s) have aads, only 13 percent ofthem are considered technical degrees. 12 assuch, the 13s career field lacks critical competencies,thereby necessarily limiting a combatantcommander’s range of space-and-missilerelatedcapabilities.The importance of aads is not unique to themilitary. a recent Internet-based survey of Fortune500 government-contractor firms foundthat 83 percent of senior managers have aads(fig. 1). 13 More importantly, the mix of degreeswithin these organizations shows a deliberateselection and development process focusedon both management and technicalcompetence, designed to complement eachcompany’s vital needs. Twenty-eight percentof these executives have technical degrees,and the range of degrees reflects long-termplanning to acquire educational expertise.not only are advanced educational profilesfor many air Force career fields significantlyout of balance, but also no mechanism currentlyexists to correct this problem. It is importantto note that the air Force cannot directlyhire senior leadership, as can thecorporate arena. We must develop and educatemilitary leadership from within the existingpersonnel pool—a career-length endeavorthat demands strategic foresight and longrangeplanning.

INVENTORY MANAGEMENT OF OFFICERS 45MBA26%Management7%Accounting5%No AAD17%OtherNontechnical6%OtherTechnical5%Law11% Engineering23%TechnicalNontechnicalFigure 1. Fortune 500 government-contractoradvanced-education profile for senior executivesThe GEMs makes the fatal mistake of assumingthe feasibility of aggregating a TotalForce strategy from disjointed field-level inputs.For example, within the current GEMsconstruct, only 2 percent of 13s career-fieldbillets are marked as validated positions re-quiring technical education. 14 The aadIMmodel, in contrast, offers a capabilities-basedstrategic approach that can implement initiativesand direction for Total Force development.The Advanced Academic Degree Inventory Management ConstructaadIM seeks to give career fields a flexibleand responsive approach to overseeing professionaldevelopment and educational healththrough “top-down” aad management. It emphasizesselection and career-field managementrather than tracking and resource utilization.a capability (inventory)-based system,aadIM focuses on deliberate strategic requirementsinstead of narrowly and often arbitrarilyselected billets.The force-development management structureestablished by aFI 36-2640 encompassesall of the organizations vital to the aadIM approach(fig. 2). By expanding its oversight intoaads, the Force development council (Fdc)can establish an aad Total Force strategy asForceDevelopmentOfficeSecretary of the Air Force /Chief of Staff of the Air ForceForce Development CouncilFunctional AuthorityFunctional ManagerAdvisoryCouncilForceDevelopmentSupportOfficeCareer-Field ManagerDevelopment TeamAssignment TeamIndividual /Chain of SupervisionMajor CommandForward Operating AgencyDirect Reporting UnitKeyAs RequiredStandingFigure 2. Force-development management structure. (Adapted from AFI 36-2640, Total Force Development[Active Duty Officer], vol. 1, 23 January 2004, 22, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-2640v1/afi36-2640v1.pdf.)

46 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007well as create overarching guidance for graduateeducation, thus integrating these concernswith all other force-development issues. dTsalready have responsibility for reviewing thehealth and diversity of the force and for ensuringthe consideration of functional and operationalperspectives. advanced education is anatural fit. Within the aadIM construct, theFdc develops aad aggregation requirements,communicates the value of graduate educationas both enabler and capability for eachtask force’s concept of operations (cOnOPs),articulates aad requirements within the airForce cOnOPs, identifies future needs foradvanced education, and integrates advancededucation into the capabilities review andrisk assessment process. This guidance thenflows to each dT for incorporation into planningand guidance specific to each careerfield. This top-down approach to aad managementuses the Fdc’s coherent Total Forcestrategy to thoughtfully manage the overallhealth and professional development of careerfields.aadIM gives air Force leadership an avenueto inject future needs quickly. Instead ofwaiting for unit-level requests to surface throughthe GEMs, aadIM starts with the Fdc’s visionto establish cutting-edge requirements and selectionguidance. For example, as new cyberwarfaretactics, techniques, and proceduresemerge, combatant commanders must currentlydraw from existing personnel pools for thenecessary capabilities to fight the latest cyberthreats. however, the GEMs sets educationalquotas for a new aad requirement only if aunit-level organization begins the process bysubmitting an updated request. In most cases,this new strategic need will not materializefrom the unit level. using aadIM, the Fdcwould set the strategic requirement for cyberwarfareofficers. Without this oversight andsenior-level input, the new requirement wouldtake excessive time to implement.as the air Force’s transformation effortscontinue, aad officer capabilities should becomebetter integrated into the cOnOPs andcapabilities review and risk assessment processes.Whether on a rapidly changing battlefieldor during the life cycle of a critical acquisitionprogram, a correctly educated officercorps greatly enhances prospects for success.In their remarks to the defense subcommitteehearing on the air Force budget for fiscalyear 2005, former secretary of the air ForceJames roche and former chief of staff of theair Force Gen John Jumper noted that “the[six] cOnOPs [that support capabilitiesbasedplanning and the joint vision of combatoperations] help analyze the span of jointtasks we may be asked to perform and definethe effects we can produce. Most important,they help us identify the capabilities an expeditionaryforce will need to accomplish its mission,creating a framework that enables us toshape our portfolio.” 15 We must also considerthe relevant portfolio of aad education to ensurethat the knowledge base exists to executethese tasks successfully.For example, a cursory evaluation of thetypes of aads necessary to support the globalmobilitycOnOPs forms the basis for determiningan appropriate forcewide mix of officeraads (fig. 3). When expanded to all cOnOPs,aads become an enabling capability that enhancesour war-fighting ability as well as improvesthe planning, programming, budgeting,requirements, and acquisition processes. Thistop-level strategic vision then flows to the dTs,which ascertain each career field’s contribution.recall that, for each functional career field,dTs manage and oversee officers’ professionaldevelopment, including education. dTs—centralizedteams with representatives from across section of the air Force who help manageboth the career field they represent andOperations Research(Resource Allocation)Foreign Affairs(Overflight)Aero Engineering(Aircraft Requirements)Economics(Budget)GlobalMobilityCONOPSCivil Engineering(Fuel Containers)Political Science(Forward Locations)Communications(Command/Control)Figure 3. Notional AADs required within theglobal-mobility CONOPS

INVENTORY MANAGEMENT OF OFFICERS 47the development of individual officers—serveas the primary advocates for future assignmentsand career progression. Instead of relyingstrictly on unit requirements to drive aadselection, aadIM leverages dT functionalityby incorporating the Fdc’s Total Force strategy,officer preferences, existing health of the careerfield, and unit-level requirements to provideboth individual aad and career-field educationvectors. already involved with officerassignment and matching of professional militaryeducation, dTs would extend their advocacyand guidance to aad selection. Throughthe dTs, aadIM provides specific planning tofulfill the Fdc’s Total Force aad strategy. ThedTs are uniquely positioned to analyze desiredaad capabilities, career-field needs, andcurrent personnel inventories for the purposeof generating actionable goals. using an endstatetarget, dTs can vector suitable officers toobtain aads in a manner that simultaneouslymeets the career field’s goals and enhances officers’professional development.Within aadIM, career-field-specific “idealaad profiles” (fig. 4)—developed, reviewed,and updated by each dT—express these endstategoals. a time-phased, cumulative-growthfunction, each ideal profile shows the percentageof officers that should possess an aad.One can decompose the aggregate profile toNotiona l Cum ula tive Te chnica l AAD Inve ntory Le ve lsNotional Cumulative, Technical AAD Inventory Levels1009080Percentage e of o Off f O fficers706050403020100S&ERated1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20Commissioned Years of ServiceFigure 4. Notional ideal educational profile for science and engineering (S&E) officers and ratedofficers

48 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007show the force percentages desired for eachacademic discipline. Each career field’s idealprofile reflects the specific needs as reconciledbetween Fdc strategy and unit-level requirements.using Fdc’s Total Force strategy,dTs can create and review specialized idealprofiles that include a great deal of unique informationabout their career field.This inventory approach focuses on determiningwhat a healthy officer inventory lookslike and what capability-based manpower requirementswe need for this career field. Bystarting with strategic vision, dTs can identifyappropriate degree mixes, suggest educationalreleaserates, generate a long-range careerfieldvision, and inculcate educational expectationsfor the officer corps.note that educational profiles will not—indeed,should not—remain the same across thevarious career fields. For example, s&E officerstypically require advanced degrees earlyduring career progression—reflected in thenotional profile for technical degrees (see fig.4). This situation contrasts the profile of ratedofficers, whose early career expectations focuson operational duty. In this case, advancededucation tends to defer more towards themidcareer point and consists of a broaderrange of both technical and nontechnical degrees.such an educational profile, also notionallyshown for the technical subset of degreesin figure 4, therefore assumes a differentshape than that of s&E officers.The foregoing profiles are not contradictory.They both reflect respective career-field imperativesand contribute to the Total Force strategydefined by the Fdc; that is, such educationalprofiles document each dT’s deliberate planningfor aad education. note that aadIMdoes not focus exclusively on fully fundedaads. In fact, fiscal constraints will nearly alwaysprevent adequate funding for meetingdesired educational end states through residenteducation.Ideal profiles encompass the total numberof aads received by the officer corps, irrespectiveof the educational method. Personnel mayobtain these degrees through resident programs,internships, tuition assistance, distancelearning, or as part of developmental education.Particularly for technical career fields,education opportunities at aFIT (in residence),the aFIT civilian Institution, and the navalPostgraduate school are highly valued. careerfieldcOnOPs and career-development guides,such as those published for scientists and engineers,should emphasize career-field-relatedadvanced education, with the caveat that theseresident-education options are limited, givenfiscal and operational constraints. 16 naturally,officers want to qualify for and apply for suchprograms, especially given the secretary andchief of staff of the air Force’s renewed emphasison education by linking advanced degreesand the promotion process. 17 This isclearly a “win-win” philosophy for professionalofficers and air Force strategy alike.For officers not selected for resident education,whether by virtue of competition, availability,or academic qualification, the aadIMconstruct provides a method for the dTs toprovide vectors towards alternative degreesand educational modes suitable for each officer’sprofessional circumstance. These vectorswould remain consistent with overall careerfieldend-state goals as documented in the respectiveideal educational profile. The currentsystem completely lacks such guidance andstrategic forethought. The Officer developmentPlan (OdP) provides the essential bridge betweeneach officer’s preferences and the dT.This approach is not limited to individualvectors only. One strength of an inventorymanagementmethodology lies with career-fieldvectors, broadcast via the air Force Portal orpublished in updates to career-developmentguides. In cases in which fully funded aadscannot remedy a specific degree shortage,dTs can provide career-field vectors recommendingfields of study for their officers toconsider, based on capabilities assessmentsand the Fdc’s Total Force strategy.These career-field vectors serve as the basisof managing long-term educational health.recently completed aadIM studies examinethe development of user-friendly MicrosoftExcel–based tools to create ideal profiles,forecast future inventories, and propose appropriateeducation quotas for advanced education,both fully funded and otherwise. 18

INVENTORY MANAGEMENT OF OFFICERS 49drawing on current personnel data takenfrom the Military Personnel data system andaadIM-model forecasts, aadIM provides alist of actionable recommendations to improveshortages and manage the mix of aadsbased on a dT’s implementation policies,such as planning-time horizon and maximumeducational-release rates.Take for example a sample aadIM analysisof aads for an arbitrarily selected career field(figs. 5 and 6). Figure 5 compares the idealprofile to officer aad data drawn from theMilitary Personnel data system. The exampledepicts a relatively “healthy” current educationalstatus, in that the aggregate number ofeducated officers approaches the desired levels.however, further analysis reveals a potentialfuture concern: education for officers in thefirst three groups lies below expectations, anddisproportionately large numbers of educatedofficers are nearing retirement eligibility. Figure6 depicts aadIM spreadsheet modelingof the capability to calculate and propose futureeducation quotas, given any desired “getwell”time horizon (e.g., eight, nine, or 10years), to achieve a career-field education statusthat mirrors the ideal profile. 19 The modelalso partitions the recommended quotas bycareer phase point (not shown in fig. 6).When fully funded education is not feasible,dTs can use the foregoing analyses for bothcareer-field and individual aad vectors to correctshortages and achieve the desired mix ofdegrees. But this powerful analysis tool doesnot currently exist. however, the medium forsuch feedback already exists via the OdP, oncewe add fields applicable to educational preferences,qualifications, and vectors to this tool.RecommendationsThe following proposals will move us towardsintegrating advanced education into TotalForce development.25Percentage of Officers2015105ActualIdeal01 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17Commissioned Years of ServiceFigure 5. Sample snapshot of AADIM waterfall “educational health.” (Reprinted from Maj George M.Reynolds and Maj Aaron D. Troxell, Inventory Management of Advanced Academic Degree Officers: Advocacyand Spreadsheet Modeling, Graduate Research Project [Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Departmentof Operational Sciences, Air Force Institute of Technology, May 2006], appendix B.)

50 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007Number of OfficersTotal Yearly Graduate Education Requirements for 13s Career Field605550Eight-Year45 Option4035Nine-Year30Option25201510-Year10 Option05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12Fiscal YearFigure 6. Sample AADIM annual quota recommendation. (Reprinted from Capt Andrew D. Jastrzembskiand Lt Col Raymond W. Staats, “Inventory Management for Air Force Advanced Academic Degree Officers”[briefing charts presented at the 73rd Military Operations Research Society Symposium, West Point,NY, June 2005], 23.)Remove the Graduate Education ManagementSystem from Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2302,Professional Development (AdvancedAcademic Degrees and ProfessionalContinuing Education), 11 July 2001The GEMs does not satisfy the objectives ofTotal Force development initiatives because itdoes not consider long-term career-fieldhealth, makes no provision for including dTsin the selection process, and effectively conductsaad processes as training concernsrather than as professional education. Even asa training and utilization concern, the GEMshas proved less than successful, a fact documentedlong ago by the air Force auditagency. 20 We need an entirely new approach—so much so that revisions to the current instructionare insufficient. such an effort willbe subject to the anchoring effect, described byrobert clemen and Terence reilly as the tendencyto use the status quo as the baseline forplanning decisions, often reverting to this pointrather than pursuing opportunities perceivedas radical departures from established practice. 21attempting to reform the current system isnot enough; it needs to be replaced. To fullyremove the air Force from a failing GEMs, weshould rescind the applicable portions of aFI36-2302 in favor of the aadIM approach.Revise Department of Defense Directive (DODD)1322.10, Policy on Graduate Education forMilitary Officers, 26 August 2004The GEMs draws much of its inspiration fromseveral key paragraphs in dOdd 1322.10,which requires periodic reviews of graduateeducation programs to ensure the funding ofappropriate academic disciplines and properutilization of officers receiving funded education.The mechanism involves identifying, validating,and listing—by billet—those dutiesrequiring advanced education for optimal incumbentperformance and comparing this listbiennially against a list of officers having receivedcorresponding advanced degrees. 22This listing requirement is the basis for theineffective system encompassed by aFI 36-2302.although the aadIM construct can complywith these requirements, they impose a bureaucraticlayer that adds no value, given the strategicoversight inherent via the Fdc and the

INVENTORY MANAGEMENT OF OFFICERS 51dTs. Indeed, these requirements hinder compliancefound elsewhere in dOdd 1322.10, inparticular, paragraph 4.2, which states that“the Military services shall have the authorityto provide graduate education to their militaryofficers in sufficient numbers and disciplinesto accomplish the missions of the Militaryservices.” 23 an examination of current andhistoric aad billet-incumbency rates makes clearthat the GEMs cannot achieve strategic educationalgoals. aadIM implements the spirit ofthis directive as a cOnOPs enabler, with aadsrecognized as an integral military capability. Further,as put forth in the preceding recommendation,such a revision to dOdd 1322.10 removesaadIM from any anchoring to the GEMslegacy. Finally, revision supports current dOdguidance to develop competency-based managementtools for all military education. 24note that although payback is essential as areturn on educational investment, it is alreadyassured by active duty service commitments asrequired under Title 10 US Code, section 2005:“The secretary providing advanced educationassistance to any person, that such person . . .shall agree . . . to serve on active duty for aperiod specified in the agreement.” 25 Personnelmeet this fundamental requirement irrespectiveof whether the GEMs or aadIM serves asthe implementing construct.Implement the AADIM Construct viaIncorporation into AFI 36-2640The Total Force development construct providesan ideal implementation vehicle foraadIM. The Fdc structure established by aFI36-2640 allows treatment of advanced educationas a strategic capability. aadIM fits wellwithin the Fdc construct and enhances existingTotal Force development initiatives throughthe dTs and tools such as the OdP. aadIMalso molds into the current air staff/a1 “continuumof Learning” initiative. 26 aadIM providesfor a standardized approach to graduateeducation across career fields, using dTs asthe focal point and the Fdc as the coordinatingand strategy-setting body.We should create new educational data fieldsfor the OdP that include officers’ desires anddT vectoring for advanced degrees. doing sowill place the appropriate focus on educationfor officers and will support the air Force’s renewedemphasis on graduate-education opportunitiesas a part of career development.as concepts such as specialty-relevant distancelearning develop, reviewers and dTs will havethe means to articulate a broader range of vectoroptions for graduate education.Align Educational Strategies across the Total ForceWe should reexamine unit requirements foradvanced education, currently identified locallyand validated functionally, to align withpolicies for strategic education. Furthermore,we should include education as part of eachofficer’s “menu of competencies,” which recognizesthe inappropriateness of strictly identifyingofficer education by one of more than3,500 academic codes currently found withinthe GEMs. 27 The knowledge and skills acquiredfrom a particular academic degree overlapsubstantially with those for many other degrees.For example, two degrees offered ataFIT—operations research (coded 0yEy) andoperations analysis (coded 0yEa)—are veryclosely related, distinguished only by the degreeof expertise in the general field (in thiscase, operations research demands more theoreticaldepth). however, an 0yEy officer doesnot receive “payback credit” for serving in an0yEa billet, which the current GEMs considersas having a nonqualified incumbent. TheaadIM construct, capable of recognizing requiredduty competencies, alleviates this issue.Conclusionachieving Total Force development’s visionfor graduate education to support cOnOPswith aad capabilities relies on healthy careerfields—not resource utilization and tracking.The aadIM approach represents the rightstep towards formulating a coherent strategyfor the development of graduate education. Itincorporates an Fdc Total Force strategy withthe experiences and guidance of dTs whileplacing selection of personnel for graduateeducation in step with the initiatives of Total

52 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007Force development. The educational healthof career fields and the professional developmentof individuals become primary focusesrather than afterthoughts. aadIM separatesthe idea of selection from tracking and utilization,thereby ensuring that the validation pro-1. air Force Instruction (aFI) 36-2302, Professional Development(Advanced Academic Degrees and Professional ContinuingEducation), 11 July 2001, 3, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-2302/afi36-2302.pdf.2. Ibid., 3–5.3. department of defense directive (dOdd) 1322.10,Policy on Graduate Education for Military Officers, 26 august2004, 8, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/132210_082604/132210p.pdf.4. J. r. crawford, auditor general, Report of Audit, Managementof Education and Training Programs (Project 92051002)(Washington, dc: air Force audit agency, 1992), 1.5. Ibid.6. united states air Force Legislative Liaison, Reporton Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT): Study for Senate andHouse Armed Services Committees (Washington, dc: Officeof the secretary of the air Force, 25 February 2002), 23,http://www.afit-aog.org/reportOverview.html (onlinesource unpaginated).7. Gen John Jumper, “chief’s sight Picture: TotalForce development,” 6 november 2002, 1.8. Lt col raymond W. staats and Maj derek a. abeyta,“Technical Education for air Force space Professionals,”Air and Space Power Journal 19, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 51–60,http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/win05/win05.pdf.9. Report of the Commission to Assess United States NationalSecurity Space Management and Organizations: ExecutiveSummary (Washington, dc: The commission, 11 January2001), 10, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/commission/executive_summary.pdf.10. air Force Instruction (aFI) 36-2640, Total Force Development(Active Duty Officer), vol. 1, 23 January 2004, 9, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-2640v1/afi36-2640v1.pdf.11. “sEcaF/csaF Letter to airmen: advanced Education,”[12 april 2006], Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/jvp.asp?id=230.12. Military Personnel Data System Database Report (randolphaFB, TX: air Force Personnel center, 4 april 2006).13. Briefing to aFIT/cc, Lt col raymond W. staats,“advanced academic degree Inventory Management,”draft, 25 april 2006, 4.14. staats and abeyta, “Technical Education,” 56.15. senate, Defense Subcommittee Hearing on the FY05 AirForce Budget: Testimony of the Honorable James G. Roche, Secrecessdoes not replace smart policy. Viewinggraduate education for what it is meant to be—lifelong education and a strategic capability—highlights the need for a change to the existinginadequate system. qNotestary of the Air Force, and General John P. Jumper, Chief of Staff,U.S. Air Force, 108th cong., 2d sess., 24 March 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2004_hr/040324-roche-jumper.htm.16. see secretary of the air Force/science, Technology,and Engineering directorate (saF/aQr), Concept of Operationsfor Scientists and Engineers (Washington, dc: saF/aQr,september 2001); and idem, Career Development Guide forScientists and Engineers (Washington, dc: saF/aQr, May2003).17. “sEcaF/csaF Letter to airmen.”18. capt andrew d. Jastrzembski, “advanced academicdegree Inventory Management Model” (master’s thesis,air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson aFB,Oh, March 2005), iv; capt andrew d. Jastrzembski and Ltcol raymond W. staats, “Inventory Management for airForce advanced academic degree Officers” (briefingcharts presented at the 73rd Military Operations researchsociety symposium, West Point, ny, June 2005), 8; andMaj George M. reynolds and Maj aaron d. Troxell, InventoryManagement of Advanced Academic Degree Officers: Advocacyand Spreadsheet Modeling, Graduate research Project(Wright-Patterson aFB, Oh: department of Operationalsciences, air Force Institute of Technology, May 2006), iv.19. reynolds and Troxell, Inventory Management, appendixB.20. crawford, Report of Audit, 1.21. robert T. clemen and Terence reilly, MakingHard Decisions with DecisionTools, 2d rev. ed. (Pacific Grove,ca: duxbury, 2001), 314.22. dOdd 1322.10, Policy on Graduate Education, par. 1.23. Ibid., par. 4.2.24. Brig Gen robert r. allardice, aF/a1d, “continuumof Learning Brief” (presented to the air university Learningsymposium, Maxwell aFB, aL, 3–5 May 2006), 5.25. Title 10, United States Code, subtitle a, pt. 3, chap.101, sec. 2005, par. (a)(1), “advanced Education assistance:active duty agreement; reimbursement requirements,”18 March 2004.26. allardice, “continuum of Learning Brief,” 2.27. dr. Bruce Murphy, chief academic officer, air university“air university supply side (continuum of Education)Model Brief” (presented to the air university Learningsymposium, Maxwell aFB, aL, 3–5 May 2006), 4.

DefiningInformationOperationsForcesWhat Do We Need?Maj TiMoThy P. Franz, USaFMaj MaTThew F. DUrkin, USaFMaj PaUl D. williaMS, PhD, USaFMaj richarD a. raineS, PhD, USaF, reTireDlT col roberT F. MillS, PhD, USaF, reTireDEditorial Abstract: For years nationalleadership has called for an informationoperations (IO) career force, but the broadrange of skills required has preventedimplementation. This article analyzescurrent doctrinal definitions to determinethe need for such a force and outlines recommendationsfor network-warfare andinfluence-operations-planner career forcesas well as operational-security Red Teams.It also advocates better integration of IOtheory into the Air Force.In 2001 the Quadrennial Defense ReviewReport mandated that the military treatinformation operations (IO) not merelyas an enabling function but as a “corecapabilit[y] of future forces.” 1 In 2002 the De-fense Planning Guidance, 2004–2009 directedthe development of an “IO Roadmap” thatwould “address the full scope of IO,” includinga “career force.” 2 the following year, thatroad map recommended “establish[ing] an53

54 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007IO career force” and “develop[ing] IO planners.”3 Most recently, the Quadrennial DefenseReview Report of 2006 again highlighted theneed for IO forces. 4 Although the military serviceshave made some progress toward carryingout these directives, they have not yetcome close to fulfilling their intent.Our struggles come as no surprise. theyare due in no small part to our inability to answerthe question, what exactly constitutes an“IO force”? Given the broad definition of IO,it has proven difficult to create a professionalwhose training and education encompass thebroad set of skills required to operate acrossthe full spectrum of IO. having to contendwith so many disparate parts, how can we define—muchless build—such a force? In fact,we cannot. no single “career force” can coverall of IO.Realizing this fact, each military branch hasapproached the problem piecemeal, attackingthose elements of IO most supportive ofits own objectives, missions, and competencies.the Army has defined an IO functional areaand has matured portions of the psychologicaloperations (PSYOP) mission. the navy has focusedmainly on electronic warfare (eW) andnetwork warfare (nW), as has the Air Force.the Air Force recently began to address theidea of an nW force but has yet to define anAir Force specialty (AFS) or organize most effectivelyfor use by combatant commands. 5throughout these efforts, no branch has provideda clear vision for where we want to go ora corporate strategy for how to proceed.this article attempts to answer the question,what is an IO force? and determine thoseelements necessary to fulfill the directives ofthe past six years. In this regard, it analyzes thedoctrinal definition of IO (and its mission areas),examines capabilities that currently conductoperations for these mission areas, and presentsa gap analysis for existing shortfalls. Itconcludes with four recommendations thatcould help fulfill these directives. Althoughthe focus of this article remains on the AirForce (largely by design), its theory, ideas, andrecommendations may prove useful to theother services.Words Are ImportantIn defining operational forces for IO, onefinds it useful to describe IO in operationalterms. As planners and operators, we characterizeoperations using words such as domains,effects, targets, and capabilities. Unfortunately,we find variations in the meanings of thesecommon terms throughout the Departmentof Defense (DOD) (if they are defined at all).For our purposes, this article uses a combinationof definitions adopted by joint doctrineand the Battlespace 21st Century (B21) model. 6Our universe consists of three primary domains:physical (including the terrestrial, atmospheric,marine, space, and electromagnetic[eM] environments as well as the tangiblecomponents contained within them), cognitive(the single and collective consciousnessthat exists in the minds of individuals), 7 andinformation (existing within both the physicaland cognitive domains and hosting the creation,manipulation, storage, and sharing of dataand information). 8An operational domain represents a portionof one or more primary domains chosenfor a specific national or military operation. 9essentially, it is an artificially defined (in thatit is defined by humans), bounded area of theuniverse. For example, the operational domainwithin which the Air Force traditionallyoperates is made up of parts of the physical(atmospheric, space, terrestrial, and the eMenvironments), cognitive (the minds of theparticipants), and information domains (thedata and information associated with the operationsat hand). Another example, pertinentto the discussion that follows, is cyberspace. thecyberspace operational domain is “characterizedby the use of electronics and the electromagneticenvironment to store, modify, andexchange data and information via networkedsystems and associated physical infrastructure.” 10From this definition, we can see that cyberspaceconsists of elements of the physical (thephysical electronic components as well as theeM environment), cognitive (the “mind” ofany automated decision maker), and informationdomains (the data and information confinedwithin its physical architecture).

DEFINING INFORMATION OPERATIONS FORCES 55Within any operational domain, capabilitiesachieve effects against specific targets. Leveragingjoint doctrine, we define a target as “an area,complex, installation, force, equipment, capability,function, or behavior identified for possibleaction to support the commander’s objectives,guidance, and intent.” 11 Using thesame reference, we define an effect as “a changeto a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom”to one or more targets. 12 Finally, we draw uponthe B21 model to define capabilities as “thecombination of military equipment (weaponssystems, tools, software, etc.), personnel, logisticssupport, training, and resources that providethe ability to achieve effects against targetsin one or more domains.” 13having defined some operational terms,we turn to the current doctrinal meaning ofIO, defined by Joint Publication 3-13, InformationOperations, as “the integrated employmentof the core capabilities of electronic warfare,computer network operations, psychologicaloperations, military deception, and operationssecurity, in concert with specified supportingand related capabilities, to influence, disrupt,corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automateddecision making while protecting ourown.” 14 DOD- and service-level doctrines adhereto this definition and further define the“core capabilities” identified therein. 15 Unfortunately,the terms and definitions for thesecapabilities vary somewhat. Further, DOD-,joint-, and service-level doctrines present anumber of additional terms intended to helpfurther characterize IO. the table on the nextpage identifies those that make up a good portionof the entire scope of IO. the sheer numberof disparate terms, however, tends tomuddy the waters rather than bring clarity toan already murky subject.For simplicity’s sake, we confine our analysisto the following terms: EW, CNA/NetA,CND/NetD, PSYOP, MILDEC, and OPSEC (seetable). In doing so, we consider all definitionsof these terms as presented in national-leveldirectives and in joint, Army, navy, and AirForce doctrine. however, we refrain from referringto these terms as capabilities (as doesmost doctrine), contending that they representa combination of capabilities, domains,and effects (as we have defined these termsearlier). Consequently, they are referred tohereafter simply as mission areas.A Review of the Information-Operations Mission Areas:Characteristics, Capabilities,and Career Pathsthe following discussion reviews each missionarea of IO, translates its definitions intooperational terms, and performs a gap analysisof current capabilities and career forces responsiblefor that mission area. It introduceseach mission area by identifying the commoncharacteristics found within DOD-, joint-, andservice-level doctrinal definitions and then usingthese characteristics to restate the missionarea in operational terms. Viewed in this operationalcontext, each analysis concludes byidentifying those capabilities and effects requiredto conduct operations effectively forthe mission area and by evaluating these requirementsagainst existing capabilities. Fororganizational purposes, and in conformancewith AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, we combinethe analysis of CnA/netA and CnD/netD under the heading of nW and the analysisof PSYOP and MILDeC under the headingof influence operations. however, due to itsunique nature, OPSeC, normally associated withinfluence operations, is examined separately.Electronic WarfareAn analysis of current doctrine shows that eWinvolves the use of eM or directed energy andincludes offensive or defensive operations affectingthe eM spectrum. 16 translating thesecharacteristics into operational terms, we seethat the eW mission area consists of capabilitieswhich use eM energy or directed energy toachieve their effects and that those effects occurwithin the EM environment (physical domain).A review of current Air Force capabilitiesshows that many of today’s weapons systemsuse eM energy to achieve their effects. Most ofthese come in the form of airborne jamming

Table. Common Information Operations TermsTermEW / EW Operations (EWO)(USAF-only term)Joint DoctrineIdentificationAir Force DoctrineIdentificationElectronic Attack Action of EW Military Capability ofEWOElectronic Protect Action of EW Military Capability ofEWOEW Support Action of EW Military Capability ofEWOComputer Network Operations (CNO) /Network Warfare Ops (NW Ops)(USAF-only term)Computer Network Attack (CNA) /Network Attack (NetA)(USAF-only term)Computer Network Defense (CND) /Network Defense (NetD)(USAF-only term)Computer Network Exploitation /Network Support (USAF-only term)Information AssuranceArmy DoctrineIdentificationNavy DoctrineIdentificationCore Capability Capability Core Capability Core CapabilityComponent of EW Subdivision of EWComponent of EW Subdivision of EWComponent of EW Subdivision of EWCore Capability Capability Core Capability N/A*Action of CNOAction of CNORelated EnablingOperation ofCNOSupportingCapabilityOperational Activity ofNW OpsOperational Activity ofNW OpsOperational Activity ofNW OpsIntegrated ControlEnabler (part of NetOps)Core CapabilityCore CapabilityCore CapabilitySupportingCapabilityInfluence Operations N/A Capability N/A N/APSYOP Core Capability Military Capability ofInfluence OperationsMilitary Deception (MILDEC) Core Capability Military Capability ofInfluence OperationsOperations Security (OPSEC) Core Capability Military Capability ofInfluence OperationsPhysical Attack / Physical DestructionCounterintelligencePublic AffairsCounterpropagandaSupportingCapabilitySupportingCapabilityRelatedCapabilityAction taken byPublic AffairsCore CapabilityCore CapabilityCore CapabilitySupporting Capability Supportingof Influence Operations CapabilityMilitary Capability ofInfluence OperationsMilitary Capability ofInfluence OperationsMilitary Capability ofInfluence OperationsSupportingCapabilityRelated ActivitySupportingCapabilityCounterdeception N/A N/A SupportingCapability*N/A = term not referred to in core doctrine documentCore CapabilityCore CapabilityN/ASupportingCapabilityCore CapabilityCore CapabilityCore CapabilitySupportingCapabilityN/ASupportingCapabilitySources: Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006, II-1 through II-9; Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5,Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 5–25; Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,28 November 2003, 1-14, 2-7, 2-8; and Navy Warfare Publication 3-13, Navy Information Operations, 2003, 13 and 2-6.N/AN/A

DEFINING INFORMATION OPERATIONS FORCES 57and collection assets. however, we have madeprogress in the area of space control, whichalso produces effects in the eM environment. 17In addition to achieving offensive effects, allof these capabilities use measures within theeM environment to deconflict their profilesor protect themselves from enemy attacks.Career fields and training strategies for theeW mission area are relatively mature. AirborneeW systems are typically integratedwithin each platform, and the flying communityhas a recognized career path and qualificationprogram for personnel assigned to usethese systems. typically these individuals areidentified under the navigator (12XXX) AFS,associated with a particular platform, and designatedwith an AFS prefix, which highlightstheir specialty as an eW airborne operator.Space-control capabilities that use eW assetsare primarily manned by personnel from thespace and missile operations AFS (13SXX)and follow the career path specified underthat career field.Although this represents only a cursoryanalysis, we see that the Air Force maintainscapabilities that fulfill the immediate needs ofthe eW mission area. Its systems can achieve anumber of effects within the eM environment,and the associated forces have well-establishedcareer paths and appropriate training. therefore,the Air Force does not require additionalcapabilities or career forces for the eW missionarea of IO. 18Network WarfarenetD and netA involve the use of hardware,software, and network-based capabilities toconduct defensive and offensive operations,respectively. 19 netD operations protect anddefend friendly information systems, computernetworks, and information transitingwithin them. In addition, they protect againstthe netA capabilities of others. netA operationstraverse through computers or computernetworks to offensively affect them or the informationresident therein. 20 translating thesecharacteristics into operational terms, we seethat the nW mission area consists of bothnetD and netA capabilities, the former usingcomputer networks (network-based) to producedefensive effects that protect our friendlyspaces of the cyberspace operational domain, andthe latter using computer hardware or softwareto traverse the cyberspace operational domainand achieve offensive effects within it.the Air Force has made significant progressin the area of netD capabilities but stillfinds itself primarily confined to softwarepatchupdates, virus protection, and networkperimeterdefense. While the commercial worldcontinues to make advancements in areas suchas spyware and rootkit detection, the corporateAir Force has implemented few of thesetools or techniques. the DOD limits detaileddiscussion of netA capabilities to classified forums,so further discussion here is not possible.Suffice it to say that the service still needs awell-structured, efficient capability-developmentstrategy to keep up with current advances intechnology.neither dedicated forces nor a maturetraining strategy exists for the nW missionarea. Individuals from a mix of different specialtiesfill netA positions at all levels of operation.netD positions at the tactical level aremore standardized in that they primarily includecommunications personnel (33XXX/3C0XX). however, at the operational andstrategic levels, netD personnel are just as variedas their netA brethren. Most individualsassigned to nW positions are considered on“career broadening” tours and are expectedto return to their designated career-field pathupon completion of the nW assignment.Lack of dedicated forces affects the potencyand maturity of these forces. nW units requireunique training and experience to performthe technical aspects of their mission. Unfortunately,these units must rely significantly onthe prior experience and formal education ofnew arrivals. Some of these individuals mayhave previous training in basic computer andnetworking concepts, but many possess littletechnical expertise. We can conduct training atthe gaining unit (what occurs today), but suchinstruction takes time and money, shortensthe operational “shelf life” of the individual,and detracts from mission accomplishment.Lastly, the fact that we “borrow” all personnel

58 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007from other career fields affects continuity andtypically results in the loss of such expertise atthe conclusion of the tour. Some may arguethat such disbursement strengthens the AirForce as a whole, but it provides little in theway of providing a mature, experienced nWwar-fighting force.Influence OperationsAFDD 2-5 describes influence operations asthose “affecting the perceptions and behaviorsof leaders, groups, or entire populations,”including PSYOP and MILDeC within its definition.21 PSYOP involves conveying selectedinformation and indicators to foreign audiencesto influence their emotions, motives,attitudes, objective reasoning, and behavior.MILDeC operations (whether offensively ordefensively focused) mislead adversary decisionmakers in order to cause them to take actions(or not act) in accordance with friendly objectives.22 Viewed in operational terms, theinfluence-operations mission area consists ofcapabilities that produce effects within the cognitivedomain.Any weapons system and/or platform withinthe Air Force can achieve effects within thecognitive domain (albeit not directly). For example,an F-15 may destroy a supply truck,which, in turn, disrupts an adversary’s fuelsupply, which then denies the adversary use ofhis aircraft. the inability to field aircraft maythen influence the adversary to capitulate.Consider also the positioning of the 5th Marineexpeditionary Brigade off the coast ofKuwait during Operation Desert Storm, anaction that helped deceive Iraq as to the directionof the allied advance and influencedSaddam hussein to reposition his defenses.Admittedly, we will need many capabilities notyet in existence to achieve certain cognitive effects.however, such capabilities will alwaysdepend upon a commander’s established missionobjectives. Without a thorough analysis ofcurrent and future combatant-commander requirements,we cannot identify all needed capabilitieshere. Such analysis lies beyond thescope of this article. We move forward withthe assumption that current kinetic and nonkineticweapons systems and military assetscan fulfill immediate requirements to conductinfluence operations and have the potentialto achieve necessary effects within the cognitivedomain.Although career paths and trained personnelalready exist for most Air Force weapons systemsand platforms, training in the art of influenceoperations remains limited. Schoolhouseand weapons-school focus does not extendfar beyond the tactical-level effects ofdeny, disrupt, degrade, and destroy. this isnot to say that psychological effects or MILDeCdoes not exist or that we do not conduct them,but most operators receive little formal trainingin these areas. the concepts taught—if atall—are system specific and constrained to thetactical level. Few personnel receive formaltraining in planning and executing influenceoperations at the operational and strategiclevels through the application of our fullrange of national capabilities. Some careerforces that specialize in affecting the cognitivedomain do exist, however. the Army has ahandful of specialists trained in some aspectsof influence operations. 23 the Air Force haspublic-affairs forces, but necessarily restrictiverules of engagement limit their capabilities.Cultural attachés or foreign area officers alsoreceive training in related skill sets, but eventhese have limited scope. In essence, the AirForce lacks a cadre of individuals with thetraining and experience necessary to producemature, sophisticated effects within the cognitivedomain (i.e., those that leverage arts andsciences such as marketing, psychology, andsociology). the state of operations in Iraq offersa perfect example of why we need suchtraining now and in the future. Our inabilityto cultivate personnel trained in these skillsmay have led to our failure as a department toaffect the cognitive domain and quickly establishconditions conducive to long-term stabilityand democracy. 24Operations SecurityDoctrinally, the definition of OPSEC is standardizedthroughout the DOD. 25 In operationalterms, the OPSeC mission area consists

DEFINING INFORMATION OPERATIONS FORCES 59of capabilities that achieve the effects of identifyingcritical information about friendly forces,analyzing friendly actions, and determiningindicators that hostile intelligence systems mightobtain which could be interpreted or piecedtogether to derive critical information in timeto be useful to adversaries. In addition OPSeCincludes capabilities, which conduct defensiveeffects that eliminate or reduce vulnerabilitiesof friendly actions to adversary exploitation.the effects produced can take place anywherewithin the associated operational domain andcan involve the use of many different capabilities(whether kinetic or nonkinetic, a nationalor military asset, or at the strategic, operational,or tactical levels).Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-11,Operations Security, directs “commanders atevery level [to] establish a program that ensuresOPSeC is fully integrated into their missionresponsibilities.” 26 Local OPSeC managersrely on Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-701,Operations Security (OPSEC), to develop and executetheir local programs. 27 the program iswell documented and appears well structuredon paper. Unfortunately, most OPSeC managerstake on these responsibilities as an additionalduty instead of as a full-time job, andmany find themselves ill equipped to performthe type of vulnerability assessments necessaryto meet the requirements identified in theseregulations. thus, more often than not, theyimplement only the minimum requirements(e.g., unit training and development of a criticalinformationlist)—enough to pass an inspectionbut not enough to defend effectivelyagainst enemy observations. the most effectivecapabilities we have today come in theform of multidisciplinary vulnerability assessments(MDVA). Unfortunately, few units inthe Air Force conduct these at this time.not part of a focused career field, OPSeCmanagers are appointed locally from availablepersonnel at each level of command. they receivestandardized training—mostly consistingof a threat overview and brief summary ofthe five-step OPSeC process—but very littleinstruction in OPSeC tactics, techniques, andprocedures (ttP). Any continuity relies strictlyon the ambition of their predecessors. typically,long-term, experienced OPSeC managersdo not exist. their appointments are considereda secondary duty, and they tend to bejunior personnel.Recommendationsthe preceding section characterized, inoperational terms, the different mission areasof IO. It identified each area’s capabilities andeffects and defined the domains within whicheach one operates. In addition, an analysis ofcurrent capabilities and career forces highlightedshortfalls that contribute to our inabilityto execute certain mission areas effectively.We now address these gaps with four recommendationsintended to help fill them. Specifically,these include the establishment ofboth an nW-operations career force and aninfluence-operations-planner career force,OPSeC Red teams at the base and major command(MAJCOM) levels as well as full-timeOPSeC managers, and a more effective integrationof IO theory within the corporate AirForce.Network-Warfare-Operations Career ForcenW forces should have both technical trainingin the use of computer hardware and/orsoftware and the ability to use such equipmentto produce offensive and/or defensive effectswithin the cyberspace operational domain. Juniorofficers are experts in one or more“classes” of networks (e.g., Internet protocol–based networks, process-control networks, telephony,etc.) 28 with experience in both offensiveand defensive operations at the tacticallevel. Senior officers have the backgroundnecessary to leverage a variety of nW capabilitiesin order to plan and execute integrated operationsat the operational and strategic levels.nW forces have their own AFS and careerforcemanagers. their dedicated developmentteam (Dt) at the Air Force Personnel Center(AFPC) works to ensure that each individualobtains tactical-level expertise and experiencein a variety of nW capabilities and skill setsduring his or her junior years. this ensuresthat nW operators acquire the foundation

60 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007necessary to serve MAJCOM and combatantcommands as skilled planners and staff personnelduring their midgrade years. Seniorpersonnel lead nW units and organizations atthe tactical, operational, and strategic levels.these forces have their own education andtraining path similar to those that currentlyexist for other operations career fields (e.g., pilotsand space operators). Air education andtraining Command handles the formal undergraduateand graduate training of new accessionswho pass stringent aptitude tests. Undergraduatetraining covers core fundamentalssuch as operating systems, architecture, andnetworking as well as basic force application,including attack, evasion, and exploitationtechniques. Graduate training improves uponthese skills but focuses on a specific networkclass. 29 Following graduation from these twoprograms, qualified operators move on totheir gaining operations unit, where they receivetraining in local policy and procedures.A numbered air force or MAJCOM-level cybercommand oversees recurring training andstandardization/evaluation while an expansionof the USAF Weapons School implementsadvanced tactics.Influence-Operations-Planner Career Forcethese forces would be practiced in arts and sciencessuch as psychology, sociology, and marketingwith an understanding of how to integratenational and military assets to conduct sophisticatedeffects within the cognitive domain. Juniorofficers are experts in the creation of tacticalleveleffects using one or more different capabilities(e.g., those of the land, sea, air, andcyberspace). Midgrade officers can integrate avariety of capabilities to create operationalleveleffects (e.g., joint operations and militarycampaigns), whereas senior-level officers havethe experience necessary to plan and executemore strategic-level effects (e.g., foreign-policydevelopment and long-term planning).Like nW forces, influence-operations plannershave their own AFS, career-force managers,and Dt at the AFPC. they spend their junioryears embedded within a variety of tacticalunits (e.g., armor battalions, air squadrons, andsurface fleets), where these planners honetheir craft and apply techniques during exerciseand real-world situations. they spendtheir midgrade years at the MAJCOMs and/orcombatant commands leveraging the expertisegained during earlier years but now applyingit at the operational and strategic levels. Plannerscould also serve a tour in a joint strategiccommunicationsorganization before taking onmore senior roles that affect national policyand strategy. 30Influence-operations planners receive formalundergraduate training in skills such as appliedpsychology, sociology, and marketing.Much of their early development results fromexperiences within a variety of tactical-level capabilitiesand scenarios. Additional professionalmilitary education (PMe) courseworkincludes topics such as military operations,command-and-control authorities, and law.Midgrade assignments also include cultural immersionin one or two particular theaters andpossibly a media posting aimed at honing publiccommunicationskills. 31 Continuous courseworkin such subjects as organizational behavior,foreign policy, world religions, culturalstudies, and strategic communications becomesrequired as planners move into theirmid and senior years.OPSEC Red Teams and Full-Time OPSEC ManagersOPSeC managers would still provide the leadfor command-directed requirements. however,their full-time status now gives them thetime to implement effective OPSeC programs.Red teams provide vigilant support to the unitOPSeC managers by regularly conductingMDVAs for their base or MAJCOM. MAJCOMRed teams conduct assessments from a moreregional perspective. Red teams and unitOPSeC managers are closely connected withthe counterintelligence community, thus ensuringthat OPSeC tactics and effects mirror—butare not limited to—expected adversarymethods. together, these individualswork to continuously mitigate OPSeC vulnerabilitiesand counter adversary threats.no specific career field or path is envisionedfor either OPSeC managers or Red

DEFINING INFORMATION OPERATIONS FORCES 61Team personnel. 32 Positions are filled by individualsfrom a variety of backgrounds, andOPSEC assignments are treated as careerbroadeningopportunities. However, OPSECplanners at the operational and strategic levelsshould have previous experience as an OPSECmanager or Red Team member. All OPSECpersonnel receive initial qualification trainingat the local unit in areas such as social engineering,physical security, and collection ofopen-source intelligence; they acquire moreadvanced skill sets through on-the-job training.Well-documented TTP manuals maintaincontinuity and advances in this art, which arepassed on during initial and recurring trainingof new personnel. As with all IO missionareas, “best practices” are maintained in theappropriate Air Force TTP series volume foruse by all OPSEC personnel.More Effective Integration of Information OperationsTheory within the Corporate Air ForceIn addition to heeding the mission-areafocusedrecommendations mentioned above,we must more effectively integrate the doctrinalconcepts of IO into the corporate Air Force.After all, just as all Airmen must understandair and space theory, we must also understandIO theory if it is to truly become a “corecapabilit[y] of future forces.” 33 This integrationmust occur in two ways: (1) through improvededucation within PME curricula, and(2) (and more fundamentally) as an underlyingcultural change in how we approach alloperations (whether kinetic or nonkinetic).PME exposes every member of the AirForce, regardless of specialty, to air and spacepower doctrine during different stages of hisor her career. Although this coursework includesIO to some extent, such lessons remainlargely theoretical, provide little or no instructionon how to apply its concepts to existingoperations, and do little more than provideinteresting points to ponder. In short, IO lessonsat present have little or no substantial operationalvalue to their recipients—a situationthat one can attribute to the nascency of AirForce IO itself. In some aspects, we are justlearning how to effectively “do” the missionareas of IO, and in many respects, we lack indepth,mature operational experience—thelessons learned from which we distill our doctrine.However, as we continue to expand ouroperational knowledge and abilities in thisarea, the Air Force must expose all personnelto its evolving doctrinal concepts. In addition,we must strive to better integrate our developingIO-power doctrine seamlessly with that ofair and space power and, as it matures, demonstrateits utility to real-world operations.The second approach to corporate integrationrequires a shift in culture. For years, leadershiphas realized the importance of integratingIO within all other operations, yet we havenot completely succeeded—due in large partto the fact that we have defined IO too broadly,as mentioned earlier. However, in our effort tomove forward, we have effectively sidesteppedintegration and instead simply developed IO asa separate entity. In doing so, we have createdeverything from IO doctrine to IO organizationsto IO training blocks of PME, all independentof air and space operations. Unfortunately,“add-on” IO can work for only some ofits mission areas. For example, we can (andshould) develop and organize NW capabilitiesseparately, at least until they attain a certainlevel of maturity and prove fit enough to integratewith other air and space power capabilitiesfor combined operations. 34 However, portionsof IO—specifically, those within theinfluence-operations mission area—will neverbe effective if developed or employed independently.Influence operations (or the effectsachieved within the cognitive domain)represent the impetus for all operations andthus must become an integral part of every capability(whether kinetic or nonkinetic) andthe basis for how all operators approach missionplanning and execution. Every effect ofevery objective of every strategy supports anend state that aims at affecting the cognitivedomain. As Lt Gen Robert Elder recently stated,“Operations ultimately seek to influence behaviorsso we can achieve our objectives at theoperational and strategic (and even the tactical)levels.” 35 While this article advocates separateplanners who specialize in these arts, it doesso in part because this principle has not yet

62 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007become an accepted and integral part of ourculture. If we are to truly be successful in thismission area, it must become the bedrock ofevery step in force development, from institutionaldogma to operational training—somethingwe cannot achieve simply by adding anotherblock of instruction to standing curricula.however, embracing such a philosophy requiresa complete change in culture and a transformationof our foundational beliefs.ConclusionInformation Warfare has become central to theway nations fight wars, and will be critical toAir Force operations in the 21st century. . . .We must invest in our people, planning,equipment, and research so our ambitions canbecome reality.—Cornerstones of Information Warfare, 1997experts agree that the future of warfare ischanging and that our ability to execute IOeffectively remains critical to our success onthe battlefields of the twenty-first century.Over the past several years, leadership hascalled for development of a career force thatwill lead us into this arena. Unfortunately, wehave struggled even to define IO, much lessdetermine what forces we need to answer thiscall. Seen in an operational light, our analysishas identified several gaps in both capabilityand career field that we must address. thesegaps not only hinder our ability to advance IOand its mission areas but also, if the epigraphabove is to be believed, threaten the very securityof our nation. the recommendations providedhere represent one solution. Do theygive us the entire answer? no, but they offer astarting point for discussion and a vision tostrive for. qNotes1. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC:Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 38, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.2. Defense Planning Guidance, 2004–2009 (Washington,DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2002), 36.Secret/nOFORn. Information extracted is unclassified.3. Information Operations Roadmap (Washington, DC:Department of Defense, 30 October 2003), 33, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nSAeBB/nSAeBB177/info_ops_roadmap.pdf. nOFORn.4. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC:Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), passim, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf.5. the Air Force is attempting to better organize itscyber forces. In late 2006, the chief of staff of the AirForce designated the commander of eighth Air Force asthe commander of the new Air Force Cyber Command,directing him to lead such forces and provide “combatready forces trained and equipped to conduct sustainedoffensive and defensive [cyber] operations.” AF/CC to8AF/CC, memorandum, 1 november 2006.6. For information on the B21 model, see Maj timothyP. Franz, “IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations:Analysis, Implementation Concept, and Way-Ahead fornetwork Warfare Forces” (master’s thesis, Air Force Instituteof technology, March 2007), 7–29.7. It is important to note that the terms individual andmind used here represent any decision maker, whetherhuman or automated.8. the three-domain concept is based on the originalwork of David S. Alberts et al., Understanding InformationWarfare (Washington, DC: CCRP [Command and ControlResearch Program] Publication Series, 2001). this articleuses a modification of the definitions in this work, as presentedin Franz, “IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations,”9–14.9. For the definition of the term operational domain, seeFranz, “IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations,” 14–17.10. this definition is a modification of the one foundin the “national Military Strategy for Cyber Operations,”draft (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, november 2006), vii. Secret. Information extractedis unclassified. For the background of and justification forthe modification, see Franz, “IO Foundations to CyberspaceOperations,” 15–16.11. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (asamended through 5 January 2007), 529, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.12. Ibid., 174.13. Franz, “IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations,”18.

DEFINING INFORMATION OPERATIONS FORCES 6314. JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006,GL-9, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf.15. As defined in Department of Defense Directive(DODD) 3600.1, Information Operations (IO), 14 August2006, 1; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-9 and II-1through II-9; AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January2005, 1–25; Field Manual (FM) 3-13, Information Operations:Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 november2003, 1-13, 1-14, 2-7, 2-8; and navy Warfare Publication(nWP) 3-13, Navy Information Operations, 2003, 13,14, and 2-6.16. As defined in DODD 3600.1, Information Operations(IO), 1-1; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-7 throughGL-8; AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 50; FM 3-13, InformationOperations, 2-7; and nWP 3-13, Navy InformationOperations, 13.17. tSgt Austin Carter, “new Squadron trains forSpace-Based Aggression,” 25 October 2000, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-00q.html.18. two items to note: (1) Classification restrictionsprevent a more in-depth discussion of eW capabilities.however, understanding that organized, trained, andequipped eW capabilities do exist is sufficient to proceedfor the purpose of this article. A detailed analysis that determineswhether existing eW capabilities fulfill all of acombatant commander’s needs is beyond the scope ofthis work. (2) the authors recognize that an overlap existsbetween the eW and nW mission areas since somenW capabilities may use eM energy to achieve their effectswithin the eM environment of cyberspace. Suchcapabilities are addressed under the nW section laterin this article.19. We use the terms NetD and NetA to be more in stepwith Air Force terminology. however, we do not restrictour analysis of these terms to Air Force doctrine but includethe equivalent terms CNA and CND, found in DOD-,joint-, and other service-level doctrine.20. As defined in DODD 3600.1, Information Operations(IO), 1-1; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-5 throughGL-6; AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 53; and FM 3-13,Information Operations, 2-9 through 2-20. the US navy usesthe joint definition.21. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 3. As mentionedearlier, we evaluate OPSeC separately although, doctrinally,it is still considered part of influence operations.22. As defined in DODD 3600.1, Information Operations(IO), I-2; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-10through GL-11; AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 52–54;FM 3-13, Information Operations, 2-3 and 2-6; and nWP 3-13,Navy Information Operations, 2003, 15.23. examples include the IO specialist (FA30) andthe PSYOP specialist (FA39).24. Maj tadd Sholtis, “Public Affairs and InformationOperations: A Strategy for Success,” Air and Space PowerJournal 19, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 97–106, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/fall05.pdf.25. As defined in DODD 3600.1, Information Operations(IO), 1-2; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-11; AFDD 2-5,Information Operations, 53–54; FM 3-13, Information Operations,2-2; and nWP 3-13, Navy Information Operations, 15.26. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-11, OperationsSecurity, 31 May 2001, 1, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/10/afpd10-11/afpd10-11.pdf.27. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-701, Operations Security(OPSEC), 30 September 2005, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/10/afi10-701/afi10-701.pdf.28. the concept of of a “network class” is introducedin Franz, “IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations,”67–69. networks are organized under “classes” accordingto similar underlying technologies (e.g., hardware, commonservices, architectures, protocols, etc.).29. Ibid.30. Sholtis, “Public Affairs and Information Operations,”105.31. Ibid.32. Despite the fact that some experience will be beneficialat the higher levels, we do not believe that our analysisof the OPSeC mission area indicates the need for a dedicatedcareer force at this time. In contrast, due to themostly nontechnical nature of the mission area, we believethat it is more beneficial to cycle through personnelwith different backgrounds and mission areas. Such diversityprovides two benefits: (1) different backgrounds bringdifferent ways of thinking, which is advantageous when itcomes to this mission area, and (2) the more individualsexposed to OPSeC positions and then recast into theirassigned career field, the more “OPSeC aware” the corporateAir Force becomes. For the technical aspects of MDVAs(e.g., network-penetration testing), it is recommendedthat each Red team be supported by one or more netAaggressor units. It is envisioned that such aggressor units,which do require a dedicated career force due to theirtechnical nature, would be part of the nW forces discussedearlier.33. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), 38.34. One finds a precedent in the development ofearly airpower. Air capabilities required time for independentgrowth and development before becoming matureenough to integrate with established land and sea capabilities.35. Lt Gen Robert J. elder Jr., “effects-Based Operations:A Command Philosophy,” Air and Space Power Journal21, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 17, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/spr07/spr07.pdf.

ASPJQuick-LookPreferential Treatment for Military Members Based on Personality Type1st Lt Ryan KaiseR, UsaFTelevision and prinTed newscontinually remind us of the costof the global war on terrorism. TheUnited states has assumed significanteconomic expense—witness the more than$379 billion allocated by Congress as of 29september 2006 ($360 billion of which has alreadybeen spent as of 22 January 2007) forunits operating in iraq—and suffers the majorityof the coalition’s casualties. 1 in additionto the costs of war, military and political leadershave determined that in order for the Unitedstates to remain the world’s only superpower,each military branch must have the most technologicallyadvanced equipment available. asof april 2006, the total development and productioncost of the air Force’s newest aircraft,the F-22 raptor, amounted to over $70 billion—roughly $388 million per aircraft. 2 Becausehuge portions of the annual budget financesuch technologies, the service must cut personneland other costs. Consequently, airForce members now find themselves trying todo more work with fewer people.New Recruiting TechniquesManagers have long realized that they canreduce personnel costs by lowering expendituresfor training and recruiting, especially byretaining active air Force members. obviously,recruiting people more likely to stay inthe military for a long time would have theeffect of increasing retention. By basing itsrecruiting efforts on testing for recognized,enduring traits such as personality and charactertypes, the service could facilitate the processof identifying such individuals. additionally,newly recruited members would probablystay longer if the air Force allowed them tochoose their career field. Therefore, in orderto decrease personnel costs and ease the financialburden of war, the air Force should givepreferential treatment in recruitment and jobplacement to people whose personality typemakes them likely to remain in service for anextended period of time.personality testing would simply provide astarting point for recruiting efforts by utilizinga narrower base to focus valuable time andresources. However, such testing would noteliminate candidates who lack the targetedpersonality traits. Because most recruitingefforts are not successful, military services haveused everything from television commercialsand race-car sponsorships to magazine adsand clothing campaigns to boost recruitingnumbers. Moreover, a good deal of recruitingoccurs at enlistment stations designed for peoplewho wish to volunteer. To avoid any hint offavoritism, the air Force should retain thesemethods, which carry no requirement of personalitytesting. Furthermore, by having trainedprofessionals administer the tests or by commissioninga new test tailored to predict jobsatisfaction, the air Force could eliminate otherconcerns about the process.assessment of a potential recruit’s personalitymakes sense only if personality type and characterare enduring traits that last the entirelength of enlistment. a study by david Keirseyand Marilyn Bates found that personality changes64

QUICK-LOOK 65only slightly and that personality type remainsconsistent over one’s adult life span. 3 large,measurable changes do occur in the personalityof children, probably due to the maturingprocess. Thus, the armed services vocationalaptitude battery, administered during the secondyear of high school when students are 15or 16 years old, represents an ideal means oftesting the personality of potential recruits sincepersonalities have stabilized by these ages.if targeted recruiting could cut the numberof air Force recruiters by half, the savingswould amount to roughly $785,500 per monthor $9.4 million per year in recruiter pay alone,with much greater savings possible since anincrease in personnel retention would reducethe amount of training. additionally, this situationwould create a more experienced airForce, requiring fewer people to do the sameamount of work. increased efficiency andimprovement in the overall quality of workwould lead to even more savings.Potential Problemsdespite the advantages of targeted recruiting,the public might consider mandatory personalitytests an invasion of privacy. even thescientific community, which supports personalitytesting, would object unless the air Forceuses professionals to administer the tests ortailors them more towards job satisfaction.any personality test designed to identify goodmilitary recruits would have to be given to alarge number of individuals shortly beforethey become eligible for enlistment. sincemost high school students do not pursue acareer in the military, however, doing so wouldsubject them to a test from which they wouldderive no benefit. Finally, the service musttake into account any ethical concerns about apersonality test’s validity across all subjectgroups. For example, many types of testing,including the american College Test and thescholastic aptitude Test, have come underscrutiny since they show regional and ethnicinconsistencies. although some critics mightoppose the use of tests to recruit new militarymembers, strong evidence suggests that properlyorganized instruments would meet theair Force’s goals.as for the issue of privacy, schools alreadysubject students to ability and aptitude teststhat measure them against their peers on school,state, and national levels. every year, studentstake national standardized tests that evaluatethem on everything related to academics, aprocess that also measures schools’ ability toteach their students. administering personalitytests concurrently with the armed servicesvocational aptitude battery would give studentsinsight into the types of work most suitable forthem. no doubt the additional test would raiseprivacy issues—but no more than those concerningany other aptitude test already conducted.Furthermore, one should weigh anysuch liability against the test’s usefulness tostudents interested in choosing careers.lastly, validity always becomes a major concernwhen one designs personality assessments—especially those that facilitate job placement.The Keirsey-Bates test, introduced in 1978, hassubsequently gone through several revisions.similarly, the Myers-Briggs test and the MinnesotaMultiphasic personality inventory, conceivedduring World War ii, have undergonea number of changes to enhance their accuracy,reliability, and validity. 4 Further, the fivesignificant personality traits—openness to experience,conscientiousness, neuroticism, agreeableness,and extraversion—emerged from ameta-analysis of personality traits and theircorrelation to job performance. The scrutinyto which these tests have been subjected andthe refinement they have undergone toimprove their assessment capabilities shouldalleviate any concerns about their validity.FeasibilityConsiderable evidence points to the benefitsof using personality testing in militaryrecruitment and job placement. The militaryhas used tests such as the Woodworth personaldata sheet since 1919 to predict a recruit’s susceptibilityto shell shock and administered theThematic apperception Test in the 1930s toidentify personalities susceptible to enemy

66 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007intelligence. Currently the Keirsey temperamentsorter categorizes people into 16 differentpersonality types that strongly correlatewith the Myers-Briggs test; it also associatesoccupations with each type. Using this test formilitary job placement may be as easy as identifyingtemperaments most suitable for specificjobs and simply matching recruits withthose jobs. To test this theory, the air Forcecould conduct a latitudinal study of a large,representative cross-section of the entire military;generalize the results to the air Force;and adjust recruiting methods accordingly—all in less than a year. study participants wouldtake a test to determine their personality group,and evaluators would then compare the differentgroups to determine each one’s retentionrate based on time-in-service data.as america continues to send troops to thefar reaches of the globe in an effort to stabilizethe Middle east and promote democracy in therest of the world, Us taxpayers are left payingthe bill. The men and women in our militaryservices feel the pain of budgetary constraints.air Force decision makers have elected to dealwith this situation by reducing personnel costs.This article has suggested that the air Forcecan realize substantial savings by increasingpersonnel retention—specifically by givingpeople with a particular personality type preferentialtreatment in job placement and recruitingefforts. Targeted recruiting can save theair Force money by lowering spending onrecruiting efforts, reducing the amount oftraining, and increasing the service’s efficiencyand experience. overall, this proposal seeksto lower personnel costs of the air Force andother military services so they can continue tofund research, development, and procurementof new, state-of-the-art equipment such as theF-22. new and improved equipment will ensurethat the United states remains a superpowerand will enable our military forces to continueto fight the global war on terrorism. qNotes1. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “iraq War,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/iraq_war (accessed 15 december2006).2. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “F-22 raptor,”http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F22 (accessed 15 december2006).3. david Keirsey and Marilyn Bates, Please UnderstandMe: Character and Temperament Types, 5th ed. (del Mar, Ca:prometheus nemesis Book Company, 1984), 2–4.4. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “Myers-BriggsType indicator,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers-Briggs_Type_indicator (accessed 15 december 2006).Through technological advances and Airmen’s ingenuity, we cannow surveil or strike any target anywhere on the face of the earth, dayor night, in any weather.—Gen T. Michael Moseley, Chief of staff, UsaF

IntellectualModernizationof the C-5Making the Galaxy ExpeditionaryCol Mark C. “Marshal” Dillon, UsaFEditorial Abstract: Recalling a 41-year-old admonition to “revolutionize global mobility airlift,”the author says that now is the time to begin such a revolution—and fulfill currentefforts to “transform” the military—by routinely deploying the C-5 Galaxy in an expeditionaryrole. This article highlights the Galaxy’s capabilities, counters negative claims about itsreliability, and proposes changes in doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel,and facilities that will help modernize the aircraft (although it does not attempt a technicaldiscussion of those facilities).Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, but firmly embrace a rational alternative.—alexander hamiltonThe Federalist, no. 23The Time has come for the airForce to deploy the C-5 Galaxy routinelyin an expeditionary role. Recentexperience suggests that forwarddeployedC-5 operations have become therule rather than the exception and should becodified into expeditionary doctrine. 1 Thisdoctrine or “intellectual modernization” complementsongoing mechanical upgrades viathe avionics modernization program (amP) andthe reliability enhancement and reenginingprogram (ReRP). Furthermore, by mitigatingthe C-5’s achilles’ heel—poor mission-capable(mC) or reliability rates—the amP and ReRPshould give air Force leaders additional confidenceto deploy the Galaxy routinely. Guidancefrom Department of Defense and air Forceleadership is clear: now is the time to change.Challenging the military to transform, formersecretary of defense Donald Rumsfeldopened his Transformation Planning Guidance ofapril 2003 by remarking, “as we prepare for67

68 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007the future, we must think differently and developthe kinds of forces and capabilities that canadapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpectedcircumstances. We must transform not onlythe capabilities at our disposal, but also the way wethink, the way we train, the way we exercise and theway we fight” (emphasis added). 2 Likewise in theair Force’s posture statement for 2006, secretaryof the air Force michael W. Wynne andChief of staff of the air Force Gen T. michaelmoseley challenge airmen to “look from theirheritage to the horizon, taking lessons fromthe past and adapting them for the future.” 3Using these strategic imperatives for changeas a guide, this article seeks to begin a discussionabout intellectual modernization of theC-5. First, it highlights the aircraft’s unique capabilities,citing its early combat employmentto trace its expeditionary doctrine back to the1960s. Next, it shows that despite the C-5’sreputation as mechanically temperamental,the label of unreliability (and thus of limiteduse in expeditionary operations) is not necessarilyjustified. in addition, expeditionary andexpeditionary-like employments (both combatand noncombat) make a compelling case forroutine deployment. Finally, to round out thediscussion regarding intellectual modernization,this article proposes changes not only todoctrine but also to organization, training,material, leadership, personnel, and facilities. 4To narrow the discussion, it makes three assumptions.First, we must continue to use theC-5 as a combat asset. This follows the secondtenet of Pres. Ronald Reagan’s directive onUs airlift policy in 1987: “The role of the militarycomponent of the airlift fleet is to do whatcommercial transport aircraft or civilian aircrewscannot or will not do.” 5 second, studiesindicate that a modernized C-5m will increasereliability and provide a more capable airplane.6 Finally, this article does not pit C-5sagainst C-17s. The air Force will operate bothplatforms for decades to come. (Current programmingprojects at least 50 C-5ms in themobility Requirements study of 2005 and theQuadrennial Defense Review of 2006.) 7 Ratherthan placing modern combat-airlift aircraft incompetition with each other, this article leveragestheir strengths in order to exploit the capabilitiesof the C-5.Impressive CapabilitiesThe bottom line was that if the airplane [C-5]lived up to its expectations, “global militaryairlift will be completely revolutionized.”—Lt Col Charles e. millerAirlift DoctrineDuring the same decade that america sentmen to the moon and returned them safely,Lockheed engineers built the C-5 Galaxy, theUnited states’ largest and heaviest military-airliftjet. 8 For three decades, Us leaders have oftenreached for the C-5 in their force-projectionquiver. in light of its reputation for maintenanceproblems (some anecdotal, some legitimate),however, they have often hesitated toemploy this tremendous national asset and itsunique capabilities.in terms of cargo capacity—both volumeand total weight—the C-5 has no equal. 9 Withroom for 36 standard 463L pallets, it carriestwice as many as the C-17 (18), nearly threetimes as many as the C-141 (13), and six times asmany as the C-130 (6). 10 Furthermore, it cansimultaneously transport up to 95 aircrew membersand passengers combined (20 in the upperflight deck and 75 in the upper-aft troop compartment).Just as impressive is the total cargoweight. The C-5 can carry 291,000 poundscompared to 167,000 for the C-17; 68,725 forthe C-141; and 40,000 for the C-130. 11Designed for forward operations, the C-5boasts such features as the use of nitrogen torender vapor in the wing fuel tanks inert andother firefighting capabilities throughout theaircraft, which make it highly survivable. Becauseit can load/unload through fully opening doorsin both the nose and aft portion of the aircraft,it requires little or no ground-support equipment.12 moreover, its high-flotation landinggear enables it to operate on unimproved surfaces(including ice). in fact, the C-5 appliesless stress to runways and taxiways than anyother Us airlifter. 13The Galaxy’s payload and range are alsoimpressive. it can carry everything in the Us

INTELLECTUAL MODERNIZATION OF THE C-5 69defense arsenal, including battle-ready tanks,helicopters, submarines, boats, and the massive74-ton mobile scissor bridge. a fuel capacity of332,500 pounds contained in the wings (over51,000 gallons) contributes to its long rangeand enables forward ground refueling. Forexample, a C-5 with a cargo load of 270,000pounds can fly 2,150 nautical miles, off-load, andfly to a second base 500 nautical miles away fromthe original destination—all without aerial refueling.With aerial refueling, only crew endurancelimits the aircraft’s range. 14 as the Unitedstates adjusts its global defense posture, thecombination of the C-5’s range and payload remainsa vital force-projection capability. 15The aircraft can also perform airdrops. On7 June 1989, a single C-5 air-dropped paratroopersand equipment totaling 190,346 pounds—still a world record. 16 in the decade that followed,the air Force halted the C-5 airdropprogram. according to the service’s “heritageto horizons” posture statement of 2006, whichsuggests taking lessons from the past and adaptingthem to the future, an airdrop-capable C-5could augment current or emerging airdroprequirements. 17 an array of combat-airlift capabilitiesresides in the C-5. soon after theGalaxy became operational, world events testedthese capabilities and shaped early employmentdoctrine.Teaching an Old Dog New TricksThere is nothing new. . . . The new is the historyyou didn’t read.—Pres. harry s. TrumanThe idea of forward-deploying the C-5 originatedbefore the giant airlifter became operational.secretary of the air Force haroldBrown lay the groundwork for this doctrine inthe mid-1960s, stressing his willingness “tocommit publicly to the idea of having both theC-141 and C-5 deliver directly to forward logisticsbases rather than main ones in the rear ifthe landing zones could handle them.” 18These forward-deployed operations, albeit notconducted on a routine basis, nonetheless establishedthe foundation for today’s C-5 combatmissions in afghanistan and iraq.On 3 may 1972, two years after taking possessionof its first operational C-5, military airliftCommand (maC) completed the firstthree of 18 C-5 combat sorties into Vietnam.To counter North Vietnam’s easter Offensiveof 1972, Gen Creighton abrams Jr., commanderof military assistance Command,Vietnam, requested the emergency airlift ofsix mK-48 tanks from Yokota air Base, Japan,to Da Nang air Base, south Vietnam. 19 DemonstratingmaC’s intertheater airlift doctrine—rapiddeployment of combat forces—the six tanks were off-loaded in less than sevenminutes and proceeded from the airfield directlyinto combat. Building on this success,15 additional C-5 combat missions to Da Nangand Cam Ranh Bay—averaging off-load timesof just 32 minutes each—delivered 42 m-41tanks and eight m-548 tracked vehicles. 20Gen howell estes Jr., commander in chiefof maC (CiNCmaC) from 1964 to 1969 andthe genius behind this unconventional C-5employment, identified flexibility as the mostsignificant principle of war in the modern era,stating that throughout the Cold War, globalairlift had given the United states maximumflexibility. 21 Building on this theme, Generalestes later wrote that “the role of moderncombat airlift, then, is to airlift combat forcesand all their battle equipment, in the size andmix required—with the greatest speed—toany point in the world, no matter how remoteor primitive, where a threat arises or is likelyto erupt.” 22On 14 October 1973, a C-5 carrying 186,200pounds of cargo landed at Tel aviv’s Lod internationalairport. highlighting rapid globalmobility and the flexibility of modern combatairlift (as well as putting the aircraft at riskfrom potential terrorists and missile attacks),this C-5 landed just nine hours after Pres.Richard Nixon gave the order for the Unitedstates to send military supplies to israel. itthus completed the first mission of a combinedC-141/C-5 airlift called Operation Nickel Grass. 23in 32 days of Nickel Grass, this combination ofaircraft posted some impressive statistics, butthe political results proved even more impres­

70 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007sive, as reflected in israeli prime minister Goldameir’s statement that “for generations to come,all will be told of the miracle of the immenseplanes from the United states bringing in themateriel that meant life to our people.” 24These two operations validated secretaryBrown’s construct of putting large jet aircraftforward, demonstrating that under certainconditions—or, as the secretary stated, “if thelanding zones could handle them” (see above)—then the C-5 could and should be used. althoughmuch has changed since the early forwarddeployments of this aircraft, one constantremains—poor mC or reliability rates.Reliability:The Galaxy’s Achilles’ HeelPeople, ideas, hardware . . . in that order.—Col John R. Boyd, UsaFPushing technology of the 1960s to thelimit presented Lockheed engineers with anenormous challenge. For example, each C-5contains over 90,000 parts—the equivalent offour F-16s. as if to portend the future, whenGen Jack J. Catton, CiNCmaC, landed thefirst operational C-5a on 6 June 1970, a wheelfrom the left landing gear separated from theairplane and bounced down the runway. 25Likewise, personnel in israel had to unload all186,000 pounds of cargo from Nickel Grass’sfirst C-5 by hand because the crucial materielhandlingequipment and aerial porters wereon board a second C-5 that had diverted formaintenance. 26The mC rate for the C-5 fleet has alwayshovered around 65 percent—well below therequired 75 percent during wartime. 27 in thepast, the air Force has focused on single-systemmodifications that have yielded marginal increasesin mC rates. 28 Critics argue that theamP and ReRP represent more of the same.however, as noted in an article titled “savingthe Galaxy,” the more comprehensive amP andReRP programs may finally solve a majority ofthe Galaxy’s mechanical woes. 29No doubt the C-5 is difficult to maintain;however, prior to the multibillion-dollar investmentin the amP and ReRP, C-5s hadachieved noteworthy mC rates. The next sectioncaptures the aircraft’s recent mission (aswell as maintenance) success in forwarddeployedoperations, casting doubt on the notionof poor rates as the sole barrier to futuredeployments.Recent DevelopmentsAt a White House National Security Councilmeeting on 28 September 2001 as PresidentBush considered Afghanistan military optionsfollowing the 9/11/01 attacks, Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfeld stated, “There’s anUzbek airport eight to 10 miles from the mainairport. We’re going to send in our assessmentteam, we’re going to see if the airstrip can accommodateC-5s.”—Bob WoodwardBush at WarToday, scores of successful C-5 combat missionsinto afghanistan and iraq trace theirroots to secretary Brown’s original forwarddeploymentconstruct: “[C-5s] deliver directlyto forward logistics bases rather than mainones” (see above). modeled after previousC-130 and C-17 expeditionary airlift squadron(eas) deployments, the successful C-5 eas inJuly of 2002 in support of Operation enduringFreedom marked a historic “first” for theaircraft (note the late entry of the C-5 into atruly deployed expeditionary role). 30 it wasnot the fact that C-5s flew into combat or intothe bomb-cratered, night-only runway in Kandahar,afghanistan, that made history. Norwas it the 782nd eas’s launching of 100 percentof these sorties (26) on time to extractthe Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light infantryRegiment six days (25 percent) ahead ofschedule. Rather, this represented the first-everexpeditionary deployment of a C-5 squadron ina combat theater with a complete support-andcommandstructure. 31 Pentagon after-actionbriefings to the secretary of the air Force andair Force Council in December 2002 confirmedthe expeditionary capability of the C-5.secretary James Roche summed up the operationby saying, “You all did a magnificent job

INTELLECTUAL MODERNIZATION OF THE C-5 71on your first ever combat deployment.” 32 immediatelyafterward, in august 2002, air mobilityCommand (amC) deployed its secondC-5 eas, which extended the string of on-timedepartures by 15 more sorties to the evenshorter, narrower, daytime-only (for construction)Kandahar airfield. 33Noncombat operations can also help shapenew expeditionary doctrine for the C-5. Optionssuch as backup aircrews/aircraft, highlyqualified aircrews, and forward-deployed leadershipcontribute to the success of PhoenixBanner—amC’s highest-priority airlift mission(presidential support). 34 even before eas deploymentsbecame commonplace, the authorwitnessed the utility of forward or expeditionarylikeemployment of leadership, crews, andmaintenance. For example, in the year 2000,amC successfully merged hundreds of C-17,C-5, and air-refueling missions to safely movethe Us president’s support staff to india (in supportof the asia-Pacific economic Conference).Forward deployment has also proved valuablein training and readiness exercises. inmid-2001 the author deployed C-5s (and C-141s)stateside in an expeditionary operational readinessinspection. in fewer than five days, thisexpeditionary wing not only deployed andthen redeployed itself but also launched allC-141 and C-5 missions on time—many in asimulated chemical environment. These noncombat,expeditionary-like employments furtherdemonstrate that it is time to rewrite ourdoctrine and make C-5 expeditionary operationsroutine.An Argument for ChangeIt must be considered that there is nothingmore difficult to carry out, nor more doubtfulof success, nor more dangerous to handle,than to initiate a new order of things.—Niccolò machiavelliThe PrinceOther aging, Cold War legacy systems havemodified their doctrine—the B-52 stratofortressand KC-135 stratotanker, for example. adoptingtechnology to war fighting, the air Forcetransformed the B-52 into a platform capableof delivering nuclear and conventional weaponsvia the global positioning system, upgradedits guidance technology, and wrotenew doctrine for the aircraft. substituting precisionfor mass, B-52s evolved from carpetbombinginto successful close-air-support platformsthat caught the world’s attention duringenduring Freedom. america continues to relyheavily on this aircraft.Likewise, the KC-135 underwent a modernizationprogram similar to the C-5’s amP andReRP. The R-model conversion program centeredon new engines and avionics for the1950s-era tanker, and, as occurred with theB-52, airmen transformed doctrine for theKC-135, whose Cold War mission involved agarrisoned nuclear-alert force, a refuelingonlytasking, and “hard” crews (including navigators).35 after the Cold War, its doctrine changedto include expeditionary forward-deployedforces, a new cargo (roller) mission, mixedcrews, and a reduced crew complement (replacingnavigators with new avionics). KC-135sflying over Baghdad’s surface-to-air-missile engagementzones fewer than two weeks intoOperation iraqi Freedom touted part of thedoctrinal evolution.The B-52 and KC-135 examples illustrate aprecedent for modernizing doctrine alongwith platforms. incorporating C-5 employmentinto expeditionary doctrine constitutes oneintellectual-modernization proposal for thisaircraft. in order to capture the rest, the remainderof this article utilizes the Joint staff’scapabilities template for doctrine, organization,training, materiel, leadership and education,and personnel (deliberately excludingchanges to facilities).Doctrinein light of transformation and expeditionarystrategic imperatives, the recent success of forwarddeployments makes traditional C-5 “stage”operations ripe for change. (a traditional airliftstage, with pre-positioning of aircrews atkey airfields around the globe, resembles theUs mail service’s Pony express, in operationfrom 1860 to 1862. That is, when an aircraftlands, fresh aircrews stage or swap—just as

72 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007Pony express riders swapped horses—to keepthe aircraft moving to a destination or back tothe pickup point.) 36 Though efficient at movingforces during large operations, staging hasexperienced some shortfalls.aircrew anecdotes criticizing stage operationsare legendary. however, the real impactlies at the strategic level, especially for a longwar. First, as mobilization authority for the Reserveand air National Guard (which make upthe majority of the C-5’s crew force) runs out,the air Force must find ways to prosecute theglobal war on terrorism while efficiently managinga limited crew force. aware of this situationacross his command, Gen Duncan mcNabb,commander of amC, is “pushing for a numberof reforms, in-house and in conjunction withUs Transportation Command,” to adjust amC’shigh operations tempo. according to the general,“ ‘That mobilization authority is startingto run out’ . . . so amC must ‘get to the pointwhere we can do this steady state.’ ” 37 Duringthe “long war,” C-5 aircrews have spent as muchtime away from home as fellow airmen (in incrementsof 14–30 days) but do not receivecredit as part of an air and space expeditionaryforce (aeF). in 2002 and 2003, C-5 pilots wereaway from home longer than any other amCpilots. 38 During this same period, less than 10percent ever approached the air Force’s mandated90-day flying-hour maximums. 39second, since C-5 crews are enablers, theydo not qualify for aeF advantages of predictability,training priority, and guaranteed postdeploymentdowntime. although not consideredas “tactical” as the C-130 or C-17, C-5snonetheless routinely operate in the iraqi andafghani combat zones. Unlike C-130 or C-17crews, however, in the traditional stage paradigm,C-5 crews are sent into combat by astage manager—not a commander. a recentdeployment of C-17 aircrews (and a squadroncommander) in southwest asia highlights themanifold benefits of deploying aircrews versusC-5

INTELLECTUAL MODERNIZATION OF THE C-5 73staging. The C-17 eas commander stated that“‘this way of operating [deploying] gives boththe combatant commander as well as the aircrewsthe continuity needed to improve reliabilityand efficiency. aircrews get accustomedto the combat environment and users get accustomedto the crew and squadron leadership.it’s a win for everyone.’ ” moreover, thisdeployment reduced required aircrews by upto 50 percent. 40To meet the demands of a long war, revisedC-5 expeditionary doctrine focuses on improvingmission success—but could produce improvedaircrew efficiency as a by-product. Forexample, a complete eas (commander andaircrews) would deploy to an existing C-5 stagelocation for 90–120 days and fly sorties to/from the iraqi and afghani combat zones (orwhere directed in-theater). Nondeployed C-5crews shuttle passengers and cargo from theUnited states to the eas location and back—amission for demobilized Reserve, NationalGuard, and nondeployed active duty crews. asthe C-5 eas matures, C-5 Reserve and NationalGuard crews could assume more taskings—ashave their combat air Force counterparts.how many additional truck convoyscould we remove from the hostile roads ofiraq and afghanistan if we forward-deployedC-5s routinely?We should consider one other doctrinalconsideration: could the air Force use a modernizedC-5m for airdrop? Taxpayers must expectmore from their $8 billion amP andReRP investment, and the air Force shoulddemand even more from a modernized C-5m.The C-5 would certainly not become the airForce’s primary airdrop platform, but the servicemight wish to consider the Galaxy’s abilityto air-drop heavy equipment as one option formeeting current and emerging requirementsfor such delivery and force projection. The challengesof a long war put an ever-increasing premiumon the current combat airlift fleet andthus demand that doctrine evolve to keep pace.OrganizationWe should deploy C-5 aircrews under the aeFconstruct as an eas to existing stage locations(see doctrine above). Three- and six-ship C-5unit type codes exist and have been exercised.Critics may argue that this will put C-5 aircrewsin the same deployment spiral that C-130crews experience; however, C-5s have a muchhigher crew ratio than do C-130s. moreover,the eas conforms with General moseley’s mostrecent heritage to horizons priorities. Underhis first priority, “Prosecute the Long War onTerrorism,” applicable tier-two initiatives thatalign with C-5 intellectual modernization includethe following: “align garrison organizationaltemplate with expeditionary template,align [unit type codes] to minimize non-unitdeployments, ensure 100% of uniformedmembers are in aeF deployment bucket.” 41airmen comprising C-5 aircrews aren’t theonly ones to benefit from this initiative (seestage managers, expeditors, and ramp supervisorsin the section on “Leadership and education,”below).another recommendation calls for attachingmaintenance units to deploying C-5 flyingsquadrons—especially for the mechanicallytemperamental Galaxy. “Combat Wing Organization,”a “Chief’s sight Picture” from GenJohn Jumper, former air Force chief of staff,reiterates this construct:When i was a squadron commander there wasan aircraft maintenance Unit (amU) attachedto my squadron. i didn’t command the amU.The officer in charge of the amU was trained bythe colonel who ran the maintenance organization.This colonel had been in the business ofmaintaining airplanes for 24 years. When thesquadron deployed, there was no doubt that theamU would come under my command. But thatamU had been trained by someone who knewthe fixing business as well as i knew the flyingbusiness. 42TrainingC-5 training challenges include developing aweapons instructor course (WiC), moving theformal training unit (FTU), incorporatingmaintenance success, and evaluating missionreadiness. intellectual modernization puts establishinga C-5 WiC at the forefront. Thiscourse serves as the air Force model for insti­

74 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007tutionalizing tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTP)—turning combat lessons identifiedinto lessons learned. TTP continuity previouslymaintained by the C-5 special-operationscommunity (eliminated in 2003) now has noformal home to institutionalize combat lessonslearned. Nonetheless, C-5 aircrews’ abilityto safely execute tactical approaches/departures,integrate night vision devices, swiftly conductengine-running on- and off-loads, and survivea surface-to-air-missile strike proves that today’sC-5 crews are more than ready to embrace theintratheater or tactical combat-airlift role. 43 ifcurrent TTPs and training profiles are any indication,the C-5 still lags behind currentneeds. as of the summer of 2006, C-5 annualrefresher training still did not include afghanior iraqi databases or require combat entryand exit profiles.in fiscal year 2007, the air Force’s C-5 FTUmoves from altus aFB, Oklahoma, to an airForce Reserve Command unit at LacklandaFB’s Kelly Field, Texas. ensuring that thistransfer goes smoothly despite a host of challengeswill require keen oversight. Challengesinclude having a combat-coded unit assumethe training mission with no assigned trainingcodedaircraft and smoothly transferring therecently modernized combat mobility training.44 all of these events must occur in parallelwith the amP, ReRP, and ongoing operationsin iraq and afghanistan.Unlike earlier vignettes that showed successwith the short-term mC rate, the C-5 FTUat altus has experienced success with the longtermrate in an environment that parallels expeditionaryoperations. The 97th maintenanceDirectorate at altus—the recent airForce mC rate champion—delivered rates of70.4 and 73.3 percent for 2004 and 2005, respectively.45 This unit overcame challenges applicableto expeditionary operations: a smallnumber of assigned aircraft (eight of some ofthe oldest C-5as), a demanding training mission(multiple landings and/or air refuelingsper sortie), and a lower parts-supply priority(force/activity designator code) than the restof their C-5 brethren. 46 During the same period,the 97th flew dozens of sorties in supportof iraqi Freedom and recovery operations associatedwith hurricanes Katrina, Rita, andWilma. Despite the FTU transfer from altus toKelly, mentioned earlier, we still have an opportunityto capture and formalize the 97th’ssuccess. spreading these near-wartime mCrates will not only boost Kelly’s C-5 availability(by increasing the historic rates up to 20 percent)but also significantly lift air Force–wideavailability of the Galaxy—regardless of theamP and ReRP. 47 Finally, as former secretaryRumsfeld stated, “We must transform . . . theway we exercise and the way we fight” (seeabove); therefore, as the C-5 transforms itsdoctrine, expeditionary operational readinessinspections must continue to serve as the C-5readiness training and evaluation tool.Materielsince the amP and ReRP are evolutionarymateriel upgrades, intellectual modernizationposes revolutionary proposals for a modernizedC-5m. Could evolutions used in other airlifters—nightvision devices or head-up displays—coupledwith the ReRP’s quieter enginesand 20 percent thrust increase constitute arevolution in itself by significantly enhancingthe C-5m’s global access? Other examples includereducing the C-5’s aircrew complements(see the section on “Personnel,” below), addingairdrop capability that incorporates the JointPrecision airdrop system, and improvingground maneuver by using ReRP engines toback up the C-5 (currently an emergency procedure).48 although these items certainly do notrepresent an extensive list, the potential for highpayoff with minimum cost makes them possibletopics for the air mobility Battle Lab. 49Leadership and Educationas the section on “Doctrine” recommended,intellectual modernization of the C-5 routinelydeploys squadron commanders to leadexpeditionary units. in the traditional C-5stage, we forward-deploy stage managers andother specialists to help solve specific problems.These stovepipes of leadership includeexpediters (senior flight engineers who assistwith aircraft-equipment waivers) and ramp supervisors.But we really need squadron com­

INTELLECTUAL MODERNIZATION OF THE C-5 75manders—people who not only manage, expedite,and supervise the mission but alsostandardize tactics, intelligence, and operationsbetween downrange airfields; apply operationalrisk management; judiciously apply scarceresources (crews, maintenance, and aerialport); and, because they know their unit membersbetter than nondeployed commanders,actually improve unit cohesion/morale. 50 intoday’s expeditionary and combat environment,forward-deployed squadron commanders providemuch simpler decentralized executionthan stage managers, expediters, and ramp supervisors.(The fact that the air Force has institutionalizedexpeditionary operations intoall of its force development eliminates theneed for any educational recommendations.)Personnelin a letter to airmen, secretary of the airForce Wynne says that “we will look at innovativeways to use our materiel and personnelmore efficiently.” 51 as technology continues toreduce the pilot’s preflight workload, the airForce may look at reducing the C-5’s crewcomplement by eliminating the third loadmasterposition and the flight engineer. atthe outset of iraqi Freedom, C-5s routinelyand safely operated on augmented duty days(or at maximum crew-duty period) with twoloadmasters instead of the usual three. Usingonly two loadmasters should not require additionaltechnology but would necessitate retraining.Like C-17 pilots, C-5 pilots could assumesome of the ground duties for whichcurrent C-5 enlisted crew members (loadmastersand/or engineers) are responsible. Thisbrings us to a second personnel recommendation—flightengineers.Using technology available today, other aircraft(the civilian DC-10 to mD-11 conversionor the C-130J model) have replaced theirflight-engineer position. Obviously, withoutredesigning the C-5, the air Force cannoteliminate the second flight engineer or “scanner”crew position. Nonetheless, we now havethe technology to do without the C-5’s flightengineer. in the environment of air Forcesmart Operations 21, cost-effectiveness willdictate such changes.ConclusionThinking about airlift means thinking aboutcombat. . . . Any activity that does not contributeto this philosophy, any attitude that doesnot reflect a preparation for the combat airliftmission, any doctrine that does not serve thatend is suspect and dangerous.—Lt Col Charles e. millerAirlift Doctrineas mentioned earlier, the idea of forwarddeployingthe C-5 is older than the aircraft itself.Recent events—Us military transformation,an expeditionary focus, and successfuldeployments of the C-5—suggest that we shouldrevisit this concept. intellectually modernizingthe C-5 to make expeditionary deploymentsroutine should occur even during mechanicalupgrades of the amP and ReRP. although wehave always had concerns about the C-5’s reliability,as several examples illustrate, maintainabilityand, ultimately, the aircraft’s missionsuccess can be affected as much by employmentand/or training as by mechanical means.although this article’s recommendations remainincomplete and subject to debate, theynonetheless offer a starting place for discussionabout the expeditionary C-5, which we need ifwe wish to improve combat capability—todayand tomorrow. Done right, a modernized andexpeditionary C-5 may finally “revolutionizeglobal mobility airlift,” as former CiNCmaCGeneral estes predicted in 1966. 52 q

76 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007Notes1. “air and space doctrine is an accumulation of knowledgegained primarily from the study and analysis of experience,which may include actual combat or contingencyoperations, as well as experiments or exercises.” air ForceDoctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November2003, ix, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/aFDD_Page_hTmL/Doctrine_Docs/afdd1.pdf.2. Transformation Planning Guidance (Washington, DC:Department of Defense, april 2003), 1, http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/cgisirsi/mon+Nov+13+12:37:04+PsT+2006/siRsi/0/520/TPGfinal.pdf.3. sra J. G. Buzanowski, “air Force Releases 2006 Posturestatement,” air Force Print News, 2 march 2006,http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123016812.4. JCIDS [Joint Capabilities Integration and DevelopmentSystem] Overview (Washington, DC: Joint staff, J-8 Capabilitiesand acquisition Division, n.d.), http://www.dodccrp.org/iamwg/archive/02_20_04_JCiDs.ppt.5. Lt Col Robert C. Owen, “The airlift System: aPrimer,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 25.6. John a. Tirpak, “saving the Galaxy,” Air Force Magazine87, no. 1 (January 2004): 35, http://www.afa.org/magazine/jan2004/0104galaxy.asp.7. Briefing, air Force Requirements Council, subject:air mobility Command Outsize and Oversize analysis of alternatives,2 December 1999; and Quadrennial Defense ReviewReport (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 February2006), 54, http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf.8. Dr. John W. Leland and Kathryn a. Wilcoxson, TheChronological History of the C-5 Galaxy (scott aFB, iL: historyOffice, air mobility Command, 2003), 1. The C-5Galaxy was the world’s largest and heaviest aircraft fromits first flight in 1968 until 1982, when the soviet antonovan-124 captured this title. Like the C-141 starlifter, alsomanufactured by Lockheed aircraft Corporation, the C-5has a high T-tail, a 25-degree wing sweep, and four turbofanengines.9. For definitions of the terms palletized, oversized, andoutsized cargo, see air mobility Command instruction24-101, Transportation, 13 February 2004.10. “The 463L master Pallet system is the main deviceused for air transport by the United states air Force. allcargo aircraft used by the [UsaF] are configured to acceptthese pallets. its dimensions are 88"W, 108"L, and 2 1/2"h.The usable space is 84 [inches] by 104 [inches]. it can holdup to 10,000 lb of cargo at 8 G’s. The empty weight is 290lb.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “463L master Pallet,”http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/463L_master_pallet.11. Leland and Wilcoxson, Chronological History, 1.12. Kneeling (raising and lowering) the entire aircraftapproximately three feet to accommodate loading/unloading cargo and wheeled vehicles through its fullwidthopening front and rear doors is a feature unique tothe C-5.13. Cmsgt Timothy Reuning, amC/a3 7VG, interviewby the author, 29 January 2004. Larger than a Boeing747, the C-5 has 28 tires that help spread its weight. in factat maximum gross weight, a C-5 has a lighter pavementclassification number than a fully loaded C-141 or C-17.14. “C-5 Galaxy,” UsaF fact sheet, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=84.15. house, Statement Prepared for Delivery to the HouseArmed Services Committee by Under Secretary of Defense forPolicy Douglas J. Feith, Washington, DC, 108th Cong., 2nd sess.,23 June 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040623-0522.html.16. Leland and Wilcoxson, Chronological History, 62.17. Army Modernization Plan, 2003 (Washington, DC:Department of the army, 13 march 2003), annex D, D-17,http://www.army.mil/features/mODPlan/2003/mP03mainweb100.pdf.18. Lt Col Charles e. miller, Airlift Doctrine (maxwellaFB, aL: air University Press, march 1988), 305, http://aupress.au.af.mil/Books/miller_airlift/miller_airlift.pdf.19. Leland and Wilcoxson, Chronological History, 12.20. miller, Airlift Doctrine, 339.21. Gen howell m. estes Jr., “The Revolution in airlift,”Air University Review 17, no. 3 (march–april 1966): 15.22. Gen howell m. estes Jr., “modern Combat airlift,”Air University Review 20, no. 6 (september–October 1969):18, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1969/sep-oct/estes.html.23. Leland and Wilcoxson, Chronological History, 13.24. Capt Chris J. Krisinger, “Operation Nickel Grass:airlift in support of National Policy,” Airpower Journal 3,no. 1 (spring 1989): 27, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj89/krisinger.html; and WalterJ. Boyne, “Nickel Grass,” Air Force Magazine 81, no. 12 (December1998), http://www.afa.org/magazine/Dec1998/1298nickel_print.html.25. Leland and Wilcoxson, Chronological History, 8–9.26. ibid., 14.27. Briefing, air Force Requirements Council.28. Leland and Wilcoxson, Chronological History, 2.29. Tirpak, “saving the Galaxy,” 31–35.30. The Us air Force’s first air and space expeditionaryforce deployed in October 1995 to southwest asia. LtCol michael J. Nowak, The Air Expeditionary Force: A Strategyfor an Uncertain Future?, maxwell Paper no. 19 (maxwellaFB, aL: air War College, august 1999), 10, http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/maxwell_Papers/Text/mp19.pdf.31. Briefing, Lt Col James a. spaulding, commander,715th ams, and author, to air Force Council, Washington,DC, subject: C-5 expeditionary Operations, 12 December2002.32. inscription, personal photo from James Roche,former secretary of the air Force.33. Rick sauder, “entering a New Galaxy,” Airlift/Tanker Quarterly 11, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 13, http://www.atalink.org/atq/aTQ_Winter_2003.pdf.34. air Force instruction (aFi) 11-289, Phoenix Banner,Silver, and Copper Operations, 16 February 2006, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/11/afi11-289/afi11-289.pdf.35. hard crews are a set of crew members who alwaysfly together.36. “Us Pony express,” The History Channel, 13 November2003.

INTELLECTUAL MODERNIZATION OF THE C-5 7737. adam J. hebert, “air mobility’s Never-endingsurge,” U.S. Air Force AIM Points, 7 september 2006,http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=13670.38. according to amC’s “line assigned” aircrew datafor 2002 and 2003, C-5 pilots average the highest numberof temporary duty (TDY) days of all amC pilots. C-5 copilotsat Dover aFB, De, in 2003 averaged over 215 daysTDY, beating all other amC aircrew positions by over amonth. additionally, C-5 aircrew “weighted averages” werethe highest of all amC’s airlifters for those two years.39. after mobilization of air Force Reserve aircrewsprior to iraqi Freedom (January–march 2003), the author,serving as deputy operations group commander at TravisaFB, Ca, witnessed less than 10 percent of C-5 aircrewsever approaching the flying-hour limit of 330 hours in 90days as specified in aFi 11-202, Flying Operations, vol. 3, GeneralFlight Rules, 5 april 2006, 69, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/11/afi11-202v3/afi11-202v3.pdf.40. Tsgt Chuck marsh, “C-17 Deployment Length, efficiencyincrease,” U.S. Air Force AIM Points, 11 July 2006,http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=12484.41. Gen T. michael moseley, to commanders of themajor commands and deputy chiefs of staff, letter, 17 may2006.42. Gen John P. Jumper, “Combat Wing Organization,”“Chief’s sight Picture,” 2002.43. ian Thompson, “service under Fire—Travis CrewRecalls Baghdad mission,” Daily Republic, 21 January 2004,http://dailyrepublic.com/articles/2004/01/21/news/news1.txt.44. Combat mobility training involves the merging ofancillary training, mission-qualification ground training,and tactics, which produces a near-mission-ready, expeditionaryFTU graduate. Previously accomplished in-unit, asof 2006, 13 of these 15 events are now accomplished bythe FTU at air education and Training Command. Otherinitiatives proposed but not in combat mobility traininginclude training in night vision devices, airdrop, formation,and so forth.45. see data from amC’s GO81/Broker aircraftmaintenance system for the C-5, C-141, KC-135, KC-10,and C-17 aircraft. it also has provisions to accommodateother aircraft.46. see air Force Policy Directive 16-3, Operations Support,26 January 1994, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/16/afpd16-3/afpd16-3.pdf.47. GO81 data.48. “Joint Precision airdrop system ( JPaDs): advancedConcept Technology Demonstration (aCTD),”US Army Natick Soldier Center, http://www.natick.army.mil/soldier/media/fact/airdrop/JPaDs_aCTD.htm.49. “air mobility Warfare Center,” UsaF fact sheet,http://www.amc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=233.50. Former commander, C-17 eas, to the author, e-mail,may 2003.51. hon. michael W. Wynne, “Letter to airmen: airForce smart Operations 21,” 8 march 2006, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/secaf.asp?id=219.52. estes, “Revolution in airlift,” 15.

ASPJQuick-LookFit (and Ready) to FightStrengthening Combat Readiness throughControlled-Aggression Training2d Lt NickoLas stewart, UsaFBecause deployments to forwardoperatinglocations put airmen inharm’s way, they must remain keenlyattentive and ready for possible attackat all times. not long ago, warfare consistedmostly of movements by uniformedarmies fighting with tanks and aircraft. todayin Iraq, however, suicide bombers and jihadmotivatedterrorists pose the primary threat.unfortunately, airmen are not as ready as theyshould be for dangerous, close-proximity encounterswith the enemy.this is not an issue of legal restraint or poorequipment but of inadequate military preparation.the air Force trains its personnel wellin the law of armed conflict, equips themproperly, and assures their proficiency withfirearms, but—unlike most members of oursister services—few deployed airmen receiveextensive training in hand-to-hand combat.such expertise might represent the differencebetween life and death for unarmed airmen orthose who have exhausted their ammunition.comments by 2d lt Raymond Fernandezof los angeles aFB, california, who deployedmany times to afghanistan and Qatar as anenlisted man, typify the current situation: “Ifwe had ever been overrun or even attackedindividually, I don’t think anyone would haveknown what to do. I certainly wasn’t trained tofight individually.” 1 even aircrew members, someof the service’s most highly trained personnel,don’t receive much instruction in personaldefense following an aircraft ejection, a skillthey need if they have to fight an enemy inhand-to-hand combat.Given these circumstances, either the airForce can continue to deploy poorly preparedairmen into harm’s way or it can better preparethem for the war on terrorism by providing themcombat training—for example, by using “Irontiger immersion” to instruct all air Force specialtiesin self-defense and personnel-defensetraining. 2 this program’s defense courses wouldadopt the most applicable aspects of chineseand Brazilian jujitsu, kenpo, aikido, pakua, andthe hsing-i martial arts. specifically, all of the airForce’s enlisted basic trainees; Reserve officertraining corps, us air Force academy, and officertraining school cadets; and officer traineesshould know weapons disarmament, arms recovery,rapid-withdrawal techniques, controlledaggressionpractice,takedowns,andself-defense/personnel defense. these skills, in conjunctionwith good negotiation techniques, could savethe lives of american airmen.Initial training would prove sufficient tosignificantly improve the chances of survivalin a hostile environment. It would follow airmenthrough their careers, continuing at alllevels of enlisted and officer professional militaryeducation (pme). From the air and spaceBasic course to air War college, and from theFirst term airman’s course to the seniornoncommissioned officer academy, all airmenwould continually enhance their selfdefensereadiness. Whether such training alsooccurs at equivalent sister-service/joint, inter­78

QUICK-LOOK 79mediate, and senior developmental-educationschools would remain the decision of thoseservices and the department of defense.defense training is the natural counterpartto the air Force’s Fit to Fight program, designedto assure the fitness of airmen, both physicallyand mentally, for forward combat operations.much like pilates or yoga, mixed martial arts(mma) lengthens and leans muscles, strengthensthe heart and vital organs, and increasesblood flow as well as the ability to manage stress.a dynamic program, mma prescribes drillsranging from three-mile, slow-conditioningruns followed by calisthenics, to takedowndemonstrations and sparring matches. airmenwould see and feel the initial benefits, but thereal return on this investment would occurduring deployment. Including Iron tiger inbasic training and pme would promote professionalcompetency, self-discipline, and maturitythroughout the ranks.In many respects, american airmen are thebest trained in the world. after all, “developingairmen” is our first core competency. yet,in other ways, we may be the weak link in thechain, compared to our colleagues in theother services. the marine corps developed amartial arts program in 2000 to train marinesand attached personnel in unarmed combat,using edged weapons and weapons of opportunity.In several different programs, armysoldiers train in close-quarters fighting andhand-to-hand combat known as H2H or HtH,and the army’s field manuals for 2002–6strongly emphasize Brazilian jujitsu. accordingto army Field manual (Fm) 3-25.150 (Fm21-150), Combatives,Hand-to-hand combat is an engagement betweentwo or more persons in an empty-handed struggleor with hand-held weapons such as knives, sticks,or projectile weapons that cannot be fired. proficiencyin hand-to-hand combat is one of thefundamental building blocks for training themodern soldier. . . . In most combat situations,small arms and grenades are the weapons ofchoice. However, in some scenarios, soldiersmust engage the enemy in confined areas. . . . Inthese instances, or when your primary weaponfails, the bayonet or knife may be the idealweapon to dispatch the enemy. soldiers musttransition immediately and instinctively into theappropriate techniques based on the situationand the weapons at hand. 3the army and marine programs may notcreate a total Force of experts in hand-tohandcombat, but producing a fighting spiritwill yield tremendous benefits. their programsbind that spirit with character andcamaraderie—the warrior mind-set. Becauseair Force airmen often find themselves in thesame environment and face the same enemy assister-service troops, they need similar trainingin self-defense to bolster their combat abilities,confidence, and fighting spirit. Indeed,this proposal seems to complement the airForce chief of staff’s recent move to provide19 hours of training in expeditionary combatskills for all airmen deployed to a war zone. 4despite the air Force’s technological sophistication,combat remains very much a humanendeavor. the service must train airmen tofight the current threat of global terrorism,regardless of the cost in time and money,because it cannot allow its deployed personnelaround the world to become targets ofopportunity for terrorists. Hopefully, if the airForce implements the Iron tiger training proposedin this article, potential enemies willsay, “don’t mess with usaF airmen—they areready to fight.” qNotes1. 2d lt Raymond Fernandez, financial analyst, mIlsatcomsystems Wing, los angeles aFB, ca, interviewby the author, 10 october 2005.2. the author submitted Iron tiger immersion for considerationunder the air Force’s Innovative developmentthrough employee awareness (Idea) program.3. army Field manual (Fm) 3-25.150 (Fm 21-150),Combatives, 18 January 2002, 1-1, 7-1, https://134.11.61.26/cd5/publications/da/Fm/Fm%203-25.150%2020020118.pdf (accessed 18 october 2006).4. adam J. Hebert, “preparing for a new Way of War,”Air Force Magazine 89, no. 7 (July 2006): 41, http://www.afa.org/magazine/July2006/0706war.pdf (accessed 18october 2006).

Leadership by the Socratic MethodMaj aaron a. Tucker, uSaF*Editorial Abstract: Opining that modernleaders should study the habits of greatthinkers and leaders of the past, MajorTucker focuses specifically on Socrates, aretired soldier, stonemason, and philosopherin Athens, Greece, during the fifthcentury BC. The author argues that sincethe “Socratic method” forces students towardintellectual self-examination anda logical conclusion, it offers a valuableway to help leaders acquire critical thinkinguseful for influencing and persuadingother people.Leaders in the twenty-first centurywould do well to study the habits ofgreat thinkers and leaders of the past.socrates famously instructed his studentsthrough a series of carefully constructedquestions designed to force self-examinationand lead them to a conclusion. this methodfor instilling critical-thinking skills is invaluableto leaders in many circumstances as a wayto influence and persuade. Contemporaryleaders fill many roles: instructor, mentor,leader, follower, and peer. each of these rolesis well served by the socratic method.socrates was a retired soldier and stonemasonin athens during the fifth century BC.he took great pleasure in pulling people intoconversation, questioning their assertions, anddismantling their philosophies by turning theirown logic against them. 1 in fact he claimed tobe “fulfilling the wishes of the gods when hegoes about and argues with people.” 2 socrateswas unique among the scholars of ancientathens by presenting himself not as a masterof knowledge but as a fellow student workingtoward the discovery of truth during mostlyinformal discussions. such dialogue empowersthe student to question the logic and ideasof the instructor even as the teacher gains insightfrom the student’s arguments. as a result,both the instructor and student are betterable to order their thoughts and argumentsinto a stronger, more coherent theory tem­*the author would like to acknowledge the assistance of several outstanding individuals for their review of this article and valuableinputs: Col Mark dillon, Col harrison smith, Lt Col dan Fritz, Maj Mark thompson, Capt sandy thompson, Capt elwood Waddell, andMr. Brian ai Chang.80

LEADERSHIP BY THE SOCRATIC METHOD 81pered by relentless hammering in the forge ofdebate. socrates described himself as an “intellectualmidwife, whose questioning deliversthe thoughts of others into the light of day.” 3too often, however, socrates used his questioningto disparage his students, not necessarilyto help them. We must be wary of thesharp edge of this teaching tool. 4the Socratic method, or elenchus, is definedas a prolonged series of questions and answerswhich refutes a moral assertion by leading anopponent to draw a conclusion that contradictshis own viewpoint. 5 during this dialogue,students are forced to critically examine otherviewpoints and question their own assumptionsand assertions. socrates developed this elenchusas a “means to examine, refute, or put toshame” and gradually cultivated a school ofyoung athenians, including Plato, Xenophon,and aristophanes. 6 Often, his students wereleft confused and bewildered, not knowing exactlywhat truth was or what they personallybelieved. in time, however, the education hisstudents received enabled the development ofsome of the world’s greatest philosophy.the socratic method has been widely usedthroughout history in a variety of circumstances.Plato continued his teacher’s traditionof informal instruction and introspection;his most famous student was aristotle. BenjaminFranklin, in his Autobiography, recountedcoming across the socratic method during anearly period of self-education: “i procur’dXenophon’s Memorable Things of Socrates, whereinthere are many instances of the [socratic]method. i was charm’d with it, adopted it,dropt my abrupt contradiction and positiveargumentation, and put on the humble inquirerand doubter.” 7 Like socrates, BenFranklin also took delight in drawing peopleinto conversation and “entangling them indifficulties out of which they could not extricatethemselves.” 8 Unlike socrates, however,Franklin gradually abandoned the sharp edgeof dispute and moved toward a method ofnever expressing himself in absolutes, as amaster of knowledge might, choosing insteadto present his opinion as just that. Franklincredits this deferential air to his ability to inculcatehis opinions and promote his causes. 9as the representative to France during theamerican revolution, Franklin secured Frenchmilitary and financial assistance critical to thedefeat of english armies and the birth of theUnited states as an independent country. hisinfluence at the Constitutional Conventionwas legendary as the singularly american formof government took shape.Law and medical schools widely use the socraticmethod to educate their students. Lawprofessors start with a real court case and thentransform it “into another of [their] peculiar‘hypotheticals,’ which [they alter] bit by bit,question by question, so [the students] cansee the way each fact relates to the controllingprinciple.” 10 Law students are “tacitly instructedin the strategies of legal argument, in puttingwhat had been analyzed back together in away that would make [a lawyer’s] contentionspersuasive to a court.” 11 Medical students arelikewise instructed through case study and diagnosis.harvard Medical school wants its studentsto “identify a gap in their knowledge,feel guilty about not filling it, and have theskills to learn what they need.” 12 the result is alevel of critical thinking and mental disciplinethat society depends on for the effective practiceof law and medicine.Use of the socratic method serves to producea strong professional in fields that aremainly self-governing. the largely successfulefforts of law and medicine to maintain highprofessional standards (and remarkably littlelegislative oversight) have their foundation inthe emphasis on critical thinking and professionaldialogue. Commensurate with the levelof trust that society places in its practitioners,the fields of law and medicine have managedto transcend simple training.training and education bear important distinctions.Military training, for instance, requiresknowledge of and adherence to technicalorderprocedures, regulations, and rules ofengagement. By contrast, education emphasizescritical thinking, original thought, andjudgment. socrates states that he is not ateacher in the sense that “teaching” is simplytransferring knowledge from instructor to student.he does, however, engage students in adialogue designed to enable the discovery of

82 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007truth for themselves. 13 socrates works strictlyin the higher levels of cognitive learning.Bloom’s taxonomy stratifies the intellectualoutcomes of cognitive learning into six levels:knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis,synthesis, and evaluation (see figure). 14training delivers to the student what to think(application), whereas education involves teachingone how to think (analysis), how to produceoriginal thought (synthesis), and how to makejudgments about value (evaluation).the socratic method also has drawbacksand, like any leadership technique, fits somesituations better than others. extended philosophicaldialogue requires a certain level ofknowledge in the examinee, requiring sometraining in the subject matter in order to exchangea meaningful dialogue. Further, elenchustakes time to unfold and may be somewhatunwieldy in an operational environment.Military leaders must be agile in their leadershipstyle and balance the two goals of developingand persuading their followers with thesocratic method and executing a time-criticalmission with a more directive style of leadership.Continual questioning can also be annoyingand, perhaps, counterproductive if thequestioner is overly enthusiastic. a harvardLaw school student found it hard to take, callingit “unfair and intimidating.” 15if a leader uses the socratic method too rigidly,submitting only questions rather thanopinions or insights, the student or followermay never know exactly what the leader thinks.One harvard Law school professor’s particularstyle of questioning threatened to severely disillusionhis students: “he just stood . . . andkept asking questions; and as confusion grew,so did dissatisfaction. no one was quite surewhat [the professor] wanted from us. Were westupid? Were the questions bad? What were wesupposed to be learning? it was almost as if[he] had set out to intensify that plague of uncertaintywhich afflicted us all.” 16 in fact,socrates’s own students complained bitterlyabout his tendency to hide behind elenchus:“We’ve had enough of your ridiculing others,questioning and refuting everyone, while neverwilling to render an account of yourself toanyone or state your own opinion about any-EvaluationSynthesisAnalysisApplicationComprehensionKnowledgeFigure. Bloom’s taxonomy of the cognitivedomainthing.” 17 Leaders must trust their followersenough to reveal themselves, or the socraticmethod can become just a veil of questionsthat hides their true thoughts—or lack thereof.Leadership in the twenty-first century hasmany emerging challenges, and leaders requiretools to meet those tests. taking lessons froman ancient technique for self-inspection providesone such tool for modern leaders to usein their many roles. two thousand four hundredyears ago, socrates used elenchus—a series ofleading questions—to educate his students incritical thinking and to challenge their assumptions.Modern law and medical schools haveextensively used this form of instruction toeducate and sharpen the intellect of futureprofessionals. similarly, the socratic method canserve twenty-first-century leaders to instructstudents, mentor protégés, motivate followers,advise other leaders, and influence peers.Leadership by the Socratic MethodMilitary leaders, both officer and enlisted,find themselves in five roles in which they canimplement the socratic method:• as instructors in formal training.• as mentors while grooming protégés forprofessional growth.

LEADERSHIP BY THE SOCRATIC METHOD 83• as formal leaders while motivating peopletoward an objective.• as followers who employ critical thinkingskills to advise leaders.• as peers interacting with others.each role allows the practice of the socraticmethod to exercise critical thinking, creativity,and problem-solving skills while providing fora more effective, efficient solution to the problemat hand.As InstructorsIf you are to come to the truth, it must be byyourself for yourself.—socratesthe socratic method can be effectively usedto promote critical-thinking skills, build studentconfidence, and expand the instructor’sown knowledge. during a lecture, the instructorseeks to transfer knowledge directly to thestudents. Often, students are forced to followthe instructor’s train of thought or logic, makingthe task of learning doubly hard. Whilelecturing certainly has its place in the first stepof Bloom’s taxonomy (knowledge), allowingstudents to grasp the application and meaningof the intended lesson is best accomplishedby guiding the thought process with socraticdialogue. additionally, the instructor can usestudents’ responses to evaluate comprehension,allowing him or her to fine-tune the presentation.instruction using leading questions will helpbuild confidence as students solve problemswith familiar thought processes. the instructor’sgoal is to guide students to ask the rightquestions that lead them to reach reasonableconclusions. a common student complaint is,“i don’t know where to start.” Often, that answeris gained only through experience, whichis where the socratic method becomes useful.instead of telling the student where to beginand forcing him or her to memorize the answerfor future use, the instructor can simplyask what things are important in the task. thestudent can now follow his or her own rationaleto the answer, which validates both knowledgeand comprehension while providing fodderfor further dialogue. this type of discussionleads the student to an appropriate conclusion.elenchus transfers the burden of following alogic flow from the student to the instructor asthey navigate to the answer together. Whenstudents see that they have answered theirown question with a familiar logic, the abilityto retrace their own thought process will promoteconfidence in future success.a great advantage of using the socraticmethod is that sometimes the student’s conclusionisn’t the one that the instructor originallypredicted but is even better or at leastacceptable. through the student’s answer, theinstructor can assess the relative strengths ofdifferent courses of action and choose a new,creative path to continue the dialogue. Uponarrival at a more effective solution, both thestudent and instructor have benefited from asynergy made possible through the shared effortof the socratic method.an instructor aircraft commander (an areaof the author’s personal experience) can makeexcellent use of the socratic method. the aircraftcommander is a pilot with the specificresponsibility and final authority for the safeoperation of an aircraft and successful completionof its given mission. a myriad of agenciesand resources is available to the aircraftcommander in order to ensure safety and asuccessful mission. some tasks require no action,some require monitoring, and some requireconstant intervention to run in sequenceand on time. the student aircraft commanderhas to continually apply critical thinking toeach process to decide whether to act on it,delegate it, or take no action. the instructorcould ask what the student perceives, what hisor her intentions are, and the reasons for thatdecision in short order. the student is thereforeallowed to handle issues quickly and successfully,building self-confidence while ensuringmission success. the student quickly learnsthat the instructor is there not to lecture (andunnecessarily increase the workload) but toserve as a sounding board for the student’sideas and actions. sometimes the student’scourse of action is more effective than the instructor’sidea. in this case, the student bene­

84 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007fits from positive feedback on the success ofhis or her plan, the instructor learns a newtechnique to apply to future instruction, andthe mission benefits from the synergy.the instructor should let the student knowthat he or she doesn’t have all the answers andalso suffers from fears, doubts, and insecurities.18 if teaching is simply transferring knowledgefrom teacher to student, then socratesdid not teach. socrates defined teaching as“engaging would-be learners in . . . argumentto make them aware of their own ignoranceand enable them to discover for themselvesthe truth the teacher had held back.” 19socrates’s role in teaching is not to defend athesis of his own but only to examine the student’sassertion. 20 in the end, however, theteacher tests his or her own beliefs and assertionsas student points are examined, dissectedfor logic, and then reassembled strongerthan before.As MentorsYou may plant a field well; but you know notwho shall gather the fruits: you may build ahouse well; but you know not who shall dwellin it.—XenophonMentors are charged with developing quality replacementpersonnel and must therefore actas both instructor and evaluator. the socraticmethod is well suited to both tasks and canprovide intellectual development as well aspractical training for protégés. it can then assistspecific protégés in further developmentand eventual promotion to leadership positions.Leaders trained in self-examinationtechniques and educated with critical thinkingensure future organizational success.the mentor can seed the field of leadercandidates by addressing groups and by conductingone-on-one conversation. Questionsposed to groups mimic the style used by lawand medical schools and quickly generatelively discussion as the candidates generateideas. the mentor can shepherd the discussionto enable the group to reach an important lessonor truth while simultaneously illuminatinghis or her own critical-thinking processes. dialoguebecomes more powerful as the mentoruses the protégé’s own knowledge base toguide a philosophical thread. When the philosophyoutstrips the protégé’s experience,the mentor can continue to instruct and elucidatethe concept under examination. theprotégé learns both new concepts and thoughtprocesses, which are valuable since the mentor,a successful leader, has already internalizedthem.the mentor, while interacting with candidateleaders, can also evaluate each individual’scognitive-learning level as prescribed in Bloom’staxonomy. Lines of questioning can evaluateeach of the six levels, from knowledge to evaluation.how much does the candidate know(knowledge)? how does he or she apply it to anew situation (application)? is it right (evaluation)?the mentor can determine each candidate’slevel of training in the first two questionsand critical thinking ability in the third. thisevaluation allows further discrimination withinthe pool of candidates and a more efficient investmentof professional-development energies.As LeadersLeadership is the art of getting someone to dosomething you want done because he wantsto do it.—dwight d. eisenhowera person in a formal leadership position canuse the socratic method to persuade, securesupport, encourage an active followership,and develop followers for better efficiency.Well-timed dialogue with subordinates can allowthe leader to both receive their counseland secure buy-in to proposed policy. Questionscan be posed in conference with advisors.this dialogue allows leaders to revealtheir rationale and seek feedback on theirthought process from subordinates. subordinateswho are consulted in such a manner aremore committed to a proposed action or policythan otherwise, and through such dialogue,the leader may learn of an unpredicted resultthat could be easily mitigated early but wouldbe difficult to overcome after the act was committedor policy published. Both the policy

LEADERSHIP BY THE SOCRATIC METHOD 85and its support are simultaneously improvedby exercising the socratic method.active followers are crucial to a leader’ssuccess. For followers to show initiative, however,the leader must be open and predictable.Leaders who question their counselors receivethe dual benefit of making better decisionsbecause of their advisors’ input as well as increasingtrust within the organization. Followerswho trust that they know their leader’smind can take the initiative without actingcontrary to the leader’s philosophy.Leaders throughout history have used staffsto enable the administration of expandedspheres of influence. a staff that understandsthe mind of its leader is more efficient in itsduties and more effective in assisting theleader. a leader who spends some time in dialoguewith key staff members educates themon his or her thinking, which guides the spiritand logic of subsequent efforts, resulting inrealized efficiencies.abraham Lincoln, one of the most assertivepresidents in history, guided his staff withshrewdness and subtlety. Lincoln was a very effectivepractitioner of the socratic method.his leadership style encouraged innovationand risk taking as he would let his subordinatesproceed with the belief that it was theiridea. if their plan was not to his liking, Lincolnwould “focus, direct, or point his peopleto what he viewed as the proper path.” 21 Just assocrates claimed not to be a teacher whileguiding his students to self-knowledge, Lincolnmade a similar declaration: “i claim notto have controlled events, but confess plainlythat events have controlled me.” 22George e. Baker, private secretary to [secretaryof state] seward, described how Lincoln hadchanged his practice from year to year in thematter of signing the many public documentsbrought to him by Baker. during the first fewmonths of his administration he read each papercarefully through, remarking, “i never signa document i have not first read.” at a later periodhe asked the messenger, “Won’t you readthese papers to me?” still later he requestedmerely “a synopsis of the contents.” and in thefourth year his expression most often was, “showme where you want my name.” seward’s secretarymentioned this development as though Lincolnmight have been more expeditious to beginwith. this was not entirely so. the first yearhad been given to training seward in several respects.and as the two had fraternized and policiesin degree clarified, their mutual understandingwas such that Lincoln could nowusually say with perfect safety, “show me whereyou want my name,” whereas during the firstyear he would have been near ruin more thanonce had not his habit been to say, “i never signa document i have not first read.” 23similarly, Winston Churchill evoked creativesolutions from his staff during World War ii bychallenges and questions. Often he would setforth a proposal with the purpose of elicitingcritical feedback and creative counterproposals:“the purpose of many of his proposals, especiallyhis more imaginative and impractical ones,was to stimulate others to use their own imaginationand initiative in solving a problem.” 24As FollowersThe greatest trust between man and man isthe trust of giving counsel.—sir Francis Baconthe concept of using the socratic methodfrom a follower position capitalizes on theidea that a solution resulting from such a dialoguehas a synergistic potential not availableto either the leader or the follower in isolation.the follower has the opportunity to affectpolicy and impress his or her own logicand rationale on the leader through open dialogue.effecting a line of questioning from theposition of follower requires tact, discretion,and a high level of trust. Both the leader andthe follower must trust each other’s integrityand the method.niccolò Machiavelli, a minister to princesin fifteenth-century italy, aspired to open dialoguewith his leaders. in The Prince, he advisedleaders to “choose wise men in his statewho alone have the freedom of speaking thetruth to him, and then . . . ask them abouteverything, listen to their opinions and subsequentlyresolve for himself to his liking, andcomport himself in such a manner that eachcouncilor knows that the more freely he speaks

86 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007the more he will be accepted.” 25 Unfortunately,some of his princes did not see thepractical benefits to finding truth through socraticdialogue and imprisoned and torturedMachiavelli. 26Often, the benefit of dialogue is the illuminationof a point; however, initiation by thefollower often adds an additional benefit. thefollower can determine the sense of the leaderand enable more effective counsel in the future.Further, the follower’s insight into theleader’s personal philosophy can be carriedback and discussed with his or her peers. theleader’s base of followers is improved as a resultof the effort of one follower using the socraticmethod.As PeersIf everybody is thinking alike, then somebodyisn’t thinking.—Gen George s. Patton Jr.Leadership among peers is a difficult proposition.Without the bully pulpit of a formal leadershipposition, a person has little leverage toforce a line of questioning. also without thebenefit of knowing the destination of thethread of philosophical thought, dialogue isless efficient but still benefits from the inputs ofmultiple participants. there is a peculiarbenefit to this application, however. Peers aregenerally more open and frank with eachother than they are with their superiors andare willing to share contrarian viewpoints. despitethe lack of a formal instructor, peergroups can use socratic dialogue to help discoveranswers. While the process can seem alittle misdirected and disorganized, the approachcan be both fun and rewarding. Oftenpeople learn best when they find answersthemselves. 27Care must be taken that the socratic methoddoesn’t exasperate peers and lose the intendedobjective of exercising critical-thinking skills.Ben Franklin related his experience with a coworker:“i used to work him so with my socraticmethod, and had trepann’d [trapped]him so often by questions apparently so distantfrom any point we had in hand, and yetby degrees led to the point, and brought himinto difficulties and contradictions, that at lasthe grew ridiculously cautious, and would hardlyanswer me the most common question, withoutasking first, ‘What do you intend to infer fromthat?’ ” (emphasis in original). 28Conclusionalthough the socratic method was originallyused for self-examination and the searchfor philosophical truth, twenty-first-centuryleaders can apply its power to the needs ofmodern leadership. as an instructor, theleader can promote critical-thinking skillswhile evaluating the student’s knowledge andcomprehension in order to fine-tune furtherinstruction. the student benefits by followinga familiar, repeatable thought process (his orher own) and gaining self-confidence. socraticdialogue assists the mentor by providing intellectualdevelopment and candidate evaluationfor future leaders. in a formal leadership capacity,dialogue helps secure support, encourageactive followership, and develop efficientstaff personnel. similarly, a follower can usethe socratic method to probe the leader’s rationaleand affect policy with a synergy notavailable to the leader in isolation. Peers canimprove each other’s critical-thinking skills andinsight through open dialogue that promotescreativity and constructive feedback.the socratic method does have its drawbacks,and modern literature abounds withother effective leadership techniques, eachwith a particular strength. Pointed questioningrequires a certain level of knowledge inthe examinee, takes time to execute, and canbe annoying if the questioner is overly enthusiastic.also the leader must endeavor not tohide behind a veil of questions, never givinghis or her own philosophies or opinions to followers.Other leadership techniques are moredirective, immediate, and simpler for the leaderto use. Unfortunately the follower receives littleenergy toward his or her development, andno feedback path exists except for the bravesoul who is willing to speak up.twenty-first-century leaders face issues similarto those encountered by citizens in classical

LEADERSHIP BY THE SOCRATIC METHOD 87athens. Both require a method to promotecritical thinking and self-examination in thepursuit of truth. socrates’s elenchus provideda solution in his method of simple questioningto bring forth creative thought for inspec-tion and contemplation. the leader serves asa “jeweler of ideas. he uses his questions like agoldsmith’s hammer, working the conceptsdown to an incredible fineness and shine.” 29 qNotes1. Garth Kemerling, “socrates,” Philosophy Pages, 7 august2002, http://www.philosophypages.com/ph/socr.htm(accessed 25 June 2006).2. anthony Gottlieb, Socrates (new York: routledge,1999), 14.3. ibid., 15.4. david h. elkind and Freddy sweet, “the socraticapproach to Character education,” Educational Leadership,May 1997, http://www.goodcharacter.com/socratic_method.html (accessed 18 February 2006).5. Princess Orig, “Problem-Based Learning and thesocratic Elenchus in the teaching of Literature,” temasekPolytechnic/Learning academy PBL (problem-based learning)Portal, n.d., http://pbl.tp.edu.sg/PBL%20subjects/articles/PrincessOrig.pdf (accessed 15 February 2006).6. ibid.7. Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography (new York: internationalCollector’s edition, 1959), 38.8. ibid.9. ibid., 39.10. scott turow, One L: The Turbulent True Story of aFirst Year at Harvard Law School (new York: time WarnerBooks, 1997), 71.11. ibid., 73.12. david r. Garvin, “Making the Case: Professionaleducation for the World of Practice,” Harvard Magazine106, no. 1 (september–October 2003): 64.13. Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 32.14. B. s. Bloom, ed., “taxonomy of educational Objectives:the Classification of educational Goals—handbooki: Cognitive domain,” Learning and Teaching, 15 august2005, http://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/bloomtax.htm (accessed 20 June 2006).15. turow, One L, 98.16. ibid., 46.17. Vlastos, Socrates, 32.18. elkind and sweet, Socratic Approach.19. Vlastos, Socrates, 32.20. ibid., 113.21. don t. Phillips, Lincoln on Leadership: ExecutiveStrategies for Tough Times (new York: time Warner Books,1992), 100.22. ibid., 99.23. Carl sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years,vol. 3 (new York: harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939),414.24. steven F. hayward, Churchill on Leadership: ExecutiveSuccess in the Face of Adversity (rocklin, Ca: Prima Publishing,1998), 95.25. niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (atlantic highlands,nJ: humanities Press international, 1996), 113.26. ibid., 15.27. Maj norman h. Patnode, “the socratic Method:Leveraging Questions to increase Performance,” ProgramManager 31, no. 6 (november–december 2002): 48.28. Franklin, Autobiography, 62.29. turow, One L, 93.

Revised USAF Doctrine PublicationAir Force Doctrine Document 2-7, Special OperationsLt CoL ALexAnder M. WAthen, USAF, retiredAir Force Lieutenant General Charles Wald . . . recalled that the rapid progress of the NorthernAlliance in early November 2001 had been enabled by the targeting support provided by just“three or four [special operations forces] guys on the ground.”—Benjamin s. lambethAir Power against TerrorAir Force speciAl operations forces(AFsoF) provide unique capabilitiesto the war-fighting combatant commander.Air Force Doctrine Document(AFDD) 2-7, Special Operations, 16 December2005, describes AFsoF’s support tothe joint force commander and reiterates thecommand relationships that enable him or herto leverage the capabilities of those forces aspart of a greater campaign plan. This operationaldoctrine document guides the employmentof AFsoF to meet today’s threats.AFDD 2-7 supersedes its previous version(dated 17 July 2001) and updates key AFsoFdoctrine concepts and terms. As America continuesto engage in the global war on terrorism,AFsoF has shifted from a platform-basedto a capabilities-based model that can accommodatesuch a campaign. signaling a changein paradigms, this publication offers a reviseddiscussion of modern AFsoF and the applicationof certain enduring principles and guidingtruths; places more emphasis on AFsoF’score tasks and missions as defined by Us specialoperations command (UssocoM) directives;updates and clarifies command, control,and organizational relationships; and refinesAFsoF planning and support considerations.AFDD 2-7 includes short, interesting, andwell-written vignettes portraying the birth ofAFsoF and its evolution through the presentday. readers unfamiliar with the terms carpetbaggersor air commandos as they apply to airpowerdon’t know AFsoF. particularly notableis the fact that these vignettes include not onlysuccess stories but also examples of failuresand the way those failures have helped theforce evolve.every Airman having an investment in theapplication of airpower should read AFDD 2-7because it provides a worthy introduction toAFsoF’s unique mission, command relationships,and operating motive. For example, thedocument amply describes Air Force specialoperations command’s responsibility, as theair component of UssocoM, to organize,train, and equip AFsoF to provide the necessaryair capabilities to conduct UssocoM’snine core tasks:• counterproliferation of weapons of massdestruction• counterterrorism• special reconnaissance• direct action88

DOCTRINE NOTE 89• unconventional warfare• foreign internal defense• information operations• civil affairs operations• psychological operationsin the process, AFDD 2-7 provides short explanationsof each of these tasks. Furthermore, itgoes on to list and describe AFsoF’s core missionareas:• air-to-surface interface• agile combat support• combat-aviation advisory operations• information operations• intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance• personnel recovery/recovery operations• precision fires• dissemination of psychological operations• specialized air mobility• specialized refuelingThese examples reflect the range of informationabout AFsoF available from AFDD2-7. Furthermore, the doctrine document providesa strong understanding of how AFsoFinteracts with the joint force, detailing operatingand command relationships. it is a mustreadfor all Airmen. q

The Mandate to RevolutionizeMilitary LogisticsCOL BradLey e. Smith, USaEditorial Abstract: In 2003 senior leaders of the US military establishment called for the designationof a military-wide distribution process owner (DPO). They took this action to head off the oftenobserveddisconnects among tactical, operational, and strategic distribution as well as other associatedlogistical processes. The author posits that this long-overdue initiative represents a revolutionaryparadigm shift in the ways we should conduct logistical operations in both peace and war.In September 2003, the secretary of defensedesignated US transportation Command(UStrAnSCOm) as the distributionprocess owner (DpO) for the Departmentof Defense (DOD). It was a signal that systemicsolutions need to be instituted at the nationallevel to better integrate military logistics, especiallyin the areas of transportation, supply, andinformation technology. the secretary’s directivewas a call to action for the entire logisticscommunity to make the necessary organizationaland cultural changes to establish onedistribution system for the entire military.the call was in stark contrast to logistics atthe tactical level, which has been successful inAfghanistan and Iraq. 1 With few exceptions,Americans know that their soldiers, sailors,airmen, and marines are adequately provisionedto fight the battles. While there havebeen some contentious, publicly debated issuessuch as body-armor shortages and add-onarmor for vehicles, media coverage focusedon industrial production and election-yearpolitics—not the distribution pipeline andsupply chain management. 2 Actual shortagesare few compared to those of past wars.Still, there is room for significant improvementat the higher levels of our logistics infrastructureto project and sustain combat forcesworldwide. Our leaders need to improve the90

THE MANDATE TO REVOLUTIONIZE MILITARY LOGISTICS 91way they integrate tactical, operational, andstrategic processes to form a more effective,streamlined distribution pipeline. 3 Shortlyafter the invasion of Afghanistan, many disconnectsoccurred due to training issues. Fordecades the military reduced training opportunitiesinvolving expensive, large-scale unitmoves that would have increased an alreadyhigh operations tempo. exercises and wargames were conducted with reduced numbersof tactical line personnel. even then, logisticsand distribution challenges did not receivesufficient emphasis.the onus is upon the DpO to make fundamentalchanges in the ways we conduct largescalelogistical operations. First, systemic changesmust be made to ensure proper linkage andsynchronization throughout the entire distributionpipeline. Second, we must find newways to provide the most effective support tounits engaged in combat without incurringlarge additional costs. As Federal Times reportedon the initial tip of the iceberg, “During thefirst month of major combat operations inIraq two years ago, the Defense Departmentlost track of $1.2 billion in materials shippedto the Army, encountered hundreds of backloggedshipments, and ran up millions of dollarsin fees to lease or replace storage containersbecause of backlogged or lost shipments.” 4As US international commitments continue togrow, there is no guarantee that additional resourceswill be provided to the DOD. Whilemost senior leaders would recognize the need tofind ways to work smarter with fewer resources,paradoxically, they would also acknowledgethat many efficient peacetime operations haveno place on the battlefield. Combat effectivenessoutweighs all other considerations.Revolution in Military LogisticsChange is difficult for any organization,military or civilian; therefore, the more controversialchanges are usually introduced overtime. Any significant, new procedures are embracedby a relative few and thus pose challengesto teamwork as a whole. Significantchange in a short period of time—even for allthe right reasons—seldom occurs at the higherlevels. proponents of change for the better arenot always rewarded, so impressive-soundingphrases and glossy pamphlets precede actualachievement. the slow progress of militaryevolution may be acceptable in peacetime butnot when survival of the nation is at stake. Seniormilitary officials must take the necessaryrisks and proceed to effect a “revolution inmilitary logistics” that has been talked aboutfor over a generation.Fixing responsibility for distribution at thefour-star level sets the stage for progress. Forthe first time, we have what is in essence a distributioncommand that subsumes responsibilityfor transportation and a portion of defenselogistics and operations-information technology.the movement of information in nearreal time is as important as the physical movementof personnel, cargo, and supplies. It willtake four-stars to effect change to systems currentlyin place and bring our informationtechnologies into the twenty-first century. theamount and type of logistical forces must ultimatelybe reorganized. new roles and missionswill have to be assigned. All of this mustbe accomplished to achieve situational awarenessof all distribution considerations, includingpower projection and the generation ofcombat power in-theater.Revolutionary Change in TransportationAfter becoming the DpO, UStrAnSCOmexpanded its mode-manager mission to encompassthe systemic whole of the Defensetransportation System. In the past, the commandoperated exclusively between ports ofembarkation and ports of debarkation. todaythe focus is more holistic and extends fromfactory or depot, through forward distributionpoints inside the theater, to forces engagedwith the enemy. movement of up-armoredhigh mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles(HmmWV or humvee; up-armored HmmWVis designated UAH) is one example of missiongrowth. UStrAnSCOm and project managersanalyzed production schedules in the UnitedStates, tracked the flow from stateside facto­

92 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007ries to Kuwait, monitored in-theater upgradeswith ancillary equipment such as blue forcetrackers and combat-identification panels,and tracked onward movement by surface orintratheater air into Iraq. 5 they closed gapsbetween strategic and operational transportto eliminate delays with UAH delivery. tacticalcommanders received progress reportsso they could anticipate the receipt of UAHsfor planning purposes.Revolutionary Change in SupplyAdvancements in transportation must coincidewith improvements in other areas beforethe overall distribution chain is strengthened.Holistic improvements in supply might not beas readily forthcoming. Unity of command hasnot been established for UStrAnSCOm tofulfill the supply portion of its DpO mission.UStrAnSCOm has no assigned quartermasterorganizations. they are all transportationrelated—Air mobility Command (AmC),Surface Deployment and Distribution Command(SDDC), and military Sealift Command. DpOinitiatives are constrained to the goodwill andinformal relationships established with supplyorientedorganizations such as the DefenseLogistics Agency (DLA). Cooperative effortsalone will not bring about a revolution in militarylogistics. That will require unified effortsthrough a clearly established chain of command.Depot packing of containers is an exampleof the close links between supply and transportationand of the reasons it will take unityof effort to resolve some long-standing problems.In past wars, procedures at national-levelwarehouses have caused tremendous hardshipsat forward-distribution points in-theaterand have damaged the combat readiness ofunits on the line. In peacetime, warehousemenhave been rewarded for filling containersto capacity, which oftentimes resulted in multipleconsignees per shipment. transportationmetrics drove supply procedures, proved to behighly efficient, and significantly reduced costs.Such an approach is disastrous in wartime sinceforward-distribution points are not resourcedwith enough materials handling equipmentand personnel to deal with multiple consigneesdispersed across the battlefield. troops physicallycannot unload and reload containersquickly enough for onward movement to keeppace with throughput demands, so containerswith mixed consignees have to be pushed forwardto a single recipient. Units that never receivetheir goods must reorder, but there isstill no guarantee that they will ever receivetheir materiel if peacetime protocols are followedat depots. readiness in combat suffers,and nonmonetary costs are staggering. Secondordereffects include a general loss of confidencein the supply system at the tactical level.troops inflate priorities on requisitions. Outof frustration, commanders demand movementby air even though surface transport isresponsive enough to meet required deliverydates. trust in the distribution system is destroyed.Ironically, measures put in place atthe strategic level to achieve cost-center efficienciesin fact manifest themselves into grossinefficiencies throughout the operational andtactical realms. While some improvements havebeen made, it will take a united effort by transportersand quartermasters under one commanderto straighten it out and institute effectiveorganizational practices for the long term.A single commander with complete oversightof the distribution system would also be ableto capture total systemic costs, both financialand nonfinancial, and make the best decisionsin support of the war fighter.Distribution challenges involving depot-levelpackaging have deep institutional roots thatstem from an unwillingness to adopt costlyprocedures with the sole justification of directlysupporting troops in combat. because logisticiansat the national level are so far removedfrom the battle, it is difficult for them to financiallyjustify modifying their efficient peacetimepractices. Again, one commander withcomplete oversight of the entire distributionpipeline is needed to weigh all considerations.For example, mismanagement of supplies andsequencing of shipments were principal lessonsof the Spanish-American War. railcars—the containers of their day—were packed andshipped to Florida for onward movement byship with total disregard for the ground fightin Cuba. Confusion ensued at the port of

THE MANDATE TO REVOLUTIONIZE MILITARY LOGISTICS 93tampa as logisticians unsuccessfully tried tosort out the mess. In Vietnam, an unmanageableiron mountain of containerized materielwas received at seaports and could not besorted for onward movement to tactical units.throughout Operation Desert Storm, the USArmy faced the same problems we do todayconcerning containers with multiple consignees.Currently in Iraq, millions of dollars inpenalty costs are assessed each month for amultitude of reasons, many of which can betraced back to a fundamental difference ofopinion between strategic-level logisticians andtactical-level combat commanders concerningthe use of containers. (At the national level,logisticians were leasing and procuring containersas if they were transportation commoditiesto be quickly returned from Iraq. buttactical-unit commanders did as they alwayshave in combat and held on to containers tobe used for mobile storage, bunkers, securitywalls, and work space.)“brute force” logistics used throughout thenineteenth and twentieth centuries is no longera viable way to support the US armed forcesof the twenty-first century. Senior leaders cannow capitalize upon improved communications,computers, and other advanced technologiesto achieve greater efficiencies andfulfill unrealized potentials within the distributionsystem. Disconnects between the strategic,operational, and tactical worlds manifestthemselves in many different ways, and itwill take a DpO with the right componentcommands, using the chain of command, tosort out the complexities and unify the effort.Revolutionary Changes in Information Technologytwo obstacles block real progress in reformingthe military’s information technology. First,many computer systems are inadequate sincethe basic architecture is generations old. themilitary services have simply added new applicationsto systems over the years without replacingthe basic foundation. At some point,applying new technology to a generations-oldframe will no longer suffice. the military continuesto spend billions of dollars on new applicationsto old computer architecture to getimmediate results. Second, we have a systemsintegrationproblem. Almost every computersystem that currently exists within the DODhas been developed to meet specific service orunified-command needs and does not tie intoa larger, integrated whole. (this is the samechallenge that confronts our intelligence andlaw enforcement agencies. now the Americanpublic is holding them accountable since theywere not able to work together before 11 September2001.) In the DOD, it will take a concerted,cooperative effort by the four-stars tointegrate systems into a coherent whole,thereby enabling holistic assessments aboutall aspects of our military, including the distributionpipeline.Architecture supporting the Joint Operationplanning and execution System ( JOpeS)illustrates both these challenges. JOpeS iscritical to our military’s ability to respond tothreats worldwide. this system (under anothername) originated in the 1950s and has beenupgraded with applications and name changesover the years. the JOpeS software provides away for component commands to request strategicand operational transportation, whichsupports only a portion of the distributionpipeline. the JOpeS charter is actually muchlarger, as its name suggests, but the softwaremeets few needs of the tactical commander. Itdoes not integrate tactical or operational planningor allow staff officers to easily manageunit movements, supply needs, and transportationrequirements. nor does it track thegeneration of combat power flowing into thetheater. In addition, the products producedare complex and cumbersome—enough so tomake warriors cringe. It requires months ofspecialized training and a great deal of patienceto input data and interpret results.JOpeS must be enhanced to help revolutionizemilitary logistics as well as other war-fightingcapabilities.All of the JOpeS functions need to be incorporatedinto a new, single architecture toprovide tacticians a complete picture of personneland materiel on the ground, properlyarrayed for battle, as well as what is en route byair or sea, in order to anticipate total combatcapability. Its current focus upon the move­

94 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007ment of personnel and unit equipment needsto be included in a new and more comprehensivecapability that incorporates all aspects ofdistribution, and then those considerationsmust be inculcated into the greater automatedrealm of strategic- and operational-level warplanning and execution. through execution,future JOpeS technology must provide automationsupport to decision makers across theentire spectrum of joint-operations planning,including redeployment of forces, reconstitution,and in-transit visibility. Combat commandersneed comprehensive situational assessmentsbased on near-real-time information.the current system is simply too outdated andclumsy to continue with incremental upgradesto accomplish those goals.JOPES Planning in the Future. because logisticsis so integral to tactical warfare, automatedtools for tacticians to conduct courseof-actionanalysis must automatically factor indistribution. transportation and supply featuresshould be built into the software, alongwith other basic essentials such as tacticalmaps and unit symbols. As tactical courses ofaction are contemplated and included in computerscenarios, associated logistic units, supplyrequirements, and optimum strategic-liftestimates should be automatically programmedas well for each analysis. After a course of actionis selected, the supported and supportingcommands should be given immediate and simultaneousaccess to take anticipatory actions,including validation and scheduling of lift.this envisioned process should occur withinJOpeS and must be far more compressed anduser friendly than it is today. tacticians wouldbe better equipped and more quickly able tobrief battle plans that include all the strategic,operational, and tactical underpinnings, manyof which involve distribution. Decisions couldbe expedited and agility improved at all levels.JOPES Execution in the Future. moving informationin near real time has just as muchimportance as moving cargo and supplies. Iftacticians are ever to gain visibility over largeunit moves in their entirety, then revolutionarychange in our information technologieswill be absolutely necessary. If logisticians areto achieve an agile distribution system to meetthe demands of a fast-paced, fluid battlefield,they must be empowered with the ability tomake decisions based on the current status ofpersonnel, equipment, and supplies in thepipeline.With today’s technology, there is no reasonthat information cannot be displayed in simple,easily accessed formats that allow logisticiansand tacticians to make decisions and communicatethem using the same Web-based system.the system should allow quick data entries inputby warriors with minimal training in orderto speed turnaround times for operational assessments.Fulfilling these needs will furtherempower our tactical commanders and maywell revolutionize the way we prosecute the waron terror.Sufficiently powerful computers may notexist today for one system to collect and processthe volumes of data needed to plan andexecute global distribution and combat operations.that should not stop our military, for ithas accomplished the seemingly impossiblebefore. the US Army built the first moderncomputer, named eniac, in 1944 to automateits artillery fire and bombing tables—an extremelyambitious task in its day. While thenext generation of computers may comeabout as the result of DpO initiatives, the effortcannot be accomplished without visionaryleadership from the Joint Staff, military services,and unified commands—especially theJoint Forces Command as the joint deploymentprocess owner.Senior logisticians may serve as a catalyst forchange throughout the DOD. but since distribution,strategic movements, and operationallevelmaneuver comprise only part of the jointplanning and execution system, logisticiansalone cannot fix the problems with JOpeSand achieve its full war-fighting potential. Herculeanefforts from outside the logistics communitywill be needed before revolutionarychanges in information technology come about.the challenges are significant and will not beovercome until cultural changes occur at thehighest levels of the military.First, senior-level war fighters have to committo revolutionizing information technologiesto better equip the country to fight its

THE MANDATE TO REVOLUTIONIZE MILITARY LOGISTICS 95current battles. Aggressive leaders who embodythe warrior spirit do not naturally gravitatetowards computers. but these are the verypeople most needed to ensure that techniciansdesign JOpeS to meet war-fighter needs.Air and ground combat officers as well as surfacewarfare officers are more critical to thesuccess of a new system than are combat logisticians.Done correctly, their efforts wouldproduce a national asset that would be themodern-day equivalent of napoléon crawlingaround on his campaign-tent floor, totally engrossedwith his maps, working out timedistancecalculations as well as war-gamingbranches and sequels, positioning his forcesand resolving sustainment challenges.Second, the needs of individual militaryservices have been allowed to subsume thegreater joint interests. For generations, serviceneeds, parochialisms, and competingbudgetary priorities have thwarted the seniorleaderconsensus necessary for fundamentaland profound changes to JOpeS. Strong personalitieshave been at play across the board,so even stronger ones are needed to prevail.third, command climates at the highestechelons of our military have to change. Whileextremely dedicated and highly successful officerswork tirelessly to accomplish assignedmissions, they also have the political savvy toprotect their reputations. they normally posturethemselves so they are not associated withprojects that lack momentum and do notprogress according to schedule. Significantglitches and unforeseen delays would no doubtoccur during the development and initialfielding of a new system the size and magnitudeof JOpeS. Any concerted effort to bringit into the twenty-first century would be fraughtwith risk. because failure in the pursuit of excellenceis not an option on many flag-officerstaffs, the future of JOpeS remains uncertain.Second-order effects from these challengescreate ineffective staff dynamics at high levels.many have heard the old adage about the staffofficer who worked a project and then inheritedit again years later upon his return, essentiallywhere he had left off. that’s JOpeS. Actionofficers understand temporary delays.they know that their efforts cannot always receiveattention from senior personnel who reactto urgent priorities of the moment. butthey also realize that an important project,worked for generations but not to fruition, isreally a hot potato. the history of JOpeS andits predecessor systems includes reshuffledproponent responsibilities and mission transfersbetween commands.Given the significance of these challenges,the military’s cultural biases, and what is atstake for the country, JOpeS can only hopefor a high-ranking champion to emerge, recognizeits significance to the nation, lock hornswith the challenge, and ramrod a new productthrough the system. that person may well haveto be someone from outside the uniformedmilitary ranks. the fate of revolutionizing militarylogistics, among other things, is closelytied to the future of JOpeS. Under optimalconditions, it would take years to produce theneeded changes. A nation at war needs thevery best tools to prosecute the fight, so we needto start now, regardless of the risks involved.Resourcing the DPO Mission:Reorganization of Staffsand Support Forcesthe DpO mission requires changes in theorganization of logistical commands and staffs.From the command perspective, line units withspecialized training are needed to performdistribution functions and fulfill the theatercommander’s materiel and information requirements.From the staff perspective, US CentralCommand (USCentCOm) is pursuing a newapproach. DpO representatives are colocatedwith theater staff to provide strategic-levelanalyses and advise operational commanders.these new capabilities could “reach back” tothe continental United States (COnUS) andprovide the unity of command needed forend-to-end distribution.CENTCOM Deployment and DistributionOperations CenterUStrAnSCOm and USCentCOm organizeda new strategic-level staff called the CentCOm

96 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007Deployment Distribution Operations Center(CDDOC) and colocated it with the landcomponentheadquarters at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.CDDOCpersonnel are trained, equipped,and resourced to conduct strategic-level analysesusing available information technologies suchas the Global Command and Control System,Joint Flow Analysis System for transportation,and Global Decision Support System. they coordinatewith operational staffs such as Armymateriel Command and the DLA to anticipatereadiness needs, take corrective action whenshortfalls in supply or transportation occur,and work quality-of-life issues in-theater. theCDDOC has been so successful that similarinitiatives are being worked in US pacificCommand and US european Command.the CDDOC joined with Combined ForcesLand Component Command (CFLCC) and theDLA to provide more reliable and responsivesupport to Combined Joint task Force 76 inAfghanistan. At one time, 100 percent of thetask force’s sustainment was flown directly fromthe United States to Kabul. this approach wasreplaced by intratheater air channels and surfaceroutes through pakistan using the directsupportwarehouses in Kuwait. 6 this significantlyreduced shipping time for orders andachieved more responsive support to the warfighter. While more effective means of supportalso proved more efficient, significant dollarsavings were not the driving force for change.the CDDOC spearheaded the “single ticket”initiative to achieve seamless unit movementfrom origin to final destination. previously,onward-movement arrangements were madeonly after deploying units arrived in-theater.the CDDOC gained visibility of units prior totheir departure from the COnUS, eliminatedtransit delays in-theater, and closed the gap betweenstrategic and operational transportation.Improving Materiel Management and SupplyStrategic-level changes being made in thequartermaster field complement DpO effortsright now, but there is no guarantee that separatecommands will always row together toclose the seams between the strategic, operational,and tactical levels. these changes raisequestions over command relationships betweennational-level logistics agencies and thesecretary of defense’s intent in regards to the“DpO.” Ownership implies a high degree ofresponsibility to streamline the entire distributionsystem, including supply and materielmanagement. responsibility and authorityshould be commensurate, so one would thinkthat command relationships would also evolveto ensure unity of effort.the DLA and CFLCC partnered to resolvechallenges with the closing of requisitions aftergoods are received in-theater. During thefirst six months of Operation Iraqi Freedom,$1.2 billion worth of requisitions had not beenclosed out electronically by line organizationseven though it was believed that most of thesupplies had actually been issued out by forwarddistribution points. 7 (there is no certaintyover the accounting for goods since recordswere not kept in-theater, and the multipleconsigneeproblem discussed earlier furthercomplicated supply discipline.) Until the receiptprocess was finalized, funds could not betransferred from Army accounts to the DLA,which caused the agency’s cash flow to dry upand threatened its continued operations. Accountswere finally reimbursed by CFLCC, butno permanent fixes have been put in place toensure that tactics, techniques, and proceduresat the strategic level mesh with operations atthe tactical level. A gap still exists, and it is theDpO’s responsibility to ensure it is closed beforethe next campaign in the global war.the DLA has assumed an increasingly importantrole in executing the general supportsupply mission in USCentCOm. the DLAhas already issued thousands of national-stocknumbereditems in-theater and expanded themto over 7,000 items by 2006. A robust generalsupportbase drives down customer waittime and provides responsive backup supportto the direct support base and warfighter. through proper DLA management,replenishment stocks are ordered well in advance,and crisis management is avoided.bulk tonnage best suited for surface transportdoes not have to be flown in on anemergency basis. these efforts have helpedclose the gap between the operational realm

THE MANDATE TO REVOLUTIONIZE MILITARY LOGISTICS 97(theater-supply requirements) and the strategicrealm (transportation-required deliverydates). they illustrate that effective supportcan result in huge efficiencies and cost savings.Support Forcesnew organizations need to be established to executethe DpO mission. After staffs such as theCDDOCs provide strategic-level assessments,military line units with the proper training andresources will be needed at key logistics nodesto implement those staff recommendations.AmC is organized to execute inter- and intratheaterairlift missions, as well as operate airfieldsfor deploying forces, and to maintainunity of command—even though in some casesthe command has relinquished operationalcontrol of resources to the theater. but AmC’sground counterpart, SDDC, does not havethe force structure to accomplish its modeoperationsmission and carry out an expandeddistribution role. SDDC relies heavily uponArmy reserve units that have already fulfilledtheir mobilization commitments specified bythe secretary of defense. SDDC’s active Armyunits are stretched thin while engaged in operatingseaports around the world, even beforetaking on additional end-to-end distributionresponsibilities.“Deployment and distribution operations”battalions and groups could be organizedfrom the current logistics force structure andmanned with personnel trained in transportation,supply, and information technology. thisnew capability could be used in-theater toreach back to major logistics commands in theUnited States and ensure that the theatercommander’s intent is met. Just as AmC movespersonnel, equipment, and cargo forward tocorps organizations, so can SDDC use theseunits to execute the surface onward-movementmission from ports of debarkation to points asfar forward as corps forward distributionpoints. Such an approach combines strategicand operational distribution efforts into oneunified whole under one DpO chain of command.this is currently the approach we areusing to supply our troops in Afghanistan, andit has worked well. but in Iraq, three separatechains of command are involved: UStrAnS-COm for the strategic, CFLCC for the operational,and multi-national Force-Iraq for thetactical. by combining the strategic and operational,no longer would handoffs be necessaryat congested aerial ports and seaports, whichare not ideal locations to transfer onwardmovementresponsibilities.Deployment and distribution operationsbattalions could also assist the DLA with itsemerging general-support base missions. Atpresent, the DLA uses contractors to performmateriel management and warehousing functions.In the future, commercial options maynot be viable in some hostile regions of theworld, so provisions need to be made to adequatelyresource the DLA in-theater to performwhat are arguably DpO missions. thepermanent assignment of active duty or reserveorganizations to the DLA would establishcommand relationships and training regimenswell in advance of overseas missions.Since the military’s force structure is unlikelyto grow in the foreseeable future, senior leaderswould have to resolve any controversystirred up by considering reassignment of tacticalunits from force provider commands.Resourcing the DPO Mission:Information TechnologyComputer programs in the US military havebeen developed independently from one anotherand do not tie together. to accomplishthe DpO mission—as well as other strategiclevelmissions in the DOD—systems managementand holistic assessments of entire processesare needed. If end-to-end distribution isever to become a reality, it will require integratedsoftware systems.the logistics community needs to place lessemphasis on developing new software systemsand more on integrating the prolific numberof separate programs that currently exist. Logisticiansmust work toward a common operationalpicture that provides the most currentstatus available for all inter- and intratheatermovement and tie it all together. We cannotafford to continue waiting for a single archi­

98 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007tecture to build the common operational picture.that panacea has been discussed for decadesand is not likely to materialize anytimesoon, given the competing military services’priorities and budgets.In light of these realities, the most practicaland effective approach—called the “knowledgewall”—is currently being implementedat UStrAnSCOm. task by task and challengeby challenge, leaders are finding ways to employintegration software to pull key data fromnumerous databases and automatically displaythe most currently accessible information. existingprograms are linked together to generatecharts templated with key managementinformationfields that are automaticallyupdated as new data enters the database. theintent is to build charts as exportable packagesfor use in the field by war fighters. Whilethe DpO uses the knowledge wall to monitorthe health of the distribution system, othercommands will be able to use these same exportableproducts to make operational decisions.UStrAnSCOm uses Single mobilitySystem software to accomplish integrationfunctions, and the command is focused on capabilitiesrather than promoting specific softwareprograms.the goal is to eventually build briefingcharts with drill-down capabilities to makethem usable at all levels of a staff. they displaya full array of information: manifests for aircraften route and vessels under way, equipmentor supplies currently in the strategic ortheater pipelines, and cumulative suppliesmoved into the theater.Ideally, the standard for the manual inputtingof logistics data should be “one time atthe point of origin,” which later saves countlesshours of work and increases responsiveness ofthe distribution system. If the knowledge-wallapproach is adopted throughout the logisticscommunity, the consequent linking of increasingnumbers of databases will reduce manualinputs. eventually, senior leaders should banservice-centric programs that might be advertisedas supporting joint systems but that actuallyserve immediate and narrowly focused interests.the greater joint-distribution interestsmust take precedence.Conclusion and RecommendationsOver the years, tactical-level logistics haveevolved separately from strategic-level distributionprocesses. today they are partially unlinked.Unity of command must be establishedso the DpO can bring strategic, operational,and tactical logistics back into alignment.Only then will they form an integrated wholeto serve the needs of forward-deployed units.Designation of a single process owner for distributionwas a signal from senior civilian leadersthat significant changes needed to be madein large-scale logistical operations. to carry outits DpO responsibilities, UStrAnSCOm willneed a forward-staff presence in-theater to conductstrategic-level assessments and provide distributionoptions to the combat commanders.UStrAnSCOm must partner with the services,unified commands, and DLA to reorganize staffsand create line units from existing force structure.JOpeS must be fixed to better enable fundamentalchanges to military logistics and otherwar-fighting systems. Information technologieswith outdated architectures should be replaced.the remaining logistical programs should alsobe cobbled together to create a common operatingpicture and gain near-real-time assessmentsof personnel, equipment, and supplies in thelogistics pipeline. Command relationships needto be examined and possibly realigned so thatDpO responsibilities are commensurate withDpO authority.the DpO presents a new paradigm for thelogistics community. First, tying strategic andoperational logistics together into a coherent,end-to-end whole is the key to effective distribution.to measure progress, we must adoptnew effects-based metrics that accommodate asystems approach to logistics. Second, logisticiansat all levels will have to remain focusedon tactical warfare and be willing to let go ofpeacetime efficiencies for the sake of wartimeeffectiveness. bold leadership is needed toachieve results, build trust in the distributionprocess, and revolutionize our logistical processesto support future campaigns in the waron terrorism. q

THE MANDATE TO REVOLUTIONIZE MILITARY LOGISTICS 99Notes1. Joint publication ( Jp) 1-02, Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (asamended through 5 January 2007), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, defines tactical levelof war as “the level of war at which battles and engagementsare planned and executed to achieve military objectivesassigned to tactical units or task forces. Activitiesat this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuverof combat elements in relation to each other andto the enemy to achieve combat objectives.”2. the distribution pipeline and supply chain managementare two different concepts. the distributionpipeline is a portion of overall supply chain management.this article focuses primarily upon the distribution pipeline,but the subject cannot be discussed in isolation fromsupply chain management. they are interrelated and affecteach other’s efficiencies. the responsibilities of theDpO do not include many aspects of supply chain managementperformed by the services, such as forecasting,levels computation, and stockage policies. Logistics,supply chain management, and resource provision do notequal the distribution pipeline or pipeline management.Jp 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, provides the followingdefinitions:distribution pipeline — Continuum or channel throughwhich the Department of Defense conducts distributionoperations. the distribution pipeline representsthe end-to-end flow of resources from supplier to consumerand, in some cases, back to the supplier in retrogradeactivities. . . .logistics — the science of planning and carrying outthe movement and maintenance of forces. . . .supply chain management — A cross-functional approachto procuring, producing, and delivering productsand services to customers. the broad managementscope includes subsuppliers, suppliers, internalinformation, and funds flow.3. Jp 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, provides thefollowing definitions:operational level of war — the level of war at whichcampaigns and major operations are planned, conducted,and sustained to achieve strategic objectiveswithin theaters or other operational areas. Activities atthis level link tactics and strategy by establishing operationalobjectives needed to achieve the strategicobjectives, sequencing events to achieve the operationalobjectives, initiating actions, and applying resourcesto bring about and sustain these events. . . .strategic level of war — the level of war at which anation, often as a member of a group of nations, determinesnational or multinational (alliance or coalition)strategic security objectives and guidance, and developsand uses national resources to achieve these objectives.Activities at this level establish national and multinationalmilitary objectives; sequence initiatives; definelimits and assess risks for the use of military andother instruments of national power; develop globalplans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives;and provide military forces and other capabilities inaccordance with strategic plans.4. tim Kauffman, “DoD told to Shape Up: Omb andCongress Order Overdue management Fixes,” FederalTimes, 9 may 2005, 1.5. blue force trackers enable ground troops to communicateusing text messaging and track friendly/enemyforces. trackers are designed to increase combat effectivenessand reduce friendly-fire incidents. Combat identificationpanels (CIp) are affixed to tracked and wheeledvehicles to identify them as friendly forces. they are 1/8"thick by 24" high by 30" long and are composed of lowemissivitythermal tape. CIps are attached flat against vehiclesides and top decks, so when gunners view themthrough thermal sensors, they see a contrasting cold spotagainst the hotter surface of the vehicle.6. these warehouses are stocked with supplies thatare shipped overseas using strategic sealift instead of expensiveairlift. As of June 2005, these initiatives and othershave reduced the cumulative averages of DOD cargomoved by air to the USCentCOm area of operationsfrom 18 percent since 9/11 to 13 percent since October2003. Author’s personal papers—documentation of his serviceas chief, Joint Operations Division, UStrAnSCOm,Scott AFb, IL, August–December 2004.7. Author’s personal papers—documentation of hisservice as the deputy C4, CFLCC, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait,August 2003–August 2004.

A Model forManaging Decision-Making Informationin the GIG-EnabledBattlespaceMaj SaMuel D. BaSS, uSaFMaj RuSty O. BalDwin, PhD, uSaF, RetiReDEditorial Abstract: The Defense Departmentis transforming information-technologysystems into a Global Information Grid(GIG) that will connect sensors to weaponssystems and provide unprecedentedsituational awareness. The authors suggestthat if not properly implemented, theGIG may overwhelm war fighters withinformation presented at the wrong time,at the wrong level of detail, and withoutproper analysis. This article proposes amodel to direct the flow of information inthe GIG.TheDeparTmenTofDefense(DOD)is in the midst of transforming its vastcollection of information-technologysystems into an interconnected GlobalInformation Grid (GIG), which will ultimatelyconnect sensors to weapons systems, enablepersonnel to share information at will, andprovide unprecedented levels of situationalawareness to commanders at all levels. however,if we do not implement the GIG with aproper level of restriction on the flow of information,war fighters risk being overwhelmednot only by too much information but also byinformation presented at the wrong time, atthe wrong level of detail, and without properanalysis and interpretation. This article proposesa model to prevent this situation by directingthe flow of information based on itsclassification level, integrity, and relevance tothe end user.The Global Information GridIn response to increasing difficulties associatedwith sharing information between variousplatforms and information systems operatingin the joint environment, the DOD createdthe concept of the GIG. 1 DOD policy definesthis grid as “a globally interconnected, end-toendset of information capabilities, associated100

A MODEL FOR MANAGING DECISION-MAKING INFORMATION 101processes, and personnel for collecting, processing,storing, disseminating and managinginformation on demand to warfighters, policymakers, and support personnel.” 2 establishedGIG policies also implement key componentsof the Clinger-Cohen Information Technologymanagement reform act of 1996, includinginformation security, revised acquisition strategies,and best practices for handling data at alllevels of the DOD. 3 although many of the effortsin developing the GIG might simply entailthe application of the DOD’s best practicesin acquisitions to the still-maturing field of informationtechnology, the goal of achievinginformation superiority remains paramount—the primary objective of the overall GIG effort.Connecting personnel and equipment withadvanced information-sharing tools will likelyrevolutionize our capabilities, but we mustcarefully manage the quality and volume ofinformation presented to the war fighters oftomorrow.The Sand TableFor centuries, military commanders haveused various models to understand the battlespace.In the seventeenth century, campaignplanners used intricate, craftsmen-built scalemodels of fortifications to analyze points ofvulnerability and routes of attack. 4 In the field,leaders have long used sticks and stones in thesand to rehearse maneuvers and depict unitlocations and terrain. aircraft and antiaircrafttechnology increased the complexity of the“sand table” by adding important air componentsto the planning process. new technologyused in Operation Desert Storm providedcommanders and bomb-damage analysts a liveview from the cockpit and, in many cases, fromthe weapons themselves as they flew into targets.Today, command centers of all levels areequipped with large data walls, on which interestingcomputer or video feeds provide aconstant flow of data. Live video from remotelypiloted predator aircraft feeds into airand space operations centers, giving commandersand intelligence analysts what somepeople call “predator Crack” or “Kill TV” becauseof the display’s ability to divert viewers’full attention away from their primary duties. 5The frequently asked question concerningwhat shows on the displays and who has responsibilityfor the content raises an evenbroader and more important question aboutthe future GIG-enabled command center: howwill we manage all of the data available on allof the interconnected platforms?although the GIG’s influence on the developmentand acquisition of weapons systems isevident in requirements for common datastandards and supported communications protocols,the military services are actively developingways to inject network technology everywhere.army projects such as Future ForceWarrior will provide each soldier with a complexarray of networked information sensorsand displays, reminiscent of the gear worn bythe futuristic space marines in the sciencefictionmovie Aliens. 6 One scene in that moviedepicts a frighteningly realistic scenario inwhich the team commander watches healthmonitors go silent as each member falls andthe confusion of battle grinds his decisionmakingability to a halt. Several years later,real commanders orbiting in Black hawk helicoptersover Somalia tried to command a rescueconvoy through a decaying urban environment.The communications delay between theairborne command post and the trucks introducedchaos significant enough to confuse theconvoy, effectively driving it into a dead end. 7Future systems must be able to create a timelyflow of critical information in both directions,and we need to establish processes to help usmanage and respond to that flow effectively.Because of the rapidly increasing volume ofavailable information, numerous research projectsnow under way seek to design virtual environmentsthat integrate, analyze, and displayevery piece of information in an immersive,four-dimensional battlespace, where missionplanners and commanders can manipulatetime and perspective to suit their needs. 8 Onecan easily imagine the demands placed oncommanders trying to conduct a war from insidea virtual, real-time sand table with datafrom thousands of sources pouring in at incrediblerates. additionally, the GIG notion­

102 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007ally gives personnel anywhere in the battlespacethe ability to have similar representationsstreamed to their locations by various means.an obvious hazard of this capability—beyondinformation overload—is the danger of commandersmaking tactical decisions based ondata intended for a strategic perspective andwar fighters on the ground adjusting their tacticsbased on information intended only forstrategic planners.The Problem of Inverted Perspectivesas prescribed in joint doctrine, plannersdesign operations to follow the principles ofwar, which include surprise, simplicity, security,and unity of command. 9 numerous historicalexamples illustrate how friendly or hostile knowledgeof certain components of plans drasticallyaltered the results of those plans. Stillothers demonstrate that reaction or failure torespond to evolving circumstances has a drasticimpact on the operation and effectivenessof the leadership involved. rather than explorethe success and failure of operationswith respect to the principles of war, we shouldconsider the implications of operating a GIGenhancedcommand center of the future.For example, a suite of sensors programmedto detect personnel and vehicle movementcould collect and report status for display on acommand center’s data wall, indicating maneuverby an unknown unit. If we can attributethis maneuver to a friendly special-operationsmission planned and executed in secrecy, weshould restrict access to this sensor data at thesame classification level of the mission andnot automatically display it on a data wall forviewing by personnel without an appropriateclearance. Conversely, if a similar sensor suitedetected the footsteps of an individual in a restrictedarea, we should present the data collectedby this sensor (probably not displayedon the same data wall) only to appropriate securitypersonnel. Commanders directing theirattention to an unprocessed data point likethis could experience an inverted perspective,whereby a single piece of potentially irrelevantdata diverts focus from the broader picture.Similar scenarios could illustrate how a tacticalunit on the ground might see data intendedonly for a strategic view; any changes to theactions of that tactical unit might eliminate akey component of a strategic plan. We assertthat such an inverted perspective constitutes avery real hazard of information that might existin a GIG-enhanced battlefield.In an ideal environment, we would deploythousands if not millions of sensors across thebattlespace to collect climate, audio, video,and electromagnetic signal data. additionally,airborne command and control (C2) assetswould compose an integrated picture of thebattlespace. Current processes and tools suchas air tasking orders help deconflict the airspace,but some operations conducted on theground or at sea might not be coordinatedwith all components. a robust sensor net wouldprovide a bridge between these dissimilarcomponents of the battlespace to help preventincidents of friendly fire, but the compositepicture would likely not have relevance tosome war fighters. In total, the amount of informationcollected will be immense, and thedetails of the battlespace available for displaywill prove tempting to war fighters and leadersat all levels. GIG-enhanced aircraft will haveaccess to a vast store of information. however,with this comes the possibility that unprocessedsensor data might make its way into the cockpit,forcing pilots with increased sensitivity tocollateral damage and escalation to changetactics, select alternate targets, or abort theengagement.Ground units would need time to analyzethe data from sensors detecting a nearby firefightbefore determining the location of unitsin the area and perhaps requesting additionalairborne or spaceborne surveillance. Thoseunits not aware of friendly forces in covert operationscould alter their tactics or maneuverin response to indications of a nearby firefight—particularlyif sensors indicated activityin a unit’s area of responsibility. hopefully, allparties in that area would have already receivedbriefings on operations to an appropriatelevel of detail, but any GIG-enhanced capabilitiesfor examining additional sensor data

A MODEL FOR MANAGING DECISION-MAKING INFORMATION 103could affect the commander on the ground ina number of ways—hence the need for clearrules for using this data in order to avoid invertedperspectives.One could present any number of examplesdemonstrating avoidance of inverted perspectivesby limiting exposure of data in the GIG,and still more examples could illustrate thatany restrictions on information flow could reduceflexibility. Considering both sides of thisargument, we assert that we should place limitson the places that automatically receive dataas well as on the people authorized to accessit. We must also consider that some platforms—asWilliam T. hobbins, a lieutenantgeneral at the time, indicated during an interviewwith Airman Magazine—will produce dataat different rates while operators in varyingroles will consume data feeds at different rates,thus adding more considerations for a potentialsolution. 10 Clearly, this paints an amazinglycomplex picture with fuzzy and continuouslyevolving operational requirements.Current Management of Information FlowWe are all familiar with the classificationlevels defined by the national Security agency.Only users holding a secret or higher clearanceand having a need to know can read dataprotected by a secret classification level. Similarly,readers with a high classification levelcan normally read any material at or belowthat level, assuming they have a need to know.In a conceptual, GIG-enabled virtual commandcenter, we could classify informationspecific to a sensitive operation at a sufficientlyhigh level to prevent those who hold lowerlevelclassifications from reading the data.Furthermore, we could reserve display of datarelevant to those classified operations for individualswith the required need to know. additionally,we must assure that data on a commandcenter’s displays remains at the lowestclearance level of personnel with access tothose displays.Using a well-disciplined approach, we couldproperly secure or sanitize data from allsources to prevent users from seeing informationnot cleared for their consumption. Thusfar, however, we have addressed only theproper treatment of data with respect to confidentiality.The integrity or trustworthiness ofthe data is also of prime importance, particularlyin urban areas, where we have a greatneed for very accurate and timely data and,therefore, a need to evaluate raw data rapidlyand prepare it for presentation to leadership.normal data-classification techniques do notclassify information based on its integrity, so weneed to explore a method to help categorizedata that could cause an inverted-perspectivehazard in a GIG-enhanced picture of thebattlefield, whether it is unprocessed remotesensordata or imagery not yet evaluated byintelligence personnel.Biba’s Integrity ModelWhile working on an air Force computersecurityresearch project in 1977, K. J. Bibawrote what has since become the seminal paperon information integrity. 11 In it, he examineda method for maintaining the validity ofdata on information-processing systems, choosingto use the concept of integrity as a measureof information’s validity. That is, informationfrom a known, trustworthy source would havehigh integrity, while information based on rumoror from unknown sources would have lowintegrity. Similarly, password-protected informationstored in electronic form would havehigher integrity than data available for readingor editing without any access controls atall. If we extrapolated this concept for applicationto our GIG-enhanced command center,the integrity of the reader—that is, the reader’sresponse to data—is influenced by the informationconsumed. new and startling informationwill affect the reader’s behavior tovarying degrees, based on the integrity of thesource of that data. For example, a commandermight decide to take some risks after readinginformation from a reliable source but not doso in reaction to the same information froman unreliable source. Similarly, one should not

104 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007interpret a report that included a data pointfrom a low-integrity source as factual.In the strict formulation of Biba’s integritymodel, three rules apply to reading, writing,or acting upon information from sources ofvarious integrity levels. This model refers tothings that can create and consume data assubjects and to products produced as objects.The rules rely on the notion of dominance,which implies some sort of permission grantedto the dominant over the subordinate, whetherthat permission involves reading, accessing, orin some way modifying something. Using securityclearances to demonstrate dominance,Biba shows that one object dominates anotherwhen its security clearance level is the same asor higher than that of the other object. Forexample, a secret clearance dominates secretor unclassified clearances, while top secretdominates top secret, secret, and unclassifiedclearance levels. When a subject dominates anobject, the subject can read the object. If thesubject does not dominate the object, the subjectcannot read the object, just as someonewith a secret clearance cannot read a top-secretdocument but can read secret or unclassifieddocuments. Biba uses the concept of integrityand the rule of dominance to determine accesscontrols in his computer-security research.The three integrity-preserving rulesfrom Biba’s integrity model are as follows:1. a subject can read an object if and only ifthe object’s integrity level dominates (isgreater than or equal to) the subject’s integritylevel. That is, a subject can onlyread objects with equal or higher integrity.2. a subject can write data into an object ifand only if the subject’s integrity leveldominates the object’s integrity level.Since the subject must have integrity atleast as high as the object, the object’sintegrity is preserved.3. a subject can execute (or direct the actionof) another subject if and only ifthe first subject’s integrity level dominatesthe second subject’s integrity level.Someone of lower integrity cannot operateon someone else’s behalf. 12In plain terms, rule one means that a subjectcan read an object only if the data will nothave a deceptive or misleading effect on thereader. In our command center, we would notnormally present data (an object) to the commander(a subject) unless the data had undergoneproper vetting using prudent processes.rule two means that some data source of alower integrity level can’t inject informationthat one might interpret as accurate or valid.again using our command center example,we would not display raw data on the data walluntil we have validated it, much like we wouldnot present the actions of a unit to the commanderas confirmed results until we haveconducted proper battle damage assessmentor a mission debriefing. rule three would preventunnecessary reaction to deceptive acts orpreprocessed data from sensors, which couldprove useful in avoiding inverted perspectives.Together, these rules address some of theconcerns we have explored so far with respectto unprocessed sensor data. Therefore, it seemsreasonable that application of the Biba integritymodel to a notional command center canform the basis of a system implemented to helpprevent inverted perspectives. This modelcould assist in defining specific requirementsfor automatically filtering information andcontrolling access, but commander flexibilityand the ability to share information would experiencenecessary limitations to some degree.Joint doctrine emphasizes informationdissemination as a key component of intelligencesupport: “Intelligence will play a criticaland continuous role in supporting warfighting.advances in computer processing, preciseglobal positioning, and telecommunicationswill provide joint force commanders . . . withthe capability to determine accurate locationsof friendly and enemy forces, as well as to collect,process, and disseminate relevant data tothousands of locations.” 13a key point entails the use of the word relevantto describe the dissemination of data.Further discussion in doctrine defines this termas a key attribute of intelligence that describesthe scope of intelligence gathering and sharingefforts; moreover, it delineates who needs specificpieces of information and, more impor­

A MODEL FOR MANAGING DECISION-MAKING INFORMATION 105tantly, who shouldn’t be distracted by irrelevantdata. 14 Therefore, a model that combinesthe DOD’s traditional classification levels withdata integrity and relevance holds the key toformulating policy for data-sharing mechanismsdeveloped for future command centers.Classification, Integrity,and RelevanceThe war fighter’s need for relevant and accurateinformation is thoroughly understoodand well defined in doctrine and operationalart, but defining the scope, sources, and formatof the data would require continuouslyupdating vast amounts of information. effortsto build systems that provide data in predefinedformats or follow predefined message-sharingrules normally result in products difficult tointegrate or expensive to update. To avoid theproblems of updating systems to keep pacewith continually evolving technologies, we proposeto control information flow using a datasharingmechanism based on classification,integrity, and relevance. The following summarizesour definitions so far:• classification: a rating assigned to informationin order to provide appropriateprotection and restrict access• integrity: a measure of a subject’s or object’strustworthiness• relevance: a measure of applicability to apurpose or a customer• dominance: the condition in effect whenone entity has the same or higher ratingas anotherOur information-sharing mechanism mustenable meaningful and adaptive informationsharingcapabilities within a command center.Consider such a center staffed with personnelof varying clearances and areas of functionalexpertise, similar to other command centerssuch as wing command posts, expeditionaryoperations centers, or air and space operationscenters. as in Biba’s model, both personneland systems can create and consume data andare referred to as subjects, while the documentsor virtual products produced are referredto as objects. Our information-sharingmechanism assigns three ratings to every subjectand object: classification, relevance, andintegrity.Suppose the classification levels for subjectsand objects are unclassified, for official use only,secret, or top secret. For simplicity’s sake, ourmodel will not address clearance caveats orclearances for personnel from other countries,but we could readily incorporate them. Therelevance and integrity levels of subjects andobjects will be low, medium, or high. personnelclassificationlevels normally do not change overtime, but personnel can induce and experiencechanges in integrity levels and will produceobjects of varying relevance levels. Similarly,documents and processing systems oftenhave the same ratings as their content or inputs.For our command center, we propose the followingrules, which govern all informationsharingtransactions and which we enumeratebelow prior to discussing their implications inthe next section:1. a subject can read or process an objectif and only if the subject’s classificationlevel dominates the object’s classificationlevel.2. Initially, all trusted subjects have a highintegrity rating, and all subjects and objectsare assigned appropriate classificationratings. all untrusted subjects havea low integrity rating.3. The integrity level of a subject or object canbe raised only through a well-controlledprocess.4. When a subject creates an object, thecreated object will have an integrity levelequal to the subject that created it, or ifthe newly created object contains informationfrom other subjects or objects,in full or in part, the new object will havethe lowest integrity level of the componentinformation.

106 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 20075. The relevance level of a subject or objectis determined through another wellcontrolledprocess.6. If a subject reads an object of a lower integritylevel, the subject’s integrity levelwill take on the object’s lower integritylevel. The subject can return to its previousintegrity level only in accordancewith the process defined in rule three.7. a subject can process and then manuallyor automatically forward an object to anothersubject only if the forwarded objectdominates the receiving subject’sintegrity and relevance levels and if thereceiving subject’s classification leveldominates the object’s classification. 15Rule Analysis and Clarificationrule one ensures observation of the fundamentalrequirements of need to know, security,and proper access-control mechanisms.rule two ensures that personnel andinformation-processing systems can share informationfollowing our basic rules. Trustedsubjects include sources trusted in a wide context,whether that involves coalition partners;our own personnel- and information-processingsystems and equipment; and intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance resources. Untrustedsubjects include those systems andpersonnel not under the command center’scontrol, possibly including subjects such asthe domestic and international media, informants,or any source of questionable origin.rule three dictates establishment of a formalprocess to change the integrity level of asubject or object. The intelligence communityuses similar procedures to mark the level oftrust in an intelligence resource; multiplesources of lower integrity levels could provideenough corroboration to support raising theintegrity level of a subject or object, but theprocess of doing so should be well understoodand performed by a designated entity. Thisprocess will obviously represent one of themost important components of this modelsince improperly raising integrity levels of apoor information source could compromisethe entire scheme.rule four requires that personnel or systemscreating information attribute the sourceaccordingly and properly mark data at the appropriateintegrity level. Doing so will ensurethat a receiver places the suitable level of trustor skepticism on the information. new informationcompiled from multiple sources willnot automatically assume the integrity level ofthe subject compiling the information; instead,the integrity level of the new object willreflect the lowest such level of the compiledinformation until application of the processdefined in rule three.The process suggested by rule five can bemore flexible than that in rule three, dependingon the role of the receiving subject. Forexample, a tactical ground unit would have amuch smaller “sphere of relevance” thanwould a C2 aircraft orbiting over an area ofresponsibility. The ground unit would typicallybe interested in information about anopponent’s nearby ground forces, in-range artilleryunits, or status of aircraft flying close airsupport, but not in mission tracks of longrangefriendly aircraft, threats from enemy airdefenses, or air-refueling tracks. however, theC2 aircraft might want to display locations offriendly ground forces in the area of a specificoperation. Some process must define an appropriatesphere of relevance for each subject,based on mission needs. at the operationallevel, each subject should also be able to customizeits sphere of relevance to assure the additionof data of interest or the removal of informationdeemed no longer pertinent.rule six prohibits the forwarding of anylow-integrity information as higher-integrityinformation without proper analysis and consideration.Similarly, personnel who read lowintegrityinformation must be careful not tomake decisions or pass on the informationwithout putting it into proper context. Thisparticular rule is more difficult to implementfor personnel than for data-processing equipment.For example, one could interpret a system’sreport of erratic and illogical readingsfrom a sensor as a malfunction; additionally,one could include the appropriate caveats

A MODEL FOR MANAGING DECISION-MAKING INFORMATION 107with low-integrity data added to a report. however,when the subject is a person rather thanan automated system, preventing him or herfrom acting on or up-channeling informationwithout regard for its lower integrity will presenta problem.rule seven ensures the proper filtering ofinformation in accordance with integrity andrelevance rules. a tactical display is useless if itexhibits irrelevant or misleading informationat the wrong time, and unprocessed or incompletedata could cause premature or incorrectdecisions. The final caveat guarantees thatsensitive operations are not compromised—data must undergo sanitizing or proper declassificationbefore transmission to subjectsnot involved in the operation. In effect, thisrule provides the “push and pull”—preventinginformation overload from unneeded automatedpushes while preserving flexibilityfor pulling useful data.Back in the Command CenterIn order to implement these rules in a commandcenter, we need to completely automatesome processes, let personnel in various careerfields or leadership positions handle theothers exclusively, and see that both systemsand personnel implement several rules. afterthe transfer of objects to paper form, traditionalprocesses such as classification controlsand need-to-know restrictions become personnelresponsibilities, while various mechanismscan restrict the flow of digital information.rules three and five, however, require humansto interpret data and make changes to integrityand relevance levels, based on that interpretation.Intelligence and operations personnelwill normally be in the best position to changethese levels, depending on the specifics of thesituation. In order to enforce both rules, personnelmust have a good understanding of theprocesses and must properly restrict mechanismsthat effect changes to integrity and relevance.ConclusionClearly, we operate in a politically complexenvironment, and many operations occur inthe focal point of a 24-hour news cycle. missedopportunities to engage high-value targetsand incidents of collateral damage have equalprobability of becoming headlines; both canraise questions about our military effectiveness.as a result, a commander’s appetite forinformation will continue to grow, as will demandsthat future systems be interconnectedvia the GIG. Our efficiency and ability to rapidlyfuse, analyze, and convert raw data intoactionable intelligence will depend on the capabilitiesof future systems and the processesthat govern their implementation. We believethat the classification, integrity, and relevancerules described above will help guide thedevelopment of systems for maximizingdata fusion and avoid the pitfalls of conditionssuch as inverted perspectives. Becauseof the benefits associated with these rules,we need to utilize a simulated commandcenter and information-processing systemsto develop them significantly. qNotes1. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, DODChief Information Officer (CIO) Guidance and Policy Memorandum(G&PM) No. 11-8450: Department of Defense (DoD) GlobalInformation Grid (GIG) Computing, 6 april 2001, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/memos/gigmemo.pdf.2. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 8100.1,Global Information Grid (GIG) Overarching Policy, 19 September2002, 8, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/810001_091902/810001p.pdf.3. Clinger-Cohen Information Technology Management ReformAct of 1996, 40 US Code 1424, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 3 January1996, http://www.cio.gov/Documents/it_management_reform_act_Feb_1996.html.4. See, for example, musée des plans-reliefs nationalmonument, http://www.monum.fr/visitez/decouvrir/fiche.dml?id=102&lang=en.5. personal experience of major Bass.6. US army Future Combat Systems, http://www.army.mil/fcs.

108 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 20077. mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of ModernWar (new York: atlantic monthly press, 1999), 136–37,148–51, 193.8. house, Statement of Mr. James B. Engle, Deputy AssistantSecretary of the Air Force (Science, Technology and Engineering),to the House Science Committee on Air Force InformationTechnology Program, 107th Cong., 2d sess., June 2002,http://gop.science.house.gov/hearings/full02/jun24/engle.htm.9. Joint publication ( Jp) 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September2006, II-2, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf.10. John a. Tirpak, “The network Way of War,” AirmanMagazine, march 2005, 26–31, http://www.afa.org/magazine/march2005/0305network.pdf.11. matthew Bishop, Computer Security: Art and Science(Boston: addison-Wesley, 2003), 153.12. K. J. Biba, Integrity Considerations for Secure ComputerSystems, Technical report eSD-Tr-76-372 (Bedford, ma:USaF electronic Systems Division, april 1977), 33.13. Jp 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,9 march 2000, I-1, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf.14. Ibid., II-15.15. Steven B. Lipner, “non-Discretionary Controls forCommercial applications,” in Proceedings of the 1982 IEEESymposium on Privacy and Security (Oakland, Ca: Institute ofelectrical and electronics engineers, april 1982), 2–10.We stand ready to conduct a large-scale, long-duration irregularwarfare campaign as an integral part of the JointTeam, to include counterinsurgency, security, stability, transitionand reconstruction operations.—2007 U.S. Air Force Posture Statement

What Difference Can You Make?CMSgt John P. hearn, USaF, retired*Air ForCE SuPErviSorS commonlyreward their subordinates for outstandingperformance. The decorationsthey bestow represent tangibleexpressions of gratitude. oftentimes, however,supervisors never realize the effect they havehad on their subordinates.The finest compliment i ever received camefrom one of my former subordinates. When isupervised him, he was an Airman first class;now he’s a senior master sergeant. He oncetold me that, had it not been for me, he wouldhave left the Air Force to become a civilian. idid not save his life in a moment of glory; onthe contrary, i had several interesting talkswith him concerning his demeanor and hismethods for communicating with other Airmenof varying ranks. As a law-enforcementdesk sergeant, he frequently had opportunitiesto excel when conversing with other peopleon base. Since we were stationed together duringa “short tour” in Korea, i had only a fewmonths to interact with him before he was reassigned.Years later, he told me how i had influencedhis life—that i had inspired him bymy example. What a feeling! in essence, i succeededat one of the jobs the Air Force paidme to do because part of a leader’s job involvesdeveloping subordinates to be future leaders.At times a person’s actions influence theAir Force’s mission far beyond the demandsof his or her job description. For example,late in the spring of 1957 on the first day ofcandidate-prescreening orientation, a youngman stood on a scale at the Air Force Academyclinic. The medical technician—an Airmanfirst class who had processedthousands of candidates— s l o w l yslid the black, notched block across themeasuring arm, stopping the block whenthe point of the arm had centered itself:“one hundred and fifteen pounds, Sir,” hesaid. The doctor, a major, annotated a checkliston the candidate’s medical record andcommented, “You’re not going to make it,kid. The minimum required weight for admissionto the academy is 120 pounds. Youhave to meet that standard when you weighout at the end of the week.” Devastated atthis news, the young man thought of his father,who had enlisted in the Army andserved throughout World War ii, winning acommission and finally retiring as a colonel.His father had high expectations for himand had expended a great deal of effort towin his appointment to the academy. Howcould he tell him of his failure to meet admissionstandards?* Prior to his retirement on 1 April 2007, the author served as superintendent of the 96th Security Forces Squadron (Air ForceMateriel Command), Eglin AFB, Florida.109

110 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007Seeing the despair in the young man’s eyes,the technician told him to wait outside the office;he came to see him when the doctor tooka break: “Listen to me. Go over to the chowhall and see the mess sergeant. Tell him i sentyou, and tell him about the problem you have;he’ll take care of you.”At the academy’s dining facility, the messsergeant—overweight, unshaven, and inarticulate—patientlylistened to the candidate’splight and said, “okay kid, you just eat whateveri put on your plate.” over the next week,the sergeant made a point of filling the youngman’s plate with pasta, fats, bananas, and carbohydrates—foodthat, in today’s Air Force,would give a dietary technician a coronary. Althoughthe candidate stuffed himself at everymeal, the intense physical activities packed intothe orientation program prevented him fromgaining weight. By week’s end, the young manlay in bed contemplating his future and worryingabout the next day’s outprocessing physical.Just before lunch, the candidate enteredthe doctor’s office for his weigh-out. Earlierhe had weighed himself, happily seeing thathe was up to 120 pounds. Now, however, at theclinic he heard the technician announce,“one hundred and eighteen pounds, Sir.”The doctor made his final mark on the candidate’smedical record and turned his gaze uponhim: “See, kid, i told you that you wouldn’tmake it.” He then tossed the record into thewastebasket. in his anguish, the young manexplained, “i had to do my final physical fitnessexercises and the run this morning. i lostweight doing that.” The technician followedhim into the hall and handed him a quarter:“Go down the hall, and buy a carton of chocolatemilk.” Puzzled, the candidate asked him,“Why do you want a carton of milk now?”“it’s not for me; it’s for you.”“Don’t be ridiculous. i’m not thirsty rightnow.”The technician stared at the candidate as aparent would when disciplining a waywardchild: “Listen, Mister, a carton of chocolatemilk is one quart and weighs just over twopounds.” After the young man returned withthe milk, the technician watched him drink itall down and then approached the doctor:“Sir, would you do me a favor and weighthat last candidate one more time?”“i already marked him as a failure. Hedidn’t make the weight.”But the technician persisted, so the doctoragreed to his request. As the candidate oncemore stood on the scale, the technician slidthe weighted block across the measuring armuntil the pointer centered itself.“one hundred and twenty pounds, Sir.”“You’re very lucky, young man. You justbarely made it.”Having said that, the doctor made a newmark on the record and placed the candidate’sfile in the basket marked “ACCEPTED.”The candidate graduated 12th in his classin 1961, and throughout his illustrious 33-yearcareer, he flew F-4 Phantom ii aircraft overthe triple-canopied jungles of Southeast Asiain support of infantry soldiers far below. returningto the States, he served in a variety ofposts during the following years, includingchoice assignments at the Pentagon. in additionto fighters, he also flew training aircraft,C-141 transports, and, later, B-52 bombers. Hebecame a wing commander and was promotedto general. on one memorable inspection at anorthern-tier base, as commanding generalfor Strategic Air Command’s (SAC) inspectorgeneralteams, he got out of his aircraft andasked for a vehicle, as was his custom. The wingcommander handed him an agenda for his visit,but the general had his own agenda. Withoutthe usual entourage, he drove along the flightline and stopped by an aircraft that an Airmanwas servicing. Stepping out of the car into thefreezing wind, the general asked the Airmanhow he could service the aircraft wearingheavy arctic mittens. “it’s not very easy, Sir, butit’s so cold out here that if i touch the metalwith my bare hands, my skin will freeze to it.”The general then radioed his inspection teamto rendezvous back at his aircraft; they wouldinspect some other base farther south instead.The wing commander told him he could notdo that. Smiling, the general said, “Colonel,it’s not safe out here to work on aircraft. i’llcome back at another time when weather conditionsare better. Meanwhile, if you disagreewith my decision, call General Davis at Head­

VIGNETTE 111Gen George L.Butler began hisAir Force careerin 1961, retiringin 1994.quarters SAC and tell him.” With that, the inspectionteam departed.During the general’s tenure at the Pentagon,some members of the East German militarywho were inspecting a site in the WarsawPact area killed an Army major. The generalreceived a tasking to write a policy directivedetailing procedures for notifying Warsaw Pactforces of all future inspection requirements.These procedures also applied to Soviet-blocforces when they conducted inspections of installationsin the North Atlantic Treaty organization(NATo). in a formal ceremony, thechairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and hisSoviet counterpart approved and signed thegeneral’s policy directive.one of the greatest moments in the general’scareer occurred when he became SAC’s combatantcommander—its last commander, as amatter of fact. He also orchestrated the standupof uS Strategic Command after the collapseof the Soviet union and the inactivationof SAC, Military Airlift Command, and TacticalAir Command. During his stay at offutt AFB,Nebraska, he worked tirelessly to improve livingconditions of personnel who lived on andoff base and to upgrade offutt’s fitness center.in short, he was a leader who took care of thepeople who took care of the mission. i’ve mentionedonly a few of his accomplishments in avery productive career that spanned morethan three decades. But this account not onlymentions some of the successes of Gen GeorgeL. Butler, the candidate-made-general, it alsostresses the effect that one person can have onanother as well as the benefits that accruefrom that person’s influence.The general would be the first to say that,had it not been for the concern and considerationshown him by two enlisted members backin 1957, he never would have had either theopportunity or authority to help the enlistedforce. His successes not only benefited AirForce members but also favorably affected theforces of our sister services and NATo allies.The young medical technician and the messsergeant may never know just how important acontribution they made to the defense of ournation. They will never receive a medal orplaque to commemorate what they did for theAir Force. if the candidate whom they helpedlater saved a life in vietnam, those two enlistedmembers also had a hand in saving that life. ifthe policies and procedures the candidateeventually developed to deal with a nucleararmedopponent prevented misunderstandingsand, possibly, a nuclear incident, thenthose men also helped make the world a saferplace. if the general-to-be opened base housingfor junior enlisted members to soften theeconomic burden of raising a family, thenthose two men deserve some of the gratitudeof those personnel.We all know that combining hydrogen andoxygen produces water, but not everyoneknows that it takes a catalyst to join those twoelements. in this story, many people may knowabout General Butler and his accomplishments,the results of his actions, and the waysome people have benefited from those actions.However, very few of them know thatnone of the general’s accomplishments couldhave occurred without the efforts of two enlistedmembers, acting as catalysts, who wentout of their way to help someone else. Thegeneral tried unsuccessfully throughout hiscareer to find those two caring men so hecould thank them. i hope that the readers ofthis journal can now appreciate them as wellas the countless others who silently make differencesin our lives. Can you make a difference?Probably more than you will everknow. qEglin AFB, Florida

Leading Change by John P. Kotter. Harvard BusinessSchool Press (http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu/b02/en/books/books_home.jhtml), 300 NorthBeacon Street, Watertown, Massachusetts 02472,1996, 208 pages, $26.95 (hardcover).Nothing endures except change—the only constant.Clearly, only in effective transformation doesone find tangible security and the realization thatthose who fail to improvise face an unenviable future.In Leading Change, Prof. John Kotter, whomthis reviewer interviewed at the Harvard BusinessSchool, has written a most thorough, insightful,and provocative process assessment for effectingorganizational renewal. This superb, timely, andpractical book is a must-read for anyone in a leadershipposition who is engaged in transformation anddevelopment of reengineered organizations for thetwenty-first century. Quite simply, Leading Change isthe best book on this subject published to date.This intensive, well-written volume provides an excellentsynthesis for leading and managing an accelerationprocess to bring about change. Dr. Kotterpresents a model designed to drive change fromsmall increments to dramatic shifts and thus adjustorganizational systems and structures to bettermeet mission requirements.Part 1 of Leading Change’s three parts addressesthe change problem and its solution. Part 2, theheart of the book, considers the author’s eightstageprocess for dynamic and positive change. Part3 discusses the implications of change for thetwenty-first century.Part 1 includes Dr. Kotter’s analysis of why transformingorganizations fail. He identifies leadershipas the engine that drives redirection, maintainingthat a purely managerial mind-set will inevitably failto produce constructive revisions, regardless of thequality of people involved. Some key consequencesof failure in transformational-change efforts, primarilybased on a lack of leadership, include thefollowing: reengineering takes too long and coststoo much, promised programs do not deliverhoped-for results, and new strategies are not implementedwell. However, these failures are not inevitable.With a heightened sense of awareness of theneed for change and the application of relevantleadership competencies, one can avoid these failuresor at least greatly reduce them. The key to preventingfailure resides in acquiring a deeper andfirst-rate understanding of why organizations resistchange, having a compellingly dedicated championwho sponsors change, and making sure that thepractices to complement and reinforce change arecomprehensive and based on a process model suchas that contained in part 2 of Dr. Kotter’s book.In part 2, the author outlines an exceptionallyworkable and relevant eight-stage process for creatingredirection. He argues that successful transformationswill not happen easily and that one mustcreate a detailed road map which guides the way.His powerful process for creating major reform makesa unique contribution to better understanding renovationleadership. It includes the following steps:1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency. Examiningcurrent realities and identifying crises, potentialcrises, or major opportunities for improvement.2. Creating the Guiding Coalition. Putting togethera group with enough influence to leadthe change and getting the group to work togetheras a team.3. Developing a Vision. Creating a vision to helpdirect the change effort and formulatingstrategies for achieving that vision.4. Communicating the Change Vision. Constantlycommunicating the new vision, strategies,and behavior expected within the organization.112

BOOK REVIEWS 1135. Empowering Broad-Based Action. Getting ridof obstacles that prevent change, reshapingsystems or structures that undermine thechange vision, and encouraging risk taking andnontraditional ideas, activities, and actions.6. Generating Short-Term Wins. Planning forvisible improvements in performance as wellas recognizing and rewarding people whomade the wins possible.7. Consolidating Gains and Producing MoreChange. Using increased credibility to changeall systems, structures, and policies that donot fit together and do not meet the transformationvision. Recognizing people who canimplement the change vision and reinvigoratethe entire process.8. Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture.Encouraging more and better leadership aswell as more effective management. Articulatingthe connection between new behaviors andorganizational success and ensuring the successionof continued leadership development.After considering the organization of the future,leadership, and lifelong learning, the author contendsin part 3 that the twenty-first-century organizationwill become less bureaucratic, contain moreeffective customer data systems, and be more risktolerant as well as more open and candid. He emphasizesthe importance of lifelong learning andenhanced leadership skills to success in the future.In summary, given the inevitability of change, wemust embrace it if we wish to successfully meet thechallenges of the present and the future. In LeadingChange, Dr. Kotter provides us with a detailed roadmap that highlights potential dangers and offerssolid advice to all leaders and managers trying toorchestrate effective change throughout their organizations—theprincipal theme of this book.Dr. Richard I. LesterMaxwell AFB, AlabamaAir Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: TheStrategic Importance of USAF Advisory and AssistanceMissions by Alan J. Vick et al. RAND(http://www.rand.org/publications/index.html),1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica,California 90407-2138, 2006, 204 pages, $25.00(softcover). Available free from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG509.pdf.The short title of this RAND monograph givesthe impression that its authors will enlighten readersas to characteristics of the newest generation ofcounterinsurgency (COIN) warfare and details ofairpower’s role in this novel environment—certainlya topic of great interest to military-aviation scholars,given recent operations. Despite providing a conciserecap of COIN’s political and military characteristics,the work describes timeless principles—not novel ones. Although the study does (lightly)treat various applications of COIN airpower, it expendsmuch effort somewhat narrowly promotingthe expansion of the Air Force’s elite foreign airadvisoryunit as the most cost-effective means ofcombating budding insurgencies of the future.The pseudobeguiling title aside, the work hasonly a few faults and much to offer the reader concerningCOIN. The authors spend a majority of theirtime clearly defining and categorizing insurgencies,detailing COIN principles, and discussing grandstrategic options for COIN. They advocate a “new”strategy of “precautionary” COIN—very limited militaryintervention at the earliest stages—as the mostcost-effective means of combating insurgency (p. 70).Even though the study does not eliminate the potentialnecessity for “remedial” COIN, whereby thehost government requires direct outside assistanceto put down an insurgency, it focuses primarily onchanges needed to enhance the Air Force’s capabilitiesto execute a robust, precautionary COIN strategy.The authors introduce an Iraq-style situation, aso-called constabulary COIN, as a third option buttake it no further than a concept in which an occupyingpower has removed the existing governmentand now must fight an insurgency while generatinga legitimate replacement. This particulartopic raised a hopeful eyebrow. Sadly, however, theauthors avoid an opportunity to explore neededchanges in airpower applicable to today’s majorchallenges by tersely noting that “the occupyingstate should take what steps it can to limit the scaleof the insurgency beforehand” (p. 72).A case study on El Salvador’s insurgency and anexamination of considerations in the developmentof COIN capabilities highlight important issues forUS military planners: that smaller footprints andcloser contact are often preferable, that the hostnation must win the political as well as military battle,that military restraint is a virtue, and that airpoweroffers important capabilities. The remainder of thework theoretically and methodologically detailshow the Air Force can affect an early insurgencybest through institutional and bureaucratic initiativesand the growth of air advisers, using the 6thSpecial Operations Squadron as a model.

114 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007In sum, I was impressed by the discussion ofmilitary power’s application to insurgency but deflatedto discover that the prescription for airpoweramounted to speeches, new Air Staff offices, coursesin developmental education, and an order-ofmagnitudeincrease for the 6th Special OperationsSquadron. Granted, increased operational airadvisorycapability constitutes a valid recommendationfor precautionary COIN, but the study omitsdiscussion of relevant airpower options in all typesof counterinsurgencies. If “the optimal force mixesfor warfare against regular [i.e., conventional] andirregular [i.e., COIN] adversaries differ even moretoday” (p. 60), then shouldn’t the Air Force alsoconsider developing a small but talented “model”COIN air force to strafe enemy insurgent positionsinstead of relying on fourth-generation (soon fifthgeneration)fighters costing $75 million (accordingto the Defense Department’s Program AcquisitionCosts by Weapon System, February 2006)? Where arethe examinations of tough force-structure choices?Must US forces capable of flying, employing, andinstructing from third-generation attack platformsbe limited to select special operators? Unfortunately,Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Erastops short of addressing these options. I wouldread this monograph again for the excellent expositionof not-so-new COIN principles but look elsewherefor novel, innovative, and broadly applicableairpower solutions.Maj Paul A. Hibbard, USAFNaval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, CaliforniaFortress France: The Maginot Line and FrenchDefenses in World War II by J. E. Kaufmannand H. W. Kaufmann. Praeger (http://www.greenwood.com/praeger.aspx), GreenwoodPublishing Group, 88 Post Road West, Westport,Connecticut 06881, 2005, 220 pages,$49.95 (hardcover).The Treaty of Versailles ended World War I, butit did nothing to prevent World War II. Shortly afterit was signed, European countries began consideringplans for the next inevitable war. France initiallycreated offensive plans but found themunrealistic due to manpower shortages created byWorld War I. In 1929 André Maginot, the Frenchminister of war and a veteran of Verdun, beganpushing for the creation of massive defenses thatwould cut off German invasion routes into France.He preferred physical structures because, as hesaid, “concrete is better . . . and is less expensivethan a wall of chests” (p. 15). The wall that Francebuilt would carry his name. If only it had worked.After World War II, one encountered much talkdescribing the Maginot Line as a white elephantthat created a false sense of security—a “Maginotmentality” that doomed France to defeat. AuthorsJ. E. Kaufmann and H. W. Kaufmann take the oppositestance, suggesting that the Maginot Line fulfilledits purpose and gave French authorities anopportunity to mass their combat power in the faceof the Nazi onslaught. The authors posit that restrictiveFrench doctrine limited subordinates’freedom of initiative, hemming in the French military’sfree thinkers. That argument, which theKaufmanns state as a given, is certainly worthy ofconsideration, but this reviewer takes no positionon it because the points are difficult to glean fromthis dense work.Rather than a work of history or doctrinal analysis,Fortress France is predominantly an engineeringstudy, packed full of detailed drawings and explanationsof every aspect of the Maginot Line downto the smallest detail. For example, readers interestedin the protective properties of reinforcedconcrete walls against artillery shells of various sizeswill appreciate table 2-9 (p. 49), typical of thebook’s many tables. Whereas most military historieslack sufficient graphics and visuals, this one comesclose to overdoing it, offering 33 tables and 54 figures—almosthalf the book.In an effort to put the Maginot Line in context,the authors do offer a short opening chapter thatdiscusses its origins as well as snapshots of the preparationsand performance of France’s air and navalarms. Additionally, they mention similar French defensiveworks in Africa known as the Mareth Line.However, one finds the book’s one-page concludingchapter unsatisfying, serving merely as an endnotethat will leave the reader wondering about theauthors’ true points.Furthermore, Fortress France devotes itself completelyto the physical properties of the wall. As thepremise of the book implies, if the wall itself comprisesonly part of the story, then the authors shouldhave placed more emphasis on the people involved.They do include all the major players but in such away that fails to bring out their humanity—theirsterile presentation simply doesn’t excite the mind.This is a shame because the story of the MaginotLine presents such fertile ground for military thinkers—groundthat Fortress France leaves untilled.Oftentimes military history allows the student toestablish parallels and extract lessons that apply to

BOOK REVIEWS 115modern military thought. Why read military history—orany history for that matter—if we cannotuse it to understand our current condition? Thisbook may do that—but without assistance from theauthors. For example, might the lessons of theMaginot Line and France’s reliance on it for defenseserve as a warning to those who favor robots,unmanned vehicles, and smart weapons over humanefforts? One will never know because theKaufmanns fail to open the door to such thinking.Finally, the book is just too expensive. For$49.95, one could buy several decent books on thesubject. Overall, the extremely limited scope andexcessive detail of Fortress France, together withother concerns mentioned above, limit its utilityfor the average reader.CSM James H. Clifford, USA, RetiredMcDonough, GeorgiaLas Metáforas de una Guerra Perpetua: Estudiossobre Pragmática del Discurso en el ConflictoArmado Colombiano by Fernando Estrada Gallego.Fondo Editorial Universidad EAFIT(http://www.eafit.edu.co/fondoEditorial), Carrera49, no. 7, Sur-50, Medellín, Colombia, 2004,173 pages, $10.00.Las Metáforas de una Guerra Perpetua argues thatopposing sides in Colombia’s chronic guerrilla wararticulate their political views through metaphorbaseddiscourses that can be interpreted throughsystematic study. The author, Dr. Fernando EstradaGallego, director of the Regional Studies Center atthe Industrial University of Santander, Colombia,has published other works about the theoretical relationshipsamong philosophy, language, and rationality.In this book, he applies complex philosophicalconcepts from Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, Carlvon Clausewitz, Michael Walzer, and many othersto examine how discourses influence listeners anddistort the public’s perception of events. His analysisis convoluted and narrowly confined to Colombia,but serious students of information operationsmay find broader applications for his thoughts.The author carefully dissects public statementsmade by guerrillas of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionariasde Colombia (FARC) and right-wingparamilitary groups to show how those organizationsuse metaphors to obscure and justify their violentactions. For example, the FARC euphemisticallyrefers to indiscriminate mass kidnappings as“miraculous catches,” a metaphor derived from thebiblical verse “follow me, and I will make you fishersof men” (pp. 87–90). Members of the FARCthereby cast themselves not as kidnappers but asrevolutionaries conducting religiously inspiredacts. Colombian paramilitary groups use similarrhetorical devices. Dr. Estrada contends that thesemetaphors treacherously mask crimes by intellectuallyeroding the public’s ability to use normal languageto understand events. As he puts it, “Thewar’s rhetoric has generated an unconscious reversalof the values we Colombians attribute to our shareddaily reality, and this reversal corresponds primarilyto changes in words and their meanings” (p. 123).His focus on the power of words reminds one ofGeorge Orwell’s classic book 1984, in which governmentdeprives people of the vocabulary theyneed to articulate ideas that might challenge its absoluteauthority.Readers unfamiliar with philosophy and rhetoricmay find Las Metáforas de una Guerra Perpetuahard to grasp. They might also wonder whether theauthor’s analytical method implicitly assumes thatpolitical discourses and metaphors really are subjectto rational examination. Passions certainly runhigh during guerrilla wars, but if one accepts theClausewitzian notion that war is the continuationof politics by other means, then political discoursesshould reflect deliberate strategies calculated to influencepublic opinion.Employing metaphors during counterinsurgencyis challenging yet important. This book offers usefulinsights, but some of its underlying assumptionsseem excessively gloomy. Dr. Estrada paints a bleakpicture of Colombian social and political conditions,lamenting how that country has “a deprivedsocial culture with the world’s highest unemploymentrates, highest corruption rates, and most discouragingindices of social cooperation” (p. 31).One can hardly believe that Colombia is in suchdire straits. The author also bewails the country’sheterogeneous political and social systems in termsthat might almost apply to the United States. Colombiacertainly faces serious problems yet hasmanaged to sustain democratic governance despitedecades of guerrilla war—a remarkable achievement.Writing during Pres. Álvaro Uribe’s first term,Dr. Estrada sounds a skeptical note about how thepresident would address Colombia’s problems.President Uribe’s impressive reelection in 2006shows that he is a potent agent of national progress.Indeed, the author acknowledges that despite Colombia’sproblems, “we have a country filled withhope, challenges to barbarism, and enterprisingspirit, with people capable of conceiving projectsfor a new order of communal living” (p. 37).

116 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007Even if his assumptions are too pessimistic forColombia, Dr. Estrada’s ideas have wider applicabilitythan he claims. For example, like Colombian armedgroups, al-Qaeda terrorists often try to legitimizebarbarous acts by resorting to religious metaphors.The author’s policy recommendations may alsohave international validity because if the Colombianscan make democracy work, they can serve as amodel for others. To counteract social and politicalfragmentation and lessen the attraction of armedgroups, he calls for more integration of minoritiesinto Colombian politics. He also advocates governmentaldecentralization to empower local authoritiesto address local grievances. These prescriptionscould apply as well in Iraq and other countries seekingto unify disparate groups; however, one shoulduse prudence in doing so because weak centralgovernmentalauthority characterizes failed stateslike Somalia and Afghanistan. Even in democraticcountries faced with severe political disruptions,the ship of state needs a firm hand on the tiller.Las Metáforas de una Guerra Perpetua, a theoreticaltreatise about what the US military calls informationoperations or strategic communications, holdsparticular interest because our experience in theglobal war on terror shows the importance of publicattitudes. The book offers a conceptual lens for interpretinginformation campaigns in Colombia,but its basic ideas apply to information operationsin general. Too abstract for the hands-on practitioner,it may nevertheless suit advanced theoristsand strategists. Dr. Estrada provides just the sort ofinsights the Air Force needs as it embraces cyberspaceoperations.Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAFMaxwell AFB, AlabamaInside the Iron Works: How Grumman’s GloryDays Faded by George M. Skurla and William H.Gregory. Naval Institute Press (http://www.usni.org/press/press.html), 291 Wood Road, Annapolis,Maryland 21402, 2004, 256 pages, $32.95(hardcover).Inside the Iron Works, an interesting and usefulbook for Air Force readers, focuses on the personalitiesof and decisions made by senior managementofficials at the Grumman Corporation fromthe 1940s through the 1980s. Its premise, supportedby the authors’ anecdotes, maintains thatGrumman failed as a defense manufacturing companybecause of mismanagement (i.e., bad decisionsmade) by these leaders.A major aircraft (and later space vehicle) builderfor the US Navy, Grumman was founded on theconcept of building as safe a vehicle as possible toprotect the pilot—even at the expense of aerodesignqualities that may have increased rangeand/or maneuverability. Indeed, “naval aviatorschristened Grumman Aircraft Engineering as theIron Works because of the habit its battle-damagedairplanes had of getting their pilots back to the carrierdeck” (p. vii). The company remained dependentupon the Department of Defense (DOD) asits predominant (if not sole) customer throughoutthe vast majority of its corporate life. When Grummandid venture into the realm of product diversificationin the civilian market (e.g., windmills,buses, and solar panels [p. 163]), these excursionsproved unprofitable. Do these business decisionsillustrate bad management practices? Readers mustdecide for themselves.One of the authors, George M. Skurla, relatesGrumman’s story through a series of anecdotal vignettesbased on events that occurred during histenure at the Iron Works. Though the tale of onespecific company, it has a more far-reaching effectinsofar as the book offers readers an appreciation ofthe inner workings of the defense industry’s aircraftbuildingelement over a 30-year period. It identifiessuccesses in innovation by several firms as theyevolve into major defense contractors, a phenomenonthat becomes readily apparent to Skurla as hevisits Lockheed, where he sees firsthand the F-117,and then Northrop, where he views a model of theB-2. Because these first ventures into the realm ofstealth technology represent something unknownto Grumman, he criticizes its management style fora lack of awareness. Perhaps it was mismanagementat Grumman, or perhaps it was a conscious decisionby the government to limit the cognizance ofstealth technology during its infancy—that is aquestion of public policy and something for thereader to determine.However, the firsthand accounts of how businessworks and how Congress, the DOD, and defensecontractors depend upon each other to fulfill theirown missions and assure our collective security undeniablyjustify the price of the book. A fast read,Inside the Iron Works offers detailed insight into thedefense industry as seen through the eyes of one ofthe company presidents and chief operating officers.Col Joseph J. McCue, USAF, RetiredSpringfield, Virginia

BOOK REVIEWS 117B-17 at War by Bill Yenne. Zenith Press (http://www.zenithpress.com), 729 Prospect Avenue,P.O. Box 1, Osceola, Wisconsin 54020, 2006, 128pages, $19.95 (softcover).When people think about American airpower inWorld War II, several images stand out. There areperhaps no other icons more compelling than theelegant silhouette of the magnificent Boeing B-17Flying Fortress. Whether painted in camouflagedolive drab or glistening in its unpainted natural silverfinish, this aircraft, bristling with .50-caliber machineguns, struck fear and demanded respectfrom its German adversaries in the Luftwaffe.Against this backdrop, Bill Yenne adds to the alreadyovercrowded history of this amazing airplane.A San Francisco–based author, Yenne has writtenmore than two dozen books on the military,aviation, and other historical topics, including theexcellent Story of the Boeing Company (Zenith Press,2005). Because of his knowledge of the history ofone of America’s most significant companies, itcomes as no surprise that the author decided tonarrow his focus to one of Boeing’s most importantaircraft. What is surprising, however, is the lack ofdetail in this rather expensive paperback.Like other authors of the publisher’s At War series,Yenne probably had to encapsulate as muchhistory of the B-17 as possible within a limited numberof pages. Considering the plethora of B-17 booksavailable, many of them hundreds of pages in length,trying to put the entire history of such a magnificentmachine into fewer than 130 pages is no smallfeat. Unsurprisingly, the author falls a little short inthis attempt.Although B-17 at War contains more than 100excellent photographs, 32 of them in color, it includesno cutaway drawings, color plates, profilecomparisons between B-17 variants, or maps of theoperating areas in Europe, the Pacific, or the Mediterranean.Although the development of combatboxformations, which helped thwart attacks byLuftwaffe fighters, contributed to the B-17’s success,one finds no detailed mention or illustrationsof them. The book does, however, discuss the littleknownbut nevertheless interesting operational historyof the B-17 in the Pacific. Although B-17 at Wardetails an inventory of the aircraft for selectedmonths as well as the number of variants and theirspecifications, it never fully gets off the ground as asignificant work of history. For example, Yennetalks about the YB-40 (B-17 gunship) but omits anypictures of this aircraft. Simply put, B-17 at War providesa look at B-17 operations on an almost day-bydaybasis, illustrated throughout with photographs,but offers very little new information, no detailedanalysis of bomber operations, and too few storiesof the men who flew this great airplane in combat.Despite its simple, clean presentation, I find itdifficult to recommend this book since it presentslittle or nothing in terms of historical significance;in reality, it is a rehash of the dozens of other B-17books already on the market. If readers want anotherB-17 book with several new photographs andmany of the same ones from other books, then theymay want to add it to their collection. If, however,they prefer a fresh look at the B-17, along with newstories of bravery and courage under fire, then B-17at War is not for them.Lt Col Robert F. Tate, USAFRMaxwell AFB, AlabamaResponsibility of Command: How UN and NATOCommanders Influenced Airpower over Bosniaby Col Mark A. Bucknam. Air University Press(http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress),131 West Shumacher Avenue, Maxwell AFB, Alabama36112-6615, 2003, 428 pages, $40.00 (softcover).Available free from http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Books/Bucknam/Bucknam.pdf.In 1991 American airpower was reborn over thedesert sands between Kuwait City and Baghdad. Inthe decade that followed, policy makers aggressivelymade use of airpower and its promise of seeminglyunlimited precision and effectiveness. The forestsand hills of the disintegrating former Yugoslavia representedairpower’s next challenges—Bosnia during1992–95 and Kosovo in 1999. Whether one callsthese efforts successes or failures, they highlight thepolitical challenges of employing and controllingviolence from the air in situations less amenable toairpower than the first Gulf War. Colonel Bucknamaddresses the first of these interventions—the airwar over Bosnia, which began as Operation DenyFlight and ended as Operation Deliberate Force.Through interviews and a study of North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) and United Nationsdocuments, Bucknam shows how upper-levelcommanders—of all nationalities—sought to controlairpower to meet their particular goals. He detailsthese interventions as they flowed both throughand around the chain of command as circumstancesdictated. Unsurprisingly, he concludes thatcommanders used their military expertise to gaininfluence over airpower from policy makers. What

118 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007is surprising is that he shows how commanders notonly influenced the details of military interventionbut also began to function as policy makers themselves.Colonel Bucknam demonstrates how thispractice especially held true of NATO commanders,whose airpower plans (complemented by those atUS Air Forces in Europe) often drove the selectionof possible policy options. This conclusion is one ofmany worthy insights offered by Responsibility ofCommand, which should be read by anyone whowants to know more about how airpower functionsin both peacekeeping and coalition warfare.Capt Tim Spaulding, USAFRoyal Air Force Lakenheath, United KingdomPrisoners: A Novel of World War II by Burt Zollo.Academy Chicago Publishers (http://www.academychicago.com), 11030 South LangleyAvenue, Chicago, Illinois 60628, 2003, 275pages, $22.50 (hardcover).In the months following the Normandy invasionin June 1944, the German army began its long retreateast. As it did so, an increasing number ofGerman prisoners of war (POW) fell into Alliedhands. Because resources were earmarked for Alliedforces prosecuting the war—to end it as quicklyas possible and thus save lives—the care of tens ofthousands of German POWs became a low priority.Undoubtedly, the fact that many of them sufferedand died in captivity gave rise to James Bacque’sstunning accusation, appearing in his inflammatorybook Other Losses in 1989, that Supreme AlliedCommander Dwight Eisenhower deliberately tried tostarve to death and otherwise murder GermanPOWs. Reputable military historians quickly examinedBacque’s assertions and concluded, convincingly,that no such policy and no such massacreever existed. Now comes Burt Zollo, a former USArmy soldier who served at one of those POWcamps near the end of the war, to write a fictionalizedaccount of such a camp. By doing so, he givescredence to the ridiculous charges of an Alliedpolicy of deliberate starvation.Zollo’s story line is lackluster: “Sandy” Delman,a young American soldier and Jew working at oneof the POW camps, is so outraged by the treatmentof the Germans that he decides to take action, goingstraight to Lieutenant Colonel Nelson, campcommander, to propose a plan. Delman suggeststaking a convoy of trucks—driven by GermanPOWs—to supply depots near the front and requisitioningfood and supplies directly. Nelson’s requestsfor food, clothing, and medicine have goneignored by higher-ups who, apparently, are contentto let the prisoners die of neglect. Indeed, Zollohas one high-ranking officer exclaim, “I don’t haveto feed and clothe [expletive deleted] Nazis” (p.160). Nelson agrees to Delman’s scheme, but oneof the POW drivers—an SS officer masquerading asan enlisted man—engineers an escape and takes ahostage (coincidentally, Delman’s best friend). Delmantracks down the escapee alone, settles thescore with the SS officer, rescues his buddy, andgets a convoy load of supplies back to the camp. Ofcourse he receives no credit for his actions. It seemsthe Army is like that.Prisoners is barely worth a review and certainlynot worth reading, but I thought it necessary to callattention to the underlying fallacious premise regardingthe American “policy” of murdering prisoners.That was simply not the case.Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, RetiredWest Chicago, IllinoisRealizing the Dream of Flight: Biographical Essaysin Honor of the Centennial of Flight, 1903–2003edited by Virginia P. Dawson and Mark D. Bowles.NASA History Division (http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/history.html), 300 E StreetSW, Washington, DC 20546, 2005, 326 pages,$20.00 (hardcover). To order, write the NASACenter for Aerospace Information, 7121 StandardDrive, Hanover, Maryland 21076. Availablefree from http://history.nasa.gov/sp4112.pdf.Realizing the Dream of Flight, an anthology editedby Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, consists ofacademic papers presented at a conference celebrating100 years of flight; it also includes a DVDrecording of the conference proceedings. Expertlyedited, finely produced, and containing a usefulindex, this book, like most anthologies, does notrely upon a common theme beyond aviation andspace, and the papers vary in quality. The contributors,many of whom deal with their own particularresearch interests, are highly qualified historiansand good writers, but only Alan Gropman has anypractical experience with combat aviation.His essay deals with Gen Benjamin O. Davis Jr., aprincipal player in the painful integration of blacksinto the armed forces of the United States and oneof the foundations of Gropman’s seminal book, TheAir Force Integrates, 1945–1964 (1978). The other es­

BOOK REVIEWS 119say under the category “Military Strategists” (see thebook’s introduction, p. xi) is Tami Davis Biddle’spiece about Gen Curtis E. LeMay, a central playerin her important book Rhetoric and Reality in AirWarfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideasabout Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 (2002). NeitherDavis nor LeMay was present at the creation of aviation,which had matured a fair amount by the timethey got their wings. If the conference needed toinclude military operators in the story, then onewonders about the total absence of naval aviators.In the first two essays, feminist scholars Amy SueBix and Susan Ware write about Bessie Coleman andAmelia Earhart, respectively. Closer to the creationof aviation, Coleman did not attain the fame thataccompanied Earhart, and both women died in aircraftaccidents at a young age, cutting short any furthercontributions they might have made. Waredoes make the valid point that women seemed toplay a greater role in the barnstorming age thanthey did after aviation became more profitable, layingthat fact at the feet of gender discrimination.But Betty Friedan’s great book The Feminine Mystique(1963) makes the point that the first wave offeminism died out after passage of the 19th Amendmentand did not revive until the second wave gotrolling in the 1960s. I think she explained that, as acultural phenomenon, it included the ideas ofmany women as well as male prejudices. In anyevent, both aviatrixes had an important moral andfinancial supporter—a male in both cases.The anthology also includes three fine essays byWilliam M. Leary, W. David Lewis, and Roger Bilsteinon the emergence of aviation as a profitableenterprise during the 1930s. Leary addresses thecollaboration of Charles Lindbergh and Juan Trippein the building of Pan American Airways; Lewiswrites about the part played by Eddie Rickenbacker,Johnny Miller, and Eastern Airlines in airmail service;and Bilstein offers an account of Donald Douglas’srise and fall. Later on, Tom D. Crouch, MichaelGorn, Andrew J. Dunar, and Roger Launius—allfine historians of air and space technology—contributechapters about the genesis and maturing ofthe space age. Most of them deal with figures notwell known to Air Force officers: Willy Ley, a spacewriter; Hugh Dryden, a scientist and manager; andRobert Gilruth, a mover and shaker in the mannedspaceflight program who lived in the shadow of theastronauts. The other essay—about Wernher vonBraun, who was present at the creation of the spaceage—is a stimulating piece.The other chapters are probably sufficient forany Air Force officer’s professional reading program,but he or she will want to go to Gropman’sbook on integration and Biddle’s on strategicbombing for the detail necessary to the militaryprofession. The essays on commercial aviation andNASA space development are summaries oftendrawn from other books but sufficient for the modernair warrior. Even though Realizing the Dream ofFlight does not form a coherent whole, it might deservea middling place on officers’ reading lists ifthey already have a pretty firm grasp of the historyof air and space power.Dr. David R. MetsMaxwell AFB, AlabamaPacific Skies: American Flyers in World War II byJerome Klinkowitz. University Press of Mississippi(http://www.upress.state.ms.us), 3825 RidgewoodRoad, Jackson, Mississippi 39211-6492, 2004, 256pages, $32.00 (hardcover).English professor Jerome Klinkowitz has writtenextensively about World War II in such books asTheir Finest Hours: Narratives of the R.A.F. and Luftwaffein World War II (1989), Yanks over Europe: AmericanFlyers in World War II (1996), and With the Tigersover China, 1941–1942 (1999). In Pacific Skies, hetakes the familiar in a new direction, leaving thearchives to historians and using as his material thenarratives written by participants, both during thewar and in the half century since. With room foronly 100 of the thousands of memoirs and biographiesavailable, Klinkowitz is necessarily selective inmaking his choices. His selection seems representative,including the classics as well as relatively obscureworks. And he uses writings by both Americanand Japanese veterans.The book has two parts. First, the author tracksthe war chronologically, dividing it into four parts:peacetime and the sudden outbreak of war, theJapanese advantage, the turning of the tide, andthe late-war shift in approach, including the kamikazesand low-altitude firebombing. This is not abattles-and-leaders narrative; the book presents notonly the old, familiar accounts of Curtis LeMay,Jimmy Doolittle, and “Pappy” Boyington, but also(and more often) those of various aces, heroes, andordinary Airmen. It relates a personal war ratherthan an official one. The first section consists of theintroduction and all but one of the topical chapters(“Going to War in Peacetime,” “An Air War at Seaand on Land,” “Tales of the South Pacific,” and“Endgame”).

120 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007“Endgame” discusses the final phase of the war,characterized by kamikazes and the firebombing ofJapan. The increasing brutality of war during thisperiod provides a natural lead into the other partof the book, the thematic one. In this section,Klinkowitz examines the attitudes of the adversaries,the philosophical underpinnings and motivations,and the perception of the foe. He also draws distinctionsbetween the nature of war in the Pacificand in Europe. Moreover, he deals with an oddphenomenon—the unusually large percentage ofPacific veterans who turned to religion of one sortor another in the aftermath of the war.A polished and experienced writer, Klinkowitzhas 40 books to his credit and knows how to tell astory. The work holds together nicely throughout.We encounter a bit of slippage late, when Klinkowitzdiscusses debates over the dropping of the atomicbombs in a one-sided manner. His attempt to makethe kamikazes explicable is adequate but not satisfying.Also, he seems to have written the philosophicalsection without consideration of Paul Fussell’s Wartime:Understanding and Behavior in the Second WorldWar, written in 1989 but arguably still the best studyof attitudes and motivation in the Pacific war. Regardlessof these shortcomings, however, PacificSkies is worth the few hours it takes to read it.Dr. John H. BarnhillHouston, TexasSoldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in ClassicalAntiquity by J. E. Lendon. Yale UniversityPress (http://www.yale.edu/yup), P.O. Box209040, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-9040,2005, 480 pages, $35.00 (hardcover), $20.00(softcover).Once upon a time, there was an ad campaignpromoting public libraries, the theme of which declared“You Are What You Read.” This promotionemphasized the idea that increasing the amount ofmaterial read would mold anyone into a better educatedand more productive person. Nothing couldillustrate this concept more effectively than usingancient Greece and Rome as role models. J. E. Lendon’sbook Soldiers and Ghosts, a far cry from a fairytale or an ad campaign, gives the reader a very thoroughappreciation for why these two cultures’ militaryforces became what they read. Across the pagesof both Greek and Roman history, he decisivelyshows us that neither culture suffered from a shortageof reading and that both had ample opportunityto employ what they read.Lendon starts with a review of the Greeks’ militaryculture and mind-set—an important introductionbecause it sets the historical stage for the entirebook. Noting that the ancient Greeks basedmany of their warrior principles upon The Iliad,written around 700 BC, he stresses that a numberof historians refer to the Homeric poems as thebible of the Greeks (p. 36). Lendon further observesthat the Greeks based their warrior principlesnot so much on the military discipline and orderfamiliar to modern warriors but on the characteristicsof a sports team. That is, war became a competition,with the contestants battling more for recognitionas the bravest or most glorious (as in The Iliad)than because their general ordered them to fight.This mind-set plays throughout Greek militaryhistory—from the Spartan philosophy and cultureof conduct in warfare—and culminates with a discussionof Alexander the Great’s campaign to theMiddle East (itself Homeric in proportion anddeed). It also plays into the use and evolution ofGreek military formations from 500 BC into early200–300 AD. Technology seldom drove changes inthe Greek method; in fact, the Greeks had forsakenadvances in military technology in favor of implementinginterpretations of historical writings anddiscussions over “the right way” to conduct war andbehave in it.Through this review of history and analysis ofGreek writings, Lendon shows the reader how theGreek military philosophy operated, why it operatedthe way it did, and the natural conclusions ofthis track. Choosing not to concern itself solely withthe military side of affairs, Soldiers and Ghosts alsoexplores the civilian and political connections ofGreek society since the Greeks initially believed ina citizen-soldier as much as Americans do (but in asomewhat different context). Throughout thisstudy, one finds the underpinning that Greek writings,rooted in ideals from and interpretations ofThe Iliad, constituted the foundation for the Greeks’military psyche and doctrine.Lendon uses the second half of Soldiers andGhosts to discuss Rome and its rise as a republic aswell as its fall as an empire. The Romans also believedin a citizen-soldier concept but with a Romantwist. Like the Greeks, they based their militarypsyche and doctrine on their historical readings(some of which were probably fabrications looselybased on a historical event). As Romans’ culturalawareness grew during the first two centuries AD,so did their interest in “ancient” Greece. Withoutbelaboring the point, suffice it to say that the authordoes an equally admirable job in discussingthe Roman war and civil psyche as well as their ap­

BOOK REVIEWS 121plication to military campaigns as Rome’s highwatermark rose and then fell.Why is a book as obscure as Soldiers and Ghostsimportant to advocates of airpower and spacepower today? We all recall Sun Tzu’s mantra “knowyour enemy as yourself.” To better anticipate theenemy, it’s important not only to find out what hewould do but why he would do “that something”that way. Such is the rationale that Lendon presents—togreat effect! The Greeks and Romans behavedas they did for the most part because of thereadings they incorporated into their military andcivilian cultures. Our military employs its doctrineas it does, based upon lessons learned and continuedprofessional readings; likewise, people in oursociety view military ideals as they do, based uponwhat they read and see. It’s not far fetched to saythat other militaries and societies, past and present,function similarly.My only complaint about Soldiers and Ghosts involvesthe constant sidebar diversions within chaptersthat the author uses to build further points. Imaginesitting in a math lecture only to have a socialsciencestopic emerge on the professor’s board fora 10-minute discussion. Eventually, all of these pointsthat Lendon brings up come back to roost at theend of the chapter. Some help to clarify main pointsor even bring up new points upon which otherchapters elaborate. Still, the sudden jumps fromone topic to a completely different topic on thesame page were distracting—I frequently wonderedwhere the tangents were leading.Nevertheless, Lendon’s study makes for very enjoyablereading about ancient Greece and Rome.More importantly, it gives the reader tools to ponderother militaries and their societies—a skill thatcould no doubt prove beneficial to future analystsand planners in the ongoing global war on terror.Soldiers and Ghosts gets my vote as a must-read.Maj Paul Niesen, USAFScott AFB, IllinoisThe Intelligence Archipelago: The Community’sStruggle to Reform in the Globalized Era byMelanie M. H. Gutjahr. Joint Military IntelligenceCollege (http://www.dia.mil/college/index.htm), 200 MacDill Boulevard, Washington,DC 20340-5100, 2005, 283 pages.The Intelligence Archipelago examines efforts to reformthe intelligence community dating back toWorld War II. Written by Melanie Gutjahr (an intelligenceprofessional with more than 25 years’ experience)during a one-year stay at the Joint MilitaryIntelligence College’s Center for Strategic IntelligenceResearch, the book demonstrates that intelligencereform is difficult and sometimes impossible,thanks to turf battles, congressional wrangling, lackof resources, and personality conflicts. Most importantly,the study documents the struggle to changethe course of the intelligence community after thecollapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence ofa new, globalized world.Gutjahr refers to the National Security Agencyand its struggle to intercept and monitor new communicationsmedia, such as the Internet, that theagency had not dealt with during the Cold War. Ascomponents within the intelligence communitystruggled with new tasks, a series of intelligence failuresseemed to accompany the rise of new radical-Islamic terrorist groups. India’s nuclear tests, NorthKorea’s missile launch, and the proliferation of nuclearmaterials added to the community’s woes. Congress’sattempts to change the community after thecollapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence ofa new global order in the nineties illustrate the difficultyof some of these executive- and legislativebranchstruggles. From a historian’s point of view,the author provides a useful service to anyone attemptingto gather information about what transpiredin the House and Senate Intelligence Committeesduring those turbulent years.According to Gutjahr, the definition of “intelligencereform” and what it should encompass involvesmost reform movements, regardless ofwhether the executive or legislative branch pushesthe changes. Others have argued that in the post–Cold War global age, intelligence is adaptive andthat the community must continuously reform itself.Reform should occur as a community-wide,perpetual series of process-improvement tasks. Processesand procedures that guarantee successagainst today’s opponents will not work on tomorrow’senemy, who has shown his adaptability andmaneuverability inside our decision cycles—hencethe need for intelligence reform. Believing that theintelligence community remains caught up in a1947 structure, the author argues for far-reachingchanges, which Congress in 2004 could not musterthe votes to pass.The Intelligence Archipelago covers every issuewithin the intelligence community for the last 15years—including transnational issues that emergedwith the proliferation of technologies, the creationof the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (nowthe National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), andthe emergence of terrorists with state support. In­

122 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007telligence officers will recognize all problems andsituations described in the book, lending it thecredibility that so many other reform texts lack.Gutjahr also addresses the terrorist attacks of 11September 2001 and subsequent attempts at reform,using data from the National Commission onTerrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11Commission) to illustrate the systematic nature ofintelligence failures. She then examines the commission’sreport in detail and turns her attention tothe struggles that accompanied the creation of theposition of director of national intelligence. Herdetailed exposé helps the reader understand thecomplex posturing within the intelligence communityas Congress inevitably mandated reform. Suchreform is hampered by a lack of a shared vision betweenthe intelligence community on one side andCongress and the president on the other. Some ofGutjahr’s anecdotes suggest that improvement hasoccurred, but others demonstrate that the bureaucraticprocesses deeply embedded within the communityhave not changed.Granted, the text suffers from problems thattypically arise when authors attempt to turn an academicthesis into a book—that is, too many quotations,poor layout, and wordiness that makes it difficultfor the reader to follow the author’s keypoints. Nevertheless, these flaws should in no waystop the intelligence professional, historian, or politicalscientist from studying the data therein. TheIntelligence Archipelago is a gold mine of information,and the annexes—a collection of executive ordersand legislative bills—show the path of reform tothe current intelligence community. I highly recommendit to officers, intelligence professionals,and anyone interested in government reform.Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, RetiredFairfax, VirginiaWhy Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat editedby Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris. UniversityPress of Kentucky (http://www.kentuckypress.com), 663 South Limestone Street, Lexington,Kentucky 40508-4008, 2006, 416 pages,$39.95 (hardcover).Historians have well documented the defeats ofarmies and navies but have paid far less attention tothe defeat of air forces. What does exist is usually inhistories of the greater conflict of which the aircampaigns were a part. In Why Air Forces Fail, perhapsthe first study of its kind, 11 well-known historiansof aerial warfare take on this noteworthy taskwith short but detailed and engaging essays. Thecontributors consider the defeats of the air forcesof Poland (1939), France (1940), Arab countries(1967), Germany and Austria-Hungary (1914–18),Italy (1939–43), Imperial Japan (1942–45), Germany(1940–45), Argentina (Falklands War, 1982),Russia (1941), United States (1941–42), and Britain(1941–42). Through these essays, the book explainsthe complex, often deep-seated foundationsfor these catastrophes.The book’s editors are well versed in military history.Robin Higham, professor emeritus of militaryhistory at Kansas State University and editor of thejournal Aerospace Historian from 1970 to 1988, haswritten and edited many books on varied aspects ofmilitary history. Currently chief historian at the Directorateof History and Heritage, National DefenceHeadquarters, Canada, Stephen Harris coauthoredthe official history of the Canadian air force. Thetwo editors asked prospective contributors to examine“archetypical examples from which worthwhileconclusions could be drawn” (p. 1) and providedthem with numerous questions to stimulate theirthinking. They especially wanted the contributors togo beyond technical, tactical, and political reasonsfor the defeats of the subject air forces.Thus, the essays are both overviews and analyticalnarratives that examine more than the specific aircampaign. In addition to the typical reasons forthese catastrophic defeats, the contributors providedoctrinal, logistical, and cultural reasons to showwhy these air forces failed in their respective historicalair campaigns. Each also discusses the industrialand economic capability of each country toproduce/obtain the quantity and quality of aircraft(airframes and aircraft engines) needed to counterprospective enemies effectively. Most also discussan important but often overlooked aspect—thequality of aircrews and maintenance personnel.Guided by the editors’ initial request, each contributorcame up with the same basic reasons forthe defeat for these air forces despite differences intime, place, economic status, and culture. Theyconcluded that the leaders of each country and itsair force did not properly connect doctrine, technology,and industrial output to produce aircraftand trained crews and maintenance personnel topreclude defeat in the historical campaign. Theirfailure did not generally stem from ignorance orstupidity but from the politics and culture of theirtimes. For example, the defeated air forces of1939–42 were the products of post–World War Imentality and economics as much as technologydevelopments. The initial air victors of that con­

BOOK REVIEWS 123flict—Germany and Japan—had simply done betterthan their defeated enemies. However, in thelong run, neither air force could maintain its positionbecause of the same basic causes that hamperedthe air forces they had initially defeated.The editors could have organized the book better.The essays are arranged haphazardly—not topicallyor even chronologically. Higham and Harristhemselves write that the defeated air forces fallinto three categories: (1) the “dead ducks,” whichnever had a chance (German air force of WorldWar I, Russian in 1941, Polish in 1939, French, andItalian); (2) the “hares,” which had initial successbut eventually failed (Luftwaffe and Japanese airforce in World War II); and (3) the “phoenixes,”which suffered initial defeats but were reborn fromthe ashes of their defeats (the Argentine air force,Arab air forces, Royal Air Force in 1941–42, and USArmy Air Forces in the Pacific, 1941–42). If the editorshad arranged the essays by these categories,readers could have better discerned similaritiesand differences among the different air forces.As one would expect, the essays differ in qualityand depth. The better ones cover a relatively shortcampaign, such as those of the Polish and French airforces at the beginning of World War II. On theother end of the spectrum, one finds the essay onthe Arab air forces, which tries to do too much bydiscussing all of the major Middle Eastern air forces,including the Israeli air force, from the 1950s to the1970s. A better approach would have focused moreon the Egyptian and Israeli air forces alone. Eachessay also includes short bibliographies and areasfor future research—definite pluses. Overall, WhyAir Forces Fail represents a much-needed and longoverdueaddition to airpower history and a mustreadfor any airpower enthusiast, historian, andserving operational Air Force officer.Dr. Robert B. Kane, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, RetiredAir Armament CenterEglin AFB, FloridaWeapons of Choice: The Development of PrecisionGuided Munitions by Paul G. Gillespie. Universityof Alabama Press (http://uapress.ua.edu),Box 870380, 20 Research Drive, Tuscaloosa, Alabama35487-0380, 2006, 232 pages, $35.00(hardcover).During the brief history of aviation, our nation’sbombing efforts have progressed from using hundredsof bombers to destroy a single enemy targetto sending a single aircraft to hit multiple targetsprecisely. Key to this revolutionary capability areprecision-guided munitions (PGM), ranging fromearly radio-controlled bombs to the current generationof laser- and satellite-guided weapons, whosedevelopment we can attribute to both human innovationas well as evolutions in technology. Theseweapons, which permit more flexibility in aircraftdelivery and enhance bombing accuracy, have becomea key asset of our military. Moreover, theirability to destroy targets yet cause little to no collateraldamage has changed national-security policy.Weapons of Choice provides a detailed account ofthe US military’s development of PGMs, an effortthat began during World War I and continues todayin the form of numerous programs. Gillespie tracesthese weapons throughout aviation history, addressingtheir testing and employment as well asmilitary and political players’ reaction to them. Henot only discusses the effect of PGMs on militarystrategy and tactics for all major US conflicts fromWorld War I to recent battles in the Gulf, but alsoanalyzes how they have affected current airpowercapabilities. The author limits his coverage to conventionalguided bombs (not cruise missiles or surfaceto-surfacemissiles), examining the innovation,technology, budgets, national-security policy, andpolitics that have shaped their development; healso uses the results of multiple Quadrennial DefenseReviews to assess the effect of PGMs on currentnational policy and force structure. His bookexposes readers to the wide variety of guided weaponsand explores reliability and logistical issues thatraised concerns about employing them in battle.Unfortunately, Gillespie does not delve into therecent emergence of the small-diameter bomb ormention capabilities that the military might like tosee in future PGMs. Such omissions, however, do notdetract from the book’s ability to educate readerson the current capabilities/limitations of these weaponsand their effect on airpower. Lastly, Gillespieseems somewhat biased toward the Air Force despitethe other services’ major contributions to thedevelopment of precision weapons.Overall, Weapons of Choice offers an excellent historyof PGMs. Airpower enthusiasts and novicesalike will gain a better understanding not only ofthe important capabilities that the current generationof PGMs gives the military, but also of the adverseeffect their absence had on earlier conflicts inour nation’s history.Maj Evan Dertien, USAFAir Force FellowYorktown, Virginia

APJAir and Space Power Journal, the US Air Force’sprofessional journal, is published in English,Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, French, and Chinese.Each version has its own personality as well as aneditor—a native speaker of the particular languageand an expert in the region of coverage—who selectsthe Journal’s content. We’re always looking forgood, thought-provoking articles up to 5,000 wordsin length, written in any of our published languages.All submissions will be edited in accordancewith the standards set forth in the Air UniversityStyle and Author Guide (available online at http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/Resources/style/austyle_guide.pdf). For details, please see our guidelinesfor submitting articles at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/howto1.html. You cancontact us by e-mail at aspj@maxwell.af.mil; regularmail at Air and Space Power Journal, 401 ChennaultCircle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6004; phone at DSN493-5322 (commercial [334] 953-5322); or fax atDSN 493-5811.Printed copySubscribing to ASPJ:Both Printed and Electronic Subscriptions Are Available• The Journal is available free to all USAF organizationsas described below in the section “Is Your OrganizationReceiving Its Proper Number of ASPJCopies?” Other US government and foreign militaryorganizations may also receive the Journal for free bycontacting the editor at aspj@maxwell.af.mil.• Nonmilitary and nongovernmental organizationsmay receive the Journal by contacting the Superintendentof Documents by any of the following methods:writing to New Orders, Superintendent of Documents,P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954;calling (202) 512-1800 (voice), (866) 512-1800 (tollfreeoutside the DC area), or (202) 512-2104 (fax);or visiting http://bookstore.gpo.gov/collections/military_ journals.jsp on the Internet. The Journal’sofficial designation is AFRP 10-1, Air and Space PowerJournal, stock number 708-007-00000-5. The cost is$32.00 ($44.80 for international mail). Major creditcards are accepted.Free electronic copy• You can receive the Journal electronically by loggingon to the “Subscription Center” at the Air Force LinkWeb site http://www.af.mil/subscribe, selecting Airand Space Power Journal (English, Spanish, Portuguese,and/or French editions), entering yourname and e-mail address, and then clicking on the“submit” button. You will immediately receive ane-mail asking you to reply in order to confirm yoursubscription. You won’t receive your subscriptionunless you reply to that message. Electronic subscriptionis free.Is Your OrganizationReceiving Its Proper Numberof ASPJ Copies?The following criteria guide the free distributionof Air and Space Power Journal to USAF andgovernmental organizations. These criteria areonly planning factors—not absolute limits. If yourunit has different needs, please contact us ataspj@maxwell.af.mil.• One copy for each general on active duty with theUS Air Force or Air Reserve Forces.• One copy for every five active duty US Air Force officersin grades second lieutenant through colonel.• One copy for each US Air Force or Air Reserve Forcesoffice of public affairs.• Three copies for each Air Reserve Forces unit downto squadron level.• Three copies for each air attaché or advisory-groupfunction.• One copy for each US Air Force or US governmentlibrary.• Other US military, US government, or foreign militaryorganizations wishing to receive the Journal shouldcontact us at aspj@maxwell.af.mil.If your organization is not receiving the desirednumber of copies, please contact us.Cumulative Article IndexA cumulative index of ASPJ articles, listed alphabeticallyby the author’s last name, is available athttp://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apjindex.html.The Editor124

OUR CONTRIBUTORSLt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz (USAFA; MPA, Universityof Northern Colorado) is the commanderof Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.The general attended undergraduatepilot training at Craig AFB, Alabama. A commandpilot with 3,300 hours in eight aircraft,he has commanded an air-refueling squadron,a geographically separated operations group,an air-refueling wing that won the 1994 RiversideTrophy for Best Wing in Fifteenth AirForce, and an air-mobility wing that won the1995 Armstrong Trophy for Best Wing inTwenty-first Air Force. He also served as thecommandant of cadets at the US Air ForceAcademy and as deputy assistant secretary forbudget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of theAir Force for Financial Management andComptroller, Headquarters US Air Force,Washington, DC. General Lorenz is a graduateof Squadron Officer School, Air Commandand Staff College, Air War College, and theNational War College.Maj Gen Allen G. Peck (USAFA; MS, Air ForceInstitute of Technology; MA, Salve Regina College)is commander, Headquarters Air ForceDoctrine Center, and vice-commander, AirUniversity, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He hasserved as an F-15 aircraft commander, instructorpilot, and standardization and evaluationflight examiner. General Peck has completedtwo tours on the Air Staff at the Pentagon anda joint assignment as chief, Current Operations,US Central Command (USCENTCOM),MacDill AFB, Florida. The general has commandedan air operations group in Germany,an air expeditionary wing in Saudi Arabia, andthe Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center,Langley AFB, Virginia. A key planner for theair war over Serbia, General Peck served as chief,Combat Plans, combined air operations center(CAOC), Vincenza, Italy, during the subsequentcampaign. He also served with the commander,Air Force forces at USCENTCOM’sCAOC during Operation Iraqi Freedom’s majorcombat operations. As deputy combinedforce air component commander, he oversawplanning, tasking, execution, and assessmentof coalition air operations for Operations IraqiFreedom and Enduring Freedom. A commandpilot with more than 2,700 hours in the F-15,including more than 300 combat hours, GeneralPeck is a distinguished graduate of the USAir Force Academy, Squadron Officer School,the Air Force Institute of Technology, and theCollege of Naval Command and Staff; he alsoattended Harvard University as a National SecurityFellow.C. R. Anderegg (BA, Hobart College; MS, TroyUniversity), a member of the Senior ExecutiveService, is the director, Air Force History andMuseums Policies and Programs, HeadquartersUS Air Force, Washington, DC. Prior to assuminghis current position, Mr. Anderegg was an airand space power strategist in Project Checkmateduring the planning and execution of OperationsEnduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Heserved as an active duty Air Force officer for 30years, commanding an F-15 squadron and twiceserving as a fighter group commander and twiceas a fighter wing vice-commander. A former F-4Fighter Weapons School instructor pilot, he flewmore than 3,700 hours in the F-4C/D/E/G andthe F-15A/C/E, including 170 combat missionsduring the Vietnam War. Following his retirementfrom the Air Force at the rank of colonel,he wrote The Ash Warriors and Sierra Hotel: FlyingAir Force Fighters in the Decade after Vietnam. Mr.Anderegg is a graduate of Squadron OfficerSchool, Air Command and Staff College, and AirWar College.COL Bradley E. Smith, USA (BS, Washingtonand Lee University; MS, University of SouthernCalifornia; MS, National Defense University),served as chief of the Joint Operations Divisionfor the United States Transportation Command.A veteran of both Gulf wars, he hasserved in a variety of command and staff positionsin the continental United States, Korea,Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Haiti, and Germany, includingchief, Deployment Division, JointChiefs of Staff at the Pentagon and commander,7th Transportation Group (Composite) at FortEustis, Virginia. A graduate of the Army Commandand General Staff College and School ofAdvanced Military Studies, Colonel Smith haspublished several articles in the Military Review.125

126 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007Lt Col Raymond W. Staats (BA, Syracuse University;MS, Air Force Institute of Technology;PhD, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and StateUniversity) is vice-commandant of the CommunityCollege of the Air Force, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.He previously served as an assistant professorof operations research and chief of theOperations Research Division within the Departmentof Operational Sciences, Air ForceInstitute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB,Ohio. He has served as a Defense Satellite CommunicationsSystem III crew commander andinstructor with the 3d Space Operations Squadron,as well as executive officer for the 50thOperations Group, Schriever AFB, Colorado;Delta II launch-crew commander with the 1stSpace Launch Squadron and chief of the DeltaII Standardization and Evaluation Section, 45thOperations Group, Cape Canaveral Air ForceStation, Florida; and ICBM test operations officerwith the 576th Flight Test Squadron andchief of plans and programs at the 381st TrainingGroup, Vandenberg AFB, California. Agraduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Commandand Staff College, and Air War College,Colonel Staats has previously published in Airand Space Power Journal.Lt Col Marty Reynolds (USAFA; BS, PennsylvaniaState University; MBA, Gonzaga University; MA,George Washington University; MOA [Master ofOperations Analysis], Air Force Institute of Technology)is the director, Commander’s ActionGroup and Analysis, Assessment, and LessonsLearned (A9), Twelfth Air Force (Air ForcesSouthern), Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. He previouslyserved as chief of staff, 355th Wing, andassistant director of operations, 41st ElectronicCombat Squadron, Davis-Monthan AFB, and asstaff weather officer, tanker airlift control center,Scott AFB, Illinois. An EC-130 instructor pilot, heflew combat missions in Operations EnduringFreedom and Iraqi Freedom. Colonel Reynolds isa graduate of Squadron Officer School and theAir Force Institute of Technology (intermediatedevelopmental education).Maj Aaron D. Troxell (USAFA; MS, Wright StateUniversity; MOA [Master of Operations Analysis],Air Force Institute of Technology) is chief,Unit Compliance Inspections Branch for the inspectorgeneral, Headquarters Air Force MaterielCommand, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. He hasprogram-management experience in the B-1Band KC-135 program offices. The major also hasheld various group and squadron flying assignments,including commander, Current OperationsFlight, 22d Operations Squadron, McConnellAFB, Kansas. He has deployed in support ofOperations Southern Watch, Allied Force, andEnduring Freedom. Additionally, he served asan operations officer for Operation Iraqi Freedom,directing 20 KC-135s and 32 crews as wellas the execution of 1,300 wartime sorties. Agraduate of Squadron Officer School and AirCommand and Staff College, Major Troxell is asenior pilot who has logged over 2,500 hours intanker aircraft with experience in combat andspecial-operations support.Maj Matthew F. Durkin (USAFA; MS, Air ForceInstitute of Technology) is a resource analystat Headquarters USAF/A9 (Air Force Studies,Analysis, Assessment, and Lessons Learned).He previously served as test director for the A-10Aircraft Sustainment Squadron and as an A-10aircraft-battle-damage-repair engineer at HillAFB, Utah. He led planning of a multimilliondollartest program to ensure successful integrationof state-of-the-art targeting-pod andprecision-weapon capabilities on the A-10. MajorDurkin is a graduate of Squadron Officer School.Maj Timothy P. Franz (BS, University of CentralFlorida; MS, Central Michigan University; MS,Air Force Institute of Technology) is assigned toBarksdale AFB, Louisiana, to work on the standupof the new Cyber Command. In this role, heprovides direct support to all Air Force networkattacksquadrons. He previously served as aninformation-operations planner at HeadquartersUnited States Strategic Command, Offutt AFB,Nebraska. Major Franz also helped stand up the23d Information Operations Squadron, wherehe co-led the creation of Black Demon, the AirForce’s first global network-defense exercise, andspearheaded the publication of Air Force Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-1, vol.36, Information Warfare, 2001, the Air Force’s firstinformation-operations tactics manual. MajorFranz is a distinguished graduate of the AirForce Institute of Technology, Squadron OfficerSchool, and Undergraduate Space andMissile Training.Lt Col Robert F. Mills, USAF, retired (BS,Montana State University; MS, Air Force Instituteof Technology; PhD, University of Kansas),is an assistant professor of electrical engineeringat the Air Force Institute of Technology(AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. He joinedthe AFIT faculty after serving 21 years as a communicationsofficer in a variety of informationsystems-managementand engineering roles.His research interests include information operationsand security, electronic warfare, networkmanagement, and systems engineering.Lieutenant Colonel Mills is a graduate of theUS Army Command and General Staff Collegeand Joint Forces Staff College.

CONTRIBUTORS 127Maj Paul D. Williams (BS, University of Washington;MS, Air Force Institute of Technology;PhD, Purdue University) is an assistant professorof computer science and cyber operationsin the Department of Electrical and ComputerEngineering at the Air Force Institute of Technology,Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. He hasserved in many information-operations roles,both operational and supporting, for 17 years.His research interests center on cyber operations,including algorithms, artificial intelligence,and computer architecture. Major Williams isa distinguished graduate of the USAF Schoolof Applied Aerospace Sciences (in electroniccommunications and cryptographic systems),Officer Training School, Basic CommunicationsOfficer Training School, and the Air Force Instituteof Technology.Maj Richard A. Raines, USAF, retired (BS,Florida State University; MS, Air Force Instituteof Technology; PhD, Virginia PolytechnicInstitute and State University), is director,Center for Information Security Educationand Research, Department of Defense TransformationChair, and associate professor ofelectrical engineering, Graduate School of Engineeringand Management, Air Force Instituteof Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.A senior member of the Institute of Electronicsand Electrical Engineers, he has authoredor coauthored more than 90 technical publicationsin the areas of computer and satellitecommunications, communications theory, vulnerabilitiesof communications systems, andinformation security. Major Raines is a graduateof Squadron Officer School and Air Commandand Staff College.Col Mark C. “Marshal” Dillon (BS, Arizona StateUniversity; MA, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University;MSS [Master of Strategic Studies], AirWar College) serves as the US TransportationCommand liaison to US Southern Command,Miami, Florida. His other staff assignment was atHeadquarters US Air Force, Pentagon. ColonelDillon began his career as a space shuttle systemsengineer. A distinguished graduate of undergraduatepilot training, he has commanded the22d Airlift Squadron at Travis AFB, California,the 782d Expeditionary Airlift Squadron (thefirst C-5 combat deployment into Afghanistanduring Operation Enduring Freedom), and the97th Operations Group at Altus AFB, Oklahoma.Prior to his current assignment, he served asvice-commander, 97th Air Mobility Wing, AltusAFB. A distinguished graduate of Air Commandand Staff College and a command pilot withmore than 3,500 flying hours in the C-5, KC-10,T-38, C-17, and KC-135, Colonel Dillon has combatexperience in both the C-5 and KC-10.Maj Rusty O. Baldwin, USAF, retired (BSEE,New Mexico State University; MS, Air Force Instituteof Technology; PhD, Virginia PolytechnicInstitute and State University), is an associateprofessor of computer engineering at theAir Force Institute of Technology (AFIT),Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Major Baldwinretired in 2004 after 23 years of active duty inthe Air Force, which included assignments atLowry AFB, Colorado, to attend technicalschool for the instrumentation-mechanic careerfield; Holloman AFB, New Mexico, as aninstrumentation mechanic with the 6585th TestGroup; and Los Angeles AFB, California, as aproject officer for the Defense MeteorologicalSatellite Program. After earning his master’sdegree at AFIT, he went to the Avionics Directorateof the Air Force Research Laboratory.Following PhD studies at Virginia PolytechnicInstitute and State University, he returned toWright-Patterson AFB to join the faculty of theElectrical and Computer Engineering Departmentat AFIT. Major Baldwin attended SquadronOfficer School and completed Air Commandand Staff College by correspondence.Maj Samuel D. Bass (BS, University of CentralFlorida; MS, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University;MS, Air Force Institute of Technology)is senior communications watch officer, OperationsTeam 3, National Military Command Center,Pentagon, Washington, DC. He has been astudent at the Air Force Institute of Technology(AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, and hasserved as combat-communications flight commanderand contingency planner at RamsteinAir Base, Germany; Air Mobility Commandnetwork-operations and security-center flightcommander and group executive officer atScott AFB, Illinois; commandant of cadets andassistant professor of air and space studies atAFROTC Detachment 20, Tucson, Arizona; andmissile combat-crew member, crew evaluator,and crew instructor at Malmstrom AFB, Montana.Major Bass is a graduate of intermediatedevelopmental education (AFIT) and SquadronOfficer School.Maj Aaron A. Tucker (BS and MS, University ofSouthern California; MS University of Missouri–Rolla) is the C-17 flight commander and a C-5and C-17 experimental test pilot in the 418thFlight Test Squadron, Edwards AFB, California.He has commanded combat missions into Afghanistanand Iraq as a C-5 flight-examineraircraft commander at Travis AFB, California.As an Air Force intern at the Pentagon, MajorTucker worked in the Military Personnel PolicyDirectorate of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,Rated Force Policy Branch in the AirStaff, and Congressional Action Division in theAir Force Secretariat. He graduated from theUS Air Force Test Pilot School at Edwards AFBand was honored by his classmates with theAaron C. (C-dot) George Award for best warriorfocus to field the best weapon system possible.Major Tucker is a distinguished graduateof Squadron Officer School.

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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARDGen John A. Shaud, USAF, RetiredLt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, RetiredMaj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University (professor emeritus)Col Steven D. Carey, USAF, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and EducationDr. J. Douglas Beason, Colonel, USAF, Retired, Los Alamos National LaboratoryDr. Alexander S. Cochran, National Defense UniversityProf. Thomas B. Grassey, Naval War CollegeLt Col Dave Mets, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus)Left to right : Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, commander, Air University; Gen Stéphane Abrial, chief of staff,Armée de l ’ air (French air force); Mr. Rémy Mauduit, editor, Air and Space Power Journal-Français ; andGen T. Michael Moseley, chief of staff, US Air Force, during General Abrial ’ s visit to Air University, Max -well AFB, Alabama (5 April 2007).