Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T. Michael MoseleyCommander, Air Educationand Training CommandGen William R. Looney IIICommander, Air UniversityLt Gen Stephen R. LorenzCommandant, College of AerospaceDoctrine, Research and EducationCol Steven D. CareyChief, Professional JournalsLt Col Paul D. BergDeputy Chief, Professional JournalsMaj James C. UlmanEditorMaj Roger BurdetteProfessional StaffMarvin W. Bassett, Contributing EditorJames S. Howard, Contributing EditorDebbie Banker, Editorial AssistantSherry Terrell, Editorial AssistantSteven C. Garst, Director of Art and ProductionDaniel M. Armstrong, IllustratorL. Susan Fair, IllustratorAnn Bailey, Prepress Production ManagerAir and Space Power Journal Web SiteLuetwinder T. Eaves, Managing EditorThe Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), AirForce Recurring Publication 10-1, published quarterly,is the professional journal of the United States AirForce. It is designed to serve as an open forum for thepresentation and stimulation of innovative thinking onmilitary doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness,and other matters of national defense. The views andopinions expressed or implied in the Journal are thoseof the authors and should not be construed as carryingthe official sanction of the Department of Defense,Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, AirUniversity, or other agencies or departments of the USgovernment.Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or inpart without permission. If they are reproduced, the Airand Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line.http://www.af.milhttp://www.aetc.randolph.af.milhttp://www.au.af.milhttp://www.cadre.maxwell.af.milAir and Space Power Journal401 Chennault CircleMaxwellAFB AL 36112-6428e-mail: aspj@maxwell.af.milVisit Air and Space Power Journal onlineat http: // www.airpower.maxwe ll.af.mil.

Fall 2006 Volume XX, No. 3 AFRP 10-1Senior Leader PerspectiveInterdependence: Key to Our Common Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Gen Tom Hobbins, USAFFocus AreaIntegrating Operations: Joint Air and Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals412FeaturesThe Air Force’s New Ground War: Ensuring Projection of Air and SpacePower through Expeditionary Security Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Brig Gen Robert H. “Bob” Holmes, USAFCol Bradley D. Spacy, USAFLt Col John M. Busch, USAFLt Col Gregory J. Reese, USAFCounterinsurgency Airpower: Air-Ground Integration for the Long War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Col Howard D. Belote, USAFFilling the Stealth Gap and Enhancing Global Strike Task Force Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Maj Collin T. Ireton, USAFSpace Power: An Ill-Suited Space Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CDR John J. Klein, USNMilitary Transformation: Ends, Ways, and Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Dr. Jack D. Kem, Colonel, USA, RetiredMolecular Nanotechnology and National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .LCDR Thomas D. Vandermolen, USNClausewitz and the Falkland Islands Air War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111Maj Rodolfo Pereyra, Uruguayan Air ForceDepartments415569778596Prelaunch NotesBook Reviews and Introduction of the Latest Chronicles Online Journal ArticlesRicochets and Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The MergeWhy Red Flag Is Obsolete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lt Col Rob Spalding, USAFRed Flag Still Matters—After All These Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Col Steven D. Carey, USAFIntegration of Space-Based Combat Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Cortney KonnerRonald Pope89131618

PIREPsJoint Airspace Management and Deconfliction: A Chance to Trade in aStovepipe for Network-Centric Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Lt Col Alex Wathen, USAF, RetiredCADRE’s Professional Education Opportunities for USAF, Joint, andAllied War Fighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Maj John Dierling, USAFIra C. Eaker Award Winners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Quick-Looks and NOTAMsThe Air Force Needs New Glasses: Sensor Requirements for Urban Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Lt Col David L. Robie, USAFNew USAF Doctrine Publication: Air Force Doctrine Document2-1.9, Targeting 53Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, RetiredA New Operational Assessment Paradigm: Splitting the Stoplights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65Maj Kirsten Messer, USAFMaj Shane Dougherty, USAFRevised USAF Doctrine Publication: Air Force Doctrine Document 2,Operations and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94Lt Col D. Robert Poynor, USAF, RetiredThe Nature of Close Air Support in Low Intensity Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107Lt Col Phil M. Haun, USAFBook ReviewsThe Battle for the Hague—1940: The First Great Airborne Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120Lt Col E. H. Brongers, translated by C. C. W. van RomondtReviewer: Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, RetiredThunderchief: The Right Stuff and How Fighter Pilots Get It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121Don HenryReviewer: Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAFTail-End Charlies: The Last Battles of the Bomber War, 1944–45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121John Nichol and Tony RennellReviewer: Lt Col Robert Tate, USAFRFranco: Soldier, Commander, Dictator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123Geoffrey JensenReviewer: Dr. Robert B. KaneAllied Fighter Aces of World War II: The Air Combat Tactics andTechniques of World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123Mike SpickReviewer: Lt Col Willem M. Klumper, Royal Netherlands Air ForceTactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124H. John PooleReviewer: Maj Paul Niesen, USAFMission Debrief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Air and Space Power Journal Board of ReviewersProf. Tami Davis BiddleUS Army War CollegeDr. Kendall K. BrownNASA Marshall Space Flight CenterBrig Gen Phillip D. Caine, USAF, RetiredMonument, ColoradoCol Steven D. CareyUSAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Researchand EducationDr. Clayton K. S. ChunUS Army War CollegeDr. Mark ClodfelterNational War CollegeDr. Conrad CraneDirector, US Army Military Studies InstituteDr. Dik A. DasoNational Air and Space MuseumSmithsonian InstitutionCol Michael D. DavisUSAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Researchand EducationDr. William L. DowdyAlabama State UniversityCol Dennis M. Drew, USAF, RetiredUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesDr. Stephen FoughtUSAF Air War CollegeCol Thomas E. Griffith Jr., USAFNational War CollegeDr. John F. Guilmartin Jr.Ohio State UniversityDr. Grant T. HammondCenter for Strategy and TechnologyAir UniversityDr. Thomas HughesUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesLt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, RetiredUSAF Doctrine CenterCol Mark P. Jelonek, USAFThe PentagonCol John Jogerst, USAFCommandant, Air Force Special Operations SchoolMr. Charles Tustin KampsUSAF Air Command and Staff CollegeDr. Tom KeaneySchool of Advanced International StudiesJohns Hopkins UniversityCol Merrick E. KrauseDirector, National Defense University PressEditor, Joint Force QuarterlyCol Chris J. Krisinger, USAFThe PentagonDr. Charles KrupnickUS Army War CollegeDr. Benjamin S. LambethRANDLt Col David MacIsaac, USAF, RetiredMontgomery, AlabamaDr. Karl P. MagyarMontgomery, AlabamaCol Edward Mann, USAF, RetiredColorado Springs, ColoradoMr. Brent MarleyUSAF Air War CollegeDr. Jerome V. MartinCommand HistorianHeadquarters US Strategic CommandCol Phillip Meilinger, USAF, RetiredChicago, IllinoisDr. Daniel MortensenUSAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Researchand EducationDr. Richard R. MullerUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesCol Robert Owen, USAF, RetiredEmbry-Riddle Aeronautical UniversityCol Bob Potter, USAF, RetiredMontgomery, AlabamaLt Col Thomas R. SearleHeadquarters US Special Operations CommandCol James Spencer, USAF, RetiredUSAF AcademyCol Michael A. StanleyUSAF Air War CollegeCol Richard Szafranski, USAF, RetiredToffler AssociatesDr. James TitusUSAF AcademyLt Col Edward B. Tomme, USAF, Retired, PhDSci-Ops ConsultingCol Mark Wells, USAFUSAF AcademyDr. Kenneth P. WerrellChristiansburg, VirginiaDr. Harold R. WintonUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies3

APJInterdependenceKey to Our Common SuccessGEN TOM HOBBINS, USAFSINCE I TOOK command of US AirForces in Europe (USAFE) and ofNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) Air Component CommandRamstein (CC-Air Ramstein), I have beenhighly impressed with both the commitmentand performance of the men and women ofthose extremely busy, continuously engagedcommands. Their level of activity and breadthof involvement are simply staggering. Our goalis to fly, fight, and win as a value-recognizedmember of an interdependent team of allies,services, and coalition partners. History hasproven that we are most successful when wecombine our capabilities to achieve commonsecurity interests.As I look to the future, I see only increasingopportunities to further develop and strengthenour interdependent relationships to addressfuture security challenges. USAFE is heavilyengaged with our sister services, allies, andpartners in forging an interdependent team.We’re making great strides in transformingour own USAFE operations to ensure we arepostured for both present and future challenges:reorganizing our headquarters, improving regionalinteraction and security through ourtheater security cooperation (TSC) programs,and integrating ground-component operationswith our own. NATO is undergoing profoundchanges as well: moving beyond its borders,committing to the International Security As-4

INTERDEPENDENCE5sistance Force (ISAF), and adopting a postureto support the NATO Response Force (NRF).USAFE is currently in the process of transformingits numbered air forces and restructuringits management headquarters to produceworld-class, full-spectrum, joint-war-fightingstructures linked together in a collaborativeplanningnetwork. USAFE’s new WarfightingHeadquarters (WFHQ) supports contingencyoperations theaterwide. As the combined/joint air component, the WFHQ serves as theAirman’s single voice to the combatant commander.Our WFHQ actively supports humanitarianand security operations within the areaof responsibility. In one operation, its memberstransported 404 Polisario Front prisonersof war (held captive for more than 20 years inAlgeria) back home to Morocco. In another,the WFHQ provided continuous securitymonitoringoperations for the 2006 WinterOlympics in Turin, Italy. Our headquarterssurveys and assesses potential operating locationsacross the entire area of responsibilityfor future engagements and training opportunities.From providing forces for NATO’s airpolicingefforts to medical teams for mannedspace-recovery operations in Kazakhstan, theWFHQ truly lives up to its name.At the same time, we stood up Air CommandEurope, our management headquarters, toexecute the daily “organize, train, and equip”mission, keeping our forces ready to providesovereign options to our leaders across thespectrum of conflict. By developing both awar-fighting and management headquarters,we support the combatant commander moreefficiently by leveraging technology and executingair, space, and cyberspace power withminimal transition from peacetime to fullcombatoperations. We are in transition towardhighly effective force presentations. Ianticipate more changes as we move from awar-fighting headquarters to a numbered-airforceconstruct that allows the combatantcommander to choose from both joint forcecommander and combined/joint force aircomponent commander leadership options.But USAFE’s focus does not stop at ourheadquarters. Continuous theater engagementand strategic presence remain one ofour goals, and our TSC program has provencritical in the global war on terrorism, deliveringoperational access for basing; increasingtraining opportunities; and enhancing intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)collaboration through the establishment ofcooperative relationships. In fiscal year 2005alone, USAFE conducted over 500 separateTSC events, engaging 66 of the 91 countries inour theater. Our engagements have producedtangible results as part of European Command’s(EUCOM) “move south and east” strategy. Onthe eastern front, we are heavily engaged withcountries such as Romania and Bulgaria—newNATO allies strategically located on the BlackSea, where 25 percent of Europe’s energy needstransit each day. In Romania, two years of hardwork by USAFE and EUCOM personnel culminatedin Secretary of State CondoleezzaRice’s signing the Defense Cooperation Agreementbetween our two nations. Such agreementsare forging the creation of the EasternEuropean Task Force, which will provide deploymentand training opportunities in theregion as well as bring together air and groundunits as part of a light, lean, lethal, and agileforce. Having such a force structure in EasternEurope has the additional benefit of servingas the template against which our newNATO allies can model their own transformationefforts.To the south, we are putting the “face ofAmerica” on humanitarian, ISR, and contingencyoperations in Africa. USAFE C-130s haveairlifted four battalions from Kigali, Rwanda,to the Darfur region in support of the AfricanUnion Mission in Sudan—another great, interdependenteffort. USAFE provides the airliftcapability, Rwanda provides the troops, andtogether we enable this mission to get off theground. We continuously engage with theState Department and EUCOM in OperationEnduring Freedom / Trans-Sahara. Throughmultiple TSC events, we assist willing partners(Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco,Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia) in theirstruggle to prevent the development of supportnetworks for terrorists. We do this by providingactionable intelligence to help host na-

6 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006tions combat terrorist enclaves that takeadvantage of ungoverned spaces in the region.This drive south and east becomes possibleonly by expanding our mobility-throughputcapability. Just last year, in partnership withGermany and NATO, USAFE closed historicRhein-Main Air Base (AB), Germany, andtransferred its mission to Ramstein AB andSpangdahlem AB, Germany. Ramstein has becomethe new “Gateway to Europe,” infusedwith world-class, technologically advancedcargo-handling facilities and support infrastructure.With its new mobility ramp and passengerterminal, Spangdahlem has becomethe new “gas and go” surge facility in-theater.Together, they eclipse the former capability ofRhein-Main and position USAFE to better supportcurrent and future mission requirements.Our relationship with our sister component,the US Army in Europe (USAREUR),continues to grow. Last year, our airlift movedUS and Russian ground troops to the trainingfacility at Grafenwoehr, Germany, to take partin the largest combined ground-force exercisesince the end of the Cold War. This year we’lldo it again, moving 300 USAREUR personneland supplies to Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, fora field-training exercise at the Mulino TrainingArea. Here at USAFE, we’ve also welcomedthe 19th Battlefield Coordination Detachment(BCD). Recognizing the critical role ofthe BCD in joint operations, the Army and AirForce service chiefs agreed to align BCDs andAir Force “Falconer” air and space operationscenters (AOC) within each geographic combatantcommand.This new concept for integrating groundoperations into daily AOC battlefield coordinationhas created a leaner, shorter, and moreflexible cycle for air tasking orders. We havecut planning for the interaction and supportbetween air and ground assets that assist incounterinsurgency operations from 72 to 44hours. Our 32d AOC recently deployed to thecombined air operations center in Al Udeidand, along with BCD personnel, proved theeffects of this integration in 25 named operationsin Operation Iraqi Freedom and 10named operations in Enduring Freedom.Within the first week of arrival, an Airmananalyst in the ISR Division found a rather obscurehuman-intelligence report of a suspectedweapons cache. Quickly grasping itspotential impact, he nominated the facility forcollection and passed the information to corpsheadquarters in Baghdad, which thought theinformation credible enough to conduct araid. AOC/BCD personnel then undertookthe planning process for the operation. In theend, an Army patrol found three weaponscaches at that site, eliminating dozens of rocketsthat the enemy would have used to attackour troops and air bases. This potentially lifesavingintelligence might have been lost ordelayed under the previous structure.Down the road, we anticipate integratingour operations even further by incorporatingA-10 and F-16C airframes that have receivedthe Enhanced Position Locating ReportingSystem into the Army Stryker Brigade CombatTeam, bringing airpower into the Joint MissionCapability Package concept. We envisionBradley, Abrams, Stryker, A-10, and F-16Ccrews all tied together in a common ISR, targeting,and support network both on andabove the battlefield.NATO has also made great progress intransforming its Cold War capability, takingon the most challenging and interesting missionsof its history. Engaged in operations onthree continents, NATO is delivering on someof the operational concepts borne of the 2002Prague summit. Accordingly, CC-Air Ramsteinsupports NATO’s expanding commitment tothe ISAF mission in Afghanistan in partnershipwith Enduring Freedom. ISAF offers agreat example of interdependence, with 36NATO and non-NATO nations working togetherto help the Afghan government establisha safe and secure environment in supportof reconstruction efforts.In addition, CC-Air Ramstein is providingair forces for the NRF—one of the most visibletransformational efforts within NATO—givingthe alliance a rapidly deployable combinedarmscapability. Such an agile force will enableNATO to respond proactively to the broadspectrum of threats we face today. This new,expeditionary-minded NRF has deliveredhumanitarian-aid supplies, ranging from blan-

INTERDEPENDENCE7kets to water pumps to mobile medical teams,from over 40 NATO and partner nations tovictims of natural disasters in both the UnitedStates and Pakistan. NATO aircraft also patrolthe sovereign airspace of new allies that donot have their own organic air-policing capability.Just a few months ago in Lithuania, GermanF-4s handed the Baltic air-policing missionto USAFE F-16s, which then passed theresponsibility to Polish MiG-29s and then toTurkish F-16s. These operations prove that togetherwe can combine capabilities to limiteach ally’s vulnerabilities.Bolstering security and stability in the worldhas never been more important. Throughproactive transformation and investment,USAFE and NATO will continue to developvalue-added relationships with other services,partners, and allies to achieve common goals.Our strength, through interdependence, residesin our ability to leverage our best practicesto deliver decisive results; we are makingsuperb progress.Serving as commander in this theater is agreat honor. I am grateful for the opportunityto lead these wonderful Airmen, and I am veryproud of their service to our nation and theNATO alliance. q

APJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CHIEF, P ROFESSIONAL JOURNALSBook Reviews and Introduction of the Latest Chronicles Online Journal ArticlesMILITARY PROFESSIONALS needto keep up with the latest literatureon national defense, butreading time is scarce. Nobodyhas time to examine every new book, so Airand Space Power Journal (ASPJ ) book reviewshelp readers set priorities. Each ASPJ issuecontains reviews of recent books about nationalsecurity, strategy, air and space operations,military history, and related topics. Evenif readers choose not to peruse one of our featuredbooks, the review succinctly conveys itssignificance and salient features. Reviews summarizebooks, analyze them, evaluate theirquality, and compare them to similar studies.If a book delivers less than it promises, the reviewwill say so. Each issue of ASPJ includes alist of book reviews in the table of contents,and our Web site offers a cumulative list ath t t p :// w w w. a i r p o w e r. m a x w e l l . a f . m i l /airchronicles/bookmain.html.The people who write our book reviewsearn significant perks. First, reading and writingcontribute to professional development.Second, reviewers can build their professionallibraries because they get to keep the publisher’sreview copy that we send them. (See http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/bookrev/listing.pdf for a list of books currentlyavailable for review.) We do accept multiplereviews of the same book, but we have only alimited number of free copies to offer. Lastly,reviewers need not limit themselves to our listof available books. We happily accept reviewsof any work that would interest our audience.Please check the ASPJ Web site to see if wehave already published a review of the bookyou’re interested in writing about.Most of our reviews deal with books writtenin English, but ASPJ also welcomes critiques ofSpanish, Portuguese, Arabic, or French publications—andreviewers can write in any ofthose languages since we have the capabilityto translate. As the US Air Force increases itsstudy of other languages and cultures, Airmencan profit from the perspective of works writtenin languages other than English. Such insightsmay prove valuable when working withcoalition partners in expeditionary settings.Anyone interested in writing a book review forASPJ may consult our guidelines at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/bookrev/bkrevguide.html.All ASPJ editions promote professionaldialogue among Airmen worldwide so thatwe can harness the best ideas about airpowerand space power. Chronicles Online Journal(COJ ) complements the printed editions ofASPJ but appears only in electronic form.Not subject to any fixed publication schedule,COJ can publish timely articles anytimeabout a broad range of topics, including historical,political, or technical matters. It alsoincludes articles too lengthy for inclusion inthe printed journals.Articles appearing in COJ are frequently republishedelsewhere. The Spanish, Portuguese,Arabic, and French editions of ASPJ,for example, routinely translate and printthem. Book editors from around the world selectthem as book chapters, and college professorsuse them in the classroom. We arepleased to present the following recent COJarticles (available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc.html):8

RICOCHETS AND REPLIES9• CAPT Randall G. Bowdish, USN, “Campaign,Operation, and Battle Analysis”(http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/bowdish.html)• Col Francis R. Stevens Jr., USAF, Retired,“My Father and I and Saburo Sakai”(http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/stevens.html)The ASPJ editorial staff always seeks insightfularticles from anywhere in the world. We offerpublication opportunities in five languages,as noted above. To submit an article in any ofour languages, please refer to the submissionguidelines at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/howto1.html. qAPJWe encourage you to send your comments to us, preferably via e-mail, at aspj@maxwell.af.mil. You may alsosend letters to the Editor, Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. We reserve the right to edit the material for overall length.NEAR SPACE 2015In his article “Near Space 2015: A ConceptualVision of Near-Space Operations” (summer2006), Maj Mark Steves seriously underestimatesIndia’s communications capabilities.I specifically disagree with his assumption thatIndia by 2015 would need a US “near-spacecraft” for enabling communications during anearthquake on its coast. Even today, India iswell connected by satellite communicationsprovided by the INSAT series. By 2015 our capabilitieswill be even more advanced. Indiamight indeed appreciate US assistance in theevent of a natural disaster, but we have enoughspace assets to look after our needs.K. K. NairNew Delhi, IndiaTHE MYTH OF THE TACTICAL SATELLITEKindly convey my heartiest congratulations toLt Col Edward B. Tomme, USAF, retired, forhis article “The Myth of the Tactical Satellite”(summer 2006). In one masterstroke, the colonelhas put the entire conundrum in perspectiveand blown away a lot of myths from propagandists—andhe does so in terms easily understoodby practitioners and laypersons alike.While it is understandable that the colonelhas focused only on the land aspect, theworrisome trend that is slowly spreading is theadvocacy of “tactical maritime surveillance satellites”—somethingthat sounds patently oxymoronic.I would like to highlight one thing,which may or may not have been covered inthe extended version of Colonel Tomme’s paper.While one can have high-gain antennaethat would detect faint signals at extendedranges, imagine the number of signals thatthe same receiver will pick up in a dense fieldof view, such as when the satellite reaches itslowest altitude. Weeding out the spurious andmultipath emissions will prove to be a Herculeantask, thus further complicating efforts toseparate the grain from the chaff—especiallywhen the satellite is in a signals-intelligencerole. The author has focused primarily on imagingsensors in the visible and infrared bands.How about synthetic aperture radar or inversesynthetic aperture radar, technologies thathave opened up exciting possibilities for overcomingthe ill effects of atmospheric disturbancesand poor visibility? In the maritimedomain, ships have now been mandated to installan Automatic Identification System (AIS)under the United Nations Convention on theLaw of the Sea. These operate in the VHF/

10 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006UHF band and work on the principle of selforganizingtime-division multiple access. Simpleback-of-the-envelope calculation indicates thatan AIS receiver fitted on a low-Earth-orbit satellitecan provide tactical-level information ona near-real-time basis. However, for it to be ofany use over a particularly large ocean expanse,there ought to be augmentation in either ofthe following two forms: (1) additional satellitesor (2) tactically deployable unmannedaerial vehicles that can be triggered by a satellitefeed to patrol areas indicated to have themost threat.Cdr V. Srivatsan, Indian NavyNew Delhi, IndiaIRAQ AMIDST TWO FORMS OF TERROR-ISM: THE POWER OF PERSPECTIVECongratulations to both ASPJ and GeneralQaa’id for an excellent article (“Iraq amidstTwo Forms of Terrorism,” spring 2006). It’sabsolutely critical that we hear directly fromour coalition partners. It’s even more importantto get their understanding and interpretationof the facts on the ground before, during,and after Operation Iraqi Freedom.We must understand the culture, the mentalterrain, of those we work with as well as thosewe work against. Reading General Qaa’id’slyric prose gives one a glimpse of the power ofexpression required for ideas to compete inMiddle Eastern cultures. It’s very differentfrom the clinical approach taken by US authors.The general’s words show the power ofvivid imagery while losing none of their intellectualcontent and impact.In fact, reading his article provides an insightinto and example of what we must do tocompete in the war of ideas for both IraqiFreedom and the war on terrorism. The measuredand cold statements we make aboutfreedom and progress are not resonating withpeople whose mental filters are tuned to metaphorand allegory. Maybe it’s time to hire anIraqi poet instead of a translator to get ourmessage out.I was struck by a profound message whilereading General Qaa’id’s words when he said,“Some say that America invaded Iraq. I call itliberation of my country from the regime of atyrant and his accomplices. In fact, Saddambrought America to Iraq. . . . But he forgot thepower of God, who harnessed the strength ofthe United States to liberate Iraq after Americansdied in the terrorist attacks of 11 September2001” (8–9).This is a powerful message coming from anIraqi leader. Iraqi Freedom was not a war betweenthe US-led coalition and Iraq. The coalitionwas merely a tool used by God to liberateIraq from Saddam’s tyranny.The fact that I find this so striking showsthe effect of my own cultural filters. The metaphoris not unknown in our culture—just littleused today. Numerous invasions and catastropheshave been interpreted as God’s action toset the world right and take vengeance onevildoers. Was not Attila the scourge of Godagainst Europe?General Qaa’id has outlined a powerfulnarrative of the war against terrorism. God abhorsviolence against Muslims and innocents—boththe state-sponsored violence ofSaddam Hussein and the bloody actions ofterrorists. God is great enough to use everytool, including non-Muslims, to redress thesewrongs. In this context, the United States isbut a tool to liberate Muslims, end the evils ofterrorism, and provide Muslims the freedomto practice their faith and contribute to aglobal civilization.To compete in a war of ideas, we’ve got tospeak to the audience in a way they understand.Col John Jogerst, USAFHurlburt Field, FloridaTECHNICAL EDUCATION FOR AIRFORCE SPACE PROFESSIONALSThe authors of the article “Technical Educationfor Air Force Space Professionals” (winter2005) are pleased with the progress cited in LtCol Thomas Peppard’s letter (summer 2006)concerning our article, especially in that muchof that progress is in concert with the article’srecommendations. However, we respectfully

RICOCHETS AND REPLIES 11disagree with the assessment that a direct liaisonbetween the Air Force Institute of Technology(AFIT) and Air Force Space Command(AFSPC) is unnecessary. A significant advantagepossessed by AFIT and the Naval PostgraduateSchool relative to their civilian counterparts isan exceptional responsiveness to changingeducational-curricula needs. For example,AFIT’s Department of Operational Sciences isa permanent representative at quarterly AirForce Analytic Community Senior Leadermeetings. This routine interface provides insightinto dynamic war-fighting-analyst requirementsand facilitates near-real-time adjustmentsto the institute’s graduate programsin operations research. Flag-officer representationin the Space Professional OversightBoard and periodic “observer” participationin the Joint Space Academic Group do notprovide the direct interaction essential to createthis level of synergy between operationalspace practitioners and academic institutions.The Space Commission concluded, via extensivestudy, that the educational backgroundand experience of senior space leaders weresubstantially inadequate. An educational-needsassessmentmethodology that draws heavily onthe expertise of these same senior leaderswould seem problematic. Indeed, an Air ForceSpace Command study concluded that presentaccession requirements are satisfactory yet stillcalled for additional officer education in thecore areas of math, physics, sciences, and engineeringduring the first four years of serviceas part of earning an “initial space certificate.”(See Lt Col Peppard, Headquarters AFSPC/A1FX, “Air Force Space Professional DevelopmentPlan Update” [PowerPoint presentation,Joint Space Academic Group Meeting, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, March 2006].) The cost,in terms of both time and money, to providesuch education is unnecessary, given that officersalready possessing this core knowledgecould be readily obtained through modestchanges to accession policies.Lt Col Raymond W. Staats, USAFMaxwell AFB, AlabamaMaj Derek Abeyta, USAFKirtland AFB, New MexicoBUILDING A WORLD-CLASS NONCOM-MISSIONED OFFICER CORPSAir and Space Power Journal is very valuable tothe members of our Colombian air force. Thetopics you publish are discussed in forums andused as instructional tools in our various militaryacademies. Colombian Air Force Academycadets have been assigned to research ChiefMaster Sergeant of the Air Force Gerald Murray’sarticle “Developing Airmen: Building aWorld-Class Noncommissioned Officer Corps”(winter 2005).Clara Ines ParraBogotá, ColombiaEditor’s Note: Ms. Parra read the Spanish version ofChief Murray’s article, available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2005/3tri05/murray.html.

ASPJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CHIEF, P ROFESSIONAL JOURNALSIntegrating OperationsJoint Air and Space PowerTHE YEAR 2006 marks the 20th anniversaryof the Goldwater-Nichols Departmentof Defense Reorganization Act, a milestonein the evolution of the US military.Intended to improve Army, Navy, Air Force, andMarine Corps joint operations, the act engenderedorganizational and cultural changes, the former includingthe shifting of authority from heads of themilitary services to the chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff and establishing the Unified CombatantCommand structure we see today. The culturalchanges proved subtler, focusing on broadeningthe perspectives of military personnel. Joint doctrinehas helped link these two types of changes,but the process remains incomplete.According to Joint Publication 1-02, Department ofDefense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12April 2001 (as amended through 14 April 2006), theword joint “connotes activities, operations, organizations,etc., in which elements of two or more MilitaryDepartments participate.” Although not officiallydefined, jointness expresses the quality of being joint.A hard-to-achieve virtue, jointness is a centripetalforce that opposes the centrifugal tendency of themilitary services to think and act divergently. Eachservice conceptualizes military problems in differentways and proposes solutions based on its area of expertise.The resulting diversity of thought offers eitheradvantages or disadvantages, depending onhow leaders translate it into action. National leaderswant alternatives when they make military choices,but blending different services’ ideas into coherentstrategies is challenging. The Goldwater-Nichols Actsought to integrate service perspectives synergisticallyafter a number of operations fell short of thisideal. Potential degrees of jointness array themselvesacross a spectrum, ranging from working at crosspurposes (which produces interservice rivalry),through deconflicting separate actions or performinglimited interservice coordination, to achievingthe close partnership of true jointness (which requiresyears of patient training and effort).Common sense suggests that services shouldseek unity of effort in the pursuit of shared goalsbecause blending different military assets and techniquescan produce synergistic effects; however,organizational factors obstruct interservice cooperation.Having services specialize in different mediumsor styles of warfare makes good sense becauseeach branch excels in its respective medium,but that virtuosity can foster a counterproductiveurge to operate independently. These large organizationsfollow their own internal procedures andseek to maximize their available resources. Competitionfor shares of the defense budget poses a particularlyserious challenge to jointness. Consolidatingthe services into a single organization mightlessen the severity of the contest but would do so atthe cost of losing valuable and unique perspectives.Clearly, jointness involves a delicate balance ofcomplex organizational forces.The promulgation of joint doctrine not only haspromoted jointness but also has invigorated servicedoctrine. The first joint-doctrine manuals exhibiteda strong Army tone, probably because Army doctrinewas more developed than that of the other services.Air Force capabilities affect practically all forms ofjoint warfare, so our service devoted considerable effortto articulating its views of joint matters. Doing sorequired the Air Force to codify its own doctrinalideas more systematically than ever before. Our doctrinedocuments have proliferated and now evolveconstantly to reflect fast-changing technologies andoperational concepts. Hence, the publication ofjoint doctrine following the Goldwater-Nichols Actcoincided with a renaissance of Air Force doctrine.Future jointness will require more than adjustmentsin organization, culture, and doctrine. Becausewarfare constantly changes, professional debateof joint issues will remain essential. To markthe 20th anniversary of the Goldwater-Nichols Act,Air and Space Power Journal, the professional journalof the Air Force, dedicates this issue to advancingthe professional dialogue about joint militaryoperations. q12

In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then theyusually “mix it up.” In a similar spirit, Air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articlespresent contending ideas. Readers can draw their own conclusions or join the intellectual battlespace.Please send comments to aspj@maxwell.af.mil.Editor’s Note: For an opposing viewpoint, see Col Steven D. Carey’s “Red Flag Still Matters—AfterAll These Years.”Why Red Flag Is ObsoleteLT COL ROB SPALDING, USAF*AFTER SITTING THROUGH my fifth Red Flag debrief, listeningto MiG 1 say “color pod 7 white from pod 25,” I sadly realized thatRed Flag represented the bygone era of my youth. I thought backto my days as a young post–Desert Storm Air Force pilot in thesesame seats, learning the skills that would keep me alive and help me kill the“bad guys.” Back then, Red Flag made sense to me. Now I struggle to balancethe exercise against the lessons I’ve learned:1. Our world is made unsafe by a few miscreant leaders with the resourcesto build terrible weapons.2. Bad guys are clever.3. The Internet and globalization have made it easier for terrorists to gettogether.4. Tackling terrorism isn’t for lawmen; it takes a sustained effort from adedicated military.5. A modern Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) is a network of earlywarning radars, not individual-threat surface-to-air missiles.6. We (the USAF) are outside the bad guys’ decision loop.After 9/11 our nation’s leaders realized that the biggest danger we facedwas from asymmetric threats. Criminals at an economic disadvantage resortto whatever means are available to push their agenda. Additionally, roguenations use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as their trump card. Ourleadership’s answer has been to take down the terrorists and then addressthe rogue nations.*Colonel Spalding is an intelligence officer within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Prisoner of War /Missing Personnel Office, Washington, DC.13

True to form, the Air Force has responded with unprecedented victoriesin Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet much remains to be done, and the Air Force’scharacteristic efficiency has recently lagged. Fortunately, a new weapon systemhas emerged as the combatant commanders’ favorite: the Predator unmannedaerial vehicle. The Predator is successful because of its persistentintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.Red Flag should have predicted Predator’s rise to fame. An exerciseproperly oriented to the current conflict would have pointed out the inadequacyof other weapon systems to the task at hand. Instead, the Air Forcehas used Red Flag to develop missions that extend the usefulness of fighters.I can’t help likening this to cavalry officers who looked for ways to preservethe horse in spite of the overwhelming evidence that tanks were the wave ofthe future.Red Flag needs to be organized to better prepare us for future threats aswell as provide a joint learning environment to develop new ideas/tactics tocounter those threats. There are two possibilities for future conflict withvastly different target lists and threats: the peer competitor and the globalwar on terrorism (GWOT). As a result, Red Flag should evolve into a twotieredexercise.Scenario one would introduce a peer competitor with modern weaponsystems and vast resources. This situation requires a kick-down-the-door exercisethat emphasizes the use of B-2s/F-22s with ground/airborne special operationsforces (SOF) to take down a modern IADS in preparation for aground invasion. This scenario would emphasize the ability to counterWMDs delivered by cruise or tactical ballistic missiles and other threatsposed by a powerful nation-state. This could be a two-week exercise that allowsless-capable weapon systems to participate as the threat picture diminishesand ground forces begin their main thrust.Scenario two would pose a GWOT-type environment against an ill-equippedterrorist-type foe embedded in a somewhat complicit populace. The threatlevel would consist of man-portable antiaircraft weapons and light antiaircraftartillery. This situation would require heavy use of the Predator/AC-130gunship combination, ground/airborne SOF, and conventional Army andMarine forces. It would emphasize countering WMDs delivered by unconventionalmeans, and the goal would be restoring law and order after aground invasion while adapting to progressively more-creative terrorist tactics.The B-2/F-22 combination provides a powerful one-two punch for successin scenario one, but scenario two presents overwhelming challenges forcurrent Air Force weapon systems. The Predator is well suited for scenariotwo, but it is limited by the need for high bandwidth. In addition, thestrength of our military lies in decentralized execution. The tendency forhigher-level scrutiny at the tactical level seems to accompany direct Predatorfeeds and dilutes this strength.Finite Predator orbits and continuous requests for air support by groundforces during a scenario-two exercise would overwhelm current Air Forcearchitecture. Therefore, canceling an upcoming forecast weapon system14

such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) might seem to be an extreme measure,but a properly imagined Red Flag would make it a clear necessity. The JSF,like the Army’s Crusader, gives us too much of a capability we already have(survivability—B-2/F-22) and not enough of a capability we really need(persistence—Predator).A weapon system is also needed which merges the strengths of the Predatorwith the strength of decentralized execution. Since it would be built forthe GWOT scenario, survivability is not a large concern; thus, cost could beminimized. A manned airframe similar to the Predator, when combinedwith current sniper-pod technology and either the Hellfire missile or smalldiameterbomb, would provide the persistent reconnaissance and lethalityrequired. Terminating the JSF program would help pay for the acquisitionof this new asset.The fact that defense budgets are always constrained necessitates toughdecisions. Exercises like Red Flag should help us make these choices by providingproperly scripted scenarios that could be analyzed for future forcestructurerequirements. Col H. L. Gilster analyzed Vietnam War operationsagainst the Ho Chi Minh Trail to highlight the fallacy of purchasing F-105swhen AC-130s were needed. 1 One can only imagine the same result if theJSF competed against a Predator-like weapon system in a GWOT scenario two.Some will argue that Red Flag still successfully prepares aircrews forworst-case scenarios. What it does not provide, and what we need, is the capabilityto exercise jointly across the full spectrum of future scenarios. RedFlag also fails to teach and exercise a coherent strategy for defeating symmetricand asymmetric adversaries. Finally, it perpetuates a fighter-centricmind-set which prevents the Air Force from transforming into an organizationthat will be successful in any current/future environment. In short, inits current incarnation, Red Flag is obsolete. qWashington, DCNote1. See Col Herman L. Gilster, “The Commando Hunt V Interdiction Campaign: A Case Study in ConstrainedOptimization,” Air University Review 29, no. 2 (January–February 1978), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1978/jan-feb/gilster.html (accessed 8 May 2006).15

Red Flag Still Matters—After AllThese YearsCOL STEVEN D. CAREY, USAF*HAND GRENADE OR think piece? The title “Why Red Flag Is Obsolete”catches our attention, but the author oversteps his argument.It’s fair to say that Red Flag needs to refashion itself in orderto be relevant, but that has been its continuing charter sinceit was conceived in the wake of Vietnam’s aerial battles. Before we break themold, one has to ask, “Why was Red Flag created, and who is the intendedtraining audience today?” Historically, Red Flag was designed to enhancethe survivability of our young, inexperienced fighter pilots and aircrews exposedto the high-intensity environment of aerial combat during their first10 combat missions. Today’s Red Flag mission still marches to that drum,but it also includes a full spectrum of scenarios involving air and space operationscenters; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; defensivecounterair; offensive counterair; combat search and rescue; bombers; tankers;ground controllers; and space assets. Can it do more? Sure. Should itdo more? Sure. That’s the intent of the Air Force chief of staff’s new initiativesregarding aggressors. Last year the Air Force stood up the 57th AggressorTactics Group and, more recently, reactivated the 65th Aggressor Squadronto “provide realistic adversary training in air, space and informationoperations.” 1 The world of Red Flag has already changed. The fact that wehave added space and information-warfare aggressors to our compositetraining is proof that we are adjusting our training—innovating and incorporatingnew technologies. To say that Red Flag is fighter-centric today andin the chief’s vision for tomorrow is an unfair characterization. 2 From nightflags to close air support, from electronic-warfare scenarios to protection ofhigh-value aerial assets, and now the infusion of full-spectrum aggressors,Red Flag has steadily matured and demonstrated a keen ability to move beyondthe fighter mind-set of our youth.Lest we forget, Red Flag should be an “aerial pressure cooker.” It is intendedto challenge our aviators in large gorilla packages, forcing them tomultitask in high-threat environments in order to prepare for the first timethey face a barrage of antiaircraft artillery or a salvo of surface-to-air missiles.I agree wholeheartedly with the author that Red Flag needs to addressboth symmetric and asymmetric threats and tailor scenarios to include ourcomposite capabilities—manned and unmanned. However, the trainingmust still challenge the skills and minds of those who participate. After all,16*Colonel Carey is commandant, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

they are the ones at risk and the ones likely to become smoking holes ifthey aren’t prepared. Rather than reshape Red Flag into a two-tiered trainingenvironment as suggested, we should open the scenario shutter and createan environment that truly tests our warriors, whether they strap on amachine or sit at a console providing precise airpower. We must make surewe teach all of these Airmen how to incorporate the latest systems and technologiesas we take the fight to our enemies. The author is right to claimthe need to adjust fire, but we cannot lose sight of the original purpose ofRed Flag as a proving ground for our young warriors who put themselvesand our nation’s valuable assets at risk. To bury our heads in the sand anddeclare large-scale conflict or scenarios obsolete would be a mistake. Althoughno longer in vogue as a “real” threat, it is very likely that our younglieutenants will be staring down the barrel of a peer competitor within theirprofessional lifetimes. We cannot let the asymmetric enemy we face todayrestrict our training regimen. Red Flag must bridge the spectrum of conflictfor the sake of our flying Airmen unless we are to believe that the future ofaerial warfare lies with unmanned combat aerial vehicles! We cannot forgetthat enemies choose asymmetric strategies not because they can but becausethey must. 3 To fail to secure the advantage in high-intensity conflict isto invite our enemies to fight us there—a far worse prospect than any smallwarscenario. qMaxwell AFB, AlabamaNotes1. Gen T. Michael Moseley, chief of staff, US Air Force, to the Airmen of the United States Air Force,letter, 5 January 2006, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/csaf.asp?id=207.2. Ibid.3. See Col Qiao Liang and Col Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: People’s Liberation ArmyLiterature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999), Foreign Broadcast Information Service translation,http://www.terrorism.com/documents/TRC-Analysis/unrestricted.pdf.There is still a tendency in each separate unit . . . to be aone-handed puncher. By that I mean that the riflemanwants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman tofire. . . . To get harmony in battle, each weapon must supporteach other. Team play wins.—Gen George S. Patton Jr.17

Integration of Space-BasedCombat SystemsCORTNEY KONNERRONALD POPE*THE CONCEPT OF combined arms—integrating different militarycapabilities to achieve effects not available from applying the individualcapabilities in isolation—provides a key asymmetric advantageto American military forces. Foreign military planners covetAmerican-style jointness and seek to emulate it. Although the integration ofexisting capabilities is a key enabler, having a monopoly on new capabilities(and the means to integrate them quickly and effectively) is also powerful.As with American-style jointness, potential adversaries also envy the nearmonopoly on space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance(ISR) systems enjoyed by the American military.The advantages provided by integration and by near monopolies on spacebasedsystems warrant careful consideration by organizations responsible fordelivering them to the war fighter. To analyze the opportunities and challengesinherent in the military use of space, one should consider the four classes ofmilitary capabilities and the six integration pathways they create (see fig.). Ofthese four classes, three currently exist, as do the three integration pathwaysbetween them (1, 2, and 3). For the most part, space-based combat systemsremain in the conceptual stage (indicated by the dotted lines), as do the integrationpathways that their deployment would create (4, 5, and 6).The Challenge of Getting Integration RightThis article explores the opportunities exploited and the challenges overcomein the three existing integration pathways. It does so with an eye towardmaximizing the utility of the three future integration pathways that willprovide military advantages when space-based combat systems become areality. Since integration has proven its value for existing systems and capabilities,expectations for integrating future capabilities remain high. At leastone complicating factor exists, however. As technology explodes in applicationsfor war fighters, the choice of space-based versus air-/Earth-based systemsis no longer an either/or proposition: because each host medium offersdistinctive advantages, operating in and from two media becomes*We are grateful to our colleagues Dr. Michael Stumborg, Jeffrey Barnett, Robert Bivins, Deborah Westphal, andRichard Szafranski for their help with this article.The authors are consultants with Toffler Associates.18

Figure. Six available integration options among four classes of military capabilitieshighly desirable, leading naturally to a need to integrate operations inboth. 1 This space-versus-air/Earth dichotomy holds equally for ISR systemsas it does for combat systems. 2Over the past 20 years, the United States has repeatedly altered its approachto military operations in space. 3 Reasons for this turmoil and uncertaintyare complex; however, one can reasonably point to shifts in the perceptionof threats and advances in technology as major drivers. Rapidtechnological advances in today’s earthbound systems for remote sensingwill likely continue this trend, as will rapid shifts in the threat environment.A desire for greater speed in acquisition, better integration, more transparency,more accountability, and more rapid deployment of capability will requirethe space community to restructure the way it does business yet again.That earthbound alternatives to space-based ISR and combat systems canchange more quickly, just when the threat is changing more rapidly, suggeststhat space-based systems may lose their primacy to an integrated combinationof space-based systems and their air-/Earth-based alternatives.The High Ground: A Two-Dimensional NotionMilitary planners used to talk in terms of space as the “ultimate highground,” but shifts in threat and technology have changed the military calculus.One can no longer assert that only satellites or only atmospheric systemswill dominate future operations. The issue is not one of either/or;rather, all will remain, and all will progress. The challenge for space plannerslies in integrating their efforts within the larger whole. Space formerlyhad a monopoly over vital military operations, but now space-based systemsprovide only one of several alternatives. In some cases, space may offer the19

est alternative. In other cases, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) mightdominate. In all cases, planners strive to produce the greatest military effectby integrating space systems with atmospheric and terrestrial systems. Suchintegration has the crucial added benefit of giving the United States aunique global capability—a monopoly that no other group, nation, orgroup of nations can presently match.Whether developing space ISR, space combat power, or both, the UnitedStates obviously needs to build a future space force that integrates leadingedgecapabilities with the rest of the joint team. Postdeployment system integrationis more difficult and far more expensive than the a priori integrationof systems that exist only on paper or in computer-aided design / computeraidedmanufacturing programs. Consequently, “the present” is always thetime to start considering integration strategies for proposed and postulatedspace-based combat systems. 4 Lessons learned from past integration of spacebasedISR systems should inform future integration strategies for space-basedcombat systems.Integration Pathways from the PastThe three solid integration pathways in the figure represent capabilitiescurrently available to commanders. These integrations enable precision targeting,battle damage assessments, ISR cueing from one system to another,and all the capabilities that encompass the United States’ twentieth-centurymilitary arsenal.Pathway One: Air-/Earth-Based Combat Systems with Air-/Earth-Based ISR SystemsCombat “systems” have existed as long as combat has. ISR systems, the mostancient of which include visual sightings, verbal communication, standardbearers, smoke signals, and flags, entered the battlefield shortly thereafter—ifnot concurrently. When ISR and combat systems took to the air, attempts tointegrate them with their earthbound manifestations became imperative.Blitzkrieg serves as a useful example of pre-space-age air/Earth integrationthat provided tremendous military utility. These past integration initiativesrepresent useful analogies for future space/air and space/ground integrationthat we cannot ignore.Pathway Two: Air-/Earth-Based ISR Systems with Space-Based ISR SystemsNetworks, adaptability, and access are moving toward depriving space of theunique capabilities that operating from the high ground once afforded.Networks of all kinds—air defense, command and control, and remotesensing (as well as networks of networks)—have become the new centers ofstrategic value. Rapidly expanding networks, growing faster and broader bythe day, generate incredible wealth and national power. They have becomedominant features of societies, economics, politics, and militaries. 520

One can no longer depend only on space systems to provide the onceunique perspective of space’s orbital heights. In the commercial communicationsbusiness, terrestrially based cellular networks and fiber optics helpeddrive Iridium, a satellite-based system, into bankruptcy. Cellular networksand fiber optics will continue to dominate, using robust private investmentto match satellite communications, advance for advance. Given their large lead,surface-based communications will likely keep their lead for a long time.In the same way, UAVs, high-altitude airships, and unattended groundsensors are making rapid progress in their support of remote sensing andpersistent surveillance. 6 These alternative systems adapt to the needs of abattlespace and offer some means of replacing our space architecture. Activitiesformerly conducted only from the high ground of space now takeplace in the atmosphere. When technological advances made all this a reality,space ceded the high ground.With regard to access, one remembers that the Soviets shot down the U-2piloted by Francis Gary Powers as he attempted to reconnoiter areas forwhich we had no detailed space coverage. Today, satellites provide that informationwithout putting human beings in harm’s way. One still encounterslimitations to the details detectable via space systems, but only some ofthe same challenges apply to airborne or ground systems.This is not to say that commanding space is unimportant. The absolutevalue of space-based ISR systems, unique and not easily replaced, is not theissue. Their relative value, however, appears to be shifting. Space will remainone of the places from which we collect information, but in the future wewill find solutions to our remote-sensing problems by netting space systemswith both air and ground systems—even subterranean systems. 7 Networks ofspace and airborne and terrestrial sensors now overshadow the importanceof the high ground of space.Pathway Three: Air-/Earth-Based Combat Systems with Space-Based ISR SystemsThe coupling of the Joint Direct Attack Munition with the global positioningsystem (GPS), a fertile example of this pathway, is well known—so muchso that it does not require detailed treatment here. The deployment ofspace-based GPS provided revolutionary advancements in terrestrial andaerial military power projection and precision. Ultimately, the GPS does notproduce combat power but enables its projection, making it worthy of inclusionin this examination of space-based ISR systems. Since the US militaryrelies so heavily on the GPS, it places a priority on the robustness of thesystem. 8 The Department of Defense is exploring methods of GPS navigationbased on terrestrial and airborne systems as an alternative to reinforcingGPS space-based assets.The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), for example,has begun exploring the use of airborne pseudosatellites to overpower GPSjammers and the use of navigation via signals of opportunity to “provide theUS warfighter with the ability to geo-locate and navigate effectively when21

power projection, but advances in autonomous unmanned systems, guidedweapons, precision weapons, aerial platforms, and DE weapons suggest theavailability of similar capabilities from terrestrial and airborne systems. 12Once again, the absence of an irrefutable argument demonstrating the clearsuperiority of combat power projection from space-based systems to thatfrom air-/Earth-based systems (or vice versa) implies the presence of both,thus providing yet another opportunity for force multiplication via integration.Space-based DE weapons do face power and targeting hurdles. Futuretechnology may address these issues, but UAV-based DE weapons may alwaysprove more dependable, easier to maintain, cheaper, and just as safe asthe space-based version. 13 Furthermore, we may always find UAVs easier torefuel, rearm, and repair. Since the airborne laser program has already begundeveloping this capability, can a UAV-borne laser be far off? Like theGPS, DE weapons no longer reside exclusively in space, and the advantagesof airborne and earthbound lasers may negate the need for space-basedlasers entirely. But what about space-based kinetic weapons?Such weapons have the advantage of targeting anywhere in the world morequickly than terrestrially based alternatives, but this benefit may disappear ifwe compare them to land-based global-artillery concepts (e.g., the Slingatron,Blast Wave Accelerator, or guns of Gerald Bull) rather than to air-launchedkinetic weapons. 14 The fixed position of these large, hard-to-hide weapons isa clear liability, but the predictability of an orbiting kinetic weapon’s positionposes similar problems of perhaps equal and offsetting magnitude.In the past, this desire for speed and global reach has created researchprograms (such as the National Aerospace Plane) to explore the feasibilityof craft that provide such reach by flying most of their route in space. 15 Theseplanes may eliminate many of the costs associated with forward-deployedsupport forces by enabling strike operations of any size or scale from US airbases. Additionally, they protect national security by permitting the basingof assets and personnel on US soil. Space planes also reduce dependencieson foreign states by taking off from domestic bases and flying into space—international territory—before reentering the atmosphere over enemy airspaceto strike their targets. Researchers are currently exploring the possibilitythat if precision-guided munitions deploy from a plane outside theatmosphere, then it would never need to enter nonsovereign airspace at all.Goals of the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems ( J-UCAS) programprovide some indication of future airborne force-projection capabilities. 16 Ifsuccessfully completed, such a system could facilitate global reach withoutspace. Although the J-UCAS may not possess the speed of a space plane, itlikely will offer greater persistence at costs more easily contained within finitebudgets.Virgin Galactic’s pursuit of both tourism and faster intercontinentaltravel indicates that spaceflights between terrestrial locations already liewithin reach. This private “space line” has an agreement with New Mexicoto establish the world’s first commercial spaceport for personal spaceflight.As commercial industry continues its push into the realm of space, further23

advancements in technology, engineering, and manufacturing should enablemore cost-effective spaceflight. 17 This increased capacity to use space asmerely the transit medium for combat power decreases proportionately thefeasibility of operational concepts that propose to use space as the origin ofthat power. Similarly, we cannot ignore the fact that opponents of spaceweaponization would approve of making space a transit media for combatpower rather than its point of origin. 18ConclusionIt is counterproductive to think of tomorrow’s space capabilities solely interms of space systems. Assets on the ground, in the air, and in space can increasinglyperform each other’s missions. None has a monopoly on futuremilitary operations. If planners try to treat space as a separate mission, theywill only continue the current cycle of turmoil that faces the space community.The optimum way forward calls for integrating atmospheric and spacebasedsystems and operations. We must begin this task now.The six integration pathways described above demonstrate that the threepathways of the past provide lessons we can and must learn to realize thethree pathways that will arrive with the advent of space-based combat systems.The asymmetric advantages enjoyed by American forces, because ofintegration and a near monopoly on space-based capabilities, suggeststrongly that success in these new integration pathways is critical to maintainingthose advantages. The American public accepted the substantial expenseof postdeployment integration of our space-based ISR systems becauseimmediate deployment to counter the Soviet nuclear threat wascritical to national survival. Because no such adversary today threatens oursurvival in a way that demands immediate deployment of space-based combatcapability, we have no reason for postponing integration. Failure to beginthis effort a priori may very well close out space-based combat capabilitiesas a financially viable option, thereby precluding a unique and powerfulmilitary capability. qManchester, MassachusettsNotes1. Even air/Earth is complicated: near space, stratosphere, low altitude, surface, subsurface, and soforth. When military forces identify with an operational medium—or lay claim to it as their exclusive domain—integrationcan become extremely difficult.2. For the purposes of this analysis, we roughly define ISR systems as anything that provides the “observe”and “orient” parts of the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop, and combat systems as thosethat provide the “act” portion. We do not consider command, control, communications, and computers(C4) systems, which essentially exist in cyberspace as opposed to physical space (air/Earth domain or thespace domain) to provide the “decide” portion. It is convenient to consider them as part of the integrationpathway “arrows” shown in the figure.24

3. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization(Washington, DC: The Commission, 11 January 2001), 79, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.html.4. Michael Stumborg et al., “Total Ship Engineering: A Team Effort,” Surface Warfare 20, no. 6 (1996):10–15.5. See Alvin Toffler, Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century (New York:Bantam Books, 1990).6. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), passim, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG166.pdf.7. Ibid., 290.8. A Defense Science Board task force recommended a 30-satellite constellation for GPS III to increaserobustness and improve the system’s performance in mountainous and urban-warfare environments.Defense Science Board Task Force on the Future of the Global Positioning System (Washington, DC: Officeof the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, October 2005), 9, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-10-GPS_Report_Final.pdf.9. “Global Positioning Experiments (GPX),” DARPA Special Projects Office, http://www.darpa.mil/spo/programs/gpx.htm; and “Navigation via Signals of Opportunity (NAVSOPP),” DARPA Special ProjectsOffice, http://www.darpa.mil/spo/programs/navsopp.htm.10. Richard Stevens et al., Systems Engineering: Coping with Complexity (New York: Prentice Hall, 1998),chap. 6.11. John D. Banusiewicz, “Wolfowitz Asserts Value of Ground Forces, Touts Their Role in Joint Operations,”American Forces Press Service, 8 October 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2003/n10082003_200310088.html.12. Hon. John N. Hostettler, “Directed Energy and the Future of Security,” Lexington Institute, 11 July2002, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/events.asp?aid=256; “Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems,”DARPA, http://www.darpa.mil/j-ucas/index.htm; and “A Brief History of the Airborne Laser,” USAF factsheet (Kirtland AFB, NM: Airborne System Laser Program Office, Office of Public Affairs, 27 February2003), http://www.de.afrl.af.mil/Factsheets/ABLHistory.swf.13. Publicly available information limits the argument made here. The authors recognize the possibilitythat classified research in the United States or other countries may very well alter the conclusions regardingDE weapons.14. Eric Adams, “Rods from God: Space-Launched Darts That Strike Like Meteors,” Popular Science, 4January 2006, http://www.popsci.com/popsci/technology/generaltechnology/df869aa138b84010vgnvcm1000004eecbccdrcrd.html; Dr. William R. Graham, The Status of Technology for Defense of the United States, ItsForces, and Its Interests against Ballistic Missile Attack, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, UnitedStates Senate, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 4 May 1999, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1999_h/s106-339-3.htm; Derek A. Tidman et al., “Sling Launch of Materials into Space,” SSI [Space Studies Institute]Update 22, no. 1 (January–March 1996): 1–5; David W. Bogdanoff, “Ram Accelerator Direct SpaceLaunch System: New Concepts,” Journal of Propulsion and Power 8 (March–April 1992): 481–90; and “ProjectBabylon Supergun/PC-2,” Federation of American Scientists, 8 October 2000, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/other/supergun.htm.15. William B. Scott, “Two-Stage-to-Orbit ‘Blackstar’ System Shelved at Groom Lake?” Aviation Week andSpace Technology, 5 March 2006, http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_awst_story.jsp?id=news/030606p1.xml.16. “Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems.”17. Leonard David, “Virgin Galactic Partners with New Mexico on Spaceport,” Space.com, 14 December2005, http://www.space.com/news/051214_spaceport_newmexico.html.18. Ensuring America’s Space Security: Report of the FAS Panel on Weapons in Space, Federation of AmericanScientists, September 2004, 1, http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?formAction=297&contentId=311.25

APJEditor’s Note: PIREP is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot to passon current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we intend to usethis department to let readers know about air and space power items of interest.Joint Airspace Management andDeconflictionA Chance to Trade in a Stovepipe for Network-CentricWarfareLT COL ALEX WATHEN, USAF, RETIRED*The lack of significant situational awareness in our combined air defense system, which involvedmajor systems such as Patriot, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), and Aegis[was a significant shortfall in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)]. We tend to assume that dataare routinely communicated from one system to the other, that targets are correlated, and targetinformation is shared and assimilated by all. We believe that we are a long way from that vision.The communication links, the ability to correlate target tracks by disparate sensors, and the overallinformation architecture are simply not there.—Defense Science Board Task Forceon Patriot System PerformanceTHE MILITARY IS transitioning froma stovepipe (vertically designed systemincapable of integrating properlywith other, similar systems ownedand operated by sister services) to a networkcentric-warfare(NCW) operating environmentas described in Joint Vision 2020. As partof that transition, a concept of airspace managementin the battlespace is being developedby the Air Force Research Laboratory / RomeResearch Site (AFRL/RRS) Requirements andOperations Division. That laboratory is workingin conjunction with the Air Force Commandand Control and Intelligence, Surveillanceand Reconnaissance Center (AFC2ISRC/DOR/DOO) to develop the joint airspace managementand deconfliction (JASMAD) system.The program is being coordinated with AirCombat Command (ACC) and Air MobilityCommand (AMC) airspace managers, as wellas with all interested combatant command(COCOM) service or agency personnel andis being developed with strong support fromthe United Kingdom Ministry of Defense. 1The JASMAD represents an opportunity to reduceor eliminate stovepipe mentalities thatcontinue to thwart true interservice interoperability.Throughout the Department ofDefense (DOD) numerous command andcontrol (C2) systems have been conceptual-*Lieutenant Colonel Wathen is a military defense analyst with the Airpower Research Institute, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.26

PIREP 27ized, programmed, funded, and built for thepurposes of planning and executing aerial operationsthat cannot adequately1. share databases,2. exchange mission-essential information,3. allow collaborative planning in a dynamicenvironment, and4. exchange mission-execution information.These C2 systems have numerous names butcan be referred to collectively under the rubric“air and space operation centers” (AOC).Simply stated, these AOCs are not networkcentric. They are the product of stovepipesystems built by major commands within theAir Force (ACC’s Falconer AOCs and AMC’stanker airlift control center [TACC]). TheArmy air-ground system, the Marine Air Commandand Control System, the Navy’s aircraftcarrieroperations control center, as well asthe joint special operations air componentoperations center were also built with stovepipementalities.By definition, the JASMAD will be networkcentric because it is an attempt to deconflictanything and everything that flies in the battlespace.That means all the data available abouteverything flying in the airspace will be incorporatedinto the JASMAD, no matter the owningservice. This article introduces the JASMAD,describes its current planned capabilities, proposesadditional capabilities for the JASMAD,identifies current problems, and offers potentialsolutions—all with a goal of promoting anetwork-centric mentality throughout the DOD.What Is Joint AirspaceManagement and Deconfliction?The JASMAD will be an airspace managementand deconfliction application designedto replace the airspace deconfliction system(ADS) module within the theater battle managementcore system (TBMCS) of the FalconerAOC. The TBMCS is the system thatcurrently provides the combat air forces andthe joint/combined forces with an automatedand integrated capability to plan and executethe air battle plan for operations and intelligencepersonnel at the combined AOC(CAOC) and individual unit levels. It providesthe air commander with the means to plan,direct, and control all theater air operationsin support of command objectives. It also coordinateswith engaged ground and maritimeelements. The TBMCS can be tailored to largescaleor small-scale operations in varying intensitiesof warfare, and it implements interoperablefunctionality with other command,control, communications, computer, and intelligence(C4I) systems involved in theaterair warfare during military operations. 2In another transformation effort, the TBMCSis expected to be replaced by the theater battleoperations net-centric environment (TBONE)by the time the JASMAD is developed andfielded. The TBONE will have all the functionalityof the TBMCS but will offer the additionalcapabilities of networking 37 applicationsfrom the AOC in a multilevel securityenvironment. The TBONE will enable air taskingorders (ATO) to be shared at the winglevel so wing staffs know what airplanes are beingtasked in the coming days or weeks; forexample, it can be linked to airborne aircraftso the aircrew members know immediatelywhat munitions they are scheduled to use. Airand ground commanders will have access toimmediate data about all missions within aspecific area and time frame, thereby greatlyenhancing battle damage assessment. The recentJoint Expeditionary Force Experiment2006 ( JEFX ’06) ending 28 April 2006 includeda field test of the TBONE. 3Airspace DeconflictionOnce the airspace master plan is built, the airspacecontrol measures (ACM) designed tooperate within it are input into the ADS moduleof the TBMCS. Those ACMs are the bitsand pieces that eventually go into transformingairspace into battlespace, and airspacemanagers arrange those ACMs to set the flyingrules in the battlespace.The airspace control plan provides the detailsof the approved requests for ACMs. The

28 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006daily airspace control order (ACO) implementsthe airspace control plan to provide thegreatest flexibility and extent of use of airspacefor all of the airframes in that airspace,thereby enabling all participating partners toaccomplish the mission safely. The ACO canbe published either as part of the ATO or as aseparate document. The ACOs can be verysimilar to each other from one day to the next,but even the subtlest of changes must beclearly identified to the pilot and then flownprecisely. To illustrate the fluid, dynamic natureof airspace management in the battlespace,during OIF an average of 1,200 ACMswere used to produce the ACO on a daily basis,and the ACO was changed an average of12 times every day. 4The Air Tasking OrderThe TBMCS is important in producing theATO, which tasks air forces’ components,subordinate units, C2 agencies, projectedsorties, capabilities, and/or forces to targetsand specific missions. It also provides specificinstructions including call signs, targets, controllingagencies, and other general instructions.Currently, the ATO is produced in a24-hour cycle. At any given moment, thereare three versions of the joint ATO either inexecution or planning/production at theAOC—today’s plan, tomorrow’s plan, andthe following day’s plan.Once the ATO is loaded, the Web-basedairspace deconfliction (WebAD) within theTBMCS performs a basic deconfliction analysisbased on estimated launch times androutes, using minimal amounts of data includingdeparture base, estimated time of departure,target location, and estimated arrivaltime at the final landing location. WebAD issuesalerts when it detects conflicts. The ATOhas not been passed to the units that will flythe mission at this point, so the takeoff timesor flight/mission profiles have not yet beenlocked into the ATO.A shortcoming of WebAD is that it cannotinclude all objects flying in the ATO. Althoughinterservice coordination and cooperationare improving, there are still situations wheresome components of joint and combined airforces are not communicating with the others.Not all the events that could occur in the airspaceare predictable, and there are some datathat simply cannot be loaded into the TBMCS.For example, Army Tactical Missile Systemscan be launched at the discretion of the combinedforce land component commander afterproper real-time coordination, but thoselaunches are not always entered into the ATO.Still another limiting factor of the deconflictioncapabilities of the TBMCS is the sheernumber of WebAD alerts that must be resolvedon a daily basis to produce the ATO. Recallthat the ATO production is on a 24-hour cycle.The war won’t stop and wait for the next ATO.Production operators from the OIF CAOC reportthat it is virtually impossible to deconflicteach and every alert with the current system.What Joint Airspace Managementand Deconfliction Will DoThe JASMAD will not only completely revolutionizethe entire process of producing theACO and deconflicting the ATO, but it willalso perform a much more refined deconflictionanalysis during the building of the ATO—it will perform deconfliction analysis duringthe execution of the ATO, a function ADScurrently lacks. JASMAD objectives are to developa single, joint-theater airspace managementand dynamic deconfliction capability tocoordinate real-time ATO planning and executionamong the service components andcoalition partners to minimize conflicts. 5The current planning capabilities of theJASMAD include providing a four-dimensional(four-D) visual picture for the purposes of airspacemanagement. It will depict latitude, longitude,and altitude as well as provide timeorientation. The TBMCS operator will be ableto select and sort variables within the airspacebased on criteria such as mission packages,launch times, time on target, target areas, altitudeblocks, and air-refueling tracks, amongothers. AOC airspace managers will be able toimport routes (including routes within civilairspace) and operating areas to facilitate the

PIREP 29creation of ACMs. One anticipates that theend-planning product will be the ability to producecompletely deconflicted packages. It willalso allow “faster than real time” fly-out of theATO, in effect, a “look ahead” preview thatwill allow collaborative planning while simultaneouslyshowing the airspace deconfliction.During the execution phase of the ATO,the JASMAD will allow four-D airspace observationof ATO/ACO execution. It will preparethe ACMs for dissemination and enable depictionof them in near-real time (all pertinentnodes), as well as possess the capability to offerreplanning and retasking options duringexecution of the ATO. Operators will be ableto change routes and preview the effects onairspace management through the real-timefly-out feature. Conflict alerts will be generatedautomatically from the proposed routechanges. The console operator can resolvethe conflicts even before a hazardous air-trafficreport is generated.What Should the JASMADBe Able to Do?JASMAD functionality should interoperatewith the common operational picture (COP)and/or its replacement, the single integratedair picture (SIAP). Every commander has athirst for seeing “the big picture” while still beingable to focus clearly on the finite pointswithin it. It is only natural to want to have atone’s disposal as much information as possible.The COP is a technological attempt to meetthat thirst and an application within the GlobalCommand and Control System (GCCS, themain operating system of ACC’s FalconerAOCs). The GCCS correlates and fuses datafrom multiple sensors and intelligence insources to produce a graphical representationof the battlespace to provide commanderswith the situational awareness necessary forrapid, effective decision making.The COP consists of both geospatial displaysof the battlespace and intranets that extendvertically through several different levelsand serves as a repository of information fordecision makers. One hopes that the COP willlead to faster and better synchronized planningand execution decisions. One can seeevidence of success in the operational and tacticaldecision making exhibited during OIF ascompared to that in Operation Desert Storm.The COP was instrumental in the methodicaland efficient destruction of elite RepublicanGuard divisions while aiding in quick responsewith precision attack of high-value targets bytheater assets. 6 If the JASMAD can deliver thecapabilities it is programmed for, it will improvethe commander’s view of the COP andprovide the ability to play out air-strike optionsthrough the COP in a look-ahead orfast-forward mode. When air-strike or othermissions conflict, the JASMAD will automaticallygenerate alerts and also give the commanderand staff real-time visual images ofresolution options.One issue that the JASMAD must help improveis deconfliction of weapons systems thattransit multiple AOCs. One specific example,requiring different C2 interface requirements,is global mobility. The maturation of the C-17and its direct-delivery mission means it routinelydeparts from virtually any point in theworld, crosses numerous COCOM boundaries,crosses the forward edge of the battle area(FEBA), lands or air-drops its package, passesthe FEBA, and transits several more COCOMsbefore landing at its final destination. Compoundingthe complexity of transiting numerousAOCs, the duration of many (if not most)global mobility missions may require planningand deconfliction in all three phases of theATO cycle: the current, the next, and the strategic(long-range) ATO. Since global mobilitymissions are controlled by AMC’s TACC,JASMAD must have complete connectivity andinteroperability with the TACC.The Tanker Airlift Control CenterThe TACC C2 system does not interoperatewell with the GCCS, the COCOM’s air-pictureportion of the COP in other AOCs or theTBMCS. The TACC operates within the GlobalDecision Support System 2 and presents a visualand electronic presentation of virtuallyevery airlift and tanker asset in AMC’s inven-

30 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006tory. Operators can click on an aircraft todetermine its departure or arrival time, missionsegments, and maintenance status. Onecan also drill down to the cargo and passengermanifest of each aircraft.During the early stages of OIF, the only wayto input the mission data generated by theTACC into the TBMCS of OIF’s CAOC was todo so manually. Eventually a patch was built,and the airlift input module allowed downloadof four data points into the TBMCS: theairlift schedule (showing separate-leg, multidaymissions), arrival messages, departuremessages, and advisory messages. 7 However,much more information would be useful tothe COCOM, and AMC is working with ACCto improve this essential interface to theTBMCS, which will ultimately benefit theJASMAD. Once the interface between theTACC and the TBMCS is completed, mobilitymissions departing from outside the AOC’sarea will be automatically updated in the JAS-MAD to refine the deconfliction data in thecurrent, next, and strategic phases of the ATO.JASMAD developers face the challenge ofseamlessly interfacing multiple AOCs. A properinterface with the Joint Mission Planning System(JMPS); communication, navigation, surveillance/ air traffic management (CNS/ATM)system; and the tactical digital informationlink system (commonly known as Link 16 bythe North Atlantic Treaty Organization) withthe TBMCS and JASMAD can help solve thisproblem. A description of each of those systemsand their potential tie in to the TBMCSand JASMAD follows. 8The Joint Mission Planning SystemThe JMPS currently in development will replacethe Mission Planning System and PortableFlight Planning Software that some aircrewsuse today to plan their missions. The JMPS isintended to be a Web-centric system that willautomatically tie all elements of the missionplanningprocess together. Aircrew or missionplanners will be able to sit at a terminal or laptop,gather all pertinent information required(such as weather, notices to Airmen, departure-and-arrivalairfield information [runwaylength, elevation, etc.], and aircraft-specificinformation [payload, fuel, configuration, etc.])and thereby plan flights/missions. The resultingmission plans will be downloadable to theaircraft navigation systems.Certain aircraft-specific applications willalso generate such information as takeoff andlanding data. The JMPS will allow the missionplanner to take rudimentary informationfrom the ATO and output a much more detailedmission profile. If mission-profile datawere imported back to the JASMAD andlinked to the original tasking line in the ATO,that could allow the deconfliction process torun on much more specific information aboutaltitudes, routes of flight, and so forth. Thiscan only improve the deconfliction matrices.Communication, Navigation, Surveillance / Air TrafficManagementThe CNS/ATM is an Air Force program designedto meet the evolving aviation requirementsof the International Civil AviationOrganization (ICAO). It utilizes automatedsatellite-based reporting that will improve airtraffic control in areas where positive controlis not possible due to lack of radar coverage(transoceanic traffic is one example). At thetactical level, if the CNS/ATM were linked tothe TBMCS and JASMAD, it would allow thetransition of a tasked (through the ATO) andplanned (through the JMPS) mission, whichwould not originate in the AOC’s area, directlyinto the mission’s execution phase. As CNS/ATM updates are received through the satellitefeeds, the deconfliction data, which would belinked to a specific mission within the JASMAD,could be continually updated to run the deconflictionmatrices. This offers the opportunityto correlate and deconflict missions transitingmultiple AOCs in an unclassified environment.Once the aircraft enters the objectivearea, however, another method of accomplishingthis same type of updating, but to a muchhigher level of accuracy, must be found.Therefore, since the CNS/ATM will not refreshthe aircraft’s position often enough tobe utilized for air-traffic-control purposes,Link 16 could be the answer to this problem.

PIREP 31Link 16 and Joint Airspace Management andDeconflictionOne of the main input systems for the airpictureportion of the COP is information fedthrough Link 16, an improved data link usedto exchange near-real-time information (communication,navigation, and identification)that supports information exchange betweentactical C4I systems. One of the functions ofLink 16 is to provide positive, friendly identification.Link 16 periodically transmits a cryptosecuredand precise participant location andidentification (PPLI) report, a considerableimprovement that can significantly reduce orprevent fratricide incidents. 9 Part of the PPLIincludes geodetic positioning which would beimportant to JASMAD applications. Link 16messages implement a three-dimensional geodeticcoordinate system using latitude, longitude,and altitude. This enables positions tobe reported anywhere in the world and is subjectonly to display and database limitations.The geodetic grid (GEOGRID) is always availableto participants. 10 Herein lies the potentialapplication for the JASMAD: this is very similarto the Mode 4 identification, friend or foe(IFF) function used for primary aircraft separationin a radar environment.How does one maintain positive control ofairborne objects once they pass the FEBA andenter the objective area? Positive control innoncombatant areas is maintained by airtraffic-controlagencies using radar identificationand/or Mode 4 IFF reporting. When oneoperates in a wartime environment, radar controlis rarely available, and aircraft normallyturn their Mode 4 equipment off for operationalsecurity. This is part of the reason whyACMs are developed and the daily ACO is produced.Aerial vehicles flying on the ATO maintainseparation by the procedural methodsestablished in the ACO (differing routes, altitudes,and times). In air-traffic-control jargon,this is referred to as “procedural separation.”Procedural separation is not as effective forutilizing the available airspace as positive control.Larger blocks of airspace must be reservedfor operations when flying objects cannotbe separated by positive control. If amethodology for providing positive control ina secure operating environment were developed,air operations could be planned withgreater accuracy, fratricide incidents could beless frequent, and more aircraft could fly inthe battlespace with greater safety. The combinationof the COP, JASMAD, JMPS, and Link16 offers the potential to provide this capabilityand much more.A weakness of the Link 16 concept to helpprovide positive control in the battlespace isthat not all aircraft and aerial vehicles flying inthe ATO have or will have Link 16 capabilitiesor a similar interface system. For example,AMC currently operates some aircraft that employaircraft communications and reportingsystems, and eventually all strategic mobilityaircraft will meet ICAO aviation requirementsthrough the CNS/ATM program. Neither ofthese systems is interoperable with Link 16,and neither is secure. Thus, many AMC aircraftare not and will not be equipped to respondto positive air traffic control in thebattlespace. AMC is currently staffing initiativesto remedy the situation. Additionally,the number of unmanned aerial systems operatingbelow the coordination altitude isgrowing at an astonishing rate. Currentlynone have any system similar to Link 16, andalthough this is being considered for a few,most will never have Link 16 or any similarreporting capability. Another problem withthis concept is that Link 16 operates on lineof sight and requires a persistent airborneplatform to provide the link. Given all ofthese drawbacks, a solution may becomeavailable in the form of near-space platforms,which offer the potential to solve both theline-of-sight and persistence problems.Near Space and Joint Airspace Management andDeconflictionThe Air Force Space Battlelab is planning toconduct a variety of experiments in the areaof near space over the next several years. Thegoal is to determine if near-space systems flyingat an altitude of about 30 kilometersabove Earth’s surface could perform a varietyof tactical missions, including battlefield-

32 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006intelligence gathering and communicationsat a lower cost than satellites. Near-space systemsalso have the potential to hover overareas of interest for hours at a time (with solarpower, maybe for days at a time) whereassatellites are available briefly during their orbitalpasses. Hopefully these systems will offerthe same quick-deployment capability asunmanned aerial vehicles. Their operatingaltitude would keep them relatively safe fromenemy fire, and their construction wouldmake them difficult to pick up with radar andinfrared sensors. Furthermore, their ruggednesswould allow them to absorb heavy damagebefore they will be brought down.The AFRL conducted a successful demonstrationcalled Combat SkySat and tested potentialapplications during JFEX ’06. Lt GenMichael Peterson, the Air Force’s chief informationofficer, said that the balloon systemreceived rave reviews during the event. “Assoon as he heard about this: Go. Buy. Now,”Peterson said of one general’s reaction. 11Combat SkySat features a payload that extendsthe range of Army tactical radios fromabout 10 kilometers to about 480 kilometers.Additionally, the AFRL expects to deploy atest platform to OIF in the August or September2006 time frame for operational testing. 12The impact would be to demonstrate theability of near-space systems to solve the lineof-sightand persistence issues associated withensuring Link 16 connectivity throughoutthe battlespace.Publication of Airspace Control Orders and AirspaceControl MeasuresOne innovation resulting from OIF involvedproviding aircrews with a visual depiction ofthe ACOs and ACMs, which could subsequentlybe used for mission planning. TheACO ends up being a stack of pages containinglongitudes and latitudes in text format.Most people can relate to graphical presentationsmuch better than to paper printouts.During OIF, the CAOC staff started pullingthe ACM graphics from Falcon View, part ofthe Air Force Mission Planning Support Systemthat provides user-friendly ability to planmissions with a visual presentation overlayingmap databases. Through their innovation,the staff members started cutting and pastingthe images to e-mails, Secure Internet ProtocolRouter Network (SIPRNET) Web pages,and whatever other methodologies theycould employ to get better information tothe aircrews. 13 This service was very difficultto provide to AMC crews due to the nature oftheir mission, the fact that the crews oftendeparted before the current ATO was published,and the fact that they often originatedfrom locations with difficult or unavailableaccess to the SIPRNET. To help alleviatethese concerns, the JASMAD will offer the capabilityto automate the process of developingthe mission graphics, and the JMPS willoffer the capability to deliver that data.Identification, Friend or FoeJASMAD interoperability and functionalitymust extend to ground and surface forces andtheir receptors as well. For example, extendingJASMAD connectivity and functionalityout to the control and reporting centers(CRC) of the theater air-ground system couldaid in both airspace management and controland help reduce fratricide. Once an objecthas been positively identified by either radaridentification or through the Link 16 network,that object could conceivably be tracked bythe CRCs, emissions free, all the way out tothe last point of positive radar control by continuouslyupdating and comparing the actualflight profile against the planned profile asgenerated by the JMPS. The tracking informationthen would be passed back to the TBONEand ultimately updated into the JASMAD. Usingpredictive analysis and comparing the predictedradar coverage reentry point and timeagainst the actual point and time could aid inthe reidentification of friendly aircraft. Tactics,techniques, and procedures should bedeveloped to enable positive identification ofaircraft reentering positive radar or digitalcontrol without requiring emissions. Anotherexample of how this functionality can aid inpreventing fratricide would be if the properconnectivity were also established with Patriot

PIREP 33Missile Defense Systems, thereby providingjust one more means of IFF.Joint Airspace Managementand Deconfliction in aPerfect WorldThe JASMAD represents the future of airspacemanagement in the battlespace, but italso represents a test of the Joint Vision 2020NCW concept. There are many seemingly independentprograms emerging concurrentlywith the development of the JASMAD. A fewof these have been mentioned in this article:the COP, the CNS/ATM, the JMPS, the Link16, near space, the SIAP, and the TBONE. Thetest of NCW will be whether or not these independentprograms can interface adequatelywith each other to produce the most networkcentricAOC weapons system possible.The JASMAD offers the core capability todeconflict airborne vehicles using every knownand quantifiable data point, updated with themost current and available sources while emphasizingairspace management. It should beproperly integrated with the Global InformationGrid as a major portion of the AirborneNetwork, giving the commander the best possibleSIAP. Every vehicle flying the ATO shouldbe required to have the ability to automaticallyupdate the tasked profile to the plannedprofile with the JMPS, which will give the JAS-MAD much higher deconfliction capabilities.Another requirement is that every vehicleflying in the ATO should also automaticallyand continuously update the planned profileinto an execution profile with a Link 16 (orsimilar) compatible capability, transformingthe SIAP into a virtual digital radar screen, displayingall elements required for air trafficcontrol for every friendly aircraft flying in thebattlespace. AWACS aircraft will continue tohave the responsibility for identifying and directingthe elimination of foe aircraft. A gridof near-space assets would provide the line-ofsightreception and relay capability needed toprovide complete Link 16 (or similar) coverageof the entire battlespace while fulfillingtheir primary intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance roles.The CNS/ATM combined with the JMPSoffers the potential link to solve the problemof aircraft that transit multiple COCOM AOCs.Global-mobility and global-strike aircraft arealready programmed to have this capability,but it will not provide updates frequentlyenough to meet air-traffic-control requirements.For this reason, the joint communityshould pick a system that is capable of aircraftreporting in a tactical environment to a degreeof accuracy that will allow use of SIAP forcontrol purposes; furthermore, it should requireevery vehicle flying the ATO to beequipped with that system. While Link 16serves the Air Force, other formats should alsobe investigated, including the Army’s digitalmessageprotocol, the joint variable-messageformat, and the enhanced position-locationreporting system. There should also be closecoordination with Air Force Space Commandand its work on near-space platforms to solvethe problem of line-of-sight limitations.A Chance to Tradein a Stovepipe forNetwork-Centric WarfareThe bottom line is that at some point thejoint community should determine and demanda minimum level of digital connectivitythat seamlessly interfaces with each and everyAOC throughout the world. To quote a highlevelengineer working on the JASMAD: “Asan engineer, the solution is the easy part. As asubject matter expert, getting the services(and all the different air forces) to agree on acommon solution is the hard part.” 14 The pursuitof the JASMAD offers a perfect opportunityto break down these stovepipe-mentalitybarriers. All concerned would agree that deconflictionin the modern battlespace is an issueworthy of the utmost cooperation. Virtually allthe services and their aviation componentshave a vested interest in establishing a requiredlevel of digital connectivity betweenthe JASMAD and TBONE and at least two ad-

34 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006ditional arenas: mission planning and missionexecution. The JMPS can be the template formission planning, and Link 16 a template fordigital connectivity of airborne assets. Whenthis level of digital connectivity is established,the JASMAD could provide the mechanismfor air commanders to deconflict during themission-planning and tasking phases acrossmultiple AOCs and ensure the highest possiblelevel of deconfliction during the executionphase as the fog of war requires adjustment tothose plans and taskings. qNotes1. Walter Judd, contractor, Advancing NationalStrategies and Enabling Results (ANSER), Air Force Commandand Control and Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance Center (AFC2ISRC/DOR), to the author,e-mail, 15 December 2004. For the purposes of thispaper, the acronym COCOM will refer to “combatantcommand” and “combatant command authority” interchangeably.2. Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures(AFTTP) (I) 3-2.17, TAGS: Multiservice Procedures for theTheater Air-Ground System, 1998.3. A1C Ross Tweten, Joint Expeditionary Force ExperimentJEFX ’06 Public Affairs, “JEFX Focuses on BattleOperations, Communications,” 25 April 2006, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123019484, (accessed15 May 2006).4. United States Central Command Air Forces(CENTAF), Assessments and Analysis Division, “OperationIraqi Freedom—by the Numbers,” 2003, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/uscentaf_oif_report_30apr2003.pdf (accessed 6 July 2006).5. Briefing, David A. Griffith, senior member, TechnicalStaff, C2 Engineering Branch, Air Force Research Laboratory,Information Directorate, Command and ControlEngineering (AFRL/IFSA), subject: Joint Airspace Managementand Deconfliction (JASMAD), 2004.6. Dr. Dennis K. Leedom, Next Generation Common OperatingPicture (Vienna, VA: Evidence Based Research,Inc., 2004), http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2003/8th_ICCRTS/Pres/track_4/3_1330leedom.pdf (accessed 20November 2004).7. Jim Bradshaw, contractor, TBMCS C4I Field Support,609th Combat Plans Squadron (609 CPS/DOX),interview by the author, 16 July 2004.8. Field Manual (FM) 6-24.8, Marine Corps WarfightingPublication (MCWP) 3-25C, Naval Warfare Publication(NWP) 6-02.5, AFTTP (I) 3-2.27, Introduction to TacticalDigital Information Link J and Quick Reference Guide, 2000,I-1. While this article focuses on the tactical digital informationlink as the potential cure-all for digital connectivitybetween aerial vehicles operating in the battlespace andthe COCOM AOC, the author recognizes that other applicationsmay serve the purpose as well, such as the jointvariable-message format or the Enhanced Position Locationand Reporting System. The point is that digital connectivityto the AOC must be stated as a requirement—regardlessof the platform to achieve it.9. Ibid., I-8.10. Ibid., I-10.11. Rebecca Christie, “DOD Experiments with Balloon-Borne Communication Tech,” Market Watch from Dow Jones,4 May 2006, http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?dist=newsfinder&siteid=google&guid=%7BA0FEB28F-8153-4583-9346-DA23555D9BF9%7D&keyword=.12. Maj David Donahue, Air Force Space Battlelab,interview by the author, 17 April 2006.13. Maj Burl Kenner, tanker planner, Operations AlliedForce, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, 609CPS/DOX, interview by the author, 15 July 2004.14. Kenneth B. Hawks, defensive operations engineer,C3I Associates, AFRL/IFSA, to the author, e-mail, 11 January2005.

CADRE’s Professional EducationOpportunities for USAF, Joint, and AlliedWar FightersMAJ JOHN DIERLING, USAF*SCIENTIA EST POTENTIA (knowledgeis power) is as true today as when itwas first expressed. Joint Vision 2020,which calls for our armed forces toseek full-spectrum dominance in any givensituation, states, “Attaining that goal requiresthe steady infusion of new technology andmodernization and replacement of equipment.However, material superiority alone isnot sufficient. Of greater importance is thedevelopment of doctrine, organizations, trainingand education, leaders, and people thateffectively take advantage of the technology.” 1That is, fancy gadgets are nice, but technologywill not achieve full-spectrum dominancewithout knowledgeable people. Professionalcontinuing education can bridge that gap.Air University’s College of Aerospace Doctrine,Research and Education (CADRE) assistsin the development, analysis, and wargaming of the concepts, doctrine, and strategyof air, space, and cyberspace power. It alsoprovides education to Air Force and jointcommunities on war fighting at the operationaland strategic levels through research,war gaming, and military-education courses;additionally, it prepares flag officers from allmilitary services for leadership positions inthe joint war-fighting environment. CADRE’sWarfare Studies Institute offers the ContingencyWartime Planning Course (CWPC), JointAir Operations Planning Course ( JAOPC), InformationWarfare Applications Course (IWAC),and three online doctrine-education coursesto eligible US and allied personnel. Thesecourses develop leaders capable of serving inand leading joint and combined military operationsin the twenty-first century.The CWPC educates war fighters in thefundamentals of deliberate and crisis-actionplanning with emphasis on developing andexecuting contingency plans in all functionalareas. This two-week course for Air Force warplanners in grades E-5 through O-5 and theircivilian equivalents has the overall objective ofpreparing planners to serve on planning staffsat every level. It provides an overview of thejoint operational-planning processes (deliberate,crisis-action, and campaign planning), nationalstrategy and war, command relationships,and strategic mobility, as well as trainingin functional-area management. In addition,amongst the 38 topics covered, the CWPCprovides basic knowledge about the JointOperation Planning and Execution System,force planning, USAF doctrine, base-leveldeployment, readiness-assessment systems,time-phased force and deployment data, andbase-support planning.The two-week JAOPC educates war fightersfrom joint, combined, or supporting aircomponentcommands in the fundamentalconcepts, principles, and doctrine required todevelop the air portion of a joint/combinedcampaign plan. Students include officers ingrades O-2 to O-6 and civilian equivalents.Noncommissioned officers in intelligenceand space career fields, international officers,sister-service officers, and National Guard andReserve officers may also attend. The six-phasejoint air-estimate process from Joint Publication3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations,serves as the foundation of the course. 2*Major Dierling is Information Warfare Applications Course director at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.35

36 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006Lectures on USAF doctrine, joint planning,logistics, legal issues, intelligence, air operationscenters, and the joint warfare analysis centerteach students to think and plan at the operationallevel of war. A senior USAF general whohas served as a combined force air componentcommander (CFACC) briefs students on CFACCperspectives. The students learn and practicebasic skills, including intelligence preparationof the battlespace, development of joint forceair component commander ( JFACC) missionstatements, center-of-gravity analysis, courseof action (COA) development, risk analysis,COA selection methodology, and developmentof a joint air operations plan. The courseculminates with students presenting their planto a simulated JFACC.The IWAC educates war fighters in the fundamentalsof Air Force information operations(IO) doctrine and provides insight intohow the doctrine may be applied across thespectrum from peace to war. A one-weekcourse for military personnel in grades E-4through O-5 and federal employees in gradesGS-7 through GS-13, it gives individuals fromall functional areas an overview of current IOdoctrine, policies, and procedures. Lessonsaugmented by seminar discussions allow studentsto comprehend relationships amongthe numerous subjects taught; furthermore,hands-on exercises, interspersed throughoutthe course, provide them an opportunity toapply the information learned.The Warfare Studies Institute is also hometo doctrine education that develops doctrinebasedproducts and courses that provide AirForce–wide air and space power educationthrough distance learning using interactive,computer-based methodologies. Offering expertisein USAF and joint doctrine to assist AirUniversity faculty, staff, and students in doctrineeducation, the institute serves as Air Educationand Training Command’s doctrine officeof primary responsibility. Courses currentlyavailable online to Airmen worldwide includethe Air and Space Power Course, Air ForceForces Staff Training Course, and WarfighterPlanning Course, all of which are prerequisitesfor the CWPC and JAOP courses.CADRE is the first place to turn for professionaldevelopment and education in warfighting. Personnel interested in joining themore than 1,500 students who attend these inresidencecourses each year should talk totheir organization’s training manager aboutreserving a slot. To obtain more information,call CADRE/WS Operations Division at(334)953-2113/7831, DSN 493-2113/7831;to access an online course, visit CADRE athttps://cadremil.maxwell.af.mil. qNotes1. Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs ofStaff, 2000), pt. 1, p. 3, http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jv2020a.pdf (accessed 25 April 2006).2. Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control for JointAir Operations, 5 June 2003, chap. 3, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_56_1.pdf (accessed 25 April2006).

ASPJQuick-LookThe Air Force Needs New GlassesSensor Requirements for Urban OperationsLT COL DAVID L. ROBIE, USAFWE CAN NO longer consider urbanoperations an optional proficiency.The current situation inIraq makes clear that US soldiers,sailors, and airmen must have the capabilitiesand tools to operate effectively in the urbanenvironment. For example, in Thunder Run:The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad (NewYork: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004), DavidZucchino chronicles the trials, tribulations,and ultimate success of the taking of Baghdad.Other Iraqi experiences include the attemptto eliminate insurgency in Fallujah in late 2004and more recently in Iraq’s northern provincesin the fall of 2005. Outside Iraq, the USmilitary has engaged in numerous urban conflicts,including those in Panama and Kosovoas well as the stunning loss in Mogadishu,which emphatically changed US foreign policyin Somalia. These past and present examplesnot only give clear indication of the criticalnature of urban capabilities but also foreshadowan even more significant role for urbanoperations in future conflicts.The urban environment has become an essentialresponsibility in modern conflict becauseof significant changes arising from threecurrent trends: the massing of people in urbanareas, the increasing influence and powerof these areas, and the changing face of conflict.Continual movement of the populationfrom a rural to urban environment began withthe industrial revolution and continues withthe world’s urban population growing fourtimes faster than its rural counterpart. Thispopulation movement creates a secondary effectby concentrating influence as urban areasbecome centers of gravity for diplomatic, informational,military (command authority),and economic power. Finally, the end of theCold War and the new world order that hasemerged in the last decade have all but eliminatedthe possibility of heavily armored warfarein open terrain. Future US engagementswill most likely include regional conflicts,failed states, and nonstate actors. Insurgents,terrorists, and small regional states will not attemptto engage the United States in openbattle since US forces enjoy an overwhelmingadvantage in sensing, speed, and firepower.Instead, they will choose urban terrain, wherethey will attempt to remove the asymmetriccapabilities of the United States and try tomass their effects against “soft” civilian targets.These three factors make understanding theurban terrain an essential part of future conflict.Today, we must consider urban operations acore competency of all US military services.BackgroundUnderstanding the urban environment’scomplexity—one that exists on numerouslevels—poses the greatest challenge to urbanwar fighters. Physically complex and extremelydiverse, its terrain includes the urbancanyons of major metropolitan cities, theclose quarters of ancient cities, and the urbansprawl that surrounds both. The physicalcomplexity is also multidimensional, startingfrom rooftops; going through numerousfloors; and ending in subterranean base-37

38 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006ments, conduits, and lines of communications.Home to millions of people, each individualmotivated by an intricate combinationof beliefs and desires, the urban environmentis also psychologically complex. These people,influenced by personal conviction, devotionto family, or the norms of a subculture, willreact uniquely to events. Understanding thesemotivations presents significant challengesto the war fighter. Finally, the urban environmentis characterized by spatial and temporaldensity. That is, an event of interest may involveonly 10 people and last just a few minutesin a prolonged occupation of a city. Theability to discern and understand importantevents and to react appropriately representsyet another daunting task for the urban operator.The combination of complex structure,human interaction, and density ofinformation magnifies the importance ofunderstanding this environment.Proposed SolutionOn the one hand, the Air Force’s abilityto hold the ultimate high ground, potentiallyprovide a bird’s-eye view, move unimpededto any location, and project massivefirepower with unprecedented accuracy allowsurban operators to improve their understanding.On the other hand, the Air Forcecannot provide sufficiently precise intelligencecollection, cannot always operate unimpededdue to the threat of man-portableair defense systems, and cannot always projectmassive firepower in the close quartersof urban terrain. Although significant improvementsin sensor technology and systemswill not solve all of these problems, they willprovide the war fighter with the tools tograsp the complexities of this environment.To promote, fund, and field these capabilities,the research community—led by the AirForce Research Laboratory (AFRL)—mustfundamentally change the direction of currentand future programs. The followingrecommendations will help the AFRL providejoint and coalition forces with the capabilitiesthey need for urban operations.Think UrbanThinking urban will permit AFRL scientistsand engineers to view their programs fromthe proper perspective and will require eachprogram—from basic research through engineering,manufacturing, and development—to consider the contribution it makes to theurban effort. Scientists need to develop systemswith sufficient precision to detect itemsof interest and the persistence to observe on anear-continual basis; however, sensors are notthe only element of thinking urban. Due tothe complexity and multilevel nature of theurban environment, three-dimensional presentationtools, such as perspective viewing,walk-/fly-through, and layered data with fusioncapabilities, are a must to facilitate understanding.This precision, persistence, andthree-dimensional perspective will provide urbanoperators not only with situational awarenessbut also with situational understanding.To encourage urban thinking, the AFRLshould require each sensor or system to providean assessment of its capability in the urbanenvironment. To complement this assessment,the lab should also make availableconcise metrics (such as resolution, range,transit time, coverage, etc.) for evaluating programs.The development of standard metricswill facilitate the funding and evaluation ofproposed programs by means of realistic measuresof comparison. Urban capabilities willarise from this process. To modify a line fromthe movie Field of Dreams, “If we measure it, itwill come.”Think IntegrationThinking integration will make possible anetwork-centric enterprise solution acrossboth sensor platforms and the military services.Because no single sensor can produce acomprehensive urban-operating picture, wemust conceptualize, design, and test urbansensor systems with intrinsic network-centricwarfare capabilities. The latter include transmittingdata in a timely fashion via communicationlinks in machine-to-machine formatand providing tools to augment data fusion.To facilitate thinking integration, each sensor

QUICK-LOOK 39system should become a piece of the total solution,which in turn requires additional fundingfor the testing and integration of new sensordata into current operating pictures.Sensors designed and tested in an integratedenvironment will give the war fighter actionableunderstanding and information.We must also integrate sensors across theservices. The Air Force holds the high ground,but the Army provides the ground perspective,the Navy offers the sea-based picture, andthe Marines control the littoral terrain. Eachservice contributes unique capabilities andperspectives to urban understanding. To realizecross-service integration, the AFRL, underthe auspices of the Joint Urban OperationsOffice, should create a panel of scientists fromacross the service labs to facilitate informationexchange. This panel should coordinate annualconferences and promote collaborationamong the services.Think across the SpectrumThinking across the spectrum will require thelabs to look to the information spectrum andthe spectrum of conflict. Due to the complicatednature of the urban environment aswell as the density of information and theamount of obscuration and occlusion there,we must utilize all sensing modes (e.g., radiofrequency, hyperspectral, panchromatic, infrared,seismic, acoustic, and magnetic), combinedwith data fusion, in order to attain acomprehensive understanding of it. The AirForce must also look at hierarchical systemsthat combine the capabilities of high-flying,remote, complicated, and expensive sensorswith smaller, inexpensive networked sensorsthat use multiple spectrums.Additionally, the labs must formulate solutionsapplicable across the entire spectrum ofconflict. Most of the latest armed conflict inIraq concluded within the first three months;however, security and stability operations havecontinued for over three years. The Air Forcemust continue to contribute to operationsacross the spectrum of conflict, from majorcombat to humanitarian aid. A concrete proposalto encourage such thinking would requiretest programs to consider at least threescenarios: full combat, security and stabilityoperations, and humanitarian aid. By consideringsystems that operate across both the informationspectrum and the spectrum of conflict,the labs can provide our servicemen withcomplete capabilities for the multiple rolesthey need to perform.Think OperationallyThinking operationally will reinforce the importanceof complete, thorough, and realistictesting of systems with regard to current andfuture threats. Additionally, participation injoint exercises will ensure integration and informationexchange while providing the AFRLan important operational perspective.We must evaluate full-spectrum capabilitiesin the urban environment with realistic testscenarios that use the best possible view ofreal-world inputs and the best available predictionsof future conflicts/adversaries. Morerealistic testing will afford decision makerstrue understanding of the proposed system’scapabilities. Additionally, the Air Force mustbecome involved with joint urban trainingexercises to the maximum extent possible. Byidentifying deficiencies during these exercises,the participants can combine tactics,techniques, and procedures with technologyto develop new capabilities.ConclusionOur need for urban capabilities in aunique and challenging environment is veryreal. The recommendations presented herewill provide a structural foundation to promotethe development of such capabilitiesfor urban operators. q

Ira C. Eaker Award Winnersfor the top Air & Space Power Journalarticles of the 2005–2006 academic yearFirst Place1st Lt Brent D. Ziarnick“Mahan on Space Education:A Historical Rebukeof a Modern Error”(Winter 2005)Second Place (tie)Lt Col (ret.) Edward B. Tomme“The Myth of the TacticalSatellite”(Summer 2006)Second Place (tie)Maj Jack Sine“Defining the‘Precision Weapon’ inEffects-Based Terms”(Spring 2006)Congratulations to this year’s winners! The award honors airpower pioneer Gen Ira C. Eakerand is made possible through the generous support of the Air University Foundation. If youwould like to compete for the Ira C. Eaker Award, submit a feature-length article to the Editor,Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428 or via e-mail ataspj@maxwell.af.mil. All military personnel below the rank of colonel (O-6) or governmentcivilian employees below GS-15 or equivalent are eligible. If ASPJ publishes your article, youwill automatically be entered in the competition.40

APJThe Air Force’s New Ground WarEnsuring Projection of Air and Space Power throughExpeditionary Security OperationsBRIG GEN ROBERT H. “BOB” HOLMES, USAFCOL BRADLEY D. SPACY, USAFLT COL JOHN M. BUSCH, USAFLT COL GREGORY J. REESE, USAFEditorial Abstract: The changing and increasingly dangerous global-security environment presents a considerablechallenge for air-base defense and demands a new base-defense mind-set. The authors describe newinitiatives in joint doctrine that empower deployed commanders to take increased control of base-securityzones for force protection. Airmen can therefore expect to play a greater role in overall base defense, with expandedbase-security perimeters and a movement toward better coordination of air and ground forces.41

42 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006If you joined the Air Force not long ago and became a security forces person, you would have spenta lot of your time guarding missile silos, guarding bombers, alert fighters, guarding gates, or atleast being at a gate. But after we stood up 50 expeditionary bases in the Arabian Gulf and afterwe’ve had attacks on the bases, after we have had rockets and mortar attacks on the bases, afterwe’ve had aircraft hit on arrival and departure with surface-to-air missiles and small-arms fire,and after we’ve looked at what does it take to secure an airfield in an expeditionary sense, thissecurity force business takes on a whole different light. . . . Get outside the wire with the Office ofSpecial Investigations folks . . . and begin to think about what’s a threat to this airfield. Whatdo we have to do to defend it so we can operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in a true jointsense, and in a true combatant sense, so that there are no threats to this airfield that we haven’tthought about?—Gen T. Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff of the Air ForceSpeech to the American Enterprise Institute11 October 2005THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC-SECURITYenvironment has changed dramaticallyin the last 15 years, and the ColdWar comfort zone of heavy forces arrayedacross the plains of Europe has givenway to a dynamic new threat environmentfilled with irregular adversaries fighting anasymmetric style of warfare. In his book ThePentagon’s New Map, Dr. Thomas Barnett predictsthat the “non-integrating gap countries”of the world—those states with the highestrates of poverty and unemployment, most corruptgovernments, lowest standard of living,and least hope—will be rife with conflict anduncertainty. 1 In this evolving environment,the Air Force remains committed to projectingair and space power as a lighter, leaner,and more agile expeditionary war-fightingforce. Projecting air and space power in thisnew expeditionary environment means thatwe must position air bases close to (if not in)the fight, in austere locations far from the“safe” rear areas of the past. 2We have placed air bases throughout thecombat zone in Iraq and Afghanistan (consideredgap countries by Dr. Barnett) during OperationsIraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.Surrounded by irregular enemy forces,these bases have sustained steady attacks. Ensuringairpower projection in this context requiresa new look at how we establish, protect,and defend air bases—specifically, it demandsnew doctrine, tactical command and control(C2), intelligence capabilities, and more proficientexpeditionary Airmen of all specialties.This represents not only a challenge to securityforces alone but also one to the Air Force teamto “fight the air base” much like the Navy fightsas a combat team in a carrier battle group.The Asymmetric ThreatThe combination of irregular threats, networkedenemies, and the expeditionary natureof the Air Force’s operations dramatically increasesthe likelihood of attacks on its peopleand resources. Additionally, transforming theservice to one that uses fewer, more capableweapon systems has increased each weapon’scriticality and amplified the impact of enemyattacks on our ability to sustain the projectionof air and space power. 3 Air Force bases havebecome harder targets for penetrating or directattacks, and although gigantic vehicleborneexplosive attacks such as the one onKhobar Towers are still a viable threat, theenemy in Iraq and Afghanistan has reliedupon mortars, rockets, and shoulder-launchedsurface-to-air missiles (SAM) to attack expeditionaryair bases. This situation resembleswhat happened in the Vietnam War, when theAir Force suffered 447 standoff attacks, resultingin 75 aircraft destroyed, 155 troops killed,and 1,702 wounded in action. 4In 1965 the Air Force conducted a detailedsecurity survey of all bases in Southeast Asiathat contained the service’s resources. In additionto pointing out that the Air Force’s secu-

THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 43rity police lacked adequate organization, training,or equipment to provide security defensein an insurgent environment, the survey revealedthat ground forces in South Vietnamwould not conduct static defense of air bases.The study concluded that we had no satisfactorysystem for coping with attacks from standoffweapons, recommending that the Air Forcecontinue seeking an early solution to thisproblem and emphasize testing the feasibilityof new terminal-defense proposals. 5 Standoffattacks against air bases since the beginning ofIraqi Freedom already exceed 1,500; althoughneither the operational impact nor humantoll has proven severe, new weapons technologyand improved enemy tactics and trainingpromise to increase their effect. Undoubtedly,because of the enemy’s willingness, determination,and adaptivity, his aim will improve.The proliferation of precision-guided mortarsand rockets gives enemy forces the potentialof 10-meter accuracy when attacking airbases. 6 Such accuracy would have devastatingeffects on large aircraft and unsheltered smallaircraft, not to mention increased casualtiescaused by strikes on living and working areas.Coupled with the “media” effect, this scenariowill severely degrade the effectiveness of airand space power. Readily available commercialsatelliteimagery and simple reconnaissanceby sympathetic workers employed on the airbase magnify the enemy’s capabilities evenmore. Successful standoff attacks could alsoresult in reluctance to base expeditionary airpowerclose to the fight, thus reducing the responsivenessand effectiveness of the air componentand risking an unintended shift backtoward a conventional supporting role for theAir Force.Seizing the InitiativeIn part, Air Force security forces have notadjusted to combat the standoff threat becauseduring the Cold War, the standoff-attackfootprint became an Army mission—codifiedin 1985 in Joint Security Agreement 8, whichspecified that the Army would provide exteriordefense for Air Force bases. 7 Althoughthis agreement gave the Army the “outside thewire” mission, several joint exercises as well asexperience in Operations Desert Shield andDesert Storm proved this tasking impractical;consequently, in 1992 joint doctrine formallytransferred this responsibility to base commanders.The formal abrogation of Joint SecurityAgreement 8 in 2005 meant that in futureconflicts, the Air Force would have todefend its air bases in accordance with jointdoctrine. 8Perimeter fences, barricades, and high-techsensor systems are critical components ofbase security, but regardless of their effectiveness,they all detect the enemy only after hehas begun an attack, or they help respond afterhe has already attacked a base. A base’sdefense forces, however, must seize the initiativefrom the enemy by getting inside hisplanning cycle and launching a preemptiveattack. Operation Desert Safeside / Task Force1041 at Balad Air Base, Iraq, demonstratedthe effectiveness of this approach. In responseto over 400 standoff attacks against Balad,Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF)launched this 60-day operation, with TaskForce 1041 capturing 17 high-value targets,over 100 other insurgents, and eight majorweapons caches, sustaining no casualties despiteheavy enemy engagement. Afterward,enemy attacks from the task force’s sector virtuallyceased. The architects of Desert Safesideknew that “there is only one way to stopa determined enemy from attacking a base;you have to kill or capture him and take hisweapons. This was true at Balad, and it will betrue at other bases; and the brave men andwomen of TF 1041 proved it!” 9Task Force 1041 demonstrated that the AirForce possessed the capabilities needed tosuccessfully dominate the base security zone(BSZ) and provide a secure operating environmentfrom which to launch, recover, and sustainairpower. This operation also dispelledthe perception that Army units are better organized,trained, and equipped than Air Forcesecurity forces to conduct such operations.Unlike previous Army units, the task forceachieved the desired effect.

44 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006The Base Security ZoneWhereas legacy base-defense doctrine wasdesigned for Cold War–era linear battlefields,emerging joint doctrine treats expeditionarybases more like joint operating areas (fig. 1).The final draft of Joint Publication 3-10, “JointSecurity Operations in Theater,” adapts thebest practices of defending bases to the nonlinearbattlefields of today. The core of thisdoctrine seeks to ensure that the designatedbase commander can dominate the area aroundthe base from which the enemy can launchstandoff and penetrating attacks. Importantly,the new publication establishes a BSZ as ajoint operating area around critical fixed installations(such as air bases) and describesterrain that the base commander should influenceas the battlespace from which the enemycan attack the base. The fact that this terrainincludes the area traditionally known as theman-portable air defense system (MANPADS)footprint (the area the enemy could use to attackaircraft approaching/departing the basewith shoulder-launched SAMs) is of criticalimportance to the Air Force. This requirementof influencing terrain outside the fencecreated a new battlefield-control measurecalled the “base boundary” (fig. 2), defined inthe joint publication asa line that delineates the surface area of a basefor the purpose of facilitating coordination anddeconfliction of operations between adjacentunits, formations, or areas. The base boundaryis not necessarily the base perimeter; rather itshould be established based upon the factors ofmission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops andother support available, time available (METT-T),specifically balancing the need of the base defenseforces to control key terrain with theirability to accomplish the mission. 10Because the terrain included in the baseboundary is subject to constraints of the landcomponent or host nation, the Air Force willuse the BSZ to internally address the total areaoutside the base perimeter that might threatenthe base with standoff attacks. The optimaljoint situation would have the BSZ and baseboundary encompassing the same terrain.Analysis of the base’s mission as well as theenemy, terrain, time, troops available, and civilianconsiderations will determine the BSZ,which surrounds the base. Historical knowledgeof the enemy’s use of standoff weaponslike rockets and mortars in Vietnam, togetherwith recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan,shows that the BSZ must extend a minimumof five kilometers from base resources(e.g., aircraft operating surfaces, maintenancefacilities, and billeting locations). DedicatedFigure 1. Emerging joint nonlinear battlefield. (Adapted from briefing, Command and Control GeneralOfficer Steering Group, subject: Headquarters USAF/XOS-F Integrated Base Defense Command andControl, 3 November 2004.)

THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 45BaseBoundaryAirBaseBSZUrbanAreaFigure 2. Notional base boundary. (Adapted from Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-10.2,“Integrated Base Defense Command and Control,” draft [topline coordination copy], 1 April 2006, 8.)base-defense forces integrated under onecommander should conduct security operationswithin the zone. Normal BSZ operationsin the future will resemble offensive-style effortssuch as Desert Safeside. The base’s areaof interest, where the enemy can do planningand preparation for an attack against a givenbase, reaches beyond the BSZ to anticipate andcounter enemy threats (fig. 3). Base-defenseforces are not responsible for operations inthe area of interest, but they can shape the environmentby coordination with joint/coalitionforces and/or the host nation.The next challenge for Air Force doctrineentails determining which component commandsthe air base. In Iraqi Freedom and EnduringFreedom, we assigned base commandto the component with the preponderance offorces. Although doing so may appear appropriateon the surface, air bases have uniquerequirements—for example, countering thethreat of shoulder-fired SAMs. If the Armycommands an air base simply because it has alarge logistics operation (and thus a largenumber of troops) on base, the commandermay or may not place a high priority on thecritical issue of defeating the MANPADSthreat. The component with the most stringentsecurity requirements should serve asbase commander.Tactical Command and ControlProsecuting ground-combat operations inthe BSZ will require a robust tactical C2 infrastructurerun by the base-defense operationscenter (BDOC) (fig. 4). The C2 architecture

46 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006BaseBoundaryAirBaseBSZBase DefenseArea of Interest(extends to terrain forwhich the base needssituational awareness)UrbanAreaFigure 3. Notional area of interest and base boundary. (Adapted from Air Force Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures 3-10.2, “Integrated Base Defense Command and Control,” draft [topline coordinationcopy], 1 April 2006, 8.)for air bases in the future will make the BDOCcoequal with the emergency operations center(which will focus on recovery after an attack)but subordinate to the base commander’s installationcontrol center. Still commanded bythe defense-force commander, the BDOC willact as a command, control, communications,computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance(C4ISR) center to integrate theapplication of offensive and defensive actionsin the force-protection battlespace—includingthe BSZ. By integrating and coordinatingall defense efforts, the future BDOC will enablethe commander to see first, understandfirst, and act first by finding, fixing, tracking,targeting, engaging, and assessing threats tothe base. The security forces’ legacy BDOCdoes not currently possess the robust tacticalC4ISR capability it needs to integrate the necessaryintelligence and desired effects withinthe BSZ. 11The base-defense effort for a joint forwardoperatinglocation on a nonlinear battlefieldbears striking similarities to the operationalC2 issues faced by the air component commanderat the operational level of war. Bothmissions require centralized control and decentralizedexecution of forces as well as capabilitiesbrought together from several components.A BDOC and an air and space operationscenter (AOC) own some of these forces/capabilitiesbut must also integrate forces and firesfrom other components and coalition partners.Additionally, both missions require predictiveanalysis to conduct direct-action combatmissions that counter expected enemy

THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 47ControlCoordinationBase CommanderDefense-Force Commander(may appoint a BDOC officer in chargeto manage daily operations if required)Liaisons(e.g., Host Nation,Maneuver Units, etc. )Base-Tenant-UnitLiaisonsIntelligence-Fusion Cell(S-2)Future-Operations Cell Current-Operations Cell Mission-Specific(S-5)(S-3)Capability CellsMissionSupportAnalysisCollectionManagementFigure 4. Typical BDOC organization. (Adapted from Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures3-10.2, “Integrated Base Defense Command and Control,” draft [topline coordination copy], 1 April 2006, 14.)courses of action and position forces to reactswiftly to enemy forces not deterred or defeatedby the proactive effort. As we transformthe expeditionary BDOC, we can benchmarksome lessons from the AOC’s battle-provenprocesses and methods.Within the transformed BDOC organization,an intelligence-fusion cell will provide the basedefenseforce with analyzed, vetted all-sourceinformation that drives effective force-protectiondecisions and operations. Inherently multidisciplined,the cell need not possess all capabilitieslocally since theater and strategicreachback provide many of them. Designed toequip the defense-force commander with a capabilityto arrive at courses of action based oncontinuous intelligence preparation/analysisof the battlespace, the intelligence-fusion cellmust have situational awareness of eventsthroughout the base’s area of interest (thatarea where tactical intelligence must be immediatelyavailable to the base-defense forceso it can effectively counter enemy coursesof action). 12This all-source threat information enablesthe BDOC’s future-operations cell to performa function similar to that of an AOC’s Strategyand Combat Plans Divisions—but for tacticallevelbase defense. Using the intelligence-fusioncell’s analysis, the future-operations cell devisesa strategy to counter enemy activities proactivelyfor the next 24 hours and beyond.This strategy becomes a BSZ ground taskingorder (GTO)—a fires-and-effects integrationmatrix for the BSZ—that postures and deconflictsforces to provide an executable “playbook”for operations. The GTO must integrate,deconflict, and document all plannedactivities of friendly forces within the BSZ, includingthose planned by other functionalcomponents or host-nation forces. When constructinga BSZ’s GTO, the BDOC will coordinatewith the special-operations and landcomponentforces operating in the areas

48 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006adjacent to the zone to minimize risks to allforces. The BSZ’s GTO must also consider theeffects required to support the AOC’s air taskingorder. Although a playbook, the GTOmust remain flexible and easily modified duringexecution in response to urgent circumstancesor developing situations. Additionally,the future-operations cell identifies expectedshortfalls in defense-force capability and recommendsappropriate requests for forces orcapabilities for the base commander to forwardthrough the chain of command.A current-operations cell functions on behalfof the defense-force commander to monitorGTO execution and exercise C2 of allforces within the BSZ (the traditional S-3 roleof Air Force base-defense and Army units).This cell also maintains current situationalawareness of joint/coalition operations outsidethe base boundary but within the BSZ. Furthermore,it monitors the status of base-defenseforces operating outside the base boundaryunder the tactical control of adjacent-areacommanders for base-defense tasks.A fire-support coordination cell, anothercritical current-operations cell capability, plansand integrates indirect joint-fire missions suchas close air support or artillery in the BSZ. Althoughthis cell integrates these fires, it doesnot control them; instead, it facilitates themwithin established joint procedures. Successfulair-base defense in the dynamic threat environmentof an expeditionary air base in oneof Dr. Barnett’s “non-integrating gap” countriesrequires robust C4ISR. Fielding a transformedBDOC will prove critical in this effort.Force-Protection IntelligenceDesert Safeside and other Iraqi Freedom /Enduring Freedom experiences showed thatseizing the initiative in a hostile BSZ requiresaggressive ground-combat operations. A newmission area called force protection intelligence(FPI), a key enabler for the active defenseforces, began as a force-protection initiativeby CENTAF to support base defense.The Headquarters Air Force FPI WorkingGroup—run jointly by Headquarters Air ForceIntelligence, the Air Force Office of SpecialInvestigations (AFOSI), and Headquarters AirForce Security Forces—merged existing definitionsof intelligence and force protection todefine FPI as analyzed or vetted all-source informationthat drives effective force-protectiondecisions and operations. It simply means thatthe Air Force needs to apply the full spectrumof intelligence capabilities to commanderswho must make effective decisions in theforce-protection mission area. 13Continuous application of the entire intelligencecycle is critical to anticipating enemytactics and/or developing target-intelligencepackages to neutralize threats. Base-defenseoperations require the prioritization, collection,analysis, fusion, and tailoring of threatinformation into products and services for disseminationin support of current and futuresecurity operations. This capability demandsadvanced training in analytical skills and revisedtactics, techniques, and procedures thatincorporate AFOSI and intelligence methodsand sources. FPI personnel must receive analyticaltraining when initially placed in an FPIposition, periodically refresh their skills in across-functional environment, and evaluatethem prior to deployment. This assessmentcapability must allow rapid and thoroughanalysis of all-source information at the lowestpossible level yet still provide reachback capabilitiesto theater and national sources. Intelligenceand AFOSI assessment capabilitiesmust be scalable to the defense situation andable to provide dedicated, full-time support tointegrated-defense missions if necessary. 14 Theassessment capability requires new organizationalstructures, additional communicationsequipment, and either additional personnelor inventive manpower solutions to fully integrateintelligence and AFOSI with securityforces in BSZ operations.Fighting the Air BaseJust as all sailors have a battle station towhich they report at designated times of elevatedthreat, so should Airmen have such astation and participate in base defense. Ac-

THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 49cordingly, a draft Air Force instruction hascodified a fight-the-air-base concept, outlininga process by which Airmen gradually step uptheir participation in base-defense activities asthreats increase. 15 Each escalating phase ofmanning battle stations—coded green, yellow,orange, and red—has associated conditions ofreadiness attached (fig. 5). Assigning all Airmento a battle station, training them in theappropriate duties, and exercising the planrepeatedly will dramatically expand the collectivepower of the base-defense force.GREENYELLOWORANGERED• Security forces provide full-timesecurity operations• All Airmen contribute as sensors• Security forces and select Airmenprovide full-time security operationsbased on the threat and theinstallation commander’s intent• Tactical warning issued to prepare forbattle stations• All Airmen contribute as sensors andensure readiness• Security forces and select Airmenprovide full-time security• All Airmen armed for self-defense• Battle stations prepared• Security forces serve as the installation’squick-reaction force• All Airmen take shelter, defend their battlestation, or are designated mission criticalby the installation commander’s decision• Forces quickly neutralize the enemy tocontinue the missionFigure 5. Proposed Air Force battle stations.(Adapted from Air Force Instruction 10-246, “InstallationArming and Response,” draft [four-digitcoordination package], 17 January 2006, 2.)Increasing the capability for base defenserequires including ground-combat tasks in thebasic skill sets of all Airmen. 16 For example,although Airmen currently receive instructionin firing a weapon, they do not learn how andwhen to employ that weapon; neither do theylearn combat skills common in the otherarmed forces. Identifying the requirement forthese skills in Iraqi Freedom / Enduring Freedom,CENTAF established the basis for expeditionarycombat training for all Airmen witha theaterwide program called Combat RightStart. Developed as a short-term solution tothe need for ground-combat skills, the programbecame a requirement (19 hours oftraining) for all Airmen in the CENTAF theaterbefore they deploy to a designated combatzone like Iraq. Although an Air Force ExpeditionaryAirmen Integrated Process Team isbuilding a road map to fulfill these requirementsover the long term, Airmen must sustainthese combat skills by undergoing periodicancillary training, and the fight-the-baseconcept outlined above must become part ofan installation’s defense plans. Lastly, theforce must regularly rehearse going to battlestations in order to assure proficiency whencalled into action.Posturing the ForceAlong with better doctrine, robust C4ISR,FPI, and ground-combat training for all Airmen,security operations in the BSZ will requiremore effective use of security-forces capabilitiesthan do traditional flight-line orperimeter-security missions. Whereas a notionalexpeditionary base in the current IraqiFreedom threat environment might call for200 to 300 security forces to protect its flightline and perimeter, that same base duringexecution of robust BSZ operations will needcloser to 1,200 such forces. In order to supportthis new responsibility, the Air Force’s securityforces are undergoing a complete transformationdesigned to shift tactical doctrine aswell as tactics, techniques, and procedures froma Cold War focus on an industrial-securitymodel to an expeditionary war-fighting focuson offensive and defensive operations in theBSZ. Rather than follow the historical practiceof training, equipping, and manning like apolice force with some combat skills, the transformedsecurity forces will train and organizeas a competent war-fighting capability insteadof an installation police force.The Cold War force structure of our currentsecurity forces (designed to support

50 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006home-station operations) has incrementallyadapted to demands of the expeditionaryAir Force, but most tasks and manpowerstructure remain focused on running thehome station. This orientation has causedproblems for commanders of security forcessquadrons as they struggle to balance day-todaylaw enforcement and security operationsof a home-station Air Force base withthe critical task of preparing troops for combatdeployments. That is, if local requirementstake precedence, security forcesmight either ignore combat training or performit haphazardly—perhaps on scarce offdutytime. Conceivably, troops could go towar only partially prepared or prepared atthe expense of other important events.To ensure the best readiness for bothhome-base and expeditionary missions, theAir Force is in the process of redefining themission of security forces so that it emphasizestwo basic areas: security operations andair-provost (policing) services. The emergingmodel will require a mixture of militaryand civilian personnel, the former conductingwar-fighting operations such as defendingexpeditionary air bases; protectingsteady-state, high-threat locations; or securingnuclear weapons, and the latter performingmost of the provost and industrialsecurityduties such as law-enforcementmissions at locations in the continentalUnited States. This construct will allow securityforces to follow a basic train, deploy, andreconstitute cycle that will guarantee enoughproperly prepared personnel for war-fightingoperations. During the reconstitution phaseof the cycle, military security forces will integrateinto the mostly civilian air-provost mission,not only ensuring that home-stationbases have enough manpower to securetheir resources but also keeping enoughlaw-enforcement experience in the militaryforce to conduct minimal law-and-order dutiesat deployed locations. A commander ofsuch a transformed security-forces squadronwill have both the resources and time to preparefor and conduct expeditionary andhome-station missions.Emerging RequirementsA recent exercise called Headquarters AirForce Air Base Opening Tabletop exposed aseam between conducting hostile joint airbase-seizureoperations and opening the basefor operations. 17 The base-seizure mission requiresa rapid transition from combat forcesseizing an air base to personnel readying afully operational joint air base from which toproject combat and mobility airpower. Thismission lies beyond the organic capabilities ofcontingency response groups (CRG) butcould take the form of a complementary AirForce capability by integrating CRG capabilitiesinto those of the 720th Special TacticsGroup and the 820th Security Forces Group,presenting them to the joint force commanderas a scalable, tailorable force module knownas an air expeditionary combat task unit(AECTU). 18 These forces would arrive withthe seizure force during the assault phase ofthe joint forcible-entry operation. Special tacticsand security forces, inserted into the assaultelement, would fight alongside jointforces to eliminate resistance and then providesecurity and initial base defense as theremaining AECTU forces arrive to establishair operations.After the forcible-entry operation transitionsto the stabilization phase of the lodgment,the AECTU becomes primarily responsiblefor air-base defense operations while theseizure force reconsolidates and moves on toits next objective. When the initial element ofthe CRG deems the air base open for air operations,follow-on Air Force and joint capabilitieswill flow into the air base. Assessmentof the security environment by the AECTUcommander constitutes a significant portionof this opening. The AECTU will remain inplace to hand over air-base defense operationsto security forces of the air and space expeditionaryforce. This transition might take between30 and 60 days, but the goal remainsreposturing the AECTU for the next operationas soon as practical. Embedding theAECTU with the assault force creates an environmentof joint interoperability between thetwo components; it also allows a quicker tran-

THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 51sition to operations while ensuring that theseizure force can rapidly advance to follow-onobjectives without waiting to link up with aseparate follow-on force. Establishing thetasks, conditions, and standards for theAECTU in the mission statements of theCRGs, 720th Special Tactics Group, and820th Security Forces Group would go farin closing this joint seam.OpportunitiesAs the Air Force continues to retool itscapabilities to fight effectively on the battlefieldsof The Pentagon’s New Map, the expeditionaryair base is becoming more than justan airpower-projection platform. 19 With theadded ground-combat mission in the BSZ,newly focused FPI, and a more-capable forceof expeditionary Airmen trained in groundcombat, the future air base may become moreof a platform for air and ground combat. Notonly would air assets strike joint-force targetsacross the theater but also base-defense forcescould strike theater targets in their respectiveBSZs—just as Task Force 1041 did in Iraq.Multiplying this capability across a geographiccombatant command covers a significant partof the air-and-ground battlespace with coordinatedair and ground forces.One can easily imagine projecting that influenceeven farther into the combat zone bypushing logistics, civil engineering, communications,and other capabilities out from theair base to other joint forces in the area of responsibility.This proposal—not a roles-andmissionsargument and not one that wouldrequire large, new forces—would simply harnessand focus the potential combat power ofcurrently deployed base-defense as well as“support” personnel and project that poweroutward. Establishing the future air base as apower-projection platform would give thejoint force commander another formidabletool for the joint fight.The Way AheadThe shift from garrison security and law enforcementto security operations has alreadybegun. In order to ensure that these changesare in step with the Air Force’s vision andgoals, we must pursue a systematic program toshepherd such alterations. This effort beganwith the Air Force Requirements and OperationalCapability Council tasking HeadquartersAir Force Security Forces to draft a recommendationthat addressed capability gaps inintegrated defense. This process will culminatewith approval of a program action directiveto enact these changes through the service’scorporate structure.These changes will need support and understandingat all levels of Air Force leadership aswe continue to realize the desired capabilitiesof our expeditionary Air Force in the futurebattlespace. Many of the changes will provedifficult; however, they are vital to success inthe long war against terror. Land-componentmaneuver forces will be stretched thin for theforeseeable future, so the Air Force must investin its capabilities to securely project combatair and—now—ground power. Becausethe uncertainty and asymmetry of noncontiguous,nonlinear battles will create dangerouslocations for air bases, expeditionary Airmenmust ready themselves for the fight. qNotes1. Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: Warand Peace in the Twenty-first Century (New York: G. P. Putnam’sSons, 2004), 156.2. Rebecca Grant, briefing to Brig Gen Robert H. Holmeset al., subject: Securing Airpower Projection in Noncontiguousand Nonlinear Battlespace Operations, April 2006.3. David A. Shlapak and Alan Vick, “Check Six Begins onthe Ground”: Responding to the Evolving Ground Threat to U.S.Air Force Bases (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 13.4. Roger P. Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam,1961–1973 (Washington, DC: Office of Air ForceHistory, 1979), 207.5. Lt Gen William W. Momyer, Operation Safe Side FinalReport, Seventh Air Force, 1 October 1967.6. Shlapak and Vick, “Check Six Begins,” 50.7. Richard G. Davis, The 31 Initiatives: A Study in AirForce–Army Cooperation (Washington, DC: Office of AirForce History, 1987), 125.

52 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 20068. “Validating the Abrogation of Joint Service Agreement8,” AF/XOS-F staff package, 18 November 2004.9. Col Bradley Spacy, director of force protection, US-CENTAF (Task Force 1041 presentation, HeadquartersUSAF Threat Working Group, 28 April 2005).10. Joint Publication 3-10, “Joint Security Operationsin Theater,” final draft, November 2005, II-2.11. Headquarters USAF/XOS-F, briefing, Commandand Control General Officer Steering Group, subject: IntegratedBase Defense Command and Control, 3 November2004.12. Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-10.2, “Integrated Base Defense Command and Control,”draft [topline coordination copy], 1 April 2006, 14.13. Lt Col John Busch, AF/A7SO, white paper, InstitutionalizingForce Protection Intelligence (Washington, DC:Headquarters USAF/A7S, n.d.).14. Integrated defense involves providing a secure operatingenvironment for base commanders to generateand sustain combat power for joint war-fighting operations.Headquarters USAF/A7S, “DOTMLPF ChangeRecommendation for Integrated Defense” (Washington,DC: Headquarters USAF/A7S, 14 April 2006).15. Air Force Instruction 10-246, “Installation Armingand Response,” draft [four-digit coordination package],17 January 2006.16. Long-Term Integration of Expeditionary Airmen Conceptsinto the Air Force, Chartered Expeditionary AirmenIntegrated Process Team Report (Washington, DC: HeadquartersUSAF/XO, July 2005), 10.17. Minutes of the USAF General Officer Air BaseOpening Tabletop Exercise, Headquarters Air Force SecurityForces, 6 April 2006.18. CRGs provide “a unique subset of capabilities designedspecifically to respond rapidly to contingencies aswell as secure and protect airfields, rapidly assess andopen air bases, and perform initial airfield / air base operationsto ensure a smooth transition to subsequent operations.”See Alexander M. Wathen, “Contingency ResponseGroup: Time to Expand the Box and Think ‘Coalition,’” Air and Space Power Journal 19, no. 2 (Summer2005): 70.19. Grant, briefing.

New USAF Doctrine PublicationAir Force Doctrine Document 2-1.9, TargetingLT COL J. P. HUNERWADEL, USAF, RETIREDTARGETING HAS BEEN a vital partof air and space operations since anaircraft dropped the first weapon. Ithas evolved from a matter of primitiveguesswork into a discipline based on scientificprinciples and robust processes. Thesefacts are the subject of the Air Force’s newestdoctrine document, AFDD 2-1.9, Targeting, 8June 2006 (http://afdc.maxwell.af.mil).Prior to the appearance of AFDD 2-1.9,most Air Force writing on this difficult subjecttreated it as a separate discipline. Air Force seniorleadership, however, concluded that doctrineon targeting should show the larger contextinto which it fits. A distinct discipline andoperation, targeting also remains an inseparablepart of the overarching processes thatthe Air Force and joint community use to planand fight. As the new document states, “Targetingis integral to the air and space component’swartime battle rhythm and should alwaysbe thought of as part of a larger effects-basedconstruct of planning, execution, and assessment”(vii, 2).AFDD 2-1.9 helps establish this context byexpanding the definition of its subject: “Targetingis the process for selecting and prioritizingtargets and matching appropriate actionsto those targets to create specific desiredeffects that achieve objectives, taking accountof operational requirements and capabilities”(vii, 1). In simpler terms, “targeting helpstranslate strategy into discrete actions againsttargets by matching ways to means” (1). Importantly,the new definition explicitly ties itselfto effects-based operations, whose conceptsand principles AFDD 2-1.9 recaps, explainingthat targeting really involves the best way ofachieving effects with given resources. It encompassesmore than just putting the rightkind of bomb on a fixed target.The doctrine document lays out the followingprecepts, expanding upon existing jointprinciples to offer a comprehensive view ofthe discipline:• Targeting focuses on achieving objectives—itis the end of strategy that developscourses of action, goals, and effectsinto detailed actions against targets.• Fundamentally effects-based, targetingshould consider all possible ways of creatingdesired effects and not focus justupon destruction or other “traditional”means.• Targeting is part of a larger set of processes,including formal planning, thejoint air estimate process, and the taskingcycle that ultimately produces guidancesuch as the daily air tasking order.• Because of targeting’s interdisciplinarynature, it requires the efforts of personnelfrom many functional areas—notsimply “operators” or “intel types.”• Targeting is inherently estimative and anticipatory;that is, matching actions andeffects to targets requires estimating andanticipating future outcomes.53

54 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006• A rational, iterative process, targeting systematicallyand methodically analyzes, prioritizes,and assigns forces against targets.AFDD 2-1.9 identifies two basic types of targeting:deliberate and dynamic. In fact, all targetingis deliberate in the sense that it requiresplanning, but the new doctrine document describespreplanned actions against targets—actionsdetermined before publication of the airtasking order and before execution begins.The chapter on deliberate targeting explainshow targeting efforts support formal and campaignplanning, as well as the vital role theyplay in the daily battle rhythm. Indeed, AFDD2-1.9 contains the first detailed doctrinal explanationof the air and space battle rhythm,tasking cycle, and specific role of targetingwithin them.The chapter on dynamic targeting addressesthe planning and actions against targetsafter execution begins. This part includesthe first high-level doctrinal use of the findfix-track-target-engage-assess(F2T2EA or “killchain”) methodology used to prosecute timesensitivetargets at the level of the joint forcecommander, based on the recently publishedmultiservice tactics, techniques, and proceduresmanual on such targets. AFDD 2-1.9 expandsthe scope of F2T2EA to include all targets“that are not detected, identified, ordeveloped in time to be included in deliberatetargeting, and therefore have not had actionsscheduled against them” (8), includingboth time-sensitive targets and many others.AFDD 2-1.9 also contains the first doctrinalexplanation of the new Air Force assessmentconstruct, expanding its scope beyond traditionalbattle damage assessment and notingthe existence of four assessment levels: tactical(similar to current joint “combat assessment”),operational (component-commander level),campaign (joint-force-commander level), andnational (secretary of defense and presidentiallevel). The publication also highlightsmany of the challenges the Air Force will faceas it moves toward assessing effects, which canprove much more difficult and subjective thantraditional battle damage assessment.Targeting will continue to evolve as it assimilatesthe insights of ongoing operationsand innovations in fields such as effects-basedthinking and assessment. It will remain centralto the way the US Air Force fights. qWe must understand the potential of air and space power, and be ableto plan and employ it to its maximum, and to articulate it within thecontext of joint operations.—Air Force Doctrine Document 1,Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003

Counterinsurgency AirpowerAir-Ground Integration for the Long WarCOL HOWARD D. BELOTE, USAFEditorial Abstract: Unprecedented levels of joint cooperation have occurred in counterinsurgencyoperations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Colonel Belote documents the successes of increased jointcoordination in both nations, particularly with regard to improving close air support and ensuringthe security and legitimacy of national elections. The author also offers ideas for improvingjoint training opportunities and enhancing joint doctrine, tactics, and procedures.IN FEBRUARY 2005, immediately beforetransferring authority for MultinationalCorps-Iraq (MNC-I) to the incomingXVIII Airborne Corps, Lt Gen Thomas F.Metz, USA, wrote a brief note to his counterpart,Lt Gen Walter E. Buchanan III, USAF,the combined force air component commander(CFACC). General Metz highlightedthe contributions of airmen from all servicesto counterinsurgency operations, emphasizingthe joint teamwork that led to Iraq’s successfulJanuary elections and noting in particular “theprompt and sustained air support our landforces have received.” 1 Since returning fromBaghdad, General Metz, the commandinggeneral of III Corps, likewise has filled his remarksto military and civilian audiences withexamples of joint integration. Both publicly55

56 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006and privately, he mentioned the Navy smallboatcompany that worked for an Army battaliontask force, the Army brigade that workedfor a Marine division (MARDIV), and the Marineexpeditionary force that worked for anArmy corps. Speaking of airpower, he remarkedupon the totally purple airspace thatcovered Iraq, highlighting in particular thestack of Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force aircraftthat filled the skies from the surface tomore than 60,000 feet—fixed-wing and rotarywing,manned and remotely piloted—and thejoint terminal attack controllers (JTAC) fromthe Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force whofocused airpower’s effects on the battlefield. 2General Metz’s joint focus should challengeall of us to build on those joint successes. Tothat end, this article examines how soldiers,sailors, airmen, and marines integrated airpower’scontribution to joint fires and effectsfrom the battle for Fallujah in November 2004through the elections on 30 January 2005. Itfocuses on relationships that developed amongcomponent and major subordinate commandheadquarters—specifically among MNC-I’s jointfires and effects team, the air support operationscenter (ASOC), the direct air supportcenter (DASC), and the combined air operationscenter (CAOC)—and highlights innovationsthat enhanced airpower’s contributionsto counterinsurgency operations. With an eyeto the future, this article also examines instancesin which the joint team could have integratedmore smoothly and offers ideas forimproving joint integration in future conflicts.OrganizationIntegration of III Corps’ habitually aligned3d Air Support Operations Group (ASOG)into MNC-I’s planning and execution processesproved central to the successful employmentof airpower across the joint battlespace.Although the 3d ASOG’s corps tactical aircontrol party (TACP) coordinated airpowerplanning across staff functions—notably withthe intelligence, operations, and plans functions—thelion’s share of airpower integrationoccurred within MNC-I’s joint fires and effectscell (JFEC). Headed by Brig Gen Richard P.Formica, USA, the JFEC focused lethal andnonlethal fires and effects, conducted effectsassessments, managed corps-level informationoperations, and directed operational targeting—bothfuture and real time. From theASOC, collocated with the JFEC on the thirdfloor of Baghdad’s Victory Palace, Lt ColNeil Roghair and Lt Col Patrick W. Johnsonof the Air Force orchestrated the countrywideclose air support (CAS) effort on behalfof both MNC-I and the CAOC at AlUdeid Air Base, Qatar. 3This integrated air-ground team developeda trust and an interdependence that went wellbeyond paper relationships. Following doctrine,the ASOG remained within air-component reportingchannels, but General Formica incorporatedit fully into JFEC decision making. Ashe explained, “Over time, the corps [deputyeffects coordinator, Lt Col (promotable) JoeGallagher, USA] assumed chief-of-staff-likefunctions (along with targeting, fire supportcoordination and the integration of joint fires)and the [dual-hatted ASOG commander /corps air liaison officer (ALO)] essentiallyserved as my deputy. The ASOG [commander]was senior, experienced and the integrator ofmost joint fires.” 4 Significantly, General Formicademonstrated the depth of that cross-servicetrust in an unprecedented manner when hedeployed forward during August’s Battle ofNajaf and again during December and January,when he served as the Army Regulation15-6 investigating officer for the bombing ofMosul’s dining facility. 5 In both cases, he leftthe Air Force colonel in charge as the corps’joint fires and effects coordinator—provingconclusively his and the MNC-I commandinggeneral’s commitment to jointness and, as discussedbelow, setting an example for theASOG and ASOC to emulate in November’sand January’s critical operations.Counterinsurgency AirpowerFocused by the JFEC and ASOC, airpowerprovided a number of tools for commandersat all levels. The number-one priority, as ar-

COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 57ticulated by the corps commander andechoed in the air component commander’sair operations directive, called for airpowerto respond to troops-in-contact (TIC) situations.Consequently, the ASOC continuouslymonitored the Joint Air Request Net, whichlinked all battalion, brigade, and divisionTACPs and, using kill boxes as a commonframe of reference, moved air assets aroundthe country in response to developing situations.Knowing that maneuver commanderswere disciplined and deliberate in their TICdeclarations—knowing that they had weighedconsiderations of proportionality and militarynecessity carefully before asking for airpower—theASOC worked with the CAOC tominimize response time. Ultimately, airgroundteamwork combined with perceptiveintelligence work to reduce average TIC responsesof 20–25 minutes in the summer of2004 to six to seven minutes throughout November,December, and January. Furthermore,in the nine months in which III Corpsand the 3d ASOG formed the core of MNC-I’sJFEC, the team boasted a perfect record byresponding to all 811 TIC declarations. Withouta doubt, glitches occurred: communicationsdifficulties hampered some TIC responses,and no one would suggest that sucha record would be possible without the completeair dominance the coalition held overIraq. But every soldier and airman involvedin the tasking process from Baghdad to Qatarwas justifiably proud of the achievement.In addition to supporting TICs, more traditionalairpower missions involved the applicationof lethal fires. With both conventionaland special operations forces, Airmen conductedtime-sensitive targeting operations andpreplanned precision strikes; the most unusualof the latter included terrain-denial missionsagainst known insurgent firing positions.Everyone understood that insurgents woulddesert the positions at weapon impact becausethey tended to use homemade launchers withrudimentary timing devices, but commanderswanted to prevent repeat uses and perhaps deterless-committed insurgents from using theirshoot-and-scoot tactics. In all these cases, theJFEC applied US Central Command’s rules ofengagement and ensured that proper authoritiessanctioned the use of force.A number of nonlethal airpower innovationsproved far more prevalent than lethalfires, however, and represented the ingenuityand drive of the coalition military establishment.On a countrywide scale, fighter aircraftconducted infrastructure-security missions, simultaneouslyfulfilling the multinational-forcecommander’s strategic priority of protectingIraq’s lifeblood—oil and electrical systems—from insurgent attacks and the CFACC’s directionnot to waste fuel, time, or effort in airbornealertorbits around the country. On a smallerscale, fighter crews conducted nontraditionalintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance(NTISR) missions on behalf of ground commanders.For example, during a StrykerBrigade cordon-and-search mission in Mosul,F-18s continually updated the JTAC (in thecommander’s Stryker) on enemy and civilianmovements outside the cordon, allowing thecommander to reposition his platoons accordingly.After the combined-arms rehearsal fora 39th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) mechanizedoperation north of Baghdad, the AH-64Apache troop commander explained to thevisiting ALO how commonplace joint airattacktactics had become, noting that almostdaily they came up on common frequencieswith local JTACs and overhead fighters, usingthe team to develop situational awareness.One battalion commander, Lt Col Tim Ryan,highlighted the immediate impact of nonlethalCAS when he described his experiencessouth of Baghdad:On one large operation, I had [an unmannedaerial vehicle (UAV)] on station early to observethe target area as we approached; we quietlybrought in the fast movers at altitude just beforewe hit the objective and then rotary wing camein after the first door was breached because oftheir audio signature. On that morning we hadseveral “runners” that [the] UAV or F-16 [identified];the F-16 sparkled and did an on-the-nethandover to the [OH-58D] Kiowas that came inlow on the targets and fixed them in place untilground forces could capture them. I was constantlyamazed at how precise the grids and [situationreports] from the fast movers were, giventheir speed and altitude. . . .

58 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006On the day before the elections, [an F-15Eflight] was focused on the periphery of the objectivearea since we’d already been on stationfor about 45 minutes and didn’t need them inan area we already had control of on the ground.They spotted four runners that exited a houseoutside of our cordon and then they guidedground forces, my crew in this case, on to thetargets who were hiding in the reeds under anoverhang on the bank of the river. I’d walked inthe dark within ten feet of one guy and [the aircraft]sparkled the target right behind me, toldthe TACP to tell me to turn around; I saw thebeam through my [night observation device]and captured the first of four detainees. Thatwas pretty Hooah! 6To be sure, nonlethal airpower amountedto much more than NTISR; when necessary,commanders could “escalate” nonlethal effects.Due to the political ramifications of urbanbombs, commanders rarely asked forweapons release with TICs—but they oftenasked for shows of force to cause insurgents tobreak contact or prevent crowds from complicatingtactical situations. One notable situationoccurred in Baghdad in November 2004,as the battle for Fallujah raged just a few milesto the west, when a convoy stopped to dealwith a large improvised explosive device justoutside a Sunni mosque. Friday prayers hadrecently concluded, and a crowd estimated atwell over 1,000 began marching from themosque toward the convoy; the ground commanderimmediately declared a TIC and hadthe JTAC request a low and loud show of force.The ASOC and division TACP coordinatedwith the Army’s air command and control forpasses well below the coordinating altitude—and after the second low pass from an F-15E,the crowd dispersed, allowing the convoy tocontinue without incident.FallujahJoint integration of lethal and nonlethalfires and effects faced its sternest test in thebattle to retake Fallujah in November 2004—but the 1st MARDIV and its DASC had neithera common doctrinal foundation with theJFEC/ASOC/CAOC team nor a history of exercisingwith Army and Air Force assets. Doctrinaldifferences were exacerbated by theplacement of Marine expeditionary-forceboundaries immediately south and west ofBaghdad, creating a seam between the ASOCand DASC directly between Baghdad InternationalAirport and Fallujah—the busiest,most critical areas of central Iraq. As difficultiesarose in the summer of 2004, primarily ascoalition forces responded to an uprising ofMuqtada al-Sadr’s militia in Najaf, CAOC,DASC, and ASOC personnel created altitudebasedcoordination measures that proved effectivein a small-scale fight. However, no onein the command-and-control chain believedthat a fairly low-altitude cap on Marinecontrolledair operations would suffice inFallujah, considered the site of the densesturban air operations since those in Hue, SouthVietnam, more than 35 years ago.Led by Lt Col Gary Kling, USMC, theMARDIV’s operations air officer, and Lt ColPatrick Johnson, USAF, the ASOC director,and building on the joint example set withinthe JFEC, members from all services workedout the solution. Colonel Kling argued effectivelythat he needed control over the entireair effort around Fallujah. Colonel Johnsonpointed out that to manage the air warthroughout the rest of the country—to preventinsurgent attacks elsewhere from drawingcombat power away from the main effort—aswell as adequately support the Fallujahfight and enable the CFACC to fulfill his responsibilitiesas airspace control authority forthe entire area of operations, the ASOCneeded complete visibility into the DASC’sfight. Ultimately, after months of painstakingwork and carefully cultivated trust, everyonein the chain of command bought into a planbased on the twin pillars of unity of commandand transparency—and, as Colonel Kling toldUS Joint Forces Command’s Joint CAS Symposiumof 2005, the execution almost perfectlymatched the plan. From the division commandpost, assisted by an air support liaisonteam, he orchestrated all rotary- and fixedwingflights and fires within 15 miles of Fallujahand Ramadi, fires controlled by a mix ofMarine forward air controllers, Navy SEALs,

COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 59and Air Force JTACs within the city. 7 Outsidethat 15-mile circle, the ASOC controlled anair umbrella that responded to 81 TIC situationsthroughout the two weeks of intense operations,dropping bombs and conductingshows of force from Al Qaim in the westernMarine sector to Baqubah to Mosul.Significantly, the plan was not a lowestcommon-denominatorcompromise; rather, itcombined the best aspects of two differing approachesto joint fires. The DASC and theMARDIV’s operations officer for air controlledall aircraft that entered Fallujah but gave theASOC unfettered access to all its network serversand chat rooms, providing liaison officersaround-the-clock and allowing ASOC officersand technicians to move air assets in anticipationof MARDIV requirements. That exemplarymultiservice cooperation ensured effectiveapplication of lethal airpower and pointedthe way to another innovative joint success.Election SupportAs the battle for Fallujah wound down, theMarine expeditionary force focused on conductingcivil-military operations and rebuildinga devastated city; the 1st Cavalry Division’sBlack Jack Brigade conducted follow-on operationsin the villages surrounding Fallujah.Almost simultaneously, MNC-I shifted its planningfocus to support of the IndependentElectoral Commission of Iraq and electionpreparations. As the corps and its major subordinatecommands concentrated on securityof election materials and middle- and outerringprotection of election sites (the Iraqishandled all inner-ring security), all the whileresponding to a surge of enemy activity in andaround Mosul, air strategists at the CAOCoffered an innovative approach based ontheir experience with Combined/Joint TaskForce 76’s joint-fires element in Afghanistan:air presence.According to Capt Joseph A. Katz, USA, thetask force and CAOC planners had three goalsin mind: to “provide security to CoalitionForces . . . instill a sense of instability and insecurityin anti-coalition militia attempting todisrupt election safety and participation; andprovide a sense of security and support tolocal nationals as they prepared to participatein their first-ever democratic voting experience.”8 Shortly after the successful Afghanelections, a CAOC team led by Maj IoannisKoskinas, USAF, attempted to gather morethan the existing anecdotal evidence, hopingto determine the effectiveness of air presenceand support development of an air-presenceplan for Iraq in January. The team ran intoskepticism, however, both from the ASOGcommander, who asked for more data beforebuying into the concept, and from a few MultinationalForce-Iraq and unified-commandlevelbattle-staff officers who accused theCAOC team via e-mail of trying to create amission for the air component.As it turned out, the only soldier whose votecounted was already two or three steps aheadof the air-component planners. When advisedby skeptical analysts to keep aircraft out ofsight and out of mind during elections, GeneralMetz aggressively stopped the briefingand exclaimed, “Absolutely not. I want themlow—I want them loud—I want them everywhere!I don’t completely understand it, butthis population responds to airpower, bothfixed- and rotary-wing . . . so get the air outthere.” 9 Thereafter, the CAOC/JFEC/ASOCteam wasted no time merging such clear topdownguidance with the bottom-up situationalawareness resident at brigade- and divisionlevelfire support elements (FSE) and TACPs.The major subordinate commands designatedvillages, drew air-presence routes, and directedoverflight altitudes based on maneuvercommanders’ desire to deter or reassure, dependingon the local situation. The CAOC positionedtanker assets to support those routesand surged air presence in the week leadingup to the successful election.As with the Afghan case, little data exists toprove or disprove the effects of air presence.Most evidence is anecdotal, as was the reportfrom the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division’stactical operations center in Baqubah: “Tellthe guys in [the joint operations center] thatfrom the 3 BCT grunts’ perspective, air presenceworks. Our Iraqi Army counterparts re-

60 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006ally like the fighters overhead.” 10 Even withoutthe data, however, the election-support planrepresents a near-perfect blend of multicomponent,operational-level planning withboots-on-the-ground, tactical-level understanding.From battalion to corps to CAOC tocarrier air wing, the joint team came togetherto innovate and set conditions for success on30 January.ScorecardClearly, the integration of MNC-I’s JFECwith the ASOC and corps TACP represents ahuge step forward in the joint application oflethal and nonlethal effects—as does the effectiveworking relationship between MNC-I’sheadquarters and the CAOC. (Although not asubject of this article, the battlefield coordinationdetachment at Al Udeid played a criticalrole, with its commander, Col James Waring,USA, and his key staff representing their parentcomponent as effectively in Qatar as didtheir Airman counterparts in Baghdad.) Similarly,the MARDIV/corps/air-component relationship,evidenced in the DASC/ASOCtransparency and teamwork, demonstratedhow effectively our separate service doctrinescan be mined for common ground. Finally,the teamwork of lower-level TACPs and FSEsacross the country replicated the higher-levelrelationships; by election time, air support operationssquadrons had become as totally integratedat brigade and division level as had theparent group with the corps. The ASOG commandertraveled extensively during his tour,visiting Battlefield Airmen at 21 forwardoperating bases and paying courtesy calls onbattalion and brigade commanders and staffs.Everywhere, commanders and operations officerstold the same story: “I grew up nottrusting CAS because at National TrainingCenter exercises and Warfighters [corps- anddivision-level readiness inspections] it was toohard to coordinate and never where or when Ineeded it. But here, every time I asked theJTAC to get air—every time—you guys answeredthe call.”These great leaps forward did not occurwithout stumbles, however. Joint teamwork atlower levels sometimes took a while to developbecause of the poor integration of CAS intotraining and exercises. As Col Michael Formica,USA, commander of Black Jack Brigade, explained,“In my first few months in country, Irarely put air into my plan—this was becausewe did not understand how it could assist us ina counter insurgency fight—then I saw the incredibleresults in Fallujah and in our followonoperations. After that, in our North Babiloperations and election prep, I never leftwithout my JTAC and always requested air tosupport our operations.” 11 To use a baseballanalogy coined by Col Arden Dahl, formercommander of the Air Force’s joint air-groundoperations group, Colonel Formica and hispeers used CAS like a relief pitcher but laterrealized they needed CAS in the startinglineup. Future exercise designers must capturethat lesson and ensure that soldiers and airmentogether understand the processes to integrateair effectively from the opening pitch.Those battalion- and brigade-level seamsbecame especially evident inside the close urbanenvironment in Fallujah. The key playersat the 1st MARDIV, MNC-I, and ASOG workedfor weeks to solve the top-level DASC/ASOCproblem, but they failed to identify doctrinaldisconnects between Marine regimental andbattalion air officers and their Air Forcecounterparts, waiting until late in the game toassemble the 29-man Air Force team that accompaniedthe heavy Army units into the city.As a result, some members of the Air Forceteam did not arrive in Fallujah until after theMARDIV’s air-coordination meeting. Moreimportantly, not understanding the MarineCorps’ reliance on its battalion air officer, theASOG commander allowed one Air Force elementto employ without an enlisted battalionair liaison officer (EBALO). In interviews, Marinepilots indicated that they missed the oversightand situational awareness a qualifiedEBALO would have provided during check-inbriefs. Perhaps a few interservice scrimmagegames would have created sufficient familiarityto avoid those misplays; in the future, weshould demand that we practice together.

COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 61The aforementioned interservice seamshighlight a final area for improvement: thecollection and study of joint lessons learned.In the weeks after Fallujah, both the Air Forceand Marine Corps sent teams to record whathad happened—but neither team saw enoughplayers to capture the complete story. The AirForce team traveled primarily to Al Udeid;hampered by travel restrictions, it sent onlytwo interviewers to Baghdad for only one day,thereby missing most of the JTACs, the ASOC,the corps TACP, and the JFEC personnel mostdeeply involved in planning and executing airsupport for the Fallujah operation. The MarineCorps Center for Lessons Learned sentpersonnel to a Marine air wing debrief at AlAsad Air Base, where they recorded the aforementioneddisappointment at the lack of anEBALO but spent no time trying to determinethe root cause. Instead, they published an unsupportedanalysis suggesting that some AirForce JTACs’ unfamiliarity with the groundscheme of maneuver proved that the MarineCorps trained its forward air controllers betterthan the Air Force trained its JTACs.Unfortunately, as our services move towardinterdependence, neither of these singleserviceapproaches has much utility. To capturethe Fallujah experience accurately, weshould have had a multiservice team interviewkey players from all services simultaneously—players like General Formica, Lieutenant Colonel(promotable) Gallagher, Colonel Kling,and Colonel Johnson, who had common goalsbut differing perspectives and who togethercould have shed light on the foundations ofour joint successes as well as the causes of ourmissteps. In the future, our service-specificlessons-learned teams should pool their efforts,travel together, and blend those differingperspectives into a comprehensive whole.The Way AheadHow can our services perpetuate these successesand correct the missteps? The answer issimple: train the way we fight by exercising thecomplete theater air control system and Armyair-ground system (TACS/AAGS). On paper,the CAOC and ASOC are already connectedwith TACPs, FSEs, and the Army’s commandand control of the air at all levels, as well aswith Airborne Warning and Control Systemaircraft and control and reporting centers—but all of them never practice together. Infact, no formal training unit exists for ASOCpersonnel; air operations center (AOC) personnelhave a formal course that does not involveASOC operations in its final exercise;and AOC Blue Flag exercises do not involveASOCs. So AOC personnel have to learn aboutthe ASOC’s robust role after arriving intheater.Similarly, Army personnel see only anAOC response cell in their corps- and divisionlevelexercises. Deconflicting ground- and airdeliveredfires in congested space is trickybusiness, and the impending proliferation ofremotely piloted aircraft will exacerbate theproblem. Future air-ground teams must notapproach this as a pickup game. They mustpractice together, develop the game plan together,and execute together.The first step should involve creating ASOCformal training and nesting it within AOCformal training, so all air-component playerswho influence air-ground integration understandTACS/AAGS interconnections. Next, inthe joint world, we should link AOC Blue Flagexercises with corps-level Warfighter or missionrehearsalexercises. Although doing so wouldrequire innovative scenarios allowing bothservices to blend their training objectives, itwould link three-star component commandersand their staffs in a training environment,thereby building a stronger foundation forjoint success. Later training innovations mightinclude multiservice exercises that fully exploitASOC/DASC/CAOC synergies.To ensure that our services start every jointgame together, perhaps the Army, Marines,and Air Force should break some joint glassand force some interdependence upon themselves.We require deeper and more effectivecross-component representation at every level(to advocate courses of action, our liaison officersshould have full access to decision makers),and General Formica’s example of trustin MNC-I’s corps ALOs suggests one way toachieve it: trade leadership billets in the AOCs

62 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006and corps staffs. Install a soldier as chief ofstrategy or chief of plans in each AOC, andinstall an airman in a similar position in eachcorps. The devil will be in the details: the servicesmust select officers well versed in groundand air schemes of maneuver, and both theArmy and Air Force personnel communitiesmust see to it that officers who serve in theseliaison roles maintain viable career paths(joint service should expand rather than contractleadership opportunities for aircrewmembers and fire supporters alike). Such abold move would be worth the personnel turbulence.By investing real authority in sisterservicepersonnel, senior ground and air commanderscan focus every plan on the jointteam’s strengths. Most importantly, the presenceof effective joint leadership at the componentlevel guarantees that every game startswith all the stars in the lineup.At the same time, a focus on junior officerscould help the Air Force develop its futurestars. At the outbrief for Joint Urban Warrior’06, a multicommand urban-warfare experiment,Maj Gen Mike Worden, USAF, askedparticipants how to most effectively integrateairpower at battalion level. Can we improveon the current situation wherein senior JTACsserve as enlisted battalion ALOs? EBALOslearn planning and liaison skills at seven-levelschool but never have the opportunity to immersethemselves in fighter, bomber, attack,and reconnaissance tactics that young aircrewmembers have. We could best infuse significantairmanship in battalion-level planning byresurrecting the BALO program, whereinA-10 pilots attached themselves to maneuverunits during their first or second flying tours.In a resource-unconstrained world, opening aBALO program to the majority of airframesand crew positions would expose battalioncommanders and staffs to a wide range of airpowercapabilities; in turn, it would expose awide cross section of aviators to ground schemesof maneuver—albeit at significant cost.Current funding and manpower limitations,however, make significant changes inbattalion-level integration unlikely. To improvetactical-level air-ground integration, theAir Force must look one level higher, highlightthe role of the brigade ALO, and placetop performers in that role. In the current environment,brigade ALOs—usually junior captains—getanywhere from two to nine monthsof training and then deploy to Iraq or Afghanistanas the senior Air Force representative toa colonel who commands 5,000 soldiers. TheALO’s ability to advocate makes or breaks airpower’scontribution in a large battlespace—historically, though, Airmen have shunnedbrigade ALO duty. 12 If the Air Force wants effectiveintegration at the grassroots level, itshould assign its up-and-comers as ALOs—precisely as the Marines do.The Marine Corps uses a ground-liaisontour as a stepping-stone to weapons school,ensuring that lower-level ground commandersget the best airpower advice available.According to Col Lawrence Roberts, USMC,commander of Joint Forces Command’s JointFires Integration and Interoperability Team,most of the graduates of the USMC Weaponsand Tactics Instructor Course do a tour of12–18 months as ground forward air controllers(GFAC)—equivalent to battalion or brigadeALOs—en route to that school: “To ensurethe ground community is well representedby aviators, and to ensure the training cadreof the squadron is well represented by aviatorswith ground experience, those consideredfor weapons school must achieve the GFACwicket first or a career-level school like ExpeditionaryWarfare School (EWS) . . . GFAC beingthe preferred prerequisite, EWS a suitablealternative.” 13Although the Air Force may not be ready tohave its weapons-school selectees do a 12-to-18-month tour at an Army post en route toNellis, AFB, Nevada, it should at least assignsecond-assignment mission commanders oraircraft commanders to these critical billets.Doing so would instantly improve the qualityof advice given to Army commanders and simultaneouslybuild a bench of well-roundedfuture Air Force commanders. Flying squadronsdeserve leaders with joint vision and experience—andBattlefield Airmen, divisioncommanders, and corps commanders demandcommanders of air support operations

COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 63squadrons and ASOGs who can orchestratethe full range of airpower’s capabilities.Finally, after planting jointness more deeplyinto war-fighting headquarters at all levels, theservices should optimize their approaches tofire-support coordination—primarily by redefiningstandard coordination measures tomatch current practice. A memorandum fromJames A. Thomson, president of RAND Corporation,to Secretary of Defense Donald H.Rumsfeld included lessons for conductingmajor combat operations, the second of whichfocused on integration of air-land operations:“Changes need to be made in the traditionallinear approach to the coordination of air andground fire support. A nonlinear system of‘kill boxes’ should be adopted, as technologypermits.” 14 To be sure, the traditional idea of afire support coordination line is irrelevant incounterinsurgency operations and had novalue in Iraq in 2004—kill boxes formed thecommon frame of reference for tasking air assets.Looking to the future, as the RANDmemo argues, “kill boxes can be sized foropen terrain or urban warfare, and opened orclosed quickly in response to a dynamic militarysituation.” 15As an executive summary for the secretaryof defense, this memo goes into no further detail.Within four months, however, the AirLand Sea Application Center published FieldManual 3-09.34, Kill Box Multi-Service Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures [MTTP] for Kill BoxEmployment, 14 June 2005, and the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense commissioned ajoint test and evaluation of the new MTTP.Although the test is in its earliest phases, thefirst joint-test-and-evaluation experiments (attendedby the author) suggest that the newdocument has not fully captured the intent ofthe RAND memo.Kill boxes are to be opened and closed byexception to focus air-delivered fires in specificareas rather than to integrate air and surfacefires across the battlespace. Furthermore,the MTTP relies on a traditional approach ofsupported/supporting relationships regardingthe critical question of who opens andcloses kill boxes. Test-team members, led byCol Gary Webb, USAF, the test director, areexploring improvements to the MTTP—andthey might benefit from RAND’s research.The new MTTP leaves authority in the supportedcomponent’s hands, but RAND analystshave suggested an innovative, interdependentapproach. In a study entitled Beyond Close AirSupport: Forging a New Air-Ground Partnership,Bruce R. Pirnie and others foresee mutuallyenabling partnerships between fire-andmaneuvercommanders in which “the mostappropriate commander [has] the requisiteauthority to accomplish his assigned tasks”and in which “Army and Air Force staff-levelofficers working together in the ASOC wouldopen and close [kill boxes] as needed” because“to an increasing degree, especially forthe Army’s light forces, maneuver and air attackwill enable each other, and they need tobe thought out together.” 16 The JFEC/ASOCexperience in Baghdad suggests that this ispossible, and the rules of engagement forweapons approval offer an overarching principlefor kill-box management: risk assessment.Quite simply, the commander most able toassess and mitigate political and military riskshould control a given kill box. In a counterinsurgencyfight, the ground commander willalways be responsible for managing the politicalfallout of joint fires, and in a close fighthe or she will add the risk-to-troops factor tothe equation—so maneuver commandersshould control those kill boxes. In deep operations,however, the air commander will oftenhave more visibility on the political risk ofbombing. Furthermore, the air commanderalmost always will be better positioned (withimportant input from the special operationscomponent) to determine the military risk ofa mission. In all these cases, a joint collocatedteam—just like the team from the third floorof Victory Palace—should manage the processon behalf of the responsible commanders.ConclusionGeneral Metz is not alone in his enthusiasmfor the current partnership betweenground power and airpower. At the Joint Firesand Effects Seminar at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in

64 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 20062005, a number of speakers emphasized theinterdependent relationship between fire andmaneuver. The RAND memo to SecretaryRumsfeld highlighted the “increasing interdependenceof air and ground forces,” notingin particular how “air operations reduced substantiallythe costs and risks of ground operations”in Iraq. 17 Recent events demonstrate thatjointness has taken root even more deeply incurrent operations. Army and Air Force personnelin Baghdad cemented their partnershipin MNC-I’s JFEC and ASOC; the trust andcloseness they developed grew to encompassall the players involved in focusing joint firesand effects within Iraq. The Marines’ DASC,Baghdad’s ASOC, and the CAOC in Qatarjointly managed an air war that facilitated successin Fallujah; the CAOC in turn led a processthat worked through the JFEC and tactical-level FSEs to maximize airpower’s nonlethalinfluence on Iraqi elections.Because many of these elements had neverpracticed together, they stumbled occasionally,and soldiers, sailors, marines, and Airmenshould work together to correct those deficiencies.As RAND’s memo argued, “fixedwing aviation should be better integrated withground forces by increasing the realism andfrequency of joint training.” 18 At the sametime, the services can work to create a moreeffectivejoint lessons-learned process, developinnovative joint-assignment policies, and adjustnewly developing fire-support doctrine—all to ensure that future commanders understandhow maneuver and fire enable eachother so they can start every joint game withtop players in the lineup. qNotes1. Lt Gen Thomas F. Metz to Lt Gen Walter E.Buchanan III, letter, 9 February 2005.2. III Corps presentation. Slides available from the Officeof the Commanding General, III Corps, Fort Hood, TX.3. For more detail on the organization of the JFEC, seePatrecia Slayden Hollis, “Part 1: Joint Effects for the MNC-Iin OIF II” [interview with Brig Gen Richard P. Formica],Field Artillery, May–June 2005, 5–9, http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/2005/MAY_JUN_2005/PAGE5-9.pdf.4. Ibid., 7–8.5. Army Regulation 15-6, Procedure for Investigating Officersand Boards of Officers, 30 October 1996.6. Lt Col John T. Ryan, former commander, 2d Battalion,12th Cavalry Regiment, to the author, e-mail, 19May 2005. The term sparkled refers to a marking techniquevisible through night observation devices.7. Lt Col Gary Kling (presentation, Naval AmphibiousBase Little Creek, Norfolk, VA, 11 May 2005); and idem tothe author, e-mail, 19 May 2005.8. Capt Joseph A. Katz, “Afghanistan: The Role of ‘Showof-Presence’Aircraft in the First Democratic Elections,”Field Artillery, January–February 2005, 15, http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/2005/JAN_FEB_2005/PAGE15-17.pdf.9. Author’s notes from the briefing, ca. 10 January 2005.10. 3d BCT / 1st Infantry Division TACP to MNC-IASOC, electronic chat, 30 January 2005. Logs on file at712th Air Support Operations Squadron, Fort Hood, TX.Quotation is unclassified, but database and logs are classifiedSecret.11. Col Michael Formica to the author, e-mail, 25 May2005.12. See Colonel Formica’s comments above. Significantly,Colonel Formica had a highly experienced lieutenantcolonel serve as his ALO during November’s Fallujahoperations. He then took two Air Force captains underhis wing for follow-up operations.13. Col Lawrence Roberts to the author, e-mail, 18April 2006.14. James A. Thomson to Donald H. Rumsfeld, memorandum,7 February 2005.15. Ibid.16. Bruce R. Pirnie et al., Beyond Close Air Support:Forging a New Air-Ground Partnership, RAND Report MG-301-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005),86, 83, 85, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG301.pdf.17. Thomson to Rumsfeld, memorandum.18. Ibid.

ASPJQuick-LookA New Operational Assessment ParadigmSplitting the StoplightsMAJ KIRSTEN MESSER, USAFMAJ SHANE DOUGHERTY, USAFOPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT (OA)plays a crucial role in the successfulapplication of airpower, enablingdevelopment and revisionof air strategy by “closing the loop” on the airtasking order’s cycle. Because the global waron terrorism has prompted alterations in theapplication of airpower, however, analystsmust shift their approach to OA to accommodatethose changes. The conflicts in which theUnited States has fought since the end of theCold War have emphasized the large-scale applicationof airpower to deliver precise, kineticeffects. By contrast, in Operations EnduringFreedom and Iraqi Freedom, the air componentfinds itself in a supporting role, deliveringfewer kinetic effects in favor of nonkineticones such as deterrence. In such a context,analysts must tailor their approach to OA sothey can accurately assess the attainment ofdesired effects and support the joint force aircomponent commander’s (JFACC) decisionson the best use of limited resources.Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Controlfor Joint Air Operations, gives the air componentcommander responsibility for assessing“the results of joint air operations.” 1 Air ForceOperational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures(AFOTTP) 2-3.2, Air and Space OperationsCenter, assigns this responsibility to theJFACC’s operational assessment team (OAT). 2Doctrinal guidance on how to conduct assessmentfocuses mainly on tactical-level assessments,including battle damage assessment(BDA) and munitions effectiveness assessment(MEA). Guidance specific to assessment at theoperational level describes a general processof “rolling up” the tactical-level assessmentsusing the strategy-to-task linkage developed bythe Strategy Division.Using this delineation from task to objectiveas the foundation for assessment remainsthe same regardless of whether the air componentis supported or supporting. There are,however, significant differences in how onebuilds an assessment on that foundation. Whenthe air component assumes a supporting role,uncertainties exist in determining the goal tobe assessed, building tactical-assessment inputto the OA process, and evaluating and reportingeffects across components.With airpower as supporter, the operationalobjective might read, “Support command Xin achieving effect A.” So the air componenthas two goals: it must provide support to commandX and do so with the purpose of achievingeffect A. Which of these goals should theassessment measure?Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages.Looking at things from an effectsbasedperspective (achieve effect A) is generallythe preferred approach to assessmentbecause it captures progress toward the overallgoal and highlights opportunities to improve65

66 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006strategy. When the air component lends support,however, the JFACC is responsible neitherfor determining the overall desired effectnor for developing the overall strategy to meetit. In this case, effects-based assessment (EBA)may fail to identify shortfalls of the currentstrategy (since the air component—hence theOAT—may not have insight into the strategy).Furthermore, even if weaknesses in the strategybecome apparent, the JFACC has limited abilityto implement improvements since the supportedcomponent has that responsibility.These limitations reduce the utility of EBAwhen the air component provides support.On the other hand, if the OAT focuses onproviding support (support command X), it canconfine the assessment to tasks and objectivesunder the JFACC’s control, thus improvingthe ability to use assessment to shape strategy.Such an assessment, though, may go no furtherthan measuring whether or not the aircomponent gave the supported commanderwhat he or she asked for. This relies on thesupported commander to determine how bestto employ airpower and never addresses theoverall desired effect, much less the causallink between airpower actions and achievementof that effect.To reap the benefits of both approachesand mitigate the drawbacks, we have introduceda “split assessment.” For each objective,the OAT presents two assessments: one ofprogress toward the overall joint effect andone of airpower’s contribution toward that effect(see fig.). We use a modification of thestoplight chart. The color of the top half ofthe block represents a qualitative assessment(green, yellow, or red) of airpower’s contribution,and that of the bottom half indicates alike assessment of the overall joint effect.Figure. Split assessmentThe OAT assesses airpower’s contributionbased on the strategy-to-task structure. Largelydrawing on performance-based metrics, thisportion of the assessment in some cases includesa roll-up to the tactical, objective level. However,since the JFACC does not have ultimate responsibilityfor reaching the operational objective,the top half of the block usually doesn’t reflectthe level of attaining the overall objective. Insteadit indicates the air component’s contributionto the overall joint effect. The top half dealswith actions and effects under the JFACC’s control,lends itself to shaping air strategy, and supportsthe JFACC’s decision making on the bestuse of limited resources.Since the supported commander must producethe overall joint effect, the assessment ofprogress toward that objective falls under hisor her control as well. The OAT does not performthe assessment that determines the colorin the bottom half of the block; the supportedcommand performs that function. It existsprimarily to benefit the JFACC’s situationalawareness and to provide context for the tophalf of the block. Assessment of the joint effect,by itself, should not dictate changes tostrategy. Although we discuss the split assessmenthere in the context of the JFACC’s actingas a supported commander, one could applythe same technique more broadly to assessother enabling functions, such as intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); spaceoperations; and information operations.Split assessment measures the support ofthe commander and the attainment of specificeffects, but some difficulties remain whenthe air component assumes a supporting role.Specifically, this situation usually produces alower operations tempo than one would findin a major air war, which results in a smallerair operations center with relatively fewer personnel.This, in turn, leads to a smaller OAT,reduced in-house tactical-assessment capabilities,and fewer attached personnel. DoctrinalOA guidance assumes that a robust in-housetactical-assessment capability exists. The variousproducts of such an assessment, including mission assessment, BDA, and MEA, not only serve as stand-alone analyses to inform the commander, but also form the tactical-levelfoundation on which the OAT relies to deter-mine performance at the operational level. Re-duction of this function places a heavier bur-

QUICK-LOOK 67den on the OAT. First, the team must do moredata mining to gather the needed tactical-levelinputs. Second, in this situation the OAT oftenbecomes the only source for in-house scientificanalysis, so the commander utilizes it toanswer a wide range of tactical-assessmentquestions normally handled by other offices.One could consider a variety of solutions atan institutional level to address the considerableneed for tactical assessment. In the shortterm, one could enable tactical assessment byleveraging current manning in a theater’s airand space operations centers differently. Inthe long term, the new A-staff structure, includingthe A-9 (Studies and Analyses, Assessments,and Lessons Learned), might help.Perhaps the forward-deployed OAT could makemore extensive use of reachback for tacticallevelinputs. All of these bear further scrutinybeyond the scope of this article.To help alleviate the tactical-assessmentburden, the OAT at Air Expeditionary Force7/8, US Central Command Air Forces, hasimplemented assessment information requirements(AIR), a list of specific informationitems, based on the strategy-to-task construct,that the team needs to feed its assessment.This is not a new idea—the OAT at SeventhAir Force uses it, and other OA organizationspossibly do so as well. An analyst determinesthe information necessary to accurately measureeach success indicator, measure of effectiveness,or measure of performance (MOP)and identifies the sources of the information.Both the specific information and the sourcecomprise an AIR, each of which is then incorporatedinto the air operations directive,along with information on reporting procedures.Organizations responsible for reportingon the AIRs should have a hand in developingthem if at all possible. In many cases,one can leverage an existing report or productto meet the need. For example, considerthe MOP contained in a partial strategy-to-taskbreakdown (table 1).This MOP gives rise to two AIRs: (1) theOAT needs to know how many EW/GCI radarsare in critical areas, and (2) it needs to knowhow many have been destroyed. The Intelligence,Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division(ISRD) is the source of this information(table 2). One would then expect the ISRD toreport this information to the OAT periodically,in sync with the assessment cycle.The use of AIRs does not completely alleviatethe need for increased tactical-assessmentTable 1. Strategy to taskOperational Objective Tactical Objective Tactical TaskAir superiority throughout Enemy Integrated Air Destruction of electronic-warfarethe joint operations area Defense System neutralized (EW)/ ground control intercept(GCI) radars in critical areasAdapted from AFOTTP 2-1.1, Air and Space Strategy, 9 August 2002, table A3-1.MOP: X% of EW/GCIradars destroyedTable 2. Two assessment information requirementsInformation RequiredNumber of EW/GCI radars in critical areasNumber of destroyed EW/GCI radars in critical areasSourceISRDISRD

68 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006capability. However, it does ensure that theOAT will have access to the lower-level inputsrequired for performing assessments. Identifyingcritical information ahead of time reducesthe data-mining load and streamlinesthe data-reporting process by limiting the requestto only that information needed to completethe assessments.Determining the impact of air operationson achieving the desired operational-level effectrepresents a third challenge of assessmentfrom a supporting role. When the air componentis not responsible for achieving the effect,the OAT may not have insight into the actualresults of air operations. AFOTTP 2-3.2 encouragesthe establishment of cross-componentrelationships to enhance component-level assessments.3 But when the air component assumesa supporting role, these relationshipsbecome essential. It is especially critical thatthe air component ensure reliable insight intothe effects it provides by establishing feedbackmechanisms.The nature of the global war on terrorismclouds this murky issue even further. From theair component’s perspective alone, the emergenceof multirole aircraft and other capabilitieshas complicated the assessment process.In current conflicts, for example, US aircraftdeliver nonkinetic support, such as nontraditionalISR and “presence.” Unlike an assessmentof kinetic operations, whereby the aircomponent can close the loop through BDAwithout input from the supported component,the air component alone cannot evaluate theultimate effect of nonkinetic operations. Onemust document, report, and track the linkagebetween air support and end effect acrosscomponents. Furthermore, the air componentneeds to develop enduring internal processesto evaluate nonkinetic effects at thesame level of detail it does for kinetic effects.The air component must document when,where, and with whom its aircraft are working,as well as the effect desired by the supportedcommander; further, it must record this informationin a central location and enter the outcomeof each sortie, based on feedback fromthe supported component. Although missionreports currently describe each sortie, onegenerally finds them filed in a folder ratherthan catalogued in a meaningful, user-friendlyway that allows analysts to extract key informationabout the effects provided by airpower.When airpower acts in a supporting role,effects-based analysis can succeed only whenthe air component receives feedback from thesupported component on the last portion ofthe effects chain.In summary, the use of airpower in theglobal war on terrorism is driving changes inthe way we assess our progress toward realizingoperational objectives. Split assessmentprovides the JFACC information about his orher performance in the context of the overalljoint effect, and the use of AIRs lightens thetactical-assessment load on a pared-down OAT.Finally, one must establish a close working relationshipwith the supported component’sassessment team in order to accurately capturethe effects produced by airpower. Use ofall three techniques allows the OAT to providethe JFACC an assessment tailored to the currentconflict, enables the development ofstrategy, and supports decision making on theuse of limited resources.Opportunities for continued improvementin the assessment process remain plentiful.We must acquire a clearer understanding ofhow airpower truly contributes to counterinsurgencyoperations in today’s conflicts. Wemust learn how to perform tactical assessmentsfor nonkinetic effects and do so with alean, forward-deployed force. Lastly, we needto master the coordination of reporting andassessment across components. Progress inthese areas will assure our continued dominancein warfare, even as the shape of thebattlefield changes beneath us. qNotes1. Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control for JointAir Operations, 5 June 2003, III-26, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_30.pdf.2. Air Force Operational Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures (AFOTTP) 2-3.2, Air and Space Operations Center,13 December 2004, sec. 3.5.3. Ibid.

Filling the Stealth Gap and Enhancing Global Strike Task Force OperationsMAJ COLLIN T. IRETON, USAF*Editorial Abstract: Recent US government planning and budgeting decisions have forecast therapid drawdown and phaseout of the F-117 Nighthawk aircraft. The author refutes opposing argumentsthat the new F-22A will fill the gap caused by the loss of the F-117. He contends instead thatthe F-22A phase-in will be too slow and that its weapons suite (also used by the B-2 Spirit fleet) willprove insufficient to perform the critical roles the F-117 currently executes with distinction.O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.—Sun TzuSURPRISE, GAINED THROUGH stealth,has long been recognized as a key tosuccess in warfare. Its early applicationto aerial operations was inevitable: theAustro-Hungarian air force made a stab at it in1912 with a celluloid-covered Taube that wasreportedly invisible at an altitude of 900–1,200feet. Similar aircraft first saw combat with theLuftwaffe in 1916, but poor response to weatherand combat damage, as well as large variationsin detection range based on lighting conditions,conspired to cripple a promising idea.The concept was shortly resurrected as radartechnology matured and was linked to shooter*Special thanks to Mr. Steven Chisler of the 40th Flight Test Squadron, Eglin AFB, Florida, for providing much of the source material.69

70 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006systems. Still, the nascent technology allowedonly moderately reduced signatures via shapeblending and the use of radar-absorbent materials.Early low observable (LO) drones andaircraft such as the A-12 (and later the SR-71)still needed to rely on speed, overflight, andelectronic countermeasures to ensure survivability.Later, ground-breaking research byGerman and Soviet physicists Arnold Sommerfeldand Pyotr Ufimtsev, respectively, greatlyadvanced the science by enhancing the understandingof radar’s reaction to simple shapes.However, American practicality embodied inBill Schroeder’s finite, two-dimensionally surfacedaircraft models and Denys Overholser’scomputer simulations was required to allowLockheed to design the first aircraft completelyreliant on stealth. 1 By early 1983, theworld’s first modern LO aircraft—the F-117ANighthawk—was ready for war. 2Since then, LO technology has shown itsworth a number of times. Although importantto the air campaign in Operation Iraqi Freedom,it proved decisive in theaters with robustIntegrated Air Defense Systems (IADS), asdemonstrated in Operations Desert Storm andAllied Force. However, the battlefield continuesto become more dangerous with the steadyproliferation of highly lethal surface-to-airmissile (SAM) systems and the linking ofhighly capable radar systems via expansive, oftenautomated, communication systems to ensurethe sharing of target information acrossthe shooter network. Of particular concernare China and Iran, potential adversaries interestedin aggressively upgrading their defensivesystems.Recognizing these emerging threats andthe inherent merit of LO technology, the AirForce made a significant investment in the B-2Spirit bomber. When the Spirit became operationalin 1997, it joined a tiny pool of limitedproductionstrike assets dedicated to penetratingan IADS rather than beating it back. Today,the bulk of the LO force consists of about 50F-117As and 21 B-2s, buttressed by an emergingF-22 fleet. Program Budget Decision (PBD)720, however, demands the retirement of 10Nighthawks in fiscal year (FY) 2007 and theremainder of them in FY 2008. 3 If PBD 720becomes law, the majority of the Air Force’sLO strike force would exit the field, leavingonly a small group of aircraft for missions requiringsurprise through stealth. Cutting 50 ofthe country’s dedicated LO strike assets whileit faces potentially hostile, well-armed nationsis risky—and may have profound effects. Ifconfronted with a mature and aggressiveIADS, the Air Force may discover that it hascompromised combat capability by allowing astealth gap to develop. Potentially, the UnitedStates may find itself unable to enforce its willin areas of vital interest.Even though the service has embraced LOtechnology and plans to field a host of followonstealthy combat aircraft, nearly a decadewill pass before they can replace the venerable,proven Nighthawk. Even when this new generationof aircraft reaches the front lines,many of their capabilities won’t match thosecurrently resident in the F-117. Furthermore,the Nighthawk’s unique capabilities can helpenable the Global Strike Task Force (GSTF)concept. This article contends that a stealthgap exists and that the F-117 could fill it. Italso demonstrates how minimal fiscal outlayson F-117 upgrades could not only help addressthis problem but also support the goal ofimplementing the GSTF concept.Current and Future CapabilitiesLike chaff, electronic countermeasures,improved maneuverability, or expansive flightenvelopes, stealth technology is just anothertool that allows an aircraft to survive its approachto and egress from a target. Othermethods achieve the same outcome, but allbenefit from stealth. Rather than treatingstealth as a strap-on package, one must give itconsideration during every step of aircraft development.By all accounts, the F-15E is a superbaircraft, but no modification can make itstealthy; rather, one needs an entirely new design.This fact has spawned the next generationof LO aircraft and weapons, including the F-22,F-35, and AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface StandoffMissile (JASSM) to complement our tinyarsenal of B-2s and F-117s.

FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 71Each of these systems has strengths as wellas weaknesses that affect its ability to close thelooming stealth gap. The F-22 is optimized forair-to-air combat but will have the ability toemploy the GBU-32 (a 1,000-pound Joint DirectAttack Munition [ JDAM]) and GBU-39small-diameter bomb (SDB). 4 Classified as anear-precision weapon, the JDAM can achievea circular error probable (CEP) slightly in excessof two meters (disregarding target locationerror [TLE], a factor associated with theuncertainty of actual target location). 5 Becauseof the JDAM’s predominantly “launchand leave” employment, without coordinaterefinement before release, the TLE (which canexceed seven meters) is large enough to excludeit as a true precision weapon. 6 In fact, allweapons aided by the global positioning system(GPS) (including the SDB) and droppedfrom a platform without some method of correctionfor TLE have the same problem. Theinitial version of the SDB, with its 12-channelGPS guidance package combined with theGPS Accuracy Improvement Initiative and improvedTLE, can attain a CEP of only five toeight meters. 7 This level of accuracy rendersthe SDB (with a warhead containing just 50pounds of explosive) suitable for only a limitedtarget set. At some time, the F-22 may overcomethis limitation with high-resolution syntheticaperture radar (SAR) mapping that will allowprerelease coordinate refinement—or with alater version of the SDB projected to incorporatea terminal seeker and target-recognitionsoftware. Until then, the F-22 remains incapableof delivering precision weapons.Nor will the F-22 be able to destroy manyhardened or buried targets. The GBU-32 uses a1,000-pound Mk-83 general-purpose warhead—not a dedicated, case-hardened penetratorsuch as the BLU-110. Furthermore, althoughthe SDB reportedly has good penetration capability,its ability to destroy anything otherthan small or soft targets with its diminutivewarhead is suspect.Perhaps the F-22’s greatest disadvantage isthat it won’t be available in large numbers forsome time. Although the aircraft officially becameoperational in December 2005, the paucityof assets ensures its primary use in theair-to-air mission, with only a modest bombdroppingrole during conflicts in the near future.8 Annual production numbers vary fromsource to source—and from budget decisionto budget decision—but will likely stay in theneighborhood of 36 aircraft per year. Thepresident’s budget submission for FY 2005 allowedfor an end state of 276 aircraft; however,an internal Department of Defense PBD of2004 recommends an end state of 183, andPBD 720 suggests the same number. 9 In theend, the roughly 180 aircraft that we could possiblyprocure by 2010 will add only modestly tothe United States’ stealthy strike capability.The most substantial addition to this capabilitymight well come from the F-35, which,unlike the F-22, can drop a variety of GPSaidedweapons as well as laser-guided bombsand comes equipped with an electro-opticaltargeting system. 10 This system will allow guidanceof these bombs for true precision-deliverycapability. Aircraft can attack hardened targetswith either the GBU-31 equipped withthe BLU-109 penetrator-bomb body or thevenerable GBU-10 similarly equipped. Like theF-22, however, the F-35 will not be available fora number of years. The first flight of the productionmodel is slated for late 2006 with aninitial operational date of 2013. 11 But in lightof recent acquisition-program delays withsimilar manned systems, this date seems optimistic.More than likely, the F-35 will not jointhe existing stealth strike force in large numbersfor another decade—possibly even later.The AGM-158 JASSM—an autonomous,stealthy, and precise air-launched strike assetavailable today—could help legacy aircraftbridge the stealth gap. The system’s GPS-aidedinertial navigation is augmented by a terminalinfrared seeker that reportedly can drive a TLEinclusiveCEP to the three-meter level, thus attainingtrue precision. Absence of the terminalseeker reduces accuracy to about 13 meters. 12The weapon can purportedly deliver its 1,000-pound-class unitary warhead—with penetrationcapabilities close to those of the BLU-109—approximately 200 nautical miles (nm). 13Already operational on the B-52 and B-2—and soon to be operational on the B-1, F-16,and F/A-18E/F—the JASSM will help shrink

72 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006the stealth gap. However, it too has limitations.For a standoff weapon, it enjoys exceptionalrange, though still inadequate to reach targetsdeep within an enemy IADS. The threat systemsresident in the IADS will dictate the releaselocation of the weapons. One can easilyimagine a theater where legacy aircraft haveto deliver ordnance 50–100 nm from the edgeof the IADS, which will limit the weapons totargets within the barrier SAM ring or just beyond.Additionally, the JASSM currently carriesonly a penetrator warhead—not a suitablechoice for all targets. The AGM-158’s limitedrange and inability to produce desired effectsagainst all targets keep it from providing a finalremedy to the stealth gap.The B-2, on the other hand, goes a longway toward doing so. The aircraft certainly hasthe range and LO features to strike nearly anywhere.Its SAR provides excellent range andrange-rate information that, when combinedwith GPS position and velocity data, can reduceTLE. One could then send this informationto weapons such as the GBU-36 and GBU-37 GPS-aided munitions to destroy a variety oftargets. A near-precision weapon consisting ofa guidance tail kit mounted to an Mk-84 bombbody, the GBU-36 will likely be replaced by thestandard GBU-31 JDAM. The GBU-37 has asimilar tail kit but mounts to the 4,500-poundBLU-113 penetrator, giving the B-2 a deeppenetrationcapability to complement itsmore-conventional weaponry. Although neitherweapon is precise, the B-2’s ability to minimizeTLE allows these munitions to approachtrue precision. 14Unfortunately, the limited number of B-2sand their periodic nonavailability due toscheduled and nonscheduled maintenanceadversely affect the Air Force’s ability to usethem to destroy large numbers of targetsquickly and decisively. Indeed, only 16 of thesebombers are combat coded, and those aircrafthave a mission-capable rate of just 30.5 percent.15 Often, however, an aircraft in need ofminor repair may still prove suitable for combat—butnot against a robust IADS, whichwould require fully combat-capable aircraft.The remainder of the current LO strikeforce consists of the 50 F-117s, which, likeother aircraft, have strengths and weaknesses.This single-seat attack aircraft has less rangethan a true bomber but more than most tacticalfighters, enabling it to perform deep-strikemissions. Based on this author’s observations,mission-capable rates compare favorably tothose of other fighters (around 80 percent),ensuring the availability of a suitable force. Aninfrared targeting system with a laser designatordrives TLE to zero. The F-117’s two bombbays have internal storage for a variety ofweapons, including Paveway II and III laserguidedbombs, unguided cluster-bomb units,and the inertially guided and GPS-aided enhancedGBU-27, which can also guide to a laserspot. JDAM capability will be incorporatedby the end of the year; however, funds forthe integration of wind-corrected munitionsdispenserintegration have already been absorbedby PBD 720. This flexibility in weaponryallows the jet to attack a host of targets:buildings, bridges, and area targets, as well asdeeply buried, hardened targets. In fact, itsability to destroy hardened targets is unparalleled.By using two GBU-27 Paveway III precisionweapons in an optimized delivery, the systemcan penetrate deeper than even the B-2’snear-precision GBU-37. 16 Additionally, the enhancedGBU-27 (which doesn’t require laserguidance) gives the Nighthawk an all-weather,deep-penetration, hard-target defeat capability.USAF photoAs an added benefit, all these weapons canbe brought to bear with minimal or no helpfrom the GPS. Although this system has provenitself reliable and extraordinarily valuable to

FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 73the US war machine, which has incorporatedit into every new weapon, overreliance on anystrength can create both a weakness and anopportunity for an adversary. Plans for GPSjammers clog the Internet, for example, andat least one Russian firm (Aviaconversia) currentlymarkets a portable GPS jammer of unknowneffectiveness. But more credible andserious threats to the GPS may exist: “Nationsor groups hostile to the U.S. possess or canacquire the means to disrupt or destroy U.S.space systems by attacking the satellites inspace, their communication nodes on theground and in space, or ground nodes thatcommand the satellites.” 17 Even a partially disabledGPS would degrade or conceivably nullifyall B-2 and F-22 munitions. The F-117,though, would still find and destroy its targets—whetherburied and hardened or tinyand hidden—and do so with just the rightweapon for the desired effect.The aircraft’s maturity offers yet anotheradvantage. Having flown over 1,600 combatmissions since 1989, the F-117 has demonstratedits effectiveness, lethality, and survivability.Its tactics are established, and its capabilitieswell understood. The aircraft stands byto fill a critical role for the Air Force, forming(along with the B-2) a thin line that comprisesour nation’s LO strike capability. This forcewill fill the gap until such time that otherdedicated, stealthy strike platforms becomeavailable and mature enough to face a sophisticatedIADS.Any member of a supposedly antiquatedweapon-system community knows about thescarcity of resources and plans for sustainmentas well as the acquisition of new capabilities.Although funds for sustaining the F-117haven’t dried up (several airframe improvementsare under way, assuring integrity for theforeseeable future), plans and money for newweapons and capabilities are rapidly fading.This situation points to the crux of the problem:eliminating the F-117 and depriving it ofupgrades will deny us the robust LO strikeforce we need to overcome today’s and tomorrow’sstealth gap. The Nighthawk’s uniqueand worthwhile advantages have enabled it todevastate our enemies. The fact that we havenot replicated these capabilities in the newLO generation of aircraft guarantees not onlya stealth gap but also a strike-capabilitiesgap—not an appealing prospect for the future.Global Strike Task ForceIn 2001 Gen John Jumper, then the AirForce chief of staff, outlined the GSTF conceptand his vision of the service’s kick-downthe-doorforce, making the point that “theconcept hinges on precision weapons andstealth capabilities inherent in the B-2 andF-22.” General Jumper identified the key technologiesthat will enable successful GSTF operations:precision, all-weather weapons, stealth,and supercruise. In his concept, “B-2s, enabledby F-22s and in conjunction with standoffplatforms such as the B-52, will target theenemy’s antiaccess weapons, launch sites, and[command and control] . . . just as we havedone with air defense networks in recent conflicts.”The F-22s will complement the B-2s’moonless-night operations by using stealthand supersonic cruise to shrink the enemy’sthreat rings and deliver air-to-ground weaponsday or night. 18Technically speaking, neither the B-2 nor theF-22 can currently deliver precision weapons.Granted, the B-2’s SAR mapping capability andexcellent munitions make it more than capableof performing its role, but the F-22 will remainunable to deliver precision weapons unless wefund, develop, and field an SDB versionequipped with a terminal seeker. Even then,the aircraft’s diminutive warhead will restrictits ability to destroy all but a subset of existingtargets. In the meantime, the F-22 can engageonly a narrow array of targets compatible withthe GBU-39 and the GBU-32, thus essentiallyeliminating any target requiring penetrationand substantial blast, buried and hardenedtargets, and area targets. The tiny B-2 fleet willhave to handle anything else.Consider, for a moment, the F-117 in thisrole. Having explored daytime operations, theNighthawk has already completed a host of testsinvolving new tactics and a daytime-compatiblepaint scheme. 19 The aircraft cannot super-

74 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006cruise, but just as sophisticated electroniccountermeasures and enhanced tactics replacedearly performance-based threat-avoidance techniques,so can the Nighthawk offset its moderateperformance with advanced mission simulationand planning. Autorouting softwarecreates minimum-risk routing and links it toan accurate autopilot, allowing the jet to wormdeeply into IADS-protected territory. Linkingthe F-117’s ability to shrink threat envelopesintelligently with its larger payload of more diverseordnance (mostly true precision weapons)produces a useful addition to the GSTF.Enhancing the Nighthawk’s GSTF contributioneven further would require incorporatinga second facet of General Jumper’s GSTFvision. Specifically, this involves “horizontallyintegrated command, control, intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (C 2 ISR),” inwhich a host of space assets, unmanned aerialvehicles, and wide-body platforms collects anddisseminates information on the order of battle.We would then run this information throughpredictive-analysis tools to develop predictivebattlespace awareness (PBA) with the goal ofnot only gaining a detailed understanding ofthe current battlespace but also predictinghow it will change with respect to threats andtargets: “Machine-level coordination with spacebasedplatforms will fill gaps in the airborneplatforms’ coverage.” 20 A couple of technologicalenhancements to the Nighthawk canleverage data available in the PBA concept toenhance the aircraft’s value in upcoming conflicts.Now is the time to adapt the Nighthawkto ensure that it fits future war-fighting concepts.To fill the current stealth gap and enhancethe long-term GSTF concept, we shouldretain the F-117.What the F-117 NeedsIn order to access data resident in the C 2 ISRnetwork, the F-117 must have a data gateway—a data link. The architecture of the system isunimportant as long as it allows reception—and perhaps minimal input to the network. Byleveraging threat and target information collectedby ISR assets, the Nighthawk can increaseits lethality and use its own predictivetools to enhance survivability. This capabilityrepresents a step beyond “real time in thecockpit” by providing imagery and text for targetingas well as route and threat information.Before this can happen, the Nighthawk requiresairborne access to planning resourcesresident in the existing F-117 mission-planningsystem. To minimize threat exposure, the aircraftpresently uses computer-calculated routing(autorouting)—a ground-based system thatutilizes threat data available before launch. 21Thus, in certain cases, the information used toplan the mission could be outdated; ideally, ofcourse, routing data would draw on real-timethreat information. If an airborne autorouter(threat data from the C 2 ISR network accessedvia the aforementioned data-link gateway)were incorporated into the Nighthawk, the jetcould worm its way through enemy defensesintelligently, based on current threat information.Alternatively, routing data could be generatedon the ground, with information fromthe C 2 ISR network, and passed via the datalinkgateway to an airborne force of F-117s.Though timely, the airborne version wouldlikely offer only a simplified solution that mightnot wholly account for the routing of otheraircraft. The ground-based version would takeadvantage of larger processors, dedicated missionplanners, and knowledge of multiple,conflicting routes. In either case, airborne accessto autoroute planning would greatly enhanceadvanced IADS penetration.This approach differs fundamentally fromthe supersonic, high-altitude penetration solutionoffered by the F-22—but it is no lessvalid. Potentially, in fact, it offers more flexibilitysince threat avoidance through autoroutingremains valid at both high and lowaltitude. Long-distance, supersonic flight becomesrealistic only at high altitude, and, asGeneral Jumper correctly stipulated, we needboth high-altitude and supersonic flight toshrink late-technology SAM envelopes. Intelligentlyworming by means of a precalculatedroute at low altitude enables the Nighthawk tocapitalize on direct as well as indirect terrainmasking. Stealth, intelligent routing, andmedium- or low-altitude operations will per-

FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 75mit the F-117 to penetrate an advanced IADSduring the gap years and beyond.Breaching the IADS is only the most obviousadvantage, however. According to GeneralJumper’s concept of PBA, time-sensitive targetinggains new dimensions. We will usereachback to complete PBA for targeting variousaspects of the enemy’s ability to wage war.In the general’s vision, “targeting will entailmore than a target name, a black-and-whitephotograph, and mensurated coordinates.Desired mean point of impact . . . analysis ofsecond- and third-order effects, [rules of engagement]target confirmation, and collateraldamageassessment will be part of a processcompleted and transmitted” to attack aircraft(such as the F-117) equipped with an appropriatedata gateway. 22With these two simple, technology-basedupgrades, the Nighthawk would reach newheights of lethality. Armed with timely threatdata and a plethora of laser-guided and GPSaidedweapons, the F-117 could bring to beartrue precision-delivery ability via proven andflexible tactics on almost any IADS. Imaginefor a moment the following scenario: A forceof F-117s launches to join a strike package ofB-2s with F-22 escort. As they fly to a prestriketanker, a higher-headquarters, time-sensitivetarget comes to light. Headquarters staff examinesit, determines the rules of engagement,and conducts a collateral-damage assessment.Concurrently, F-117 mission planners choosethe appropriate ordnance from the variety alreadyairborne within the Nighthawks’ bombbays and plan the most survivable route—lowor medium altitude—consistent with the threatsand desired effects. Meanwhile, national assetsconfirm the electronic order of battle(noting new threat locations and identifyingthe truly active SAM systems) and submit thedata to the C 2 ISR network. With several newthreats located and others assessed as dormant,Nighthawk mission planners replan thestrikes and introduce new routes and the timesensitivetarget-data package to the network.Instead of receiving a verbal update on theelectronic order of battle, the pilots get newroutes to their original targets. One pilot, justfinishing prestrike aerial refueling, receivesthe time-sensitive targeting order, route, targetcoordinates, photos, and desired meanpoints of impact. The rest of the package departsto conduct the planned strike while thelone Nighthawk descends to low altitude andjoins the new data-linked route to the designatedhigh-priority target. In this example,timely, accurate data increases flexibility anddrives survivability and lethality to new levels.ConclusionPossible adversaries such as China and Iranare aggressively upgrading their IADS with advancedSAMs and state-of-the-art communicationsystems. The Air Force’s approach to defeatingsuch systems makes extensive use ofLO technology, which has proven successfulin recent operations. The current mainstay ofthe LO strike force consists of the service’sfleets of limited-production F-117s and B-2s—fewer than 100 combined. But PBD 720 proposesto eliminate the F-117 in the next coupleof years; moreover, small numbers and lowmission-capable rates compromise the highlycapable B-2. Although the Air Force has embracedstealth technology and plans a host ofnew weapon systems to make up for theseshortfalls, most remain in the developmentalstage. Although operational, the F-22 will notbe available in large numbers for some time;even then, the aircraft’s small, inflexible airto-groundweaponry impedes it. Similarly, theJASSM’s range and unitary warhead limits itstarget set. As a whole, the systems in developmentare excellent long-range solutions to thepresent stealth gap.But the possibility of confronting an aggressiveand well-armed adversary in the shortterm, combined with the imminent demise ofthe F-117, will create a stealth gap and hamperUS power projection. The Nighthawk’s excellentLO characteristics, good range, GPS independence,diverse weapons with a surfeit ofavailable target-based effects, bunker-bustingability, and true precision capabilities are unmatchedin either the current or future inventory.Instead of retiring the F-117, the Air Forcewould do well to consider the advantages of

76 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006incorporating it into the developing GSTFconcept for the long term. The jet not onlylends required weapons and target flexibilitycurrently unavailable in General Jumper’s visionbut also promises unsurpassed flexibility.With just a couple of current-technology upgrades,the Nighthawk could leverage the envisionedGSTF C 2 ISR network to enable air-borne time-sensitive targeting and enhancedIADS penetration. Because any serious approachto the GSTF concept demands utilizationof the Nighthawk’s unique, worthwhilecapabilities, we should plan for this event, deferPBD 720’s proposed retirement of theNighthawk, and upgrade the F-117 to fill thestealth gap. qNotes1. Curtis Peebles, Dark Eagles: A History of Top SecretU.S. Aircraft Programs (Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1995),136–67.2. Briefing, Diana Filliman, Washington, DC, subject:F-117 Sustainment: Performance-Based Logistics, 15 November2005.3. Pamela Hess, “Air Force Cuts F-117, B-52, AddsF-22s,” 11 January 2006, National Guard Association ofthe United States, http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000821/UPI%20Reports%20PBD%20720%20Air%20Force%20Cuts.pdf#search=’pbd%20720%20f117.4. “F-22A Raptor Advanced Tactical Fighter Aircraft USAir Force, USA,” Airforce-technology.com, http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/f22 (accessed 23 November2005).5. Briefing, Rick Hyde, Washington, DC, subject:JDAM, 15 November 2005.6. Dr. Cerrato, chief JDAM engineer, conversationwith the author.7. “Small Diameter Bomb / Small Smart Bomb,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/sdb.htm (accessed 26 November 2005).8. “AF Officials Declare F-22A Operational,” Sunburst48, no. 50 (16 December 2005): 8, http://www.holloman.af.mil/sunburst/2005/12December/December16web.pdf.9. Christopher Bolkcom, F/A-22 Raptor, CRS Reportfor Congress RL31673 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress,Congressional Research Service, 3 March 2005),2–7, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31673.pdf;and Hess, “Air Force Cuts.”10. “JSF (F35) Joint Strike Fighter, International,”Airforce-technology.com, http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/jsf (accessed 25 November 2005).11. Ibid.; and Robert Wall, “F-35 In-Service Dates Slide,”Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 June 2004, http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/search/autosuggest.jsp?docid=366670&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aviationnow.com%2Favnow%2Fnews%2Fchannel_awst_story.jsp%3Fview%3Dstory%26id%3Dnews%2F06144wna.xml.12. “JASSM Launch & Leave: Subsonic Cruise MissileDesign” (Eglin AFB, FL: Air Force Armament Team NewsConnection, 1999), http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/docs/990000-jassm.htm (accessed 27 November2005).13. “Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM),”Defense Update, 6 November 2005, http://www.defense-update.com/products/j/jassm.htm (accessed 27 November2005).14. “Global Positioning System Aided Munition(GAM) [GBU-36/B & GBU-37/B],” Federation of AmericanScientists: Military Analysis Network, 26 December 1998,http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/gam.htm(accessed 1 December 2005).15. Adam J. Hebert, “Long-Range Strike in a Hurry,”Air Force Magazine 87, no. 11 (November 2004): 30, http://www.afa.org/magazine/nov2004/1104strike.pdf; and BruceRolfsen, “Battling Wear and Tear,” Air Force Times, 26 December2005, 18.16. Maj Hobart Alford, chief of weapons, 9th FighterSquadron, conversation with the author.17. Tom Wilson, Threats to United States Space Capabilities[prepared for the Commission to Assess United States NationalSecurity Space Management and Organization],2001, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2001/nssmo/article05.pdf (accessed 21February 2006).18. Gen John P. Jumper, “Global Strike Task Force: ATransforming Concept, Forged by Experience,” AerospacePower Journal 15, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 30–31, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/spr01/jumper.pdf.19. Laura Pellegrino, “A Nighthawk in Raptor’s Clothing,”Air Force Link, 9 December 2003, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?StoryID=123006171 (accessed 5 December2005).20. Jumper, “Global Strike Task Force,” 29–30.21. Federation of American Scientists, “Air Force MissionSupport System (AFMSS),” 9 January 1999, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/equip/afmss.htm (accessed6 December 2005).22. Jumper, “Global Strike Task Force,” 30–31.

Space PowerAn Ill-Suited SpaceStrategyCDR JOHN J. KLEIN, USNEditorial Abstract: For the US military,space power has emerged asthe dominant strategic frameworkfor executing space warfare. CommanderKlein asserts that this framework,inherently offensive in natureand application, is myopic. Contendingthat the United States hasalready achieved space supremacy,he argues that a maritime-inspiredspace strategy will better suit US militarypurposes by ensuring the defenseof celestial lines of communicationsand enhancing the protection of vitalhardware.FORCE-ON-FORCE MILITARY engagementsare the most difficult and dangerouskinds of operations that warfighters will conduct, so strategic plannersnaturally tend to focus their attentionand efforts on them. Traditionally, one includessuch engagements within the military’sstrategic context of “power,” as with sea powerand airpower strategies. Thus, when strategicplanners consider military operations from,into, and through space, they frequently thinkin terms of “space power.” As exemplified bythe title of this journal and the fact that spaceenabledtechnologies play a pivotal role withinUS national security strategy, space power doesindeed become an important considerationfor the war fighter.Nevertheless, the moniker space power is anill-suited strategic context for considering thediverse national interests and activities inspace. For many countries—especially theUnited States—activities in space affect theirdiplomatic, information, military, and economicinterests. 1 Consequently, any space strategyshould address much more than just militaryconcerns. Today’s prevalent power approachto thinking about space strategy, however,primarily focuses on military affairs, whichhas resulted in war fighters having a predilectionto overemphasize offensive strategy and77

78 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006weapon systems. But by using maritime strategyfor inspiration, the strategic planner canproperly understand the role of defensivestrategy, the necessity of ensuring access tospace, the need to disperse assets and systems,and the implications of making space a “barrier”to an adversary.What’s in a Name?If the term space power and its strategic contextare inadequate, then what is the properstrategic framework for considering spacewarfare? The answer to this question lies inhow our contemporary power-type strategycame about. Many military professionals readilyknow that the term space power came from asimilar application of the term airpower. 2 Thiswould seem a reasonable decision since airand space are adjoining environments andshare some of the same technical and operationalconsiderations. 3 But where did the strategiccontext of airpower come from?Many of airpower’s strategic assumptionsowe their lineage to sea power as developed bythe US Navy, which received the fundamentalprecepts of sea power from Rear Adm AlfredThayer Mahan (1840–1914), an Americannaval officer, historian, and strategist commonlyregarded as the most important analystof sea power. Particularly renowned for hiswork The Influence of Sea Power upon History,1660–1783, Mahan notes that sea power is primarilyconcerned with war at sea, shipbuilding,commercial shipping, naval bases, andtraining naval personnel. 4 To achieve its strategicends, sea power calls for fleet-on-fleetengagements against the enemy’s navy in orderto achieve a decisive victory through offensiveactions. In the end, sea power is a measureof one nation’s ability to use the seas andoceans in defiance of rivals. 5The US Air Force successfully applied apower philosophy to the strategy of air warfare.By advancing the cause of airpower asthe most efficient instrument of offensivestrategy and the preferred method of strategicdeterrence, the Air Force incorporated thesame fundamental assumptions the Navy hadused prior to and through World War II. Accordingto some historians, the Air Force’sleadership was actually more adept at advocatinga power-type strategy than the Navy’s,much to the chagrin of many naval officers ofthe time. 6 Consequently, airpower replacedsea power as the keystone of US national securitystrategy. 7As exemplified by the Navy’s experienceduring the first half of the twentieth century, apower-type strategy becomes advantageouswhen a country attempts to establish dominanceamong the international community.Nevertheless, once a nation does so in a specifiedwarfare area, such a strategy provideslittle insight into solving the most pressing futuresecurity issues. Although the Navy stillholds Mahan in high esteem, his ideas and seapower strategy have minimal applicability inpresent US maritime strategy. 8Differing from classical sea power strategy,which seeks a decisive fleet-on-fleet battle, theNavy’s present maritime strategy embraces theinterrelationship between the land and sea.Because the maritime domain includes theseas and oceans of the world, along with theland adjacent to them, maritime strategy affectsa nation’s diplomatic, information, military,and economic instruments of power.Hence, a sound maritime strategy mustbroadly consider the role of conducting internationalpolitics and leadership; promotingeconomic prosperity; ensuring freedom ofnavigation; protecting against hostile, terrorist,and criminal acts; promoting peace andsecurity; establishing forward presence; andprojecting power. 9 Sea power strategy, therefore,is but a subset of maritime strategy.Remarkably, the maritime considerationslisted above are strikingly similar to the diplomatic,information, military, and economicnational interests related to space. Since maritimeand space activities have similar strategicinterests, along with the fact that both mediumsencompass distant “bases” or hubs of operationsseparated along distant lines of communication(LOC), they will share similarstrategies. 10 Therefore, instead of a power-typestrategy owing its lineage to Mahan’s sea powerstrategy, space strategy would be better served

SPACE POWER 79by using a more encompassing maritime strategyas a strategic springboard for considering thecomplex interactions of space warfare.Corbett’s Maritime StrategyOne finds the best maritime strategicframework for considering space strategy inthe writings of Sir Julian Stafford Corbett(1854–1922), a British theorist and strategistconsidered by many historians as Great Britain’sgreatest maritime strategist. He is renownedfor his work Some Principles of MaritimeStrategy, published in 1911, which received acclaimfor its “fusion of history and strategy” indescribing the strategic principles of the maritimedomain. 11 Even though Corbett writes onmany of the same issues as Mahan, Corbettmore accurately details the intricacies of maritimestrategy since he addresses those areasindirectly affected by naval operations, such asdiplomatic and economic concerns.According to Corbett, the sea has inherentvalue as a means of communication. 12 Becauseof this, naval warfare seeks to ensure one’s accessto and use of sea lines of communication(SLOC) while denying the same to the enemy.One who can successfully do so enjoys all thebenefits of operating upon and from the seaand has “command of the sea.” 13 By establishingsuch command, a maritime nation canmove freely along SLOCs while minimizingthe risk coming from an enemy’s attacks alongthem. The vital necessity of ensuring one’s accessto and use of LOCs places primary importanceupon naval vessels that directly supportthis mission; vessels that do not serve this function—includingthe battleship—are of secondaryimportance.Corbett describes how navies can affect thebalance of power between competing nations.By building a superior naval fleet and achievingcommand of the sea, a nation garnersmore diplomatic, military, and economicpower than nations without a strong navy. Indoing so, a maritime nation can better protectits worldwide interests and remain capable ofinterfering with an adversary’s seaborne commerceand trade. Even minor actions canachieve modest diplomatic and economic resultsbecause such efforts against an adversary’seconomic trade routes or fleet can affect thebalance of wealth and power between rivals. 14Since a maritime nation extensively uses itsSLOCs for trade and commerce, it must protectand defend those lines considered mostvital. To do this, Corbett argues that navalforces must disperse along expansive LOCsyet be able to concentrate overwhelming forcerapidly when needed. 15 No matter how mucha war plan calls for the close concentration ofnaval forces, protection of commerce andtrade along SLOCs necessitates the dispersalof forces. Thus, a sound maritime strategyplaces concentration in tension with dispersalat all times. 16 Corbett writes, “Such is concentrationreasonably understood—not huddledtogether like a drove of sheep, but distributedwith a regard to a common purpose, andlinked together by the effectual energy of asingle will.” 17One finds Corbett’s most controversial departurefrom Mahan’s sea power thought inhis belief that defensive strategy is just as necessaryas offensive strategy. Like the Prussianmilitary theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), Corbett views offensive strategy as themore “effective” form of war and defensivestrategy as the “stronger” form—both ofthem integral parts of any overarching militarystrategy. 18 Because the defense is thestronger form of warfare, a defensive strategyenables inferior naval forces to achieve notableresults, especially when one considersthat if those forces undertook offensive operationsagainst a superior foe, they wouldlikely be destroyed. Defensive strategy comesinto play when political objectives necessitatepreventing the enemy from acquiring somethingor achieving a political objective. 19 Furthermore,defensive strategy involves an attitudeof alert expectation that awaits themoment when the enemy exposes himself,making possible a successful counterattack. 20Despite the many advantages of this approach,Corbett was concerned that most naval officersof his day had exalted offensive strategyand actions at the expense of implementinga sound defensive strategy.

80 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006Using maritime strategy as a framework forspace strategy has benefits, but this approachhas weaknesses too. The most readily apparentone is the disparity between the requiredtechnologies to operate within the two environments.Despite the sophistication andtechnological advancement of today’s warships,they generally are not as advanced asmost spacecraft. The technological sophisticationrequired to operate from, through, andin space seems more similar to that requiredto operate in the air—especially aircraft designedto fly at very high speeds and altitudes.Since available technology frequently dictatesmilitary tactics, it stands to reason that tacticsemployed in space should more closely resemblethose of air operations rather thanmaritime operations. 21If maritime operations seem to have littleapplicability at the tactical level of space warfare,the war fighter might wonder about theutility of a maritime-inspired space strategy.The answer lies in a paradox: at the tacticallevel of warfare, space activities resemble airactivities, but at the strategic level of warfare,space activities resemble maritime activities. 22Regardless of the shortcomings arising fromthe technological and tactical disparities betweenspace and maritime operations, onecan formulate the strategic principles of spacewarfare without considering the precedent oftechnology and tactics, which tend to changewith the passage of time anyway. This is a goodthing since strategic principles—if indeedthey are such—should remain timeless. 23 Sousing a maritime strategy as a framework actuallyincreases the likelihood of deriving an enduringstrategy of space warfare.Even though the diplomatic, informational,military, and economic interests in the maritimeenvironment closely resemble those inthe space environment, space is not the sea.Despite the strategic-level similarities betweenmaritime and space operations, the aforementionedtechnological and tactical differencesbetween the two environments necessitate thatany space-warfare strategy have a context andlexicon all its own. 24 Therefore, a maritimeinspiredspace strategy simply provides a commonlanguage for thinking about military operationsfrom, into, and through space.What It Means forSpace StrategyAlthough the power approach to spacestrategy is prevalent among military planners,one should note that much of a maritimeinspiredstrategy for space already agrees withcontemporary literature on space strategy. Asmentioned above, maritime strategic thoughtsuggests that space has inherent value as ameans of communication, making it vital toensure one’s access to and use of space. Thisthinking is supported by Joint Publication3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, whichnotes the need to “provide freedom of actionin space for friendly forces while, when directed,denying it to an adversary.” 25 Consequently,joint doctrine properly emphasizesthe need to ensure one’s access to and use ofcelestial LOCs while minimizing the enemy’ssame access and use. 26Additionally, a maritime-inspired spacestrategy underscores the idea that space operationsand activities are closely tied to nationalinterests. This thought is borne out by the factthat much of the US economy and its day-todaycommercial operations rely upon spaceenabledsystems; furthermore, because spacereliantcommerce and trade affect the overalleconomic well-being of the United States,space is tied to national power. More importantly,the precedent of maritime strategy suggeststhat any spacefaring nation may protectand defend its interests in space, even with theuse of force. Such sentiments are in agreementwith the Space Commission Report of 2001,which maintains that because the UnitedStates relies upon many space-enabled technologies,it may protect its interests by employingmeans that “deter and defend” againsthostile acts in and from space, including, byimplication, the potential use of force. 27Nevertheless, a maritime-inspired spacestrategy also provides insights not found inthe current literature on space strategy. Themost profound of them concern the proper

SPACE POWER 81role of offensive and defensive strategy. Offensivestrategy in space becomes appropriatewhen political objectives necessitate wrestingor acquiring something from the adversary;such operations frequently achieve politicalgoals or establish a military advantage. In lightof Clausewitz’s and Corbett’s belief that the offensiveis the more effective form of warfare,the stronger space power should usually attemptoffensive operations in space. 28 A forcethat takes the offensive and looks for a decisivevictory, however, will likely not find it sincethe enemy’s most vital assets and forces willusually take defensive or other proactive measureswhen attack is imminent. For this reason,war fighters must exercise caution whendeciding in favor of offensive operations;otherwise, they may throw away space-basedsystems on “ill-considered offensives.” 29Defensive strategy, on the other hand,comes into play when political objectives necessitatepreventing the enemy from achievingor gaining something. Because defensiveoperations by their very nature are the“stronger” form of warfare, less capablespace forces should use them extensivelyuntil they can adopt an offensive strategy. 30A truly defensive posture awaits the blowfrom a position of advantage. 31Although it is often simpler to discuss offensiveor defensive strategies separately, theyare mutually dependent and so intertwinedthat ultimately one cannot succeed withoutthe other. For instance, defensive operationsprotect the very LOCs that make offensive operationspossible. Additionally, defensive strategiesfrequently require fewer forces and assetsthan do offensive strategies, so defensive operationsin some regions facilitate the concentrationof military forces or effects to supportoffensive operations in other regions.The primary objective of space warfare is toensure one’s ability to access and use celestialLOCs. In maritime strategy, the cruiser assuressuch access; in the classical sense, this vesselhas sufficient range and endurance to protectdistant and dispersed SLOCs. Because maritimeand space strategies share similar fundamentalconcerns, one needs a conceptualequivalent to the naval cruiser to protect anddefend interests in space. 32Understandably, the pragmatic war fighterwill want to know specifics on how to implementa “space cruiser.” Such specifics lie morein the realm of technology and tactics insteadof strategy, but a maritime-inspiredspace strategy is useless unless it can providereal-world, tactical examples. In order to designand implement a cruiser concept forspace, one must realize that its mission involvesensuring access to and use of space.The specific design of this concept dependsupon the mission it must perform, not preconceivedideas resulting from an analogy to aseagoing surface vessel. Consequently, implementinga cruiser concept for space necessitatesfielding platforms and systems that allowfor the self-defense of LOCs, afford redundancyof space-communication services, andprotect high-value assets. Technological andtactical examples of such systems include communicationsatellites designed to employdirected-energy weapons in self-defense whenattacked by another space-based system; orbitalspares of high-value satellites that provideservices in the event of the primary satellite’sloss; hunter-killer microsatellites capableof ramming an adversary’s threatening satellite;or a space-based weapons platform thatdetects, engages, and destroys an enemy’santisatellite (ASAT) weapon. 33Yet celestial LOCs presently employ bothterrestrial and space assets, as with communicationuplinks and downlinks. This observationimplies that the space-cruiser conceptmust include land, sea, and air platforms aswell to protect one’s access to and use of space.Consequently, the concept also includes utilizationof landline communication networks thatact as a redundant communication path to aspace-based network, launch vehicles meantto replace a damaged satellite in orbit quicklyand responsively, naval vessels capable oflaunching missiles to destroy an enemy’s ASATlaunch vehicle, or an airborne laser that disablesa satellite which is jamming orbital communications.As mentioned above, space warfareseeks to access and use celestial LOCs, soregardless of whether the space-cruiser con-

82 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006cept utilizes land, sea, air, or space systems tomeet this objective, such systems are of thegreatest importance in space strategy.As discerned from maritime strategy, oneshould generally disperse space-enabled technologiesand systems to cover the widest possibleregion, yet they should maintain theability to concentrate forces and effects rapidly.Such dispersal can protect a variety of interestswhile facilitating defensive operationsalong many different celestial LOCs at once. 34When one needs offensive operations to neutralizea significant threat, these technologiesand systems should then concentrate firepoweror other desired effects to defeat anadversary quickly. Tactical implementationwould include satellites that transmit a directional,low-power jamming signal. Although asingle satellite would have only a limited effectin a selected area, a constellation of such satellitesacting cooperatively could block anenemy’s celestial LOCs within a wide region ofspace. 35 Similarly, such an implementationwould also include a constellation of orbitingweapons platforms capable of deployingkinetic-energy weapons against one or moreterrestrial targets.As with the space-cruiser concept, thisstrategy of dispersal and concentration shouldemploy both terrestrial and space-based systems.Therefore, one should use land, sea,and air assets in conjunction with each otherto attack and neutralize an enemy’s spaceassets or communication systems. Examplesinclude land-launched ASAT weapons, sealaunchedcruise missiles targeting the enemy’scommunication uplinks, and aircraft carryingdirected-energy weapons capable of destroyingorbiting satellites. Dispersing such systemsaround the globe and in all environments allowsone to engage an enemy’s space-basedassets with overwhelming force through multiplemeans.Employing a strategy of dispersal and concentrationpreserves the flexibility of protectingexpansive LOCs while allowing engagementof an adversary’s “central mass” whenand where needed. 36 When attempting todeny the enemy’s use of his celestial LOCs,however, the war fighter must rememberthat—as with maritime communications—LOCs in space often run parallel to theenemy’s and may even be shared with him.Therefore, one frequently cannot attack anadversary’s space communications withoutaffecting one’s own.Considering a similar application of commandof the sea from maritime strategy, onesees that establishing command of space ensuresone’s access to and use of celestial LOCs.Yet space becomes a barrier to those who lacksuch access and use. A spacefaring nation’sability to access and use celestial LOCs is paramount;only by doing so can one fully realizethe advantages of operating in space. If suchaccess and use is not possible—whether an adversarydenies access to celestial LOCs or one’stechnological capability proves insufficient tolaunch space vehicles into orbit—then spaceeffectively becomes an obstacle or a barrier. 37Although such a condition cannot preventan enemy’s sporadic or minor attacks, establishingcommand of space and making spacea barrier to potential foes allow one to bettercontrol the escalation of future hostilities,give better freedom of action for conductingmilitary operations, minimize the effectivenessof an adversary’s counterattack, and providea significant strategic-deterrence capability.38 All of these measures better protect anation’s diplomatic, information, military,and economic interests.So What?The United States currently has supremacyin space and in the employment of spacebasedtechnologies, so the power approach tospace strategy presently used by many militaryplanners would seem to have served the nationquite well. As a result, the war fighter mightquestion the need to embrace a maritimeinspiredspace strategy. Nevertheless, spacepower strategy based upon a classical powerapproach is ill suited for describing and consideringthe true nature of military strategy in,from, and through space. The problem with aMahanian-style power strategy is that despiteits usefulness when a country attempts to

SPACE POWER 83achieve supremacy in a medium of warfare,after the country has done so, its usefulness tothe strategic planner or policy maker becomesminimal. The US Navy long ago abandonedsea power as a stand-alone framework formaritime strategy since Mahan’s sea powerstrategy focused too narrowly on offensivestrategy and the need to seek a decisive battle.Similarly, space power is an inappropriatestand-alone strategy for space.Furthermore, a maritime-inspired spacestrategy has highlighted ideas not present incurrent space power strategy, including theidea that systems which ensure one’s access toand use of celestial LOCs are the most criticalconcern of space strategy. Consequently, systemsthat protect and defend LOCs in spacehave priority over those that do not share thismission—including purely offensive weaponsystems that don’t protect and defend celestialLOCs. 39 A proper understanding of offensiveand defensive strategies reveals that one mayuse the latter to ensure access to celestialLOCs. Defensive strategies, therefore, thatharden space systems against electromagneticdamage, provide self-defense against offensive1. United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Forces CommandGlossary, http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm.One uses diplomatic, information, military, and economicareas of national power in effects-based operations.2. Gen Thomas D. White, chief of staff of the AirForce, “Air and Space Are Indivisible,” Air Force 4, no. 3(March 1958): 40–41.3. However, many critics have argued against combiningair and space strategies, noting that propulsive, aerodynamic,and orbital conditions make air and space quitedistinct environments. Maj M. V. Smith, Ten PropositionsRegarding Spacepower, Fairchild Paper (Maxwell AFB, AL:Air University Press, October 2002), 94–96.4. See Capt A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Powerupon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,1890).5. E. B. Potter et al., eds., Sea Power: A Naval History(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960), 19.6. George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: TheU.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford UniversityPress, 1994), 276. “The Air Force took over the most popularNavy positions—and turned them against the Navy” (ibid.).7. “Command of the air replaced command of the seaas the main determinant of national destiny.” Ibid.; andJohn B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Mariattack,or incorporate redundant system capabilitiesare all suitable methods of protectingcelestial LOCs while achieving a significantlevel of command in space. Sincedefensive strategy is just as important as offensivestrategy in any overall war plan, anyspace strategy that focuses too intently onthe application of force or the role of offensiveweapon systems is myopic.Today outer space supports the actions ofthe military services. To a significant extent,many soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmenare already intimately involved with employingspace-enabled technologies when theyexecute their missions. In effect, we now havespace warriors. Because of the inherent limitationsof a power-type space strategy, a maritimeinspiredstrategy can better enlighten thesewar fighters on the correct strategy for spacewarfare. Our war fighters demand and deservethe best strategies for considering future militaryoperations, and the best framework forspace strategy is based upon centuries of maritimeexperience. We would do well to acknowledgethat fact. qNotestime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper no. 19 (Newport,RI: Naval War College Press, 2004), 5.8. The failure of naval officers to understand and appreciatenaval history and maritime strategy has been welldocumented for over 100 years. J. K. Laughton, “The ScientificStudy of Naval History,” Journal of the Royal UnitedServices Institute 18 (1875): 508–9; and John B. Hattendorf,“The Uses of Maritime History in and for the Navy,” NavalWar College Review 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 13–38.9. The National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington,DC: [The White House,] September 2005), 1–2,http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/4844-nsms.pdf;Adm Mike Mullen, chief of naval operations, “CNO Guidancefor 2006: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era,”http://www.navy.mil/features/2006CNOG.pdf (accessed12 May 2006); Gen J. L. Jones, commandant of the MarineCorps, Marine Corps Strategy 21 (Washington, DC: Departmentof the Navy, Headquarters US Marine Corps, 3 November2000), 1, http://www.marines.mil/templateml.nsf/25241abbb036b230852569c4004eff0e/$FILE/strategy.pdf;and Hattendorf, “Uses of Maritime History,” 19.10. The environment of operations—including thestrategic positions within it—affects one’s strategy. WolfgangWegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War, trans.

84 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006Holger H. Herwig (1929; repr., Annapolis: Naval InstitutePress, 1989), 36, 82, and 129.11. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy(1911; repr., Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), xxxvii.Quotation attributed to Lt Alfred Dewar in Pall MallGazette, 22 December 1911.12. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 91–93.13. Ibid., 91.14. Ibid., 60.15. Ibid., 132.16. Ibid., 133.17. Ibid., 131. Here Corbett paraphrases Mahan’sthoughts.18. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. MichaelHoward and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1989), 97 and 358; and Corbett, Some Principlesof Maritime Strategy, 31–33 and 310–11.19. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 32.20. Ibid.21. Cdr John J. Klein, Space Warfare: Strategy, Principlesand Policy (London: Routledge, 2006), 154.22. Ibid.23. Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini shares a similarview: “Principles are unchanging, independent of thekind of weapons, of historical time and of place.” EdwardMead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thoughtfrom Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1971), 4; and Antoine-Henri de Jomini, The Artof War, trans. O. F. Winship and E. E. McLean (New York:G. P. Putnam, 1854), 17 and 347.24. Klein, Space Warfare, 21.25. Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations,9 August 2002, x, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf.26. Col Peter Zwack, US Army, defined celestial lines ofcommunication (CLOC) while conducting research for theMahan Scholars Program at the Naval War College in 2003.In this context, celestial means the visible sky and heavens.27. US Commission to Assess United States NationalSecurity Space Management and Organization, Report ofthe Commission to Assess United States National Security SpaceManagement and Organization (Washington, DC: The Commission,11 January 2001), x (also referred to as the SpaceCommission Report), http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.pdf.28. Clausewitz, On War, 97 and 358; and Corbett, SomePrinciples of Maritime Strategy, 31–33 and 310–11.29. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, xxviii.Similarly, Clausewitz warns, “It is a risky business to attack anable opponent in a good position” (emphasis in original). OnWar, 535.30. Clausewitz, On War, 97 and 358; and Corbett, SomePrinciples of Maritime Strategy, 31–33 and 310–11.31. Clausewitz, On War, 357 and 404.32. Klein, Space Warfare, 159.33. Ibid., 111–13.34. Ibid., 132–33.35. Ibid., 113.36. Ibid., 133. Both Clausewitz and Corbett use theterm central mass.37. Klein, Space Warfare, 100.38. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 60.39. Corbett believed that ships should be pulled fromthe battle fleet to control maritime communications evenif doing so reduced the fleet to the minimum allowableforce. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 116–17.Successful joint operations are made possible by the capabilities developedand embodied in each Service, including Service “cultures,”heroes, and professional standards.—Joint Publication 1,Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,14 November 2000

Military TransformationEnds,Ways, and MeansDR. JACK D. KEM, COLONEL, USA, RETIREDEditorial Abstract: True transformation in a military organization goes far beyond justmaking adjustments, “rightsizing,” altering methods of mission accomplishment, or reengineering.Dr. Kem argues that a unit attains transformation only when its ultimatepurpose for existence changes. The final outcome for the US military could extend beyondfighting our nation’s wars, conceivably enabling peace and stability to obviate combat.And be not fashioned according to this world: but be ye transformed by the renewing of yourmind, and ye may prove what is the good and acceptable and perfect will of God.—Romans 12:2 (American Standard Version)85

86 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006IN MY OFFICE, I have a unique toy calleda “transformer.” It looks like a simple carwith working wheels and what appear tobe chrome headlights. But wait! When Itake it apart and transform it into a great warrior,the toy acquires a totally different purpose,appearance, and way of performing itsduties even though its material makeup doesnot change.In the military, one finds confusion aboutwhat transformation really means. The Departmentof Defense’s (DOD) Office of ForceTransformation (OFT) asserts that transformationin the department “addresses threemajor areas—how we do business inside theDepartment, how we work with interagencyand multinational partners, and how wefight.” 1 Many of the initiatives at the OFT involveequipment and technologies in supportof transformation, including the Navy’s LittoralCombat Ship, operationally responsive satellites,airships, and directed-energy weapons.The late Vice Adm Arthur Cebrowski suggestedthat “one of the great rules for transformationis if you want to transform go wherethe money is and on arrival, change the rules.” 2As a result, billions of dollars have been reprogrammedin military programs. According toSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “a greatdeal of programmatic redirection has takenplace.” 3 The most visible transformational effortsby the OFT and the DOD focus on equipmentand technologies.Admittedly, the OFT’s efforts have movedbeyond toys—the resources needed for warfighting. Admiral Cebrowski was adamant thatthe military transform the way it fights as wellby strongly emphasizing such areas as networkcentricwarfare, effects-based operations, leadershipdevelopment, and cultural intelligence.The war in Iraq has helped shepherd these effortstowards a new mode of war “dependenton fast movement, interdependence amongforces, jointness down to the tactical level,persistent fires and persistent surveillance.” 4For these efforts, the OFT and DOD concentrateon methodologies—how the military doeswar fighting.Dr. Francis Harvey, secretary of the Army,recently referred to the transformation of theArmy asan approach that is best described as evolutionarychange leading to revolutionary outcomes.This priority . . . means we must make a smoothtransition from the current Army to a futureArmy—one that will be better able to meet thechallenges of the 21st Century security environment.It means we must prepare our forces, inmindset, training and equipment, to operate infuture ambiguous and austere environments.But to be truly successful, this transformationmust build on our enduring Army values andrich traditions—preserving the best of the past,while changing and improving for the future. 5However, in Breaking the Phalanx, a book widelyread by military professionals, Douglas A.Macgregor, an expert on transforming themilitary, finds great resistance by the militaryto the concept of transformation, which hedescribes as a revolutionary concept:Change in military affairs can be evolutionary orrevolutionary. For it to be implemented quickly,however, the direction of organizational changemust be more revolutionary than evolutionary.This is because most of the arguments againstchange are not based on disputes about warfighting;opposition is usually rooted in established,peacetime, bureaucratic interests. . . . In otherwords, changing the organizational structureand strategic focus of the U.S. Armed Forces willrequire not only pressure and influence fromabove and outside the services, but also anticipationof how the prior experiences and culturalnorms of the rank-and-file professional militaryresistant to change will lead them to slow otherwisemisdirected change. 6Macgregor’s later book, Transformation underFire, continues his quest to change the militaryto a more relevant force for today. Here, hewrites that his focus in the earlier book wasconsistent with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’srequirement for the Army—the capability of“moving rapidly from widely dispersed stagingareas overseas and in the continental UnitedStates, deploying into a crisis or regional conflictand initiating an attack, all without pausing.”His emphasis, however, has shifted to theorganizational structure of the military: “how

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 87to organize army capabilities effectively toprovide the joint force with needed groundcapabilities.” 7Thomas P. M. Barnett has different ideasabout military transformation, which becomeapparent when he writes about or briefs hisvision to attentive audiences. He bases hisworldview on a key assumption that the conventionaland nuclear military might of theUnited States and global interdependencehave made major warfare a thing of the past—that the United States is more likely to be “embroiledin dysfunctional parts of the world[what Barnett calls the “gap”] battling terroristsand rebuilding failed states.” 8 For Barnett,transformation depends upon the geostrategicsetting—the way the world has changedand the need to be proactive in response tothose changes.All of these transformational efforts are important,but it becomes difficult to determineif the focus for transformation is on equipmentand technologies, the way the militarydoes war fighting, the organizational structureof the military, or the geostrategic setting. Infact, all of these components are critical, butwe must tie them together coherently to producea shared vision of transformation, allowingthe military culture to transform the mindsetof those who do the fighting. Without thecoherence of addressing all components oftransformation, change can still take place—but it becomes something less than real transformation.The true version requires considerationof the ends, ways, and means of theorganization within the strategic context.A Different TransformationMind-SetEffective transformation requires that organizationsaddress four specific considerations:the geostrategic setting (the context for transformation),the ends (the purpose of the organization),the ways (the methods that the organizationuses to achieve those ends), and themeans (the resources used to accomplish theways). This approach of “context, ends, ways,means” provides a holistic, coherent approachto transforming an organization; without it,an organization does not truly transform.The context provides the purpose for undergoingtransformation. It could be the geostrategicsetting or perhaps an emerging technologyor method that demands dramatic, innovativechange. For the United States, the context ofthe geostrategic setting changed dramaticallyin 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and thesubsequent downfall of the Soviet Union. Todaywe still grapple with the impact of thosechanges—and the world keeps changing whilewe contemplate the end of the Cold War. Regardlessof whether one believes that the worldis shaped according to the “core” and the“gap,” as does Barnett, or by a “clash of civilizations,”as does Samuel Huntington, or themyriad other ways of depicting the world, wedo not have a bipolar world on the edge of asuperpower confrontation—at least not today.Since the world has changed dramatically, themilitary must do so as well or become irrelevant.Organizations generally don’t have the luxuryof setting the strategic context, but theydo have a choice in their reaction to contextualchange. Once the context is determined,three approaches—one of which is transformation—addressthe changing needs of large,complex organizations (similar to changes inthe business world). The approaches, whichdeal with the ends (purpose or product), ways(methods), or means (technology and resources),include transforming the organization’spurpose (focusing on ends), reengineeringits methods (focusing on ways), ordownsizing or “rightsizing” its technology andresources (focusing on means) (see table).Table. Focus of organizational changeStrategic Secondary TertiaryFocus Focus FocusTransformation Ends Ways MeansReengineering Ways MeansRightsizing MeansTransformation is the most comprehensiveapproach. To transform a large organization,one must look at the end product and be will-

88 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006ing to make major changes in the functions(which are related to the end product) andorganizational structure. A transforming organizationwill make radical, fundamental changesin the entire organization to ensure relevancyin the marketplace, which requires an assessmentof what the latter requires. As such, atransforming organization may well dropfunctions, add functions, and modify existingfunctions; it will also necessarily modify resourcesand the means—but the emphasis remainson the end product or the very purposeof the organization. A transforming organizationmay even have a “driver” of a new resourceor a new means, but in true transformation,the purpose or ends of the organizationquickly becomes the principal concern. Duringtransformation, one considers the ends,ways, and means but keeps the strategic focuson the ends—the goals or end product.The second approach to changing an organizationcalls for reengineering—a processthat considers ways and means but does notaddress the purpose or end state. Reengineeringis not transformation; it is organizationalchange that falls short of true transformation.During this process, one addresses functionalrequirements by assessing specific functionswithin the organization and modifying the organizationalstructure. Reengineering effortsmay also look at the methods used, such asimplementing doctrinal changes and alteringthe systems within an organization. Such actionsmay result in a downsizing of some functionsand the organizational structure, as wellas “upsizing” other functions and structures.Normally, reengineering requires not onlychanges in the ways or methods used in theorganization but also modifications in its resourcesor means. But this process considersonly ways and means, emphasizing the former—howone organizes and applies resourcesto functions or functional areas.Like reengineering, downsizing or rightsizing—thethird approach—falls short of truetransformation. This process attempts to domore with less, often using technology as aforce multiplier. Downsizing organizationsrarely reexamine functions; instead, they tryto gain efficiencies in organizational structureby consolidating functions and personnel. Ofcourse, one of the common pitfalls of this approachis that the organizations indeed doless with less—and thereby frequently lose efficiency.This is particularly true when organizationsreactively adopt a “cookie-cutter” or“salami-slice” approach to downsizing. A variantapproach, though rarely used, involves upsizingor doing more with more—for example,President Reagan’s military buildup in the1980s, which escalated the arms race at all levelsto bankrupt the Soviet Union. Thus, downsizingor rightsizing considers only the means—the resources available to pursue objectives.To go one step further, an organizationundergoing downsizing attends only to themeans—shortfalls in resources. Downsizingorganizations rarely, if ever, heed the ways andends. A reengineering organization focuseson the ways and, therefore, must also addressthe means to effect those ways. A transformingorganization concentrates on the ends and, inturn, must emphasize the ways and means ofaccomplishing those ends.Most of the changes taking place in organizations,particularly in the business world, addressmanpower shortfalls—only the resourcesor means within the organization. By concentratingsolely on resources, one may rightsize—makesome people work harder to getthe same job done—but neither the ways ofdoing the organizational mission nor theproducts change. Of course, many organizationswill say that they are transforming whenin reality they aren’t considering their purpose;in fact, those organizations are eitherreengineering or rightsizing. A transformationalapproach requires that the ends, ways,and means tie together in a coherent fashionwithin the strategic context of the organization.Transformational RealityIn a perfect world, organizations shouldaddress change with a transformational approach,focusing at the strategic level on theend product. After clearly communicating theends (the product or purpose of the organization),one can identify the ways and means. Of

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 89course, we seldom find ourselves in a perfectworld. The impetus for transformationalchange may arise not only from identifying anew product or ends but also from havingdrivers of ways or means.For example, the period between the worldwars may provide some explanation of howends, ways, or means can drive transformation.Just after World War I, the military found thegeostrategic setting dramatically changed—and still changing. This time, particularly inthe late 1920s and 1930s, was one of “strategicpause.” Because the general public did notshare military leaders’ concerns about risingthreats, the military came under great pressureto reduce budgets. In spite of fiscal constraints—perhapsin some part due to them—the US military developed new organizations,doctrine, and technologies. These developmentspaid great dividends during World WarII, enabling the United States to play the decisiverole in winning that war. The National DefensePanel of 1997 noted the correlation betweenthe present time and the period of the1920s and 1930s:This focus on the long-term capabilities andchallenges [looking 10 to 20 years in the future]is essential, as is the need for military adaptationand innovation. Indeed, one can look back tothe 1920s and 1930s—a period of great geopoliticaland military-technical transformation—and see the services engaged in bold experimentationwithin tightly constrained budgets.That culture and process of innovation must beactively encouraged so that our military willemerge at the end of this transformation able toexploit the full potential of the [revolution inmilitary affairs] and prepared to address thevery different challenges the [Quadrennial DefenseReview] correctly foresees beyond 2010. 9Each of the services approached transformationin a unique and innovative way, focusingon the ends of winning the next war in arapidly changing world. Each of them, however,had different drivers for effecting thosechanges. The budding US Army Air Corpsfound that the driver for change was indeedthe technology of the airplane—the means asthe driver for transformation. The airplaneonly partially realized its utility during WorldWar I, but at Maxwell Field, Alabama, youngAirmen considered how to put this technologyto work in the next war. At the end of WorldWar I, airpower “was in its infancy. The newrole of three-dimensional warfare was eventhen foreseen by a few farsighted men.” 10 Theincreasing capability of the airplane (the means)drove doctrinal development of strategicbombing (the ways) to win the future war (theends). The Air Corps’ strategic focus duringthe 1920s and 1930s remained on the ends—but the driver (the bomber) was the means.The US Navy realized that its ways of approachingwarfare required that it changefrom relying heavily on battleships to usingaircraft-carrier battle groups. After World WarI, the Navy deteriorated, but in 1934 it beganto build up its forces—and in 1940 the servicereceived authorization to build 11 Essex-classaircraft carriers. 11 The goal of winning the waragainst the rising Japanese naval threat (theends), which led to a change in the way offighting by shifting to aircraft-carrier groups,served as the Navy’s driver for transformationin the 1930s.In the Army, drivers of change includedboth ways and means, but the extent of changeproved limited prior to World War II. In 1929Col George C. Marshall became assistant commandantof the Infantry School at Fort Benning,Georgia. As head of the Academic Departmentthere, he had a free hand to developthe course of instruction for young officers.The future chief of staff of the Army played akey role in developing the doctrine and tacticsthat his service would use successfully on thebattlefield. Forrest C. Pogue notes that Marshallhad “strong and revolutionary ideas,many of which had been developing in hismind for some years” and found himself in a“position to apply them to the training ofyoung combat officers [at the] basic trainingground for the Army’s basic fighting branch.”Marshall felt that he “could now transfuse intothe Army’s main blood stream” the things hehad learned and thought. 12George S. Patton had strongly encouragednew tactics and the use of the tank for futurewarfare (at the Army War College, he wrote athesis entitled “The Probable Characteristics

90 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006of the Next War and the Organization, Tactics,and Equipment Necessary to Meet Them”),becoming deeply involved in a number of maneuversthat tested the tank in a combinedarmsformation. At the beginning of WorldWar II, “there was no living American soldierwho knew as much as Patton about the mobility,mechanical features, fire-power, and tacticaluse of tanks.” 13 Although he did not enjoy immediatesuccess in his efforts to integrate thetank into the US Army, his drive and desire touse it in battle ultimately earned a prominentplace for this weapon in modern warfare. 14The US Marine Corps, always concernedabout its very survival, underwent the mostdramatic change. Retaining the constabularyforces that characterized the Marines duringthe 1920s would not allow the Corps to maintainrelevance in the looming global war thatwould require forces to conduct massive amphibiousoperations:In the early 1930s, the Marine Corps issued theTentative Manual for Landing Operations, whichbecame the “bible” of American amphibious assaultdoctrine in World War II, and created theFleet Marine Force . . . to operate as an integralpart of the fleet for the purposes of capturingadvanced bases. The Marine doctrine coveredall aspects of amphibious assault, including commandrelationships between land forces and thesupporting fleet, ship-to-shore movement andcommunications, air and gunfire support, andamphibious logistics. No other country in theworld, except Japan, had such an advanced doctrineby 1939. 15The resulting change constituted a completelydifferent function for the Marine Corps, resultingin amphibious doctrine (ways) and thenecessary equipment (means, such as the Higginslanding craft) to support the doctrine.Interwar experiences with military changeremain relevant today. Gen Henry H. Shelton,former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,noted that transforming the military requiresmore than just advances in technology; rather,one should focus on the resources and meansas well as operational concepts and organizationalstructures to use these technologies onthe battlefield:In the 1930s the Allied powers were hard at workdeveloping new airplanes, tanks, aircraft carriers,radar, and other advanced systems. As warbroke out, the Allies had, across the board, bettertechnology than the Germans, and more ofit. When the Germans invaded France in May of1940, they had fewer men, fewer artillery tubes,and fewer tanks than the Allies—and the tanksthey did have were inferior.But they had revolutionary operational conceptsfor employing their systems to achieve battlefieldeffects far greater than the sum of the parts.The next year they stood before the gates of Moscow,having conquered all of Europe from thearctic circle to the shores of Greece, from thecoast of France to within sight of the Kremlin. Intime, the Allies learned the hard lesson that howyou employ technology is even more importantthan the technology itself. But these lessons cameat a fearful cost. 16 (emphasis in original)Resistance to TransformationPeople view the military, normally consideredthe primary instrument for executingthe elements of national power, as the primeexample of a bureaucracy with “fixed and officialjurisdictional areas, a distributed structure,authority to give commands for dischargeof duties distributed in a stable way and strictlydelimited by rules, and methodical provisionfor the regular and continuous fulfillment ofduties.” 17 Is this an accurate description of thecurrent state of the US military today? Doesthe traditional bureaucratic model work wellfor it in this new environment? Carl vonClausewitz wrote that “everything is very simplein war, but the simplest thing is difficult,” continuinghis treatise with a discussion of frictionand how the simplest things get complicatedin the “fog of war.” 18 Planning and implementingnew organizational structures, technologies,and doctrines can indeed prove difficultfor an organization as large and steeped intradition as the US military.Warfare has become infinitely more complexsince Clausewitz’s time. Despite this increasedcomplexity and greater friction inwarfare, military organizations have maintaineda similar structure and organizational

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 91mind-set towards fighting. In many cases,the names have changed, but the mind-sethas not (e.g., the renaming of the Army’snew “units of action” structure as “brigadecombat teams,” described and used in muchthe same way as the former brigades they replaced).The advent of peacekeeping andpeacemaking missions—such as the interventionsin Somalia and Bosnia in the 1990sand the resurrection of counterinsurgencyand stability operations today in Afghanistanand Iraq—has changed the nature ofconflict. Today, most experts agree that themilitary will not fight alone: not only will theUS military join coalition partners fromother countries but also it will become morejoint. That is, single-service missions will nolonger be the norm for fighting; instead, anintegrated, cross-service approach has takenhold. 19 In new theaters of war, military commanderswill coordinate closely with nongovernmentalagencies and private volunteeragencies (e.g., Cable News Network,the International Red Cross, and Doctorswithout Borders—entities that have competinginterests). 20 These new challenges resemblethe ones all public-sector actors facetoday: more players, press coverage, and inputfrom decision makers. As Clausewitzwould say, military operations will have morefriction in the future. The military has to adjustits institutional character and structuresto accommodate these new challenges.Several analysts have criticized recent effortsat military transformation. Commentingin 1997 on Military Review’s republicationthat year of his article “How to Changean Army,” originally printed in 1984, BrigGen Huba Wass de Czege, USA, retired,noted that “the issue is how to managechange, and that problem is with us inspades today. The article is still relevant. Weare still ‘tinkering’ our way into the future.” 21Also in 1997, Lt Gen Paul Van Riper, commandantof the Marine Corps’ Combat DevelopmentCommand, and Maj Gen RobertH. Scales Jr., commandant of the Army WarCollege, published an article in Parametersentitled “Preparing for War in the 21st Century.”Drawing on the writings of Clausewitz,the authors observe that “any sustained periodof peace challenges military institutions.It requires holding on to the immutableand terrifying realities of war in a climate ofpeacetime pursuits and ease, because onlyby an understanding of what war has beencan we hope to glimpse what it will be. Toprepare for the future, we must keep a gripon the past.” 22 Essentially, Van Riper andScales warn against structuring a force tofight the last war, urging us instead to usehistory as a means to understand what mayappear in the future. Years after these twoarticles appeared, their message still resonatesbecause of our tendency to cling tothe past way of war fighting.Lt Col Ralph Peters, USA, retired, one ofthe more vocal writers about resistance to revolutionarychange, has vigorously criticized theArmy’s leadership:The Army’s top leaders are like men who haveraised a wonderful daughter, but who cannot acceptthe fact that she is no longer Daddy’s LittleGirl. They do not want to let her change. Thesegenerals cling to outmoded organizations theygrew to love and promote subordinates whoshare their prejudices. We have a great Armythat is eroding to a good but increasingly troubledone. Our personnel policies are anachronistic,our organization is inefficient, our procurementpolicies are eye-rollers, our quality ofthought has decayed, and our image is rotting.Our Army is inherently conservative. Occasionally,this serves our nation well. In times of crisis,it does not. 23In another article, he writes that “our generalsare deer caught in the headlights of history.Courageous on the battlefield, they are terrifiedof the vibrant, challenging and simultaneouswaves of change sweeping over our ownnation and the world. They are good men, butthey are old—indeed, they are far older inmindset than in body.” Concerning currentevolutionary changes, he asks, “Is this a revolutionin military affairs? Revolutions requirerevolutionaries, not just gadgets.” 24 If we maintainour current focus on transforming themilitary’s gadgets and other means, we willnot change its mind-set and culture.

92 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006ConclusionWe must keep our transformation effortsintellectually honest, taking a holistic, coherentview of transformation and lookingbeyond a gadget-oriented approach tochange. Transformation requires full assessmentof the geostrategic context for change,followed by linking the ends, ways, andmeans of war fighting. To do less than fullyconsider all four elements simply will notproduce true transformation—and willprove inadequate in today’s context. Changeis inevitable; mastering change in today’senvironment requires full understanding ofa restated purpose for our military, themethods of using it, and the necessary resourcesand technologies. The military mayno longer have as its purpose merely fightingand winning America’s wars but nowmust create conditions—partnered withother governmental and nongovernmentalagencies—for peace and stability at homeand abroad. This purpose (ends) requiresnew ways and means of applying militaryforce and capabilities.The geostrategic context has certainlychanged since the turn of the century, yet eachof the services continues to state its purpose interms of winning wars or fighting. Admittedly,war fighting will by necessity remain a core capabilityof the armed forces, but it is time torethink the purpose of the American militaryin much broader and far-reaching terms. Weshould use it as an instrument of nationalpower to guarantee the security of the UnitedStates—as well as the rest of the world—by proactivelyshaping the future. In concert with theother instruments of national power (diplomatic,informational, and economic), the militaryshould have a primary focus of serving as aproactive agent of change to move the worldtowards greater integration and freedom. Regardingthe military’s current status as a reactiveforce concerned with “hedging bets,” GenPeter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, observes that “we cannot accurately characterizethe security environment of 2025;therefore, we must hedge against this uncertaintyby identifying and developing a broadrange of capabilities. Further, we must organizeand arrange our forces to create the agility andflexibility to deal with unknowns and surprisesin the coming decades.” 25Although we may not be able to characterizethe security environment of 2025, we shouldclearly identify our vision of that environment:shifting the emphasis away from war fightingtowards a world characterized by freedom, liberty,and self-determination. This proactive visionof shaping the international-security environmenthas a precedent in the period priorto World War II. In his State of the Union addressof 6 January 1941, Pres. Franklin D.Roosevelt offered his vision of a future characterizedby four freedoms:In the future days, which we seek to make secure,we look forward to a world founded uponfour essential human freedoms.The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.The second is freedom of every person to worshipGod in his own way—everywhere in theworld.The third is freedom from want—which, translatedinto world terms, means economic understandingswhich will secure to every nation ahealthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywherein the world.The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translatedinto world terms, means a world-wide reductionof armaments to such a point and insuch a thorough fashion that no nation will bein a position to commit an act of physical aggressionagainst any neighbor—anywhere in theworld. 26President Roosevelt clearly understood andidentified the geostrategic changes taking placein the world of 1941, proposing a clear visionof how he felt the United States should endeavorto change the future for the better.Achieving that end state required the buildupof a war-fighting capability, yet the purpose(building a better world) went well beyondmerely reacting to a threat. As we transformour military forces, we should utilize the samepurpose as our driver—proactively creatingconditions for a better world rather than re-

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 93sponding to threats and challenges. Thesechanges go well beyond organizational anddoctrinal approaches; they seek to alter themind-set and purpose of the US military.After the fall of the Soviet Union, formersenator Sam Nunn said that “the United Statesstruggled for forty-five years to create a defenseestablishment that could effectively andefficiently prepare for and wage a conflictsuch as World War II or a possible global clashwith the Soviets. Hopefully the Pentagon willnot take as long to reorganize for the securitychallenges of the post–Cold War era, in whichorganizational adaptability and quickness aremajor assets.” 27 Without a doubt, we are strugglingwith organizational adaptability in thepost–Cold War era, and it is time to addressthese issues with an open mind and intellectualhonesty. To do otherwise courts disasteron the battlefield. qNotes1. The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (Washington,DC: Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation,January 2005), 6, http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_387_NCW_Book_LowRes.pdf.2. K. L. Vantran, “Transformation Begins with Leadership,”Armed Forces Press Service, 11 February 2004.3. Rebecca Christie, “Rumsfeld: Military TransformationMore Than Program Cuts,” Wall Street Journal, 8 November2004.4. Jefferson Morris, “Iraq Operations AcceleratingTransformation, Cebrowski Says,” Aerospace Daily and DefenseReport, 4 August 2004.5. Dr. Francis J. Harvey, “A Letter to the Soldiers of theUnited States Army,” January 2005, http://www.army.mil/leaders/leaders/sa/messages/2005Feb21.html.6. Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A NewDesign for Landpower in the 21st Century (Westport, CT:Praeger Publishers, 1997), 229.7. Douglas A. Macgregor, Transformation under Fire:Revolutionizing How America Fights (Westport, CT: PraegerPublishers, 2003), 3.8. Greg Jaffe, “At the Pentagon, Quirky PowerpointCarries Big Punch,” Wall Street Journal, 11 May 2004.9. “The National Defense Panel Assessment of theMay 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review,” United StatesDepartment of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/topstory/ndp_assess.html.10. The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (EuropeanWar) (Pacific War) (30 September 1945, 1 July 1946; repr.,Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1987), 5.11. Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial JapaneseNavy, 1941–1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978),4–5.12. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of aGeneral, 1889–1939 (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 248–49.13. Edgar F. Puryear Jr., 19 Stars: A Study in MilitaryCharacter and Leadership, 2d ed. (Novato, CA: PresidioPress, 1981), 384.14. Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man behind the Legend,1885–1945 (New York: William Morrow and Company,1985), 131–40.15. Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War since theEighteenth Century, 2d ed. (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 1984), 184.16. Gen Henry H. Shelton, “Operationalizing JointVision 2010,” Airpower Journal 12, no. 3 (Fall 1998): 104,http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/fal98/shelton.htm.17. Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York:Oxford University Press, 1946), 196.18. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Middlesex, England:Penguin Books, Ltd., 1968), 164.19. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: RandomHouse, 1998), 319.20. Nik Gowing, Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance inConflict Prevention? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commissionon Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997), 10.21. Huba Wass de Czege, “How to Change an Army,”Military Review 77 (January–February 1997): 162–73.22. Paul Van Riper and Robert H. Scales Jr., “Preparingfor War in the 21st Century,” Parameters 27, no. 3 (Autumn1997): 10.23. Lt Col Ralph Peters, USA, retired, “Ruinous Generals,Heroes Gone Astray,” Army Times, 16 February 1998, 31.24. Lt Col Ralph Peters, USA, retired, “Generals, It’sTime to Face Reality,” Army Times, 5 May 1998, 37.25. Gen Peter Pace, “Chairman’s Assessment of the2006 Quadrennial Defense Review,” in Quadrennial DefenseReview Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6February 2006), A-6, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf.26. Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Annual Message toCongress, January 6, 1941: The ‘Four Freedoms’ Speech,”Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum,http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/4free.html.27. Quoted in J. Paul Reason with David G. Freymann,Sailing New Seas, Newport Paper no. 13 (Newport, RI: NavalWar College Press, 1998), 6.

Revised USAF Doctrine PublicationAir Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations andOrganizationLT COL D. ROBERT POYNOR, USAF, RETIREDREVISED AIR FORCE Doctrine Document(AFDD) 2, Operations and Organization,27 June 2006 (availableat http://afdc.maxwell.af.mil), hasundergone significant updating since its publicationin 2000. Restructured for better presentationof key ideas, it introduces much newmaterial. For example, chapter 1 lays out animportant point: “Due to its speed, range, andthree-dimensional perspective, air and spacepower operates in ways that are fundamentally differentfrom other forms of military power; thus, airpower and space power are more akin to each otherthan to the other forms of military power ” (emphasisin original) (p. 1). This statement cementsthe bond between air and space, clarifyingwhy it makes sense to have the two domainsresident in a single service. Having identifiedthe inextricable bond that exists betweenthem, AFDD 2 then acknowledges that air andspace power isnot monolithic in organization and presentation.Because it encompasses a wide range ofcapabilities and operating environments, it defiesa single, general model for organization,planning, and employment. . . . At the focus ofoperations within any region, it is possible to place thecollective capabilities of air and space power in thehands of a single Airman through an adroit arrangementof command relationships, focused expeditionaryorganization, reachback, and forward deployment ofspecialized talent. (emphasis in original) (p. 1)This recognition of different organizationalmodels and ways to effectively tie them togetherlies at the heart of AFDD 2.A new chapter on operations contains theAir Force’s thinking on effects-based operationsas well as an updated discussion of therange of military operations (ROMO). TheROMO model presented here is just that—amodel. Arguably, one could create othermodels and titles for operations within theROMO. More importantly, one must understandthat Airmen may find themselves participatingin a spectrum of military tasks andthat joint and service doctrine already definesthose types of operations.The document offers another new subject—homelandoperations—treating it separatelyfrom the ROMO discussion for emphasis.The text explains the types of tasksAirmen might perform in this environmentand examines some unique organizationalconsiderations. A new section on the politicaldimension of smaller-scale contingenciescaptures material previously contained inAFDD 2-3, Military Operations other than War,3 July 2000, now rescinded following the approvalof AFDD 2. This section talks to suchissues as restraint, legitimacy, unity of effortin multilateral operations, and perseverance.AFDD 2 also touches on conflict termination,transition to follow-on operations,and redeployment.94

NOTAM 95The document’s authors have expandedthe chapter on Air Force organization afield,based on recent experience. Some discussionremains familiar, such as the basic structureof the air and space expeditionary task force(AETF) and the roles of the commander, AirForce forces (COMAFFOR) as well as thejoint force air and space component commander.One also finds a broader, clarifiedtreatment of command relationships—easilythe squeakiest wheel in many joint scenarios—again based on lessons learned. A new sectionaddresses the integration of regionallybased and functionally organized forces,picking up the theme introduced at the beginningof the publication.An added chapter on joint organization,paralleling the discussion of Air Force organization,explains how the AETF plugs into ajoint force and offers other nuggets regardingair and space power within such a force. Thechapter on planning considerations now includesdetails regarding effects-based operationsin planning. In its revised treatment ofair and space operations centers, AFDD 2 nowtouches on air-mobility and space-operationscenters, organization, and processes. Furthermore,the revamped A-staff discussion incorporatescurrent responsibilities.The document deliberately omits any explicationof the new Air Force component headquarters/ war-fighting headquarters (AFCHQ/WFHQ) because the governing directives andshape of this organization remain under development.One should note that the AFCHQ/WFHQ leverages principles contained inAFDD 2: responsibilities of the COMAFFOR,structure of the AETF, and lash-up of commandrelationships and authorities alreadypresented in the publication. Details of theAFCHQ/WFHQ will appear later in appropriatepolicy directives.The Air Force’s meatiest doctrine publication,AFDD 2 describes much of what the servicedoes at the operational level of war. Thisrevision gives our Airmen the latest doctrinalprinciples about planning, organizing, andconceptualizing operations. qJoint warfare is team warfare. Effectively integrated joint forces exposeno weak points or seams to an adversary, while they rapidly andefficiently find and engage those adversary weak points and vulnerabilitiesthat assure mission accomplishment. This does not meanthat all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint forcecommanders may choose the capabilities they need from the air, land,sea, space, and special operations forces at their disposal.—Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the ArmedForces of the United States, 14 November 2000

Molecular Nanotechnology andNational SecurityLCDR THOMAS D. VANDERMOLEN, USNEditorial Abstract: The author asserts that the manipulation and control of matterroughly the size of the diameter of a small molecule, known as molecular nanotechnology,will spawn a technological revolution that not only will create benefits but also will causean avalanche of unprecedented problems and threats. Commander Vandermolen suggeststhat the United States take the lead in creating a strategy of international regulation.In rare instances, revolutionary technology and associated military innovation can fundamentallyalter long-established concepts of warfare. . . .Some disruptive breakthroughs . . . could seriously endanger our security.—The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2005MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOL-OGY (MNT), when fully developed,will provide the basis forthe next technological revolution,possibly the most beneficial and yet most disruptivein human history. By allowing inexpensivemass production with atomic-levelprecision, this infant technology has the potentialto create whole new classes of weaponsand economic, political, and social disruptionsserious enough to threaten internationalsecurity. To minimize the threats while maxi-96

MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 97mizing the benefits of MNT’s impending development,the United States should take thelead in creating a cooperative strategy of internationalregulation and do so as soon as possible.MNT’s arrival will cause an avalanche ofproblems and threats, many of which the humanrace has not yet encountered; the controlstrategy must therefore be ready before thatday arrives.BackgroundNanotechnology (NT) is the manipulationand control of matter at the scale of the nanometer(one-billionth of a meter)—roughlythe diameter of a small molecule. Unlike itspredecessor, microtechnology, which deals withthe relatively gargantuan scale of amoebas,nanotechnology represents human engineeringat the atomic or molecular level. But NTentails much more than just taking wellunderstoodmicrotechnology engineering techniquesdown another step in size: it abruptlyand vastly expands of the limits of what is possible.NT works with the basic building blocksof nature—atoms and molecules—allowingfor an unprecedented level of engineeringprecision and matter control. Also, the effectsof the “regular” Newtonian physics that governeveryday human experience and the “weird”quantum physics that govern the atomic andsubatomic worlds begin to overlap in thenanometer scale (or nanoscale). Working atthe nanoscale will thus permit human engineersto take advantage of the benefits of bothrealms of physical law simultaneously.It is not surprising that government andbusiness interest in NT is significant and growingrapidly. The US National NanotechnologyInitiative, which coordinates US governmentresearch and development (R&D) efforts, expectsto have a budget exceeding $1 billion infiscal year 2006, a ninefold increase over its1997 budget of $116 million. 1 But this increasingR&D budget also illustrates that today’snanotechnology “is still almost wholly on thedrawing board.” 2 Nanoscience is in its infancy,and the characteristics of even familiar, exhaustivelystudied materials (such as commonmetals) may hold surprises at the nanometerscale. 3 Thus, despite the introduction of newNT-based products to the marketplace, NT’strue practical potential is still being discovered. 4Some disagreement exists within the NTR&D community about the ultimate potentialof the field. One school of thought promotesMNT, also called molecular manufacturing(MM), the brainchild of Dr. K. Eric Drexler,originator of the term nanotechnology itself. 5MNT is “extreme” NT, with engineering soprecise that it approaches the theoreticallimits of nature by exerting “thorough, inexpensivecontrol of the structure of matterbased on molecule-by-molecule control ofproducts and byproducts of molecular manufacturing.”6 Whereas mainstream NT focuseson creating small-scale components to be incorporatedinto larger products in a conventionalmanner, MNT products will be humanscale or larger, built from start to finish byMNT processes. 7 Because the degree to whichNT will disrupt human affairs is still unclear,this article will focus on MNT, the most potentiallydangerous manifestation.MNT’s promise depends on a few key capabilities.The first is the ability to mechanicallyguide chemical reactions at the molecularlevel, called mechanochemistry. 8 In MNT,mechanochemistry will be accomplished bymolecular fabricators: essentially tiny, controllable,mechanical tools capable of physically“grabbing” specific molecules and puttingthem together in useful ways.A single fabricator, however, is not very usefulfor building large objects, as it would takethousands of years for one to build an objectlarge enough to see with the naked eye. Therefore,the second key capability is exponentialmanufacturing, or the ability to create largenumbers of fabricators that will work in unison.This is accomplished by having the fabricatorsbuild more fabricators—the number ofwhich will thus grow exponentially.Note that fabricators are autoproductive—capable of building other fabricators, but onlywith extensive outside assistance. They do notself-replicate—that is create copies of themselveswithout direct outside assistance like cells andbacteria. Fabricators are limited in this way by

98 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006design. Original MNT concepts envisionedthe use of free-floating, self-contained microscopicrobots called assemblers, which wouldbe able to self-replicate.Assemblers, much more complex than fabricators,require not only their own molecularfabricator tools, but also the associated control,propulsion, communications, and navigationsystems necessary to coordinate withother assemblers on production tasks. The inherentreplication ability of assemblers alsomakes them a potential danger (see the discussionof gray goo below), and more recentMNT theories focus on the use of fabricatorsas an intrinsically less complex, more efficient,and less dangerous solution. 9 The final key capabilityis convergent assembly, which enablesthe mass of fabricators to build large objectsby first building tiny parts, putting those tinyparts together to build larger parts, and thenrepeating the process until a complete, humanscaleproduct has been constructed. By someestimates, if the size of the parts doubles ateach stage, it will take only 30 such stages togo from parts just a few atoms in size to objectsas big as a meter. 10Thus, the MNT fabrication process will firstrequire the production of at least one fabricator,an environmental system conducive to itsoperation, and a control system. The first fabricatorswill begin to construct copies of themselves,helped along by the externally controlledfeed-and-control systems, exponentiallygrowing their number as necessary. The finalmass of fabricators will then create progressivelymore complex molecular building blocks,ultimately assembling them into the final desiredproduct. In contrast to even today’s microtechnology—which,as advanced and impressiveas it seems, still handles atoms “in unrulyherds” of billions or trillions—molecular fabricatorswill permit (and likely demand) molecularlyprecise engineering, which accountsfor each atom or molecule and places it in aspecific location. 11 Because of this increasedprecision, nano-fabricated materials can bedesigned to be simultaneously stronger, lighter,and more feature dense—that is, capable ofcarrying out multiple functions due to fewer“wasted atoms.” For example, rather than havea steel girder that only provides structural supportin a building, a girder could be createdthat is not only lighter and stronger than itssteel counterpart, but also infused with stresssensors or even computer processing capability.The combination of exponential manufacturingand the more efficient use of a product’sphysical structure will also allow for the rapidcreation of prototypes; follow-on manufacturingcan then begin at any time, as the assemblyprocess is the same as for the prototype. 12Possible applications of MNT are potentiallylimitless. Virtually every aspect of humanlife would be affected: for example, tiny robotscould be sent into the human body to locateand destroy cancerous cells or viruses, or evencorrect failing organs at the cellular level,leading to indefinite extension of the humanlife span. Dangers posed by MNT are alsonearly limitless: cheap, fast mass productionwould enable spasmodic arms races, and improvedsmart materials could make currentweapons systems much more capable—or permitcreation of entirely new classes of weapons.Perhaps the most publicized danger fromMNT is the so-called gray-goo problem, wherebyself-replicating nanomachines essentially overwhelmEarth’s naturally occurring life forms.First postulated by Drexler in his 1986 bookEngines of Creation, the gray-goo scenario describesthe release (either accidental or deliberate)of a resilient, omnivorous, artificial“bacteria” that is able to outcompete all life onEarth and which subsequently “reduce[s] thebiosphere to dust in a matter of days,” leavingbehind only a worldwide mass—or gray goo—of microscopic replicators. 13 Drexler himselfhas since repeatedly asserted that such anevent is extremely unlikely to happen accidentally,particularly with the MNT community’sconceptual shift away from assembler-basedproduction, and would be a tremendously difficultundertaking in any case.Not surprisingly, however, dramatic possibilitieslike this have exerted an overshadowingand somewhat hysterical influence onpublic perception. 14 This “science fiction” perceptionof MNT—plus the lack of a workingmolecular fabricator—has prompted themainstream nanotech community to down-

MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 99play or ignore MNT. Some of the most vocaldetractors—including the late Nobel Prize–winning chemist Richard Smalley—have claimedthat MNT-style assemblers are impossible andthat discussion of them hurts “real” NT developmentby scaring the public, diverting attentionand funding from more legitimate researchwith a proven track record. 15Is Nanotechnology aNational-Security Concern?If MNT is not technically practicable, thenis it—or even the more “mainstream” NT—anational-security concern? 16 Whether or notstrict Drexler-type MNT is viable, a convergenceof less technologically challengingmainstream nanotech and other technologiescould result in MNT-like capabilities, necessitatingserious consideration of the potentialimpacts on national security. Much of the debateover MNT focuses on which research effortswill pay off sooner (and therefore deservemore resources), rather than confronting theissue of final capabilities. Consider, however,that every day a form of MM occurs aroundthe world. Nature itself has been using MMfor billions of years to convert cheap resources(dirt and water) and cheap energy (sunlight)into useful building materials (timber). Regardlessof which development path is used toget there, an MM-like technology is demonstrablypossible.But should MNT or MM prove too difficultto achieve or not cost-effective for some reason,mainstream NT will still create a tremendousimpact on every field that affects nationalsecurity. Even a National Science Foundationreport expresses doubt about MNT’s feasibility:“It may be technically impossible to createself-reproducing mechanical nanoscale robots. . . [while conceding that] nanotechnologywill fundamentally transform science, technology,and society.” 17 Kwan S. Kwok, DefenseAdvanced Research Projects Agency programmanager, echoes the foundation’s sentiment:“It is widely accepted that the potential impactof nanotechnology may be larger than that ofany scientific field humankind has previouslyencountered.” 18Finally, consider the possible emerging trendof personal fabrication (PF), a concept createdby Dr. Neil Gershenfeld of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology’s Center for Bitsand Atoms (CBA). Gershenfeld and his colleagueshave been establishing a network offab-labs: small facilities set up in areas withlittle or no access to regular sources of technology,such as rural India. Fab-labs areequipped with computers and tabletop micromachiningequipment that enables users todesign and create objects of their choosing.Products so far have included computer circuitboards, diesel-engine flywheel sensors, andeven works of art—all these from users withlimited experience with high-tech equipment.Currently the fab-lab equipment setupcosts approximately $26,000. Gershenfeldand the CBA continue to work on improvingthe fab-labs’ setup in terms of cost, capability,and efficiency: “We’re approachingbeing able to make one machine that canmake any machine.” Eventually Gershenfeldexpects NT to become a viable basis for fabricationtools. 19 In fact, the PF paradigm maypresent the most significant long-term applicationof MNT.MNT-based personal fabricators will embodythe ultimate fusion of the industrial andinformation-technology revolutions: the abilityto move data such as design plans cheaplyand instantaneously to virtually any locationand then convert that data into real-world,solid objects at roughly the cost of raw materialsand power. This concept logicallyleads to that of inexpensive distributedmanufacturing, tailored to the needs of theorganization or even the individual. Overall,there appear to be many paths and nooutright “show-stoppers” on the road to anMNT-like capability.Threats from MolecularNanotechnologyMNT is a potentially enormously powerfultechnology that will generate both direct and

100 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006indirect threats to US security. Given the potentialdangers, it would be irresponsible notto prepare for MNT’s emergence.Direct ThreatsThe most obvious threats posed by MNT arethose based directly on the application of thetechnology itself, as a source for both betterweaponry as well as faster and more widespreadarms production.State-Based Arms Races. Intentional misuseof MNT will probably pose the greatestdirect threat to national security. MM willallow anyone with access to the technologyto quickly and economically create weaponsof virtually any description. The aspiringarms producer would have to provideonly designs, power, and basic materials. Ifthe arms producer is a state, then the resultingflood of extremely high-quality militaryequipment will enable that state topromptly and easily overwhelm any non-MNT-equipped enemy.With the rapid prototyping capability providedby MM, the time period for such abuildup could be on the order of weeks ormonths; multiple, rapid arms races could surfacewith regularity around the world. 20 Suchraces would likely not be limited to conventionalweapons as we know them today. Anarms race based on “smart” weapons of massdestruction (WMD) would be possible, suchas a smallpox virus engineered to kill onlypeople with a certain genetic trait. 21Individual-Based Arms Races. States maynot be alone in weapons-production activities.MNT-enabled personal manufacturing couldallow WMD production to shift from governmentsto small groups or even to individuals;this democratization of arms production is thedarker side of PF. Bill Joy, cofounder and chiefscientist of Sun Microsystems, has dubbed thiscapability knowledge-enabled mass destruction,calling it “a surprising and terrible empowermentof extreme individuals.” 22 Given the predilectionof some hackers to create harmfulcomputer viruses just for the thrill of it, it isnot a great conceptual leap to imagine that“nanohackers” might decide to do the samewith actual viruses.Perhaps the most frightening weapon ofall—and thus no doubt a natural aspirationfor potential nanohackers—is the infamousself-replicating gray-goo assemblers. Designinga gray-goo replicator would be an extraordinarilycomplex undertaking, however,and would require solving a multitude of extremelydifficult engineering challenges; accordingly,some have argued that such an effortwould be either impossible or highlyunlikely. 23 However, a dedicated and concertedattempt could conceivably fall short ofthe goal but still come up with something extremelydangerous and uncontrollable. Tohelp ensure that the accidental creation of agray-goo nanomachine remains a practical impossibility,Drexler’s Foresight Institute, anonprofit organization he founded to “helpprepare society for anticipated advanced technologies,”has prescribed guidelines for thesafe development of NT. The institute recommendsavoiding the use of replicators (i.e., assemblers)entirely, or at a minimum, designingthem so that they cannot operate in anatural environment. 24Surveillance. An early application of MNTand NT will likely be inexpensive yet advancedmicrosurveillance platforms and tools. Massproduced, these disposable sensors could beused to blanket large areas, providing ubiquitoussurveillance of the people within. Althoughobviously a battlefield concern, suchsurveillance could also be employed againstany group or population, raising privacy andlegality issues. 25Environmental Damage. MNT was originallyperceived as a potential cure-all for a variety ofenvironmental problems: nanobots in the atmosphere,for example, could physically repairthe ozone layer or remove greenhousegases. Recently, however, NT is increasinglyseen as a potential environmental problem inits own right. Both NT and MNT are expectedto produce large quantities of nanoparticlesand other disposable nanoproducts, the environmentaleffects of which are currently unknown.This “nanolitter,” small enough topenetrate living cells, raises the possibility of

MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 101toxic poisoning of organs, either from thenanolitter itself or from toxic elements attachedto those nanoparticles. 26Indirect ThreatsWe can expect severe disruptions from MNTsince it gives “little or no advantage to the entrenchedleader of an earlier technologicalwave.” 27 Thus, it has the potential to radicallyupset the geopolitical playing field and posepowerful indirect threats to national security.Economic. Glimpsing the potential economicchange triggered by MNT, Bill Joy has estimatedthat the wealth generated by fusing theinformation and physical worlds in the twentyfirstcentury will equal a thousand trillion USdollars. As former US House Speaker NewtGingrich observed, this is equivalent to “adding100 US economies to the world market.” 28No one can be quite sure what an MNTbasedeconomy would look like, but mostspeculations seem to agree that it would probablyresemble the software economy withproduct design being the most difficult andexpensive part of production—distributionand manufacturing being very inexpensive. Acurrent analogy would be the millions of manhoursand dollars expended to create a computerword-processing program, compared tothe ease with which users can “burn” copies ofthe program with their home computers anddistribute them to friends. This analogy alsopoints out the problems with piracy and intellectualproperty rights that would almost certainlyplague an MNT economy. 29Essentially a highly advanced manufacturingprocess emphasizing distributed, low-costmanufacturing, MNT directly threatens economiesthat are heavily dependent on mass production.For example, China’s economic growthdepends on using mass human labor to produceinexpensive, high-quality goods; in 2004it provided over $18 billion worth of manufacturedgoods to the Wal-Mart department-storechain. 30 But what will happen to China’seconomy when Wal-Mart is able to use its ownMNT-enabled fabrication facilities at home toproduce higher-quality goods at even lowercost? For that matter, when consumers areable to produce their own high-quality, lowcost,custom-designed products in their ownhomes, who will need Wal-Mart?MNT is also expected to improve energytechnologies such as solar energy by makingsolar cells tougher and much more efficient;combined with more efficient manufacturingand lighter but stronger vehicles (carbonbasedmaterials can be up to 60 times as strongas steel), the requirements for petroleumfueledenergy supplies may decline rapidly.This would obviously have significant impacton oil companies and countries with oil-basedeconomies; a correspondingly significant disruptionis likely for the shipping industry,which last year ordered petroleum-shippingtankers valued at $77.2 billion. 31 In addition, ifdistributed manufacturing were to allow mostpeople or communities to construct what theyneed locally, international trade in physicalitems may also decrease, which casts somedoubt as to whether globalization’s “peacethrough interdependence” effect will be aspowerful in the future. Indeed, isolationismmay become a more attractive policy optionfor many countries.Social. MNT’s medical applications maypresent some of the greatest social and ethicalchallenges in human history. Issues of cloning,genetically modified crops, abortion, andeven cochlear implants have created politicalatomic bombs in recent years—MNT offers acompletely new level of control over the humanbody and its processes. Accordingly, MNThas been embraced by the transhumanistmovement, which advocates using technologyto intellectually, physically, and psychologicallyimprove the human form from its current“early” phase to a more advanced “posthuman”phase. Reactions to transhumanistconcepts range from enthusiasm to indifferenceto outright fear and hostility. HistorianFrancis Fukuyama has declared transhumanismone of “the world’s most dangerous ideas.” 32Revolutionary. The final threat discussedhere essentially results from a synergy ofthe other threats. Prof. Carlota Perez hasadvanced a model of technological revolutioncomposed of two periods: (1) an installationperiod, during which the new

102 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006techno-economic paradigm (TEP) gains increasingsupport from business, and (2) adeployment period, when the paradigm becomesthe new norm. During the installationperiod, investor enthusiasm for thenew TEP grows into a frenzy leading to anincreasing gap between the “haves,” whoare profiting from the new TEP, and the“have-nots,” who are still invested in theold TEP. 33 Ultimately the investment frenzyforms a stock bubble, which bursts andbrings on the turning point, usually a seriousrecession or even a depression. It isduring the turning point that society andthe judicial system are forced to reformand shift to meet the characteristics of thenewly established TEP. 34If this model of technological revolution iscorrect—and it appears to match the last fivetechnological revolutions well enough—thensometime during the development of MNTthere will be a period of social, political, andeconomic unrest as the world system is pulledin two directions, embracing the new TEP versusclinging to the old. Given the staggeringarray of changes that MNT can bring, this periodmay be particularly stressful. Moreover, ifMNT has already enabled some of its moredangerous potential applications—such asknowledge-based mass destruction—beforeproper political and social control structureshave been established, this period could becatastrophic.What Strategy Should theUnited States Pursue?There are three basic strategy courses thatthe United States can pursue to deal withMNT:• some form of deliberate internationalregulation and control,• a “hands-off” approach that lets naturalmarket forces dictate development andregulation, and• a total ban on MNT development.International RegulationTwo strategic approaches have relevance to internationalregulation of MNT:• a hegemonic regulation imposed on therest of the world by the United States, or• a cooperative regulation overseen andenforced by an international organization.In either case, regulation will succeed—if itdoes—only by removing the majority of reasonsnations will have to develop “uncontrolled”MNT.The basic premise in regulation should beto maximize public access to the benefits ofMNT while eliminating independent (i.e., unregulated)development by minimizing accessto, or interference with, the manufacturingtechnology itself. Ideally, freely providing thefruits of MNT to the world population will decreasethe urge to develop unregulated alternativeR&D programs and may simultaneouslyreduce the impetus for civil and/or resourcerelatedconflicts by virtually eradicating theeffects of poverty. 35The Center for Responsible Nanotechnology,a nonprofit think tank “concerned with themajor societal and environmental implicationsof advanced nanotechnology,” has proposeda solution based around a nanofactory,a self-contained, highly secure MM system—in effect a highly advanced NT version ofGershenfeld’s desktop fab-lab apparatus. 36 Inthis strategy, a closely guarded crash developmentprogram would be set up as soon as possibleto develop the MM expertise required tobuild a nanofactory. It is essential that thenanofactory be developed before any possiblecompeting MNT R&D program can come tofruition. Nanofactories would then be reproducedand distributed to nations and organizations(at some point possibly even to individuals)around the world, with emphasisplaced on the most poverty-stricken regions.This “standard” nanofactory would be theonly approved MNT manufacturing apparatusin the world and would even have internallimitations as to what could be constructed(no replicating assemblers, for example, ex-

MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 103cept under very carefully controlled andmonitored conditions).The advantages of this strategy are that itwould offer a very large carrot—with the stickof regulation—in the form of the nanofactories.They could act as valid tools of humanitarianassistance, as leverage to prevent balkinggovernments from pursuing their ownrogue MNT development programs, or evenas assurance that citizens’ needs are beingmet. 37 The appeal of (and the demand for)the nanofactories would likely be enormous,particularly if they are produced for personaluse. As Gershenfeld has noted about his conceptuallysimilar fab-labs, “The killer app forpersonal fabrication is fulfilling individual desiresrather than merely meeting mass-marketneeds.” 38 By restricting nanofabrication methodsto the standard nanofactory alone, thethreat of gray-goo replicators would be minimizedprobably as much as is possible. 39Of course, there are disadvantages andrisks in this strategy as well. Although widespreadavailability of nanofactories may reducethe desire for independent MNT R&Dprograms, “noncomplying” groups will try tohide their projects, thus making complianceeven harder to verify. A significant risk is inherentin distributing the nanofactories; theunits will require extensive, built-in securityto protect both their inner physical workingsand their operating software. Every hacker inthe world (not to mention rogue organizationsor governments) would be dying tocrack nanofactory security. As a possible solution,the nanofactories must be programmedto destroy themselves if any attempt to accessthe classified areas of the unit occurs. Thiswill lead to many, many broken nanofactories,but since they can be created relativelyeasily and cheaply, replacing them shouldnot be an issue.In order for this strategy to have a decentchance of working, the United States shouldnot attempt to assume a hegemonist stanceand become the sole governing body of thissystem. Such a strategy would require a US-onlynanofactory development program. Furthermore,US efforts to dominate nanofactorytechnology will likely result in a “nanofactoryrace” that the United States could lose. Europe,Japan, Korea, China, and India are allconducting research into nanotechnology. 40However poorly the US national image isperceived throughout the world today, itcould grow exponentially worse if the UnitedStates emerged as the sole MNT superpower.Therefore, for both technical and diplomaticreasons, the US primacy option is notthe best solution.However, the United States should play amajor role in establishing an internationalcontrol organization to formulate and carryout the regulation strategy. Such an organizationwould have a better chance of actuallydeveloping a working nanofactory beforecompeting efforts do so (although maintainingsecurity would be horrendously difficult)as well as encouraging international legitimacyfor the nanofactory plan, which in turnwould likely result in greater buy-in by theworld community. There are already somerumblings of international support for anarms-control-like containment structure forNT. For example, the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization’s special report on emergingtechnologies notes that “the need for controlof these new technologies is more importantnow than in previous times of scientific development.”41An organization like the one describedhere will be supremely difficult to establishand maintain and will require many yearsof diplomatic maneuvering to secure theproper agreements. As economist DavidFriedman notes,We don’t have a decent mechanism for centralizedcontrol on anything like the necessaryscale. . . . Our decentralized mechanisms . . .depend on a world where there is some workabledefinition of property rights in which theactions that a person takes with his propertyhave only slight external effects, beyond thosethat can be handled by contract. Technologicalprogress might mean that no such definitionexists—in which case we are left with zero workablesolutions to the coordination problem. 42We must determine whether a workable solutionexists and do so quickly. MNT could be 50years away—then again, perhaps only 10.

104 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006Do NothingA valid alternative to the difficulties of regulationwould be just letting the technologyemerge as international-market and socialforces dictate. Proponents of this strategywould rely on the involved parties (governmentsand multinational corporations conductingthe majority of the R&D) to selfregulatethe use and distribution of MNT. It isalso possible that NT research will hit an intellectualbrick wall and that the sheer difficultyof mastering nanoscience and its applicationswill slow the arrival of MNT such that a disruptivetechnological revolution never occurs oris drastically mitigated.This strategy holds the highest level of riskand is essentially a strategy of hopeful optimism.Multiple R&D programs will likely leadto multiple successes, which could very welllead to competition at the national militarylevel as well as an MNT arms race. Multipleprograms will mean varying levels of success,and the leading organization or state will beless likely to agree to regulation, particularly ifsuch regulation would decrease or eliminateits lead. Given MNT’s tremendous potentialfor both peaceful and violent applications,controlling it with a “do nothing” strategy isanalogous to providing nuclear reactors toevery country under the assumption that nonewill use them to develop nuclear weapons.This strategy is unlikely to work and is in facthighly dangerous.Forbid Research and DevelopmentIf MNT is so dangerous, then why allow itto be developed at all? Why invent anothernuclear-bomb equivalent? Proponents of thisstrategy—such as the aforementioned BillJoy—would advocate at a minimum the following:(1) adoption of a voluntary moratoriumon the part of the scientific communityagainst further MNT-related research,and ultimately, (2) the establishment of aninternational set of laws to forbid any R&Dinto MNT. Mr. Joy believes that the US unilateralabandonment of biological-warfareresearch is a “shining example” of the beginningsof such a strategy. 43In many ways this path is almost as dangerousas the do nothing strategy, except it mighttake longer for the dangers to emerge. Thereare two main problems with this strategy: verificationand the dual-use nature of MNT. Evenif every country agreed to the research ban,how would the other nations verify compliance?Unlike nuclear technology, MNTdoesn’t require exotic materials that can bedetected at a distance to create deadly weapons,and nuclear weapons can’t make millionsof copies of themselves. Detecting non-stateactorprograms would be even more difficult.We are left with the same problems faced bybiological-weapons-control agencies, exceptthat biological weapons are desired only bycertain types of organizations. Virtually everyone—states,organizations, and individuals—will want NT. The potential benefits of MNTmake it very attractive, particularly for poorercountries; it not only enables nations to makeweapons easily, but also to purify and desalinatewater, create inexpensive yet sturdyhomes, provide distributed and reliable power,and possibly even expand or improve theirfood supplies. In short, MNT can help a poorcountry provide the basic necessities of life,which leaves no economic or military incentiveto comply. In fact, such a strategy wouldonly push development to noncomplyingcountries. 44 This creates another problem:there would be no “complying” country capableof defending against a rogue, MNT-equippednation unless complying countries maintainedcovert and illicit R&D programs. To paraphrasethe National Rifle Association slogan,if nanotechnology is outlawed, only outlawswill have nanotechnology.ConclusionBased on the radically unprecedented directand indirect threats to US national securityposed by MNT, the United States shouldadopt a cooperative strategy of internationalregulation to control and guide R&D. Theregulation should maximize the security ofthe processes but should not constrict innovationor liberal distribution of the technology’s

MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 105benefits. The United States should immediatelybegin investigating forms of potentialregulatory regimes for employment and beginlaying the educational and diplomatic frameworknecessary to create the most appropriateinternational control group.As the most recent national defense strategynotes about disruptive technological advances,“As such breakthroughs can be unpredictable,we should recognize their potential consequencesand hedge against them.” 45 Whateverform US strategy takes to deal with MNT, itmust not be reactive in nature. The threats enabledby MNT will likely evolve faster than bureaucraticsolutions can cope. qNotes1. National Nanotechnology Initiative, “How Much MoneyIs the US Government Spending on Nanotechnology?”http://www.nano.gov/html/facts/faqs.html (accessed 2May 2005).2. J. S. Brown and P. Duguid, “Don’t Count SocietyOut: A Response to Bill Joy,” in Societal Implications of Nanoscienceand Nanotechnology, ed. Mihail C. Roco and WilliamSims Bainbridge (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation,2001), 33.3. An aluminum atom, for example, has physical andchemical characteristics quite different from those of aluminumpowder or an aluminum ingot.4. Recent products include smaller, more capablecomputer processors and hard drives, improved cosmeticsand sunscreens, automobile windshield coatings, andwater-repellant cotton pants from Eddie Bauer.5. After the term nanotechnology came to mean anytechnical endeavor at the nanoscale, Drexler switched tothe terms molecular nanotechnology and molecular manufacturingto avoid confusion and emphasize the manufacturingaspects of his theory. Rudy Baum, “Point-Counterpoint:Nanotechnology,” Chemical and Engineering News 81, no.48 (1 December 2003): 37–42, http://pubs.acs.org/cen/coverstory/8148/8148counterpoint.html (accessed 8 May2006).6. K. Eric Drexler, Christina Peterson, and GaylePergamit, Unbounding the Future (New York, NY: WilliamMorrow and Company, 1991), http://www.foresight.org/UTF/Unbound_LBW/Glossary.html (accessed 8 May 2006).7. Chris Phoenix, “A Technical Commentary onGreenpeace’s Nanotechnology Report,” Center for ResponsibleNanotechnology, September 2003, http://www.crnano.org/Greenpeace.pdf (accessed 4 May 2005).8. K. Eric Drexler, “The Future of Nanotechnology:Molecular Manufacturing,” EurekAlert! April 2003, http://www.eurekalert.org/.9. Chris Phoenix and K. Eric Drexler, “Safe ExponentialManufacturing,” Nanotechnology, no. 15 (9 June 2004):869–72, http://stacks.iop.org/Nano/15/869 (accessed25 November 2005).10. Ralph C. Merkle, “Nanotechnology,” Zyvex Corporation,n.d., http://www.zyvex.com/nano/ (accessed 1May 2005).11. K. Eric Drexler, Engines of Creation (New York, NY:Anchor Books, 1985), 4.12. “Powerful Products of Molecular Manufacturing,”Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, n.d., http://www.crnano.org/products.htm (accessed 25 November2005).13. Drexler, Engines of Creation, 172–73.14. Dozens of science-fiction novels, episodes of TheX-Files and Star Trek: The Next Generation television series,as well as popular fiction such as Michael Crichton’s novelPrey (New York: HarperCollins, 2002) have all featuredDrexler-style nanorobots.15. Dr. Richard Smalley was awarded the 1996 NobelPrize in Chemistry for the discovery of fullerenes, a classof carbon molecule that holds enormous promise in NTrelatedapplications. Baum, “Point-Counterpoint,” 37–42.William Illsey Atkinson, Nanocosm (New York: AMACOM,2003), 6–8, 33, 124–39, 145, 171, 179, 203, 251, 255, 257,259, 266–67, 271–72.16. It is important to note that, despite 20 years of attempts,there are still no compelling arguments that MNTis physically impossible—even Dr. Smalley’s argumentsappear inconclusive. (To complicate matters, the debatersoften seem to be arguing past one another.)17. Societal Implications of Nanoscience, iv, 11.18. Quoted in Daniel Ratner and Mark A. Ratner,Nanotechnology and Homeland Security (Upper Saddle River,NJ: Prentice Hall, 2004), 82.19. Neil Gershenfeld, “Personal Fabrication,” Edge, 23July 2003, http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/gershenfeld03/gershenfeld_index.html (accessed 21 December 2005).20. Such arms races could actually stabilize some internationalsituations if production were limited to conventionalweapons and each side’s stockpiles matched theother’s—but depending on such an unlikely situation isnaive at best.21. This arms race capability would undoubtedly be aboon for those bent on ethnic cleansing. Other unpleasantpossibilities are only limited by imagination and humanDNA structure.22. Bill Joy, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us,” Wired,8.04, 8 April 2000, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy_pr.html/ (accessed 28 April 2005).23. Drexler, who originated the idea, is now amongthose who dismiss it.24. Neil Jacobstein and Glenn Harlan Reynolds,“Foresight Guidelines on Molecular Nanotechnology

106 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006Version 4.0,” Foresight Institute, October 2004, http://www.foresight.org/guidelines/current.html (accessed3 May 2005).25. For further reading on the issues raised by theemergence of ubiquitous surveillance, see David Brin’s TheTransparent Society (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1998).26. Future Technologies, Today’s Choices (London: GreenpeaceEnvironmental Trust, 2003), 36.27. Ratner and Ratner, Nanotechnology and HomelandSecurity, 114.28. Newt Gingrich, “The Age of Transitions,” in SocietalImplications of Nanoscience, 24–25.29. David Friedman, “What Would a Nanotech EconomyLook Like?” (presentation abstract for 1st Conference onAdvanced Nanotechnology, 22–24 October 2004), ForesightInstitute, http://www.foresight.org/Conferences/AdvNano2004/Abstracts/.30. Jiang Jingjing, “Wal-Mart’s China Inventory to HitUS$18B This Year,” China Business Weekly, 29 November2004.31. Will Kennedy and Haslinda Amin, “World-Wide’sSohmen Says Tanker Rates May Have Peaked,” Bloomberg.com,26 April 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=aq7iV9wV1Nqc&refer=top_world_news (accessed 2 May 2005).32. Francis Fukuyama, “Transhumanism,” Foreign Policy,no. 144 (September/October 2004), http://foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?.33. Interestingly, this investor enthusiasm providesthe means to lay down the new TEP’s infrastructure andtherefore helps ensure its eventual success. The extensivetransoceanic fiber-optic cable runs laid during the investmentboom in information technology have been essentialfor current Indian successes in this business.34. Carlota Perez, Technological Revolutions and FinancialCapital (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing,2003), 47–59.35. Paul Collier, “The Market for Civil War,” in Strategyand Force Planning, ed. Richmond M. Lloyd (Newport, RI:Naval War College Press, 1995), 461–68.36. “About CRN,” Center for Responsible Nanotechnology,http://www.crnano.org/about_us.htm (accessed20 April 2005).37. Author Joe Haldeman’s 1997 science-fiction novelForever Peace (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1997) describesa future world where access to nanofactories—or “nanoforges”in the book—is used by the United States and itsallies as leverage against poorer nations.38. Gershenfeld, “Personal Fabrication.”39. It might also be advisable to limit the nanofactoriesby design to use feedstock only with a particular controlledadditive and then impose limits on the feedstocksupply as an additional source of leverage. However, thiswould make the feedstock as valuable (or even more so)than oil; additionally, it would essentially defeat the wholepurpose of freely available MNT. The trade-off is thatfreely available feedstock would be a major blow to bulkshippingcompanies. Further, it possibly entails a correspondingdrop in relevance for sea lines of communication—whichin turn would remove some of the justificationsfor the Navy’s force structure.40. China’s NT research program, for example, is rapidlygrowing, trailing the US National NanotechnologyInitiative budget by only $100 million. See Catherine Brahic,“China Encroaches on US Nanotech Lead,” Science andDevelopment Network, 8 April 2005, http://www.scidev.net/News/index.cfm?fuseaction=printarticle&itemid=2035&language=1 (accessed 2 May 2005).41. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Special Report:Emerging Technologies and Their Impact on Arms Control andNon-Proliferation (Brussels: NATO Parliamentary AssemblyScience and Technology Committee, 2001), 16.42. Quoted in Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe : Risk andResponse (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 19–20.43. Joy, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us.”44. Assuming, of course, that the poor country’s governmentis willing to allow such distribution of wealth.45. Department of Defense, The National DefenseStrategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:DOD, March 2005), 4.Become knowledgeable, provide your great, innovative, and creativeideas on behalf of the joint force and the joint fight, and America willbe better off for it, and I think the world will be better off for it.—Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne, 2005

ASPJQuick-LookThe Nature of Close Air Support in Low Intensity ConflictLT COL PHIL M. HAUN, USAFSINCE THE CESSATION of conven-tional hostilities in Afghanistan in thefall of 2002 and Iraq in the spring of2003, the United States Air Force hasprovided close air support (CAS) in low intensityconflicts (LIC). In Iraq, US forces havefaced the challenge of controlling sprawlingurban areas, as witnessed in the battle for Fallujah.In Afghanistan, on the other hand, ourforces have conducted operations against theTaliban and al-Qaeda in small villages spreadthroughout the rugged, mountainous terrainof central and eastern Afghanistan. Despitethe significant differences in operations, however,the nature of LIC CAS remains consistent:air operations conducted in a low-threatenvironment against an elusive enemy. Aircrewstrained in CAS with an emphasis onplacing bombs on mechanized fielded forceshave been frustrated in LICs by the lack of“valid” targets (i.e., a perception that they aresimply “drilling holes” in the sky on the majorityof missions). Joint doctrine has done little toeducate Airmen in this regard. Joint Publication(JP) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Close Air Support (CAS), focuses onthe methods of coordinating and integratingfires with little mention of the other means bywhich airpower can support ground forces.The additional tasks of visual search, groundconvoyescort, and enhancement of commandand control (C2) have all proven invaluableassets to ground commanders.This article highlights the differencesbetween conventional and LIC operationsand underscores the role of LIC CAS as onebeyond that of providing firepower. It thenconsiders how current joint doctrine andtraining emphasize conventional operationswithout adequately addressing LIC CAS.Finally, it provides concrete suggestions forimproving both doctrine and training to betterprepare Airmen for the unique demandsof this effort.Conventional versusLow IntensityConflict OperationsConventional and LIC operations differ significantlyaccording to the nature of the enemy,the specified military objectives, and the methodsby which military operations are conducted.In conventional warfare, the enemy isa state actor protected by a mechanized militaryforce. The enemy state has a populaceand occupies territory. LIC, however, involvesremnant fighters, such as the Taliban in Afghanistanor insurgents recruited from the localpopulation or neighboring countries, as in Iraq.In conventional war, strategic objectivesfocus on the coercion of the enemy state. Militaryoperations primarily involve (but do notconfine themselves to) targeting the enemy’sconventional forces. Target sets include C2centers, enemy air defenses, and fieldedforces, all susceptible to identification by airand space assets and engagement by airpower.In LIC, objectives shift to the security and stabilizationof an already-occupied region. Militaryobjectives focus more on peacekeeping107

108 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006operations and the reduction of insurgentinfluence on the populace. The targeting ofinsurgents hiding within the populace is acomplex task since they often appear as smallgroups of nonuniformed guerilla fighters. Ourforces need detailed human intelligence tolocate and identify targets, as well as positivecontrol of air strikes by tactical air control partiesto prevent fratricide and collateral damage.Although in conventional war the number oftargets successfully engaged serves as a roughmeasure of success, in LIC such attacks indicatea deterioration in security and stability.As with the nature of the enemy and militaryobjectives, the types of military operationsconducted in conventional conflict versus LICvary significantly. In conventional war, targetsets include state C2, military headquarters,and fielded forces, all subject to identification,targeting, attack, and assessment. Our forcescan employ combined air, land, and sea poweragainst the enemy. Airpower may need to performextensive air superiority, suppression ofenemy air defenses, strategic attack, interdiction,and conventional CAS missions. Bycontrast, in LIC there are no enemy aircraft toengage, no enemy air defenses to attack, nostate headquarters to surgically strike, and nofielded forces to interdict. Airpower still has acritical role to play, but it typically supportsthe occupying ground forces. These missionsinclude tactical airlift; intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance; and LIC CAS.Close Air Support inLow Intensity ConflictIn LIC the security and stability of the populationare of utmost importance. Air strikes,therefore, are significantly restricted in orderto limit collateral damage, a factor which canalienate the populace and increase sympathiesfor the insurgents, as well as weaken domesticand international political support. In lieu ofdropping bombs, CAS aircrews find themselvestasked with such missions as groundconvoyescort, visual reconnaissance, and airborneCAS alert. Sorties involving theemployment of weapons can account for asfew as 4 percent of the total number of missionsflown. 1 The rare requirement for kineticeffects, however, does not undermine theimportance of the presence of armed aircraft.Firepower from the air proves most critical inan emergency situation with friendly troopsunder attack. Proper weapons employmentnot only protects friendly lives but also preventsfratricide and collateral damage, both ofwhich can have negative consequences on thestrategic level.In LIC, having dependable CAS assetsallows ground forces to operate with reducedindigenous firepower since they rely on airpowerto supply fires previously provided byArmy artillery. It also allows ground commandersto deploy a larger percentage of groundforces with a reduced reserve force. 2 CASassets overhead serve as a deterrent to enemyground attack—that is, a ground convoy coveredby visible air assets is much less likely tobe attacked than one which is not. 3 In Afghanistanthis has led to a significant increase indemand for ground-convoy escort, with somecommanders refusing to depart from safehouses until airpower arrives overhead. 4Even when ground forces do not requirethe presence of firepower, CAS assets can providethem with important support. Airmencan perform route reconnaissance for convoys,search named areas of interest for enemyactivity, and conduct searches for missingfriendly vehicles. Further, they can provide aline-of-sight relay between Army tactical operationscenters and their deployed groundforces for critical updates.Close Air Support—DoctrineCAS is a critical element of ongoing LICoperations. However, CAS as written in jointdoctrine addresses conventional operationswhile neglecting the significant challengesencountered in LIC. According to JP 3-09.3,“CAS provides firepower in offensive anddefensive operations to destroy, disrupt, suppress,fix, harass, neutralize, or delay enemyforces.” 5 To this end, JP 3-09.3 describes how toorganize, plan, prepare, request, and execute

QUICK-LOOK 109CAS missions. The publication tacitly assumesthe presence of hostile targets subject toengagement from the air. This, however, is notusually the case in LIC operations.In light of the low percentage of missionsemploying weapons (as low as 4 percent inOperation Enduring Freedom), one mustquestion how to best utilize the other 96 percentwhich do not engage targets. Having airborneCAS alert as their primary mission, theseaircrews cover specific vulnerability times overhigh-risk areas and remain prepared to provideCAS should an emergency or a troops incontact (TIC) situation arise. Although alertCAS remains the highest priority, both airmenand soldiers realize that aircrews waiting overheadfor a TIC situation can also use this timeto support ground forces in other ways. Forexample, having aircraft overhead duringconvoy escort deters ambush and improves C2by adding a radio relay between convoys andheadquarters. Aircrews can also search forbroken-down or lost vehicles, as well as reconnoiterroads for vehicle traffic and potentialhazards. Taking advantage of the high ground,CAS aircrews can improve the efficiency andsuccess rate of the ground mission by enhancingsituational awareness and communicationsrelay, all without ever having to place abomb on target. Unfortunately, these missions,which take place close to ground forces,are provided by air, and they support groundoperations not addressed in joint doctrineand scarcely mentioned in Air Force tactics,techniques, and procedures.Close Air Support—TrainingUS Air Force aircrews preparing for LICoperations currently train with CAS tactics,techniques, and procedures developed foruse against conventional ground forces. Themajority of air-to-surface ranges located inthe United States, Europe, and the Pacificare filled with such mechanized targets astanks, armored personnel carriers, surfaceto-airmissiles, and so forth, with few urbanor mountainous ranges available. Air Warrior,the premiere joint CAS exercise, remainsa conventional force-on-force battle. Despitethe existence of one LIC CAS exercise—AirWarrior II—most CAS training remains conventional.As a result, CAS aircrews findthemselves inadequately prepared to conductLIC operations.Changing the Way We Thinkabout Close Air Support inLow Intensity ConflictThe Air Force can improve its doctrine andtraining to include LIC operations by takingtwo steps. First, it can work with the other servicesto expand JP 3-09.3 by including adescription of CAS during LIC operations.This section can expound upon the nature ofthe enemy, objectives, and operations, as wellas the expanded role of CAS in providing supportnot limited to firepower. In addition, theAir Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures(AFTTP) 3-1 series should include detaileddiscussions of such topics as ground-convoyescort and Army C2 networks. Second, the AirForce must give attention and investment priorityto air-to-surface ranges and major exercisesfor training in LIC operations. Further, itshould create more urban and mountainousranges, along with opportunities for Airmento practice ground-convoy escort prior toencountering the mission in combat. 6ConclusionThis article has focused on the differencesbetween conventional and LIC operationsand offered suggestions for improving doctrineand training to better prepare Airmenfor the challenges of LIC CAS. Airpower canprovide much more than firepower when itsupports ground forces. For example, Airmencan support ground operations withouthaving to place a bomb on target by conductingsuch missions as visual search, groundconvoyescort, and enhancement of C2.Improving the understanding and trainingof Airmen for LIC CAS increases the potentialfor airpower to affect the battlespace

110 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006positively. Successful LIC operations require atruly joint effort in order to win the peace.The more Airmen understand and train forLIC operations, the quicker and more efficientlythe United States can achieve victory. qNotes1. From 4 April to 15 September 2004, the 355thFighter Squadron, an A-10 unit in Bagram, Afghanistan,flew over 2,350 sorties, using weapons on just 100 of themfor an employment rate of 4 percent.2. Maj Gen Eric Olson, commander of Task Force 76and the 25th Infantry Division (Light), commented at theCAS symposium at Bagram in August 2004 that CASallowed him to violate the commandment of havingreserve forces available: “CAS is my reserve force.”3. Of the 2,350 missions flown by the 355th FighterSquadron from 4 April to 15 September 2004, only twoinvolved attacks by enemy forces while A-10s flew overhead.4. From 1 April to 15 September 2004, the number ofair support requests for ground-convoy escort greatlyincreased. In April, tasking for ground-convoy escort waslimited to special operations forces. By September themajority of these requests supported regular Army groundconvoys and comprised well over 25 percent of the daytimedaily flying schedule of the 355th Fighter Squadron.5. Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), 3 September2003 (incorporating change 1, 2 September 2005), ix.6. The following are two concrete examples for potentialimprovement in LIC CAS. First, at the National TrainingCenter (Fort Irwin, CA, proper), the residences andinfrastructure reside underneath airspace which could beused, with appropriate restrictions, for urban CAS trainingwithout live ordnance. In addition, on the non-forceon-forcedays at Fort Irwin, unique opportunities exist forconducting ground-convoy escort and training for LICobjectives. Second, similar opportunities present themselvesfor utilizing the infrastructure of Eielson AFB, AK,during the Cope Thunder exercise. Some coordinationbetween the Stryker Brigade at Fort Wainwright, AK, andthe 354th Fighter Wing has resulted in possibilities forurban-combat training with minimum impact to the base.

Clausewitz and the Falkland IslandsAir WarMAJ RODOLFO PEREYRA, URUGUAYAN AIR FORCEEditorial Abstract: Major Pereyra applies Carl von Clausewitz’s classic ideas about warfareto analyze aerial operations in the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982. The author’sstatus as an officer in the Fuerza Aérea Uruguaya (Uruguayan air force) affords hima unique perspective of that unfortunate clash between Argentina and Great Britain.Readers may profit from his examination of basic concepts such as center of gravity, friction,and the relationship between politics and military operations.THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAR of1982 remains fresh in our memory,particularly in the minds of air forcepersonnel from Latin Americancountries. One can attribute this fact to severalfactors, such as the major role of one of thesecountries in the conflict, Latin America’s geographicalproximity to the area where the waroccurred, and the ability to gather informationfrom veterans. From a professional perspective,studying the war is attractive becauseof the dominant role of aerial combat in definingthe islands’ destiny. Specifically, interestfocuses on how the Fuerza Aérea Argentina(FAA) (Argentinian air force) and Navyair component managed to frighten the pres-111

112 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006tigious British Royal Navy, which enjoyed superiorityin weapons and technology. Thus,this article uses the Argentinian air componentas the center of gravity, without overlookingthe series of events leading to armed conflict,for the purpose of making connectionsbetween the evolving events and the philosophicalconcepts in Carl von Clausewitz’s OnWar. The interpretative complexity of thisbook is well known, but the article seeks tohighlight certain events to help us think aboutand track down the facts in a different way.This approach will also let us determine if theconcepts outlined in On War, dating from asfar back as 1831, still apply because history hasproven that military leaders base their decisionson the counsel of various thinkers, includingthe Prussian military strategist.Political Aspects and ObjectivesIn 1982 the political destiny of the Republicof Argentina lay in the hands of a military government(imposed after Maria Estela Martinezde Peron fell from power in 1976), with GenLeopoldo Fortunato Galtieri acting as presidentand army chief of staff. During the previousyear, Galtieri had replaced Gen Roberto Viola,and because of his professional background,everybody thought that his mandate would bemoderate, transitional towards democracy,and contrary to Argentina’s integration withthe nonaligned countries, thus negating anyrisk of a military campaign in the South Atlantic.However, the deteriorating economy inheritedfrom the previous government infusedin General Galtieri the idea of recovering theFalkland Islands, a British colonial bastionsince 1833, to reverse his government’s fortunesand cover up economic difficulties.Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a ConservativeParty representative, led Great Britainin 1982. Despite the fact that she had wona second term by a large margin, in March ofthat year her popularity declined because ofhigh unemployment (affecting more than twomillion persons) and economic problems; indeed,her government appeared destined tobecome the worst in British history. But thepossibility of winning an armed conflict such asthe one in the Falkland Islands would give hergovernment an opportunity to overcome thecrisis and restore British pride. According toClausewitz, “War is not merely an act of policybut a true political instrument, a continuationof political intercourse, carried on with othermeans.” 1 This definition applied to both governmentsbecause the war confronting themwould settle their diplomatic differences byother means and produce a political instrumentto overcome each country’s difficult internalsituation.On 2 January 1833, Capt John Onslow,commanding the corvette Clio, took possessionof the Falkland Islands on behalf of GreatBritain. Onslow took advantage of his militarysuperiority to force Capt Don Jose Maria Pinedo,commander of the Argentinian navy warshipSarandí, and his staff to leave the islands. Fromthat day, Argentina lost sovereignty over thoselands, starting a long diplomatic controversyto recover them.Created in 1945, the United Nations (UN)included in its charter (chap. 10) the “DeclarationRelative to Non-Autonomous States,”which asked member states to indicate whichcolonies they intended to decolonize. To Argentina’ssurprise, Great Britain included theFalkland Islands among the 43 possessions itoffered. 2 But not until 1965 did the UN GeneralAssembly approve Resolution 2065, invitingboth governments to negotiate the statusof the islands. This resolution created a greatpolicy dilemma for the British, who had to decidewhether to (1) fulfill the resolution andrecognize Argentinian sovereignty over theFalkland Islands because they did not haveevidential documentation, (2) start actions todelay complying with the resolution, or (3) preparefor an armed confrontation. 3 AlthoughGreat Britain chose the second option, excessivedelays risked unleashing the third one.Given Argentina’s internal political issues,delays in the negotiations with Great Britain,and the Argentinian government’s role in anincident involving the Armada de la RepúblicaArgentina (ARA) (Argentinian navy) shipBahía Buen Suceso in the South Sandwich Islands,Argentina pushed for implementation

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AIR WAR 113of the Schematic Campaign Plan, which includeda military operation to recover theFalkland Islands but not keep them, thus definingthe Argentinian political goal of occupyingto negotiate. 4 Clearly, the Argentiniangovernment intended to avoid an armed confrontation,following Clausewitz’s observationthat “since war is not an act of senseless passionbut is controlled by its political object,the value of this object must determine thesacrifices to be made for it.” 5Therefore, on 2 April 1982, Argentina sent500 troops by sea and air to occupy the Falklands,establish a provisional government, andwait for Great Britain to initiate negotiationsto hand over the islands. 6 This action assumeda bloodless occupation, with the troops returningto the continent, leaving only a small garrisonin the islands. It also assumed that GreatBritain would not take military action to recoverthe islands; however, Argentina did notrealize that this operation gave the British governmentthe justification it needed to recoverthe islands and build a “Falkland Fortress,” designedby the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 7 Article 51of the UN charter would have legitimized aBritish military response as a “war of legitimatedefense, recognized as the right of a State todefend itself against an armed attack.” 8Nature of WarClausewitz created a model that definedthe nature of war: “As a total phenomenon itsdominant tendencies always make war a paradoxicaltrinity—composed of primordial violence,hatred, and enmity, which are to be regardedas a blind natural force; of the play ofchance and probability within which the creativespirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination,as an instrument of policy, whichmakes it subject to reason alone.” 9 Accordingto Clausewitz, the first of these aspects appliesespecially to the people, the second to thecommander and his army, and the third to thegovernment.Argentina’s political goal of occupying tonegotiate produced Operation Rosario, basedon the Schematic Campaign Plan, designedfor execution no earlier than 15 May. Argentinachose this date arbitrarily, reasoning thatif Great Britain did react militarily to the occupation,its forces could not reach the FalklandIslands before 5 June, and by then, withwinter approaching, an amphibious landingwould prove impossible. The military junta assumedthat due to the Bahía Buen Suceso incidentat South Georgia Island, the Britishforces on the Falkland Islands would increase;therefore, they decided to move the occupationup to 2 April. 10The Argentinians’ reaction to the news ofthe successful occupation of the Falklands revivedtheir lethargic national pride and generatedunforeseen political events such as modifyingthe political goal that could be summedup as holding the islands and facing the RoyalNavy onslaught. Evidently, two of the threefactors in Clausewitz’s model—the governmentand the people—were mutually encouragedby the cause, but the armed forces hadthe responsibility to act despite many uncertainties.In this regard, Clausewitz notes that“these three tendencies are . . . deep-rooted intheir subject and yet variable in their relationshipto one another. A theory that ignores anyone of them, or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationshipbetween them would conflict with realityto such an extent that for this reason alone itwould be totally useless.” He adds that theproblem amounts to maintaining the theorysuspended between these three tendencies asbetween three magnets. 11 One factor—thearmed forces—opposed the other two, thusviolating this theory.Theory of WarTo Clausewitz, the theoretical principle ofwar planning involves reducing the enemy’spower as much as possible by annihilating hiscombat capability since “the destruction of theenemy forces is always the superior, more effectivemeans, with which others cannot compete.”12 Great Britain, on the other hand, hadsince 19 February 1976 considered three potentialcourses of action to defend the FalklandIslands: (1) proceeding without the use of aerial

114 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006means, (2) driving back an invasion by usingpreviously embarked rapid-deployment amphibiousforces, and (3) recapturing the islandsmilitarily. The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the threeBritish military branches designed these coursesof action based on the assumption that Argentinawould occupy the islands, thus providingjustification to recapture them militarily, fulfillingthe British goal of establishing theFalkland Fortress and rendering moot furthernegotiations over the islands’ sovereignty.To Great Britain’s advantage, Adm SandyWoodward, commander of Task Force 317,charged with recapturing the islands, knew ofthe contingency plans since 1974 when heserved as assistant director of naval planningin the British Ministry of Defence. 13 The Britishdesigned their plans and combined eachelement in order to reduce the enemy’s combatcapabilities to the minimum. On 2 April1982, when Argentina launched Rosario—theamphibious-landing operation in the Falklands—AdmiralWoodward received orders toimplement Operation Corporate. 14The fast British response astonished the Argentiniansbut did not alter popular opinion.Armed forces senior commanders, however,became deeply concerned about changing thepolitical goal from occupying to negotiate todefending the islands, and on 4 April theyanalyzed the situation at the highest level ofjoint operations. The Argentinian command,aware of Task Force 317’s size and operationalcapabilities (especially its amphibious forcesand likely application of a naval blockade usingnuclear submarines), ordered the largestpossible commitment of the FAA. In additionto performing all the tasks imposed by its doctrine,the air force would serve as Argentina’sonly means of linking the islands to the continentin case of a naval blockade. The broad,vague designation of air operations authorizedthe FAA to perform any mission it couldcarry out. For the ground defense of the islands,Argentina decided to increase the initialcadre of 500 men to 13,000, deployingthem by air during April. After Argentina’slack of a carefully studied defense plan becameevident, its military resorted to quickmeasures, conditioned to the speed with whichthe British forces reacted and the suddenchange in the political goal.Center of GravityClausewitz observes that “one must keep thedominant characteristics of both belligerentsin mind. Out of these characteristics a certaincenter of gravity develops, the hub of all powerand movement, on which everything depends.That is the point against which all our energiesshould be directed.” 15 Both forces hadclearly defined their centers of gravity. GreatBritain selected Port Stanley (briefly renamedPuerto Argentino) because it was the criticalcenter of the Falkland Islands and because theArgentinians had based the military commandresponsible for defending the islands there.British Task Force 317 consisted of 25,000men and a naval component of more than100 vessels. 16 Specifically, the fleet included40 warships: two aircraft carriers, three battlecruisers, nine destroyers, 20 frigates, twolanding craft, and four submarines. The remaining60 vessels were support units: six logisticallanding craft, 20 tankers, 13 cargoships, eight personnel carriers, two specialservicesvessels, three hospital ships, four tugboats,and four adapted fishing boats. Mostof the warships carried very modern and efficientelectronic gear, such as surveillanceradar, missile guidance-control radar, andidentification, friend or foe (IFF) as well aselectronic-countermeasures systems. The fleet’sair-defense weapons included long-range (upto 38 miles) Sea Dart missiles, Sea Wolf missilesfor attacking medium- and low-altitudetargets, Sea Cat missiles, and 20 mm and 40mm antiaircraft guns.As for British aviation, the Royal Navy’sFRS.1 Sea Harrier and the Royal Air Force’sHarrier GR3 served as the main combat aircraft,both featuring six weapon pods. The inboardpods carried 30 mm guns, the two intermediateones contained fuel tanks or bombs,and the outboard pods carried third-generationinfrared AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles with 90-to 120-degree fields of vision and an effectiverange of six miles. In addition to deploying

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AIR WAR 115this force 8,800 miles, on 12 April Great Britainestablished a total-exclusion zone—a circlewith a radius of 200 nautical miles—aroundthe Falklands.Designating the British fleet as the enemycenter of gravity for purposes of defendingthe islands, the Argentinians intended to harassthat force as far from the coast as possibleto prevent it from approaching the islandsand landing troops. Only the FAA could assumethat task because the ARA had to withdrawits fleet to the safety of the harbors afterthe nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror sankthe battle cruiser General Belgrano on 2 May. TheFAA and Naval Aviation Command providedthe Argentinian air assets, the former directlyattacking the British fleet and troops with theMirage III EA, Mirage 5 Dagger, A-4B/C Skyhawk,Canberra MK 62, and IA-58 Pucara, andthe latter employing the Super Etendard, A-4QSkyhawk, and Aermacchi MB-339.For the most part, these aircraft attackedsurface targets with conventional munitions,such as free-fall or parachute-retarded 250-,500-, and 1,000-pound bombs; 2.25- and 2.75-inch rockets; 20 mm and 30 mm cannons; and7.62 mm machine guns. Only the Super Etendardcould deliver the latest-generationweapon, the radar-guided 1,300-pound AM-39Exocet missile with a 30-mile range, but theArgentinians had an inventory of only fivemissiles. For air combat, only the Mirages hadmissile capability—the Matra 530 infraredmissiles with a six-mile range and visual fieldlimited to 30–40 degrees, which forced theaircraft to position itself behind an opponent.Thus, the Argentinian air component facedthe difficult challenge of overcoming technologicaland armament obstacles to reach itsobjectives, which brings to mind a Clausewitzianassertion: “That, however, does not implythat the political aim is a tyrant. It must adaptitself to its chosen means, a process which canradically change it; yet the political aim remainsthe first consideration. . . . Once theexpenditure of effort exceeds the value of thepolitical object, the object must be renouncedand peace must follow.” 17The DefensiveThe surprising British reaction of recapturingthe islands through military action forcedthe Argentinian military government to takeunplanned actions and adopt a defensive posture.The quick formation of Task Force 317,a product of the excellent British intelligenceservice’s alerting its government about the invasion,prompted General Galtieri to sendmore troops to the islands without consultingthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. The deployed forces,members of the 10th Mechanized InfantryBrigade (without its armored vehicles) andthe 3rd Infantry Brigade, joined the 5th MarineBrigade, based in the islands since the occupation,to form the ground defense. Airliftersflew more than 10,000 men and theirlogistical gear to the Falklands during April.Later we shall see how this decision negativelyaffected the course of the war.The Argentinians formed the Fuerza AéreaSur (FAS) (Southern air force), based in ComodoroRivadavia, on 5 April under the commandof Brig Gen Ernesto H. Crespo, who reporteddirectly to the military junta. Hecontrolled all aircraft designated by the FAAand Naval Aviation Command and based onthe continent. Vice Adm Juan Lombardo, theatercommander of South Atlantic operations, ledthe Argentinian naval units and the FalklandIslands garrison, the latter with Gen MarioMenendez of the Argentinian army. To defendthe islands, General Menendez had IA-58 Pucaraaircraft from the FAA and Aermacchi MB-339s and Mentor T-34Cs from Naval AviationCommand, in addition to ground units. Clearly,the Argentinian command’s organization conflictedwith principles of joint operations suchas centralized command, maximum integration,full use of forces, and mutual support.Clausewitz refers to the defense as the mostpowerful form of war, noting, “But if we arereally waging war, we must return the enemy’sblows; and these offensive acts in a defensivewar come under the heading of ‘defense’—inother words, our offensive takes place withinour own positions or theater of operations.Thus, a defensive campaign can be fought withoffensive battles, and in a defensive battle, we

116 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006can employ our divisions offensively.” 18 Immediatelyafter taking charge of the FAS, GeneralCrespo ordered that the crews be trained toattack ships, using as a simulated target a modernType 42 Argentinian navy destroyer. Theresults were discouraging, suggesting that crewswould suffer 50 percent losses during attacks;nevertheless, the training continued until thewar started, and General Crespo proved thathe had the necessary intelligence and intuitivejudgment to confront the powerful enemy. 19Tactics and StrategyClausewitz wrote, “This gives rise to thecompletely different activity of planning andexecuting these engagements themselves, andof coordinating each of them with the othersin order to further the object of war. One hasbeen called tactics and the other strategy.” 20From this definition, we can conclude that theuse of tactics is only one way to employ strategyto achieve the political purpose of war. As indicatedpreviously, the Argentinians had assumeda defensive position, as expressed intheir political goal of “hold[ing] the islandsand fac[ing] the Royal Navy onslaught.” Towardsthis end, their strategy sought to preventthe British fleet from approaching thecoast and fulfilling its goal. Only the FAS couldcarry out that mission.But General Crespo encountered severalobstacles that prevented his forces from performingoptimally—some caused by a lack oftechnology and others by the command structure’sorganization. Take, for example, GeneralGaltieri’s arbitrary decision to dispatchmore troops while implementing the initialplan to defend the islands. This deploymentused all available transport airplanes—four C-130s and some F-27s. Unfortunately, the limitednumber of transport planes and the short5,500-foot runway at the Port Stanley airfieldprevented the deployment of artillery piecesor armored vehicles.General Galtieri’s deficient intelligence apparatusprevented him from sensing the needto enlarge Port Stanley’s landing strip so thatcombat aircraft could operate from there. 21The FAA had the means to perform theneeded construction work in a little morethan one week; indeed, had the lengtheningtaken place, the war might have turned outdifferently. 22 As it turned out, the FAS had tooperate from continental bases far away fromthe islands, including those at ComodoroRivadavia (540 miles), San Julián (440 miles),Río Gallegos (470 miles), Río Grande (430miles), and Trelew (625 miles), the last fourbases hosting combat aircraft like the MirageIII EA, Mirage 5, A-4B/C/Q Skyhawk, SuperEtendard, and Canberra. At Comodoro Rivadavia,the Argentinians stationed transport,tanker, surveillance, diversion, and searchand-rescueaircraft—specifically, C-130s, KC-130s, Learjet 35s, F-27s, and helicopters.From the Argentinian air fleet, only the A-4and Super Etendard could be air-refueled,something they had to do twice on each combatsortie. The distance between the bases andthe islands limited the operation of the MirageIII and Mirage 5 to a maximum of 10minutes, precluding the use of afterburners.This limitation prevented the Argentiniansfrom achieving air superiority over the islandsor offering air cover to missions beyond therange of interceptor airplanes. Furthermore,massed attacks against the British fleet provedimpossible because Argentina possessed onlytwo KC-130 tankers. 23 Despite these restrictions,the pilots scored important hits throughinventiveness and courage, making AdmiralWoodward doubtful about the war’s outcome:“In that stage, the war had become a fight betweenthe Royal Navy and the Argentinean AirForce for the prize. Who was winning in thatprecise moment? I am afraid we were not.” 24On 1 May, the FAA’s baptism of fire occurredwhen it lost two Mirage III EAs and one Canberrain action, showing General Crespo thathigh-altitude attacks made Argentinian aircraftvulnerable to the British surveillance radarsand Harriers. Henceforth, operationstook place at low altitude, with aircraft flyingbarely over the waves. The Argentinians followedthis tactical procedure during the restof the conflict to defeat the technologicalshield protecting the British fleet.

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AIR WAR 117FrictionOne of Clausewitz’s most distinctive creationsis his notion of friction: “the only concept thatmore or less corresponds to the factors thatdistinguish real war from war on paper. Themilitary machine—the army and everythingrelated to it—is basically very simple andtherefore seems easy to manage. But we shouldbear in mind that none of its components is ofone piece: each part is composed of individuals,every one of whom retains his potential of friction.”25 Clausewitz regards factors such as danger,physical exertion, uncertainty, and chanceas pillars of friction because of their importanceand influence in all wars. 26 No doubt theArgentinian air component, from GeneralCrespo to the most junior pilot, would all experiencesuch friction.Constant danger characterized the war, especiallywhen Argentinian aircraft entered theBritish fleet’s radar-detection zone, where theyrisked encountering sophisticated missiles orHarriers and their deadly AIM-9L Sidewinders.Indeed, the British fleet downed 14 Argentinianplanes with missiles or antiaircraft artillery,and Harriers downed 19. One FAA veteranlater said, “Before the war I thought we had toteach combat pilots to fly formation, fire, andperform tactical navigation; later I understoodthat the most important thing was to teachthem to reach the target, reach it regardless offear of losing their own life, reach it no matterwhat.” 27 According to Clausewitz, the antidoteto danger is courage. 28 Their patriotism anddisdain of death allowed Argentinian pilots tosink six British ships and one landing craft,disable five ships, and damage 12 others (includingtwo aircraft carriers).The pilots also had to contend with exhaustion.Flying three- to four-hour combat sorties,including one hour spent skimming barelyabove the waves, and facing various risks affectedthe pilots’ normal reactions and reasoning;only their training allowed them toovercome this type of stress. After returningfrom his mission to attack the aircraft carrierInvincible on 30 May, Lt G. G. Isaac, an A-4 pilot,commented, “I also remember that I washot. Before that I did not feel it, but no matterhow minimal the symptoms were, I was relaxing.I wanted to shut the heat off, but when Itried to raise my hand from the throttle I realizedthat my arm did not respond. Such wasthe stress that it was stiff, disobedient. I didnot insist and tolerated the heat.” 29 After thisevent, he still had to air-refuel to return to hisbase. Of the four men sent on the mission, onlyLieutenant Isaac and one other pilot survived.At command level, uncertainty, which increaseswhen the enemy has more freedom ofmovement, keeps intelligence staffs awake.The Argentinians had only minimal surveillancecapabilities; however, in spite of theirpoorly prepared aircraft (B-707s, C-130s, andLR-35s), the crews’ navigation and pilotingskills enabled them to find numerous targetsduring their missions—for example, the discoveryon 21 April of Task Force 317 about1,900 miles off the Brazilian coast near Salvador,Bahia. Argentinian aircrews had torely on intuition because they lacked searchtechnology.Chance, another factor that increases uncertainty,permeated the conflict. Because the Argentinianshad few reconnaissance capabilitiesand only short-range radar (Westinghouse AN/TPS-43F) at the Falkland Islands informationand-controlcenter, they had to carry out blindattacks at sea. The FAA’s radar, the only longrange(225 miles) equipment in the Falklands,was designed for air surveillance, but its imageof the surface degraded with increasing distance,limiting the view over the ocean to 31miles. The following account illustrates Clausewitz’sobservation that intelligence and determinationmust overcome uncertainty andchance: 30 “The Air Force radar installed inPuerto Argentino started to record the arrivaland especially the departure paths of the SeaHarrier planes while on patrol and attackflights. . . . After tracking for several days, itwas determined that all planes vanished fromthe radar screen at similar directions and distances.The flights ended, evidently in a smallcircle where all lines met. The aircraft carrierwas in that circle.” 31 This tracking systemhelped the Argentinians plan their famed attackof 30 May against the Invincible.

118 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006Moral ForcesBetween 1 and 20 May, the war had twomain actors—the FAS and Task Force 317,each of which inflicted serious damage on theother. John F. Lehman, US secretary of theNavy, asserted in his report to Congress on 3February 1983 that “in spite of the heroic effortsby the Sea Harrier pilots, the Britishnever got anything close to air superiority overthe Falkland Islands.” 32 Argentinian aviationcontinued reaching its targets.At that time of the year, the British enjoyedan advantage caused by the weather and shortdaylight hours. Airplanes could not even takeoff on 17 of the war’s 44 days because of adverseweather conditions and the availabilityof only nine hours of daylight. But the factorthat favored the British fleet most was thelarge number of Argentinian bombs that hittheir targets without exploding, perhaps becausethe low altitude and rapid delivery preventedthe fuses from functioning properly. 33Had the bombs detonated, the British fleetwould have perhaps met a different fate.On 21 May, the British took advantage ofbad weather conditions to start OperationSutton by landing 5,000 men at San CarlosBay. This time the changing weather did notwork to their advantage since conditions improvedquickly, facilitating attacks by Argentinianaviation and creating what the Britishcalled Bomb Alley. Attacks came from the continentand the islands, but British troops stillsecured a beachhead in San Carlos and its vicinityby 27 May. From this moment on, theconflict favored the British, but the FAS continuedattacking the fleet (e.g., the risky missionagainst the Invincible).As the British forces gained ground, Argentinianaviation focused on supporting its ownsurface forces with the goal of preventing theBritish from advancing and landing moretroops—for example, the sinking of a Britishlogistical landing ship and a landing boat, thedisabling of a landing ship, and the damagingof a frigate, all at Bahia Agradable. Argentinianaircraft also launched day and night attacksagainst command posts. The FAS operateduntil the war ended, and despite theconclusion of its basic mission and the imminenceof British victory, it sought to bolsterthe morale of ground forces resisting the finalBritish attack. On 13 June, one day before theArgentinian surrender, a C-130 landed in PortStanley to unload a 155 mm gun that wasnever used.The Argentinians’ inability to obtain timelyinformation, due to the deficient work of theintelligence-and-information center, preventedawareness of the real British situation whenthe FAS was executing its last mission. AdmiralWoodward described conditions aboard theaircraft carrier Hermes, 300 miles east of theislands on 13 June: “We are already at the limitof our possibilities, with only three warshipsfree of major operating problems (Hermes,Yarmouth, and Exeter). From the force of destroyersand frigates, forty five percent havebeen reduced to zero operating capacity.” 34The Argentinian air component had lost a totalof 74 airplanes, 33 of them in combat missions,in addition to 41 crew members whosacrificed their lives pursuing their country’sobjectives. Unfortunately for Argentina, theseindividuals did not have the correct situationalinformation (at the correct time) they neededto defeat one of the world’s most powerfuland technologically advanced fleets.ConclusionConsequently, it would be an obvious fallacyto imagine war between civilized peoples as resultingmerely from a rational act on the partof their governments and to conceive of war asgradually ridding itself of passion.—Carl von ClausewitzAs the Argentinian army’s chairman andchief of staff, General Galtieri was mainly responsiblefor the conflict but did not understandmodern joint military operations. Hedelayed air force involvement, thinking thata large, poorly armed ground force coulddefend itself. Vice Admiral Lombardo faredlittle better when he attempted to use airplanescapable of only limited combat to defendthe islands against the versatile Harriers

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AIR WAR 119armed with lethal Sidewinders and the Britishfleet’s other weapons and technology.Additionally, sending the cruiser ARA GeneralBelgrano against the British fleet withoutantisubmarine cover resulted in the war’sworst loss of life (321 men).Arbitrary changes in political goals withoutsound study by the senior staff to supportthe viability of the conflict and the absenceof a plan or strategy to achieve suchgoals demonstrated that General Galtieriand the military junta lacked the necessaryabilities to conduct a war—what Clausewitzcalled military genius. Only General Crespo,commander of the FAS, demonstrated abilityand professionalism, successfully overcomingtechnological differences, inadequate aircraftrange, and shortages of tankers andreconnaissance assets.However, none of his success would haveoccurred without the courage his pilots demonstratedon each mission. Courage in theface of danger, combined with patriotic sentiment,is often overlooked by military powersor thought to have been supplanted by technologicaladvances. In reality, it deserves considerationwhen an opponent’s desire to reacha set goal outweighs his physical and technologicalinferiority. The Argentinians’ use oflow-altitude attacks and only five Exocets ledthe prestigious and sophisticated British RoyalNavy to change its defense doctrine after thewar. Although this conflict in the South Atlanticbegan 150 years after the publicationof On War, this article demonstrates thatClausewitz’s philosophical concepts aboutwar serve as contemporary pillars that applyto any armed conflict. qNotes1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, rev. ed., ed. and trans.Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1984), 87.2. Comodoro F. P. Matassi, Probado en Combate (BuenosAires: Pio Matassi, 1994), 23.3. Nicanor Costa Méndez, Malvinas ésta es la Historia(Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1993), 25.4. Argentinian entrepreneur Constantino Davidoff arrivedon 19 March 1982 at Leith Harbor (South GeorgiaIsland) on the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso to take possession ofold whale-processing plants he had purchased in December1981. The Argentinian military supposedly includedsome commandos in Davidoff ’s party. Deeming this incidentpart of the Argentinian naval command’s OperationAlpha, the British government did not let Mr. Davidoff orhis personnel stay on the islands. See “Falklands WarRoundtable,” 15–16 May 2003, Miller Center of PublicAffairs: Presidential Oral History, http://millercenter.virginia.edu/programs/poh/falklands.html.5. Clausewitz, On War, 92.6. Dr. James S. Corum, “Poderío Aéreo Argentino enla Guerra de las Malvinas: Una Panorámica Operacional,”Aerospace Power Journal Español, second quarter 2002, 69.7. Matassi, Probado en Combate, 31.8. Cited in Christophe Swinarski, “Definición y ámbitode aplicación del Derecho Internacional Humanitario,”Revista Nacional de Derecho Aeronáutico y Espacial 3 (1989): 19.9. Clausewitz, On War, 89.10. Matassi, Probado en Combate, 32.11. Clausewitz, On War, 89.12. Ibid., 97.13. Adm Sandy Woodward, Los cien días (Buenos Aires:Sudamericana, 1992), 88.14. Ibid., 89.15. Clausewitz, On War, 595–96.16. B. H. Andrada, Guerra Aérea en las Malvinas (BuenosAires: Emecé Editores, 1983), 29.17. Clausewitz, On War, 87, 92.18. Ibid., 357.19. Matassi, Probado en Combate, 27. The Military CommitteeResolution of 1969, regulating jurisdiction of thedifferent forces, transferred the air force’s air and marineoperations to the navy.20. Clausewitz, On War, 128.21. See Clausewitz’s discussion of intelligence in thesection “On Military Genius.” Ibid., 100–112.22. Corum, “Poderío Aéreo Argentino,” 83.23. Ibid., 75.24. Woodward, Los cien días, 281.25. Clausewitz, On War, 119.26. Ibid., 122.27. Capt Pablo Marcos Carballo, Halcones sobre Malvinas(Buenos Aires: Ediciones de Cruzamante, 1984), 17.28. Clausewitz, On War, 114.29. Matassi, Probado en Combate, 98.30. Clausewitz, On War, 100–112.31. Andrada, Guerra Aérea, 181.32. Cited in Matassi, Probado en Combate, 67.33. Carballo, Halcones sobre Malvinas, 171.34. Woodward, Los cien días, 339.

The Battle for the Hague—1940: The First GreatAirborne Operations by Lt Col E. H. Brongers,translated by C. C. W. van Romondt Vis. UitgeverijAspekt (Aspekt Dutch Publisher) (http://www.uitgeverijaspekt.nl), Amersfoortsestraat 27,3769 AD Soesterberg, 2004, 293 pages, $15.95(softcover).In May 1940, Germany launched its attack onWestern Europe and in 10 weeks occupied France,Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Althoughthe Ardennes breakthrough and the assaulton Fort Eben Emael are familiar, the operations inthe Netherlands are less well known and not frequentlydocumented in English. The Dutch put upstout resistance but ultimately were overcome byGerman panzers and the bombing of Rotterdam.The attack on the Hague, the political center ofthe country, had two purposes: (1) to seize the governmentand thus paralyze Dutch military activitiesand (2) to overcome the canal and river defenseslocated in the center of a series of defendable linesknown as Fortress Holland. Germany had establisheda paratrooper arm in the Luftwaffe early in1933 as well as an air-landing division that usedtransport aircraft to assault airfields and then fightas infantry. Hitler’s plan called for paratroopers tojump and seize airfields where German aircraftcould fly in reinforcements and supplies; theywould also secure bridges to allow panzer and infantrydivisions to move up quickly and seize keyDutch cities. The element of surprise, the lack ofmodern armament in the Dutch armed forces, andthe small size of the Dutch army and air force wouldall lead to a quick and easy German victory.In 1940 Western countries appreciated neitherthe size nor the capabilities of German paratroopers,whose existence had remained a secret (theyhad seen action only during the seizure of Oslo,Norway, earlier that year). In order to move the airlandingdivision and resupply the dropped paratroopers,the German military made available atotal of 430 Ju-52 transports. Although the Dutchplanned to withdraw into Fortress Holland, theirarmed forces could not deal with air attack or thecombined-arms concept of blitzkrieg.On 10 May, following extensive German reconnaissanceboth on the ground and in the air andafter the bombing of three airfields around theHague, German paratroopers began dropping whileJu-52s swooped down towards the runways. However,the Dutch proved less passive than Germanplanners anticipated, shooting up a majority ofthese aircraft and killing German troops. More importantly,the Ju-52s could not return to Germanyto pick up more troops. The Germans failed toseize the three airfields, and other paratrooperswere scattered to Hoek van Holland and other areasnorth of the Hague.The paratroopers enjoyed more success in Rotterdamand areas near the critical Moerdijk bridges.Dutch troops bitterly contested Dordrecht, anothercritical target. After four days of fighting, the Luftwaffebombed the center of Rotterdam to breakDutch resistance; at the same time, attempts by theDutch to link with French troops coming from Belgiumfailed. The Dutch queen reluctantly evacuatedto Britain along with the government, and the Dutchmilitary was forced to cease resistance on 15 May.Few military historians have succeeded in determiningwhat effect this Dutch defense had on furtherGerman military operations. German recordsof the Battle of the Hague were destroyed in 1945,but Brongers uses German and Dutch sources toestablish that airborne landings during OperationSea Lion were restricted, that the Luftwaffe neverrecovered from the losses to its transport aircraft,and that a lack of aircraft and manpower hamperedthe drop on Crete in 1941.This English translation of a Dutch text will appealto World War II enthusiasts and airpower advocatesalike. The Battle for the Hague enhances ourunderstanding of the efforts of the smaller powers,120

BOOK REVIEWS 121whose contributions in World War II are frequentlyoverlooked in English-language texts. Additionally,Brongers gives us the opportunity to make usefulcomparisons with the Battle for Arnhem—anothergreat airborne struggle in the Netherlands duringWorld War II.Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, RetiredFairfax, VirginiaThunderchief: The Right Stuff and How FighterPilots Get It by Don Henry. Pelican PublishingCompany (http://www.pelicanpub.com), 1000Burmaster Street, Gretna, Louisiana 70053-2246,2004, 295 pages, $22.00 (hardcover).Author Don Henry describes Thunderchief as “anovel in the form of a memoir.” Set in the midst ofthe interminable Rolling Thunder bombing campaignagainst North Vietnam in 1966, the bookblends dramatically realistic combat flying withworrisome psychological introspection. The storydescribes how a fictional character named AsheWilcox, one of the lieutenants initially sent to Thailandto fly the F-105 Thunderchief in combat,grows from rookie to seasoned veteran under thementorship of the equally fictional “Hunter,” a legendaryfighter pilot. A Korean War prisoner of warand full-blooded American Indian, Hunter is a consummateaerial warrior held in awe by his fellowpilots. Thus the book’s title has a double meaning:the term Thunderchief not only functions as thenickname of the F-105 but also symbolizes Hunter’sIndian character.Readers will notice that the mind-set of theF-105 pilots flying Rolling Thunder differs noticeablyfrom that of today’s pilots. Many Vietnam Waraircrews bound by ridiculously restrictive rules ofengagement (ROE) developed an intense and lastingsense of bitterness. Heavy loss rates proved thereality of the danger they faced. Completing a 100-mission tour of duty stood as a great achievementin an era when our military lost literally hundredsof F-105s each year. In Thunderchief, Hunter teachesLieutenant Wilcox to be intensely suspicious ofgenerals and intelligence officers. Obsessed withcombat flying and repelled by the prospect of anassignment to the Pentagon, Hunter deliberatelycrashes his plane into a North Vietnamese bridgeon his final mission. In modern aerial combat(quite different from that in Southeast Asia), losinga plane is rare. Few of today’s pilots relish Pentagontours, but fewer still would fly a kamikaze missionto avoid one. Perhaps only veterans of the air war inVietnam really understand the mind-set of aircrewsin that conflict.Thunderchief will remind readers of other VietnamWar accounts such as Jack Broughton’s ThudRidge and Ed Rasimus’s When Thunder Rolled—bothof them outright memoirs. Henry’s book, however,more closely resembles a historical novel. Why theauthor decided not to write a memoir about hisown experiences remains unclear. Presumably thebook reflects his personal experiences, but fighterpilots do have a reputation for hiding their feelings.No doubt Henry chooses to express himselfthrough the imaginary Ashe Wilcox. Some of theseexpressions fare better than others. His combatnarrative is gripping, but the parts that describeWilcox’s interactions with women seem stilted andunreal. Clearly the lieutenant is no romantic.Many readers will appreciate this book as a goodwartime adventure story despite its dark psychologicalaspects. Suffering heavy casualties whilefighting under unreasonable ROEs has a corrosiveeffect on the aircrews depicted in Thunderchief.Overcoming fear and courageously attacking theenemy, mission after mission, epitomizes the “rightstuff ” mentioned in the title, and completing a 100-mission tour represents a mark of courage for theF-105 pilots. These men performed their duty honorablyand often heroically, but let us hope wenever again subject our aircrews to a campaign likeRolling Thunder.Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAFMaxwell AFB, AlabamaTail-End Charlies: The Last Battles of the BomberWar, 1944–45 by John Nichol and Tony Rennell.Penguin: Allen Lane (http://www.penguin.co.uk),80 Strand, London, WC2R ORL, 2005, 496 pages,$42.00 (hardcover).Every now and then, a military history arguablysets new standards for research, readability, and significanthistorical contributions. A number of bookswritten about the Combined Bomber Offensive(CBO) against Germany during World War II havegenerated far too many ill-conceived conclusions,misguided blame, and poor statistical analysis ofthe efforts by the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) and USArmy Air Forces’ (USAAF) Bomber Commands. Ina successful attempt to raise the bar, authors JohnNichol and Tony Rennell have written a book thatanswers many nagging questions and dispels nu-

122 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006merous incorrect assumptions. Most important,the authors aim the spotlight on the most significantaspect of the bomber war: the men who flewthe missions against Germany and into the teeth ofHermann Göring’s Luftwaffe.In RAF Bomber Command’s parlance, the termtail-end Charlie designated the man who occupiedthe loneliest of positions in the tail of the bomber.Fighting intense cold, sleep, and the ever-presentfear of German night fighters, the rear-turret gunnerswere among the bravest men on any bombercrew. In American vernacular, tail-end Charlie denotedthe aircraft in the dangerously vulnerablerear position of the formation. Regardless of one’sperspective, the meaning remained the same: thisposition invoked fear. The book Tail-End Charliestakes an extraordinary look into the last half of thebomber war. Weaving historical operations withcomments and views from the men who flew thesemissions, the authors paint a clear and terrifyingpicture of what bomber crews endured during thispart of the war.Both authors bring unique talents to their task.John Nichol, an RAF flight lieutenant who becamea prisoner of war after his Tornado was shot downduring the first Gulf War, wrote several books, includingTornado Down and The Last Escape, uponreturning from Iraq. He has also written five novels.Tony Rennell authored The Last Days of Glory: TheDeath of Queen Victoria and several other books.They effectively blend their writing styles to producea work that is both historically indispensableand enjoyable to read.Any worthwhile study of the CBO, in particularone that emphasizes RAF Bomber Command, mustfocus, at least in part, on Air Marshal Sir ArthurHarris—the command’s indomitable leader fromFebruary 1942 until the end of the war. Armed withhis unbending vision of what he believed to be theproper prosecution of the bomber war, Harris hasbeen vilified—to some degree unfairly—as the solearchitect of the destruction of German cities. Althougha man who indeed held sway within BomberCommand and who proved unwilling to submit hisauthority to the destruction of what he called “panacea”targets, he has become the undying symbol forthe conduct of the command. Nichol and Rennelloffer perhaps one of the most balanced and evenhandedassessments of Harris that I have read althoughI believe they could have better supportedtheir positions by including many of the bombingdirectives handed down to Harris throughout thewar. These documents demonstrate that althoughHarris often did ignore directives and orders, heusually complied with them.In another volatile debate, the authors accuratelybroach the issue of the Dresden firebombing.The word Dresden, which conjures up images of Alliedmurder and terror bombing, has come to symbolizeall that was “wrong” with the CBO. In light ofunsubstantiated claims of hundreds of thousandsof people killed, those who condemn the CBO haveadopted “Remember Dresden” as their ballyhooedbattle cry. Although official German reports afterthe bombing list the actual number of dead at18,375, with each subsequent telling of the horrorof Dresden, those numbers seem to swell. I believethat Nichol and Rennell successfully demonstratethat Dresden was indeed a legitimate target on thatFasching night, 14 February 1945. Despite Harris’sflippant and callous comment that “Dresden was amass of munitions works, an intact governmentcentre, and a key transportation point to the east.It is now none of these things,” its legitimacy as amilitary target remains clear.For all the ferocity of the European air war, theincredible losses incurred by both the RAF andUSAAF bomber forces, and the accomplishmentsof the men in those commands, it is a shame thatwe do not have more excellent books about thisarea of World War II. John Nichol and Tony Rennellhave accomplished what many others have not:they have written a superb book. For years, we haveconsidered authors like Max Hastings and MartinMiddlebrook preeminent experts in the field. Ithink that Nichol and Rennell will soon join them.Although Tail-End Charlies contains 22 photographs,it offers no maps or appendices of bomber andcrew losses, bomb tonnages, sorties flown, targetshit, and the like. These would have certainly madean outstanding book much better.The authors brilliantly confront the controversialissues of Bomber Command’s reprehensible dealingwith men who broke under the strain of combat,the debate over daylight versus night bombing,arguments about the efficacy and morality of thebomber offensive, and Churchill’s politically expedientdisregard for the command after the war. Theauthors also tackle the final disgrace of not awardingBomber Command a campaign ribbon for itsfive-year war against Germany. Scholarly researched,professional in its presentation, and incredibly enjoyableto read, Tail-End Charlies is definitely a musthavebook. Readers interested in the CBO againstGermany in World War II can do no better thanTail-End Charlies. Period!Lt Col Robert Tate, USAFRMaxwell AFB, Alabama

BOOK REVIEWS 123Franco: Soldier, Commander, Dictator by GeoffreyJensen. Potomac Books, Inc. (http://www.potomacbooksinc.com), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles,Virginia 20166, 2005, 160 pages, $19.95 (hardcover),$12.95 (softcover).From May 1980 to June 1983, I was at an air base10 miles northeast of Madrid, Spain. FranciscoFranco had been dead for five years, and a youngking—Juan Carlos—was trying to establish democracyafter 35 years of dictatorship. I soon learnedthat many members of the older generation, waryof “democratic government” and its social ills,yearned for “the good ole days” under Franco. InFebruary 1981, to punctuate the fragility of Spain’sdemocracy and Franco’s lingering influence, someconservative military officers seized the NationalAssembly in Madrid, hoping that the king and armywould abolish democracy. Fortunately for Spain,the king—with the army’s support—took command,and the rebellion melted away.In this short biography, Geoffrey Jensen—holderof the John Biggs ’30 Cincinnati Chair in MilitaryHistory at the Virginia Military Institute and a leadingauthority on modern military history, the Spanishmilitary, and counterinsurgency—has producedan excellent overview of the life of the modernworld’s longest-sitting dictator at the time of hisdeath. The subtitle accurately reflects the author’sframework of the book, dividing Franco’s life intothree major stages. Throughout this concise andwell-paced biography, Jensen consistently shows ushow Franco’s military experiences influenced hispolitical career as the Nationalist leader during thecivil war and then as dictator of Spain.Although his father was a naval officer, Francobecame an army cadet. After commissioning, hesteadily rose in rank, helped by assignments toSpain’s Army of Africa and its campaigns againstthe Rif tribesmen of Morocco. He returned to Spainas the commandant of the new military academy.He went back to Morocco and reluctantly joinedthe Nationalist rebellion against the government inMay 1936. Within a year, Franco had become thede facto head of the rebellion. After the end of thecivil war, Franco worked to establish a viable governmentwhile walking a thin line between the Alliedand the Axis powers during World War II. After thewar, taking advantage of the Cold War between theUnited States and the Soviet Union, Franco garneredacceptance and economic aid from the West.In his waning years, he coached future king JuanCarlos, hoping he would continue Franco’s rightist,conservative government. After the dictator’s deathin 1975, Juan Carlos instituted a constitutionalmonarchy instead.Of particular importance to Franco’s developmentas a military leader, to which Jensen makesregular references, were his experiences with theSpanish Army of Africa and the Spanish ForeignLegion in their campaigns against the Rif tribesmen.Jensen points out that Franco developed hisruthlessness as the Nationalist leader during thecivil war and then as dictator during his tours ofduty in North Africa. Faced with an enemy who oftenmutilated Spanish corpses, the Spanish soldiersand officers demonstrated a growing acceptance ofbrutality and inhumanity, likewise terrorizing theirArab opponents. Not immune to such influences,Franco practiced and condoned similar conductduring the civil war and his follow-on regime.Jensen also emphasizes Franco’s development asan operational-level commander. Although Francowas no strategic genius, “he had grasped the importanceof the operational level of war [that level betweenthe tactical and strategic levels which servesto link the two] very early, at a time when technologymade rapid advances” (p. xii). From his combat experiencesin North Africa, he came to promote cooperationamong all military arms and services.These experiences would serve him well in defeatingthe Republican armies during the civil war. Forexample, he ensured that his staff included officersskilled at operational planning. Jensen regularlymentions Franco’s “joint” experience during hiscombat tours in North Africa.Franco: Soldier, Commander, Dictator is a good bookfor the general reader as well as the military historian.The author provides an excellent criticalanalysis of Franco’s life but does not get boggeddown in details and minutiae, although on severaloccasions, he digresses a bit into less-relevant issues.Overall, I highly recommend this book.Dr. Robert B. KaneEglin AFB, FloridaAllied Fighter Aces of World War II: The Air CombatTactics and Techniques of World War II byMike Spick. Stackpole Books (http://www.stackpolebooks.com), 5067 Ritter Road, Mechanicsburg,Pennsylvania 17055-6921, 2004,248 pages, $19.95 (softcover).Allied Fighter Aces examines specific tactics usedby the best-scoring Allied fighter pilots during theair war in Europe, Africa, and the Pacific, often

124 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006quoting the aces themselves. Every chapter dealswith a specific World War II time frame or theaterand generally follows the same structure: a shortpreface, a description of the fighters used in thatparticular setting, and an account of the acesthemselves.Mike Spick knows his material, having publishedextensively on the subject of fighter pilots of WorldWar II. He treats his subject systematically, placingevery ace in his proper context and giving readersinsight into reasons why one fighter pilot in a specifictheater managed to score better than anotherin a different theater. Such reasons include differencesin aircraft handling, marksmanship, visualacuity, and, of course, the number and quality oftheir opponents.Because of the clear structure of the book, it isparticularly well suited for readers who do notknow very much about the role of fighters in WorldWar II. Even for those who do, parts of the bookwill fill gaps in their knowledge. In that respect,one can conclude that there are never enoughpages to write about a few special pilots who did somuch for so many.Lt Col Willem M. Klumper, Royal Netherlands Air ForceThe Hague, NetherlandsTactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant MuslimCombat Methods by H. John Poole. PosterityPress (http://members.aol.com/posteritypress),P.O. Box 5360, Emerald Isle, North Carolina28594, 2004, 368 pages, $14.95 (softcover).A number of books have appeared over the pastfew years that address various topics about theglobal war on terrorism (GWOT): civil liberties,conduct of the war or individual engagements, andeven plans for the coming decades. A few manageto do a good job of addressing their chosen topic,keeping the subject and proposed solutions relevantto the situation and anticipated outcome.H. John Poole’s book Tactics of the Crescent Moon isone of those.Poole has several books to his credit, all of whichaddress how Western forces (primarily from theUnited States, Russia, and the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization) can and should deal with current orfuture enemy forces. In every case, the author drawson his US Marine experience in Vietnam to illustratethe inadequacies of Western leadership andtactics against Eastern (primarily Maoist, but includingother Asian) tactics and leadership methods.Here, he spends the first 10 (of 12) chaptersdiscussing individual terrorist organizations, theirtactics, similarities and sources of their tactics anddoctrine, and ways in which these “ragtag” groupshave managed to deal blow after blow to Westernforces. Poole does this convincingly by walking thereader through an exhaustive case study of Soviet/Russian conflicts in Afghanistan and Chechnya aswell as highlighting other groups’ operations againstIsraeli and US forces.Poole leaves the reader with the conclusion thatWestern forces can defeat these terrorist groupsbut not by continuing to use conventional Westerntactics. In this regard, I feel that he has hit a grandslam—in order to make true progress in the GWOT,we need to fully understand what our adversaries’motivations are and how we can counteract them.In fact, Poole titles one of his chapters “The ResponseMust Be Unconventional.” Indeed, althoughhe offers nothing new in this chapter, he draws onseveral examples in which the carrot approach hasworked far better than liberal employment of astick—even a high-precision stick.I have only a few concerns about the book. Forexample, it includes a number of maps, but theyare difficult to read and are of questionable utility.Furthermore, Poole’s practice of making repeatedreferences to the use of Eastern methods, tactics,and doctrine becomes so distracting that one istempted to skip over the section and move on. Attimes, that’s a bad idea because these referencesconvey some important points. Nevertheless, thediscussion becomes somewhat disjointed at times.Placing more emphasis on the core ideas of eachchapter would solve this problem. Lastly, Poolespends an inordinate amount of time building hiscase, only to offer a disproportionately smallamount of space to solutions. I would like to haveseen more than one-sixth of the book devoted tosolutions and proposals. The author offers someinteresting ideas; it’s a shame that he didn’t takethe space to build better cases for them.Tactics of the Crescent Moon is a comprehensive, ifsomewhat disorganized, assessment of the directionUS operations must take in the coming years.It’s worth reading, especially for any military memberof any branch of service who is headed to Iraqor Afghanistan.Maj Paul Niesen, USAFScott AFB, Illinois

APJAir and Space Power Journal, the US Air Force’sprofessional journal, is published in English,Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, and French. Each versionhas its own personality as well as an editor—anative speaker of the particular language and anexpert in the region of coverage—who selects theJournal’s content. We’re always looking for good,thought-provoking articles up to 5,000 words inlength, written in any of our published languages.All submissions will be edited in accordance withthe standards set forth in the Air University Style andAuthor Guide (available online at http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/Resources/style/austyle_guide.pdf). For details, please see our guidelines for submittingarticles at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/howto1.html. You can contactus by e-mail at aspj@maxwell.af.mil; regular mailat Air and Space Power Journal, 401 ChennaultCircle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428; phone at DSN493-5322 (commercial [334] 953-5322); or fax atDSN 493-5811.Subscribing to ASPJ:Both Printed and Electronic Subscriptions Are AvailablePrinted copy• The Journal is available free to all USAF organizationsas described below in the section “Is Your OrganizationReceiving Its Proper Number of ASPJCopies?” Other US government and foreign militaryorganizations may also receive the Journal for free bycontacting the editor at aspj@maxwell.af.mil.• Nonmilitary and nongovernmental organizationsmay receive the Journal by contacting the Superintendentof Documents by any of the following methods:writing to New Orders, Superintendent of Documents,P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954;calling (202) 512-1800 (voice), (866) 512-1800 (tollfreeoutside the DC area), or (202) 512-2250 (fax);or visiting http://bookstore.gpo.gov on the Internet.The Journal’s official designation is AFRP 10-1, Air andSpace Power Journal, stock number 708-007-00000-5.The cost is $32.00 ($44.80 for international mail).Major credit cards are accepted.Free electronic copy• You can receive the Journal electronically by loggingon to the “Subscription Center” at the Air ForceLink Web site http://www.af.mil/subscribe, selectingAir and Space Power Journal (English, Spanish,and/or French editions), entering your name ande-mail address, and then clicking on the “submit”button. You will immediately receive an e-mail askingyou to reply in order to confirm your subscription.You won’t receive your subscription unless youreply to that message. Electronic subscription is free.Is Your OrganizationReceiving Its Proper Numberof ASPJ Copies?The following “Basis of Issue” criteria guide thefree distribution of Air and Space Power Journal toUSAF and governmental organizations in theUnited States and other countries. These criteriaare only planning factors—not absolute limits. Ifyour unit has different needs, please contact us ataspj@maxwell.af.mil.• One copy for each general on active duty with theUS Air Force or Air Reserve Forces.• One copy for every five active duty US Air Force officersin grades second lieutenant through colonel.• One copy for each US Air Force or Air Reserve Forcesoffice of public affairs.• Three copies for each Air Reserve Forces unit downto squadron level.• Three copies for each air attaché or advisory-groupfunction.• One copy for each US Air Force or US governmentlibrary.• Other US military, US government, or foreign militaryorganizations wishing to receive the Journal shouldcontact us at aspj@maxwell.af.mil.If your organization is not receiving its authorizedcopies, please contact us.Cumulative Article IndexA cumulative index of ASPJ articles, listed alphabeticallyby the author’s last name, is available athttp://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apjindex.html.The Editor125

OUR CONTRIBUTORSGen Tom Hobbins (BS, University of Colorado;MBA, Troy State University) is commanderof US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE);commander of Air Component Command,Ramstein Air Base, Germany; and director ofthe Joint Air Power Competency Center,Ramstein. He previously served as deputychief of staff for war-fighting integration,Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC.General Hobbins has commanded two tacticalfighter wings, a composite air group, TwelfthAir Force, and air-component commands forUS Strategic Command and US SouthernCommand. Additionally, he has served as directorof plans and operations for US ForcesJapan, director of plans and policy for US AtlanticCommand, and director of operationsfor USAFE. A command pilot, he has morethan 4,440 flying hours, primarily in fighteraircraft. General Hobbins is a graduate ofSquadron Officer School, Armed Forces StaffCollege, and Air War College.Brig Gen Robert H. “Bob” Holmes (BA, DavidLipscomb College; MS, Georgia State University)is deputy director of operations, HeadquartersUS Central Command, MacDill AFB,Florida. His previous service includes tours asdirector of security forces and force protection,Headquarters US Air Force, Washington,DC, and commander of the 37th TrainingWing at Lackland AFB, Texas. During OperationEnduring Freedom, the general served asdeputy commander of Joint Special OperationsTask Force-South (Task Force K-Bar), responsiblefor directing and conducting jointcombat operations in southern Afghanistan. Amaster parachutist and military free-fall parachutist,General Holmes is a graduate ofSquadron Officer School, Air Command andStaff College, Air War College, and ArmedForces Staff College.Col Bradley D. Spacy (BA, Fresno State University;MS, University of Southern Mississippi) iscommander of the 375th Mission SupportGroup, Scott AFB, Illinois. A career securityforcesofficer with extensive experience in airbasedefense and antiterrorism / force protection,he has served as commander of the 47thSecurity Forces Squadron, Laughlin AFB,Texas; director of force protection for US CentralCommand Air Forces Forward in supportof Operations Enduring Freedom and IraqiFreedom, during which time he created,planned, and participated in Operation DesertSafeside / Task Force 1041, an offensive combatoperation to kill or capture insurgent forcesattacking Balad Air Base, Iraq; and chief of theForce Protection and Operations Division, Directorateof Security Forces, Headquarters USAir Force, Pentagon, Washington, DC. ColonelSpacy also commanded the United States AirForce Honor Guard, leading 250 men andwomen in over 6,000 Air Force and joint-serviceceremonies for the president, secretary of defense,chief of staff of the Air Force, and otherhigh-level military and civilian leaders. ColonelSpacy is a graduate of Squadron Officer School,US Marine Corps Command and Staff College,and Joint Forces Staff College.Lt Col Gregory J. Reese (USAFA; MS, Universityof South Carolina; MS, Air Force Instituteof Technology) is commander of the 51st SecurityForces Squadron, Osan Air Base, SouthKorea. He has served in numerous installation,training, and staff assignments in the securityforcescareer field. Previous assignments includecommander, 332d Expeditionary SecurityForces Squadron, Balad Air Base, Iraq; securityforces staff, Headquarters Air Combat Command,Langley AFB, Virginia; Air Mobility WarfareCenter, Fort Dix, New Jersey; and chief ofair base defense and police-service policy,Headquarters USAF, Pentagon, Washington,DC, where he developed new air-base defenseconcepts and doctrine. Colonel Reese is a graduateof Air Command and Staff College.Lt Col John M. Busch (BS, University of Michigan;MS, University of Kansas) is chief of theThreat and Intelligence Doctrine Branch,Force Protection and Operations Division, Directorateof Security Forces and Force Protection,Headquarters US Air Force, Pentagon,Washington, DC. A member of the Air ForceOffice of Special Investigations (AFOSI), heis a veteran counterintelligence and specialinvestigationsofficer who has held a variety ofcommand and staff positions, including OSI detachmentcommander, director of staff, operationsofficer, and Air Staff officer. Colonel Buschalso served as task force counterintelligencecoordinator for Combined Joint Task Force 7and Multinational Force-Iraq in Baghdad, responsiblefor all counterintelligence activitiessupporting operations and force protection.126

CONTRIBUTORS 127Col Howard D. “Dave” Belote (BA, Universityof Virginia; MBA, Embry-Riddle AeronauticalUniversity; MAAS [Master of Airpower Art andScience], School of Advanced Airpower Studies;MS, National War College) is chief of the CombatingWeapons of Mass Destruction Division,Joint Chiefs of Staff J-5, Pentagon, Washington,DC. He has flown more than 2,000 hours, primarilyin the F-16 and F-111. Colonel Belotehas served as the chief of theater air strategy forSeventh Air Force and the Air ComponentCommand in Korea. He commanded the coresquadron of US Air Forces in Europe’s air operationscenter as well as the Air ComponentCommander’s Element in Tel Aviv, Israel, duringmajor combat operations in OperationIraqi Freedom. From July 2004 through June2006, he commanded the 3d Air Support OperationsGroup and served as air liaison officerto III Armored Corps, Fort Hood, Texas, positionshe held in Baghdad from September 2004through February 2005. Colonel Belote is a distinguishedgraduate of Squadron Officer School,Air Command and Staff College, and NationalWar College.Maj Collin T. Ireton (USAFA; MS, Embry-RiddleAeronautical University) is an experimentalflight-test pilot with the 410th Flight TestSquadron in Palmdale, California. Previously,he flew F-117s operationally and served as anassistant director of operations for the 9thFighter Squadron at Holloman AFB, NewMexico. Major Ireton also served as an experimentalflight-test pilot in the A-10 and F-16aircraft and as the developmental flight-testflight commander for the A-10. He spent twooverseas tours as an operational F-16 pilot andhas amassed over 2,500 hours in 28 differenttypes of aircraft. Major Ireton is a graduate ofSquadron Officer School, Air Command andStaff College, and the USAF Test Pilot School.Dr. Jack D. Kem, Colonel, USA, retired (BA,Western Kentucky University; MPA, AuburnUniversity–Montgomery; PhD, North CarolinaState University), is a supervisory associateprofessor in the Department of Joint and MultinationalOperations at the US Army Commandand General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,Kansas. He previously served as amilitary intelligence officer with major assignmentswith Allied Land Forces SoutheasternEurope, 82d Airborne Division, 3d ArmoredDivision, and 3d Infantry Division. For his lastactive duty assignment, he served as the commandingofficer, 319th Military IntelligenceBattalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Dr.Kem is a distinguished graduate of Air Commandand Staff College and a graduate of theArmy Command and General Staff Collegeand Army War College. He is the author ofCampaign Planning: Tools of the Trade (FortLeavenworth, KS: US Army Command andGeneral Staff College, June 2005).CDR John J. Klein, USN (BS, Georgia Instituteof Technology; MS, Naval PostgraduateSchool; MA, Naval War College), is assistantair officer (“miniboss”) aboard the USS John C.Stennis (CVN 74). He has served as maintenanceofficer, Sea Control Squadron 24(VS-24); test and evaluation project officer,Naval Force Aircraft Test Squadron (VX-20);naval flight officer under instruction, US NavalTest Pilot School; tactical development andevaluation officer (VS-24); and maintenancebranch officer, Sea Control Squadron 28(VS-28). Commander Klein is the author ofseveral journal articles and the book Space Warfare:Strategy, Principles and Policy (London:Routledge, 2006).LCDR Thomas D. Vandermolen, USN (BS,Louisiana Tech University; MA, Naval War College),is officer in charge, Maritime Scienceand Technology Center, Yokosuka, Japan. Hewas previously assigned as a student at theNaval War College, Newport Naval Station,Rhode Island. He has also served as intelligenceofficer for Carrier Wing Five, Naval AirFacility, Atsugi, Japan, and in similar assignmentswith US Special Operations Command,US Forces Korea, and Sea Control SquadronTHIRTY-FIVE, Naval Air Station, North Island,California. His essay “A Smarter INTELINK”was awarded first prize in the Director of NavalIntelligence Essay Competition, while at theUS Naval War College.Maj Rodolfo Pereyra, Fuerza Aérea Uruguaya(Uruguayan air force), is commander of theFirst Air Squadron at Air Base no. 2, Santa Bernardina,Durazno. He previously served aschief of operations and maintenance, First AirSquadron (Attack), Second Air Brigade, inDurazno. An IA-58 Pucará combat trainer pilotwith more than 2,200 flying hours, he is agraduate of the Military School of Aeronautics,Air Staff Course, Command Basic Course,and Command Elementary Course at theCommand and Air Staff School and a distinguishedgraduate of the Inter-American AirForces Academy in San Antonio, Texas. MajorPereyra has earned the United States DefenseCooperation Office Award and the FuerzaAérea Uruguaya’s Flight Safety Merit Award.

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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARDGen John A. Shaud, USAF, RetiredLt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, RetiredMaj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University (professor emeritus)Col Steven D. Carey, USAF, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and EducationDr. J. Douglas Beason, Colonel, USAF, Retired, Los Alamos National LaboratoryDr. Alexander S. Cochran, National Defense UniversityProf. Thomas B. Grassey, Naval War CollegeLt Col Dave Mets, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus)Left to right: Lt Col Paul Berg, chief of professional journals; Lt Col Luis F. Fuentes, USAF, retired, editorof Air and Space Power Journal in Spanish; Gen Edgar A. Lesmez, chief of staff, Fuerza Aérea Colom-(Colombian air force); and Col Carl Hunter, USAF, chief, Air Force Mission (22 June 2006,bianaBogotá, Colombia).Left to right: Lt Col Luis F. Fuentes, USAF, retired, editor of Air and Space Power Journal in Spanish,displays a gift he received from Maj Gen Nelson E. Marmolejos, chief of staff, Fuerza Aérea Dominicana(Dominican Republic air force). Lt Col Paul Berg, chief of professional journals, displays his gift (1 June2006, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic).