36 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>Lectures on USAF doctrine, joint planning,logistics, legal issues, intelligence, air operationscenters, and the joint warfare analysis centerteach students to think and plan at the operationallevel of war. A senior USAF general whohas served as a combined force air componentcommander (CFACC) briefs students on CFACCperspectives. The students learn and practicebasic skills, including intelligence preparationof the battlespace, development of joint forceair component commander ( JFACC) missionstatements, center-of-gravity analysis, courseof action (COA) development, risk analysis,COA selection methodology, and developmentof a joint air operations plan. The courseculminates with students presenting their planto a simulated JFACC.The IWAC educates war fighters in the fundamentalsof <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> information operations(IO) doctrine and provides insight intohow the doctrine may be applied across thespectrum from peace to war. A one-weekcourse for military personnel in grades E-4through O-5 and federal employees in gradesGS-7 through GS-13, it gives individuals fromall functional areas an overview of current IOdoctrine, policies, and procedures. Lessonsaugmented by seminar discussions allow studentsto comprehend relationships amongthe numerous subjects taught; furthermore,hands-on exercises, interspersed throughoutthe course, provide them an opportunity toapply the information learned.The Warfare Studies Institute is also hometo doctrine education that develops doctrinebasedproducts and courses that provide <strong>Air</strong><strong>Force</strong>–wide air and space power educationthrough distance learning using interactive,computer-based methodologies. Offering expertisein USAF and joint doctrine to assist <strong>Air</strong>University faculty, staff, and students in doctrineeducation, the institute serves as <strong>Air</strong> Educationand Training Command’s doctrine officeof primary responsibility. Courses currentlyavailable online to <strong>Air</strong>men worldwide includethe <strong>Air</strong> and <strong>Space</strong> <strong>Power</strong> Course, <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong><strong>Force</strong>s Staff Training Course, and WarfighterPlanning Course, all of which are prerequisitesfor the CWPC and JAOP courses.CADRE is the first place to turn for professionaldevelopment and education in warfighting. Personnel interested in joining themore than 1,500 students who attend these inresidencecourses each year should talk totheir organization’s training manager aboutreserving a slot. To obtain more information,call CADRE/WS Operations Division at(334)953-2113/7831, DSN 493-2113/7831;to access an online course, visit CADRE athttps://cadremil.maxwell.af.mil. qNotes1. Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs ofStaff, 2000), pt. 1, p. 3, http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jv2020a.pdf (accessed 25 April <strong>2006</strong>).2. Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control for Joint<strong>Air</strong> Operations, 5 June 2003, chap. 3, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_56_1.pdf (accessed 25 April<strong>2006</strong>).
ASPJQuick-LookThe <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Needs New GlassesSensor Requirements for Urban OperationsLT COL DAVID L. ROBIE, USAFWE CAN NO longer consider urbanoperations an optional proficiency.The current situation inIraq makes clear that US soldiers,sailors, and airmen must have the capabilitiesand tools to operate effectively in the urbanenvironment. For example, in Thunder Run:The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad (NewYork: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004), DavidZucchino chronicles the trials, tribulations,and ultimate success of the taking of Baghdad.Other Iraqi experiences include the attemptto eliminate insurgency in <strong>Fall</strong>ujah in late 2004and more recently in Iraq’s northern provincesin the fall of 2005. Outside Iraq, the USmilitary has engaged in numerous urban conflicts,including those in Panama and Kosovoas well as the stunning loss in Mogadishu,which emphatically changed US foreign policyin Somalia. These past and present examplesnot only give clear indication of the criticalnature of urban capabilities but also foreshadowan even more significant role for urbanoperations in future conflicts.The urban environment has become an essentialresponsibility in modern conflict becauseof significant changes arising from threecurrent trends: the massing of people in urbanareas, the increasing influence and powerof these areas, and the changing face of conflict.Continual movement of the populationfrom a rural to urban environment began withthe industrial revolution and continues withthe world’s urban population growing fourtimes faster than its rural counterpart. Thispopulation movement creates a secondary effectby concentrating influence as urban areasbecome centers of gravity for diplomatic, informational,military (command authority),and economic power. Finally, the end of theCold War and the new world order that hasemerged in the last decade have all but eliminatedthe possibility of heavily armored warfarein open terrain. Future US engagementswill most likely include regional conflicts,failed states, and nonstate actors. Insurgents,terrorists, and small regional states will not attemptto engage the United States in openbattle since US forces enjoy an overwhelmingadvantage in sensing, speed, and firepower.Instead, they will choose urban terrain, wherethey will attempt to remove the asymmetriccapabilities of the United States and try tomass their effects against “soft” civilian targets.These three factors make understanding theurban terrain an essential part of future conflict.Today, we must consider urban operations acore competency of all US military services.BackgroundUnderstanding the urban environment’scomplexity—one that exists on numerouslevels—poses the greatest challenge to urbanwar fighters. Physically complex and extremelydiverse, its terrain includes the urbancanyons of major metropolitan cities, theclose quarters of ancient cities, and the urbansprawl that surrounds both. The physicalcomplexity is also multidimensional, startingfrom rooftops; going through numerousfloors; and ending in subterranean base-37
- Page 2 and 3: Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
- Page 4 and 5: PIREPsJoint Airspace Management and
- Page 6 and 7: APJInterdependenceKey to Our Common
- Page 8 and 9: 6 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 20
- Page 10 and 11: APJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CHI
- Page 12 and 13: 10 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2
- Page 14 and 15: ASPJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CH
- Page 16 and 17: True to form, the Air Force has res
- Page 18 and 19: Red Flag Still Matters—After AllT
- Page 20 and 21: Integration of Space-BasedCombat Sy
- Page 22 and 23: est alternative. In other cases, un
- Page 25 and 26: power projection, but advances in a
- Page 27 and 28: 3. Report of the Commission to Asse
- Page 29 and 30: PIREP 27ized, programmed, funded, a
- Page 31 and 32: PIREP 29creation of ACMs. One antic
- Page 33 and 34: PIREP 31Link 16 and Joint Airspace
- Page 35 and 36: PIREP 33Missile Defense Systems, th
- Page 37: CADRE’s Professional EducationOpp
- Page 41 and 42: QUICK-LOOK 39system should become a
- Page 43 and 44: APJThe Air Force’s New Ground War
- Page 45 and 46: THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 43
- Page 47 and 48: THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 45
- Page 49 and 50: THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 47
- Page 51 and 52: THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 49
- Page 53 and 54: THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 51
- Page 55 and 56: New USAF Doctrine PublicationAir Fo
- Page 57 and 58: Counterinsurgency AirpowerAir-Groun
- Page 59 and 60: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 57ticula
- Page 61 and 62: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 59and Ai
- Page 63 and 64: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 61The af
- Page 65 and 66: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 63squadr
- Page 67 and 68: ASPJQuick-LookA New Operational Ass
- Page 69 and 70: QUICK-LOOK 67den on the OAT. First,
- Page 71 and 72: Filling the Stealth Gap and Enhanci
- Page 73 and 74: FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 71Each of t
- Page 75 and 76: FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 73the US wa
- Page 77 and 78: FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 75mit the F
- Page 79 and 80: Space PowerAn Ill-Suited SpaceStrat
- Page 81 and 82: SPACE POWER 79by using a more encom
- Page 83 and 84: SPACE POWER 81role of offensive and
- Page 85 and 86: SPACE POWER 83achieve supremacy in
- Page 87 and 88: Military TransformationEnds,Ways, a
- Page 89 and 90:
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 87to organi
- Page 91 and 92:
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 89course, w
- Page 93 and 94:
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 91mind-set
- Page 95 and 96:
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 93sponding
- Page 97 and 98:
NOTAM 95The document’s authors ha
- Page 99 and 100:
MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 101 and 102:
MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 103 and 104:
MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 105 and 106:
MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 107 and 108:
MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 109 and 110:
ASPJQuick-LookThe Nature of Close A
- Page 111 and 112:
QUICK-LOOK 109CAS missions. The pub
- Page 113 and 114:
Clausewitz and the Falkland Islands
- Page 115 and 116:
CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- Page 117 and 118:
CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- Page 119 and 120:
CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- Page 121 and 122:
CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- Page 123 and 124:
BOOK REVIEWS 121whose contributions
- Page 125 and 126:
BOOK REVIEWS 123Franco: Soldier, Co
- Page 127 and 128:
APJAir and Space Power Journal, the
- Page 129 and 130:
CONTRIBUTORS 127Col Howard D. “Da
- Page 131:
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARDGen John A.