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Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

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82 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>cept utilizes land, sea, air, or space systems tomeet this objective, such systems are of thegreatest importance in space strategy.As discerned from maritime strategy, oneshould generally disperse space-enabled technologiesand systems to cover the widest possibleregion, yet they should maintain theability to concentrate forces and effects rapidly.Such dispersal can protect a variety of interestswhile facilitating defensive operationsalong many different celestial LOCs at once. 34When one needs offensive operations to neutralizea significant threat, these technologiesand systems should then concentrate firepoweror other desired effects to defeat anadversary quickly. Tactical implementationwould include satellites that transmit a directional,low-power jamming signal. Although asingle satellite would have only a limited effectin a selected area, a constellation of such satellitesacting cooperatively could block anenemy’s celestial LOCs within a wide region ofspace. 35 Similarly, such an implementationwould also include a constellation of orbitingweapons platforms capable of deployingkinetic-energy weapons against one or moreterrestrial targets.As with the space-cruiser concept, thisstrategy of dispersal and concentration shouldemploy both terrestrial and space-based systems.Therefore, one should use land, sea,and air assets in conjunction with each otherto attack and neutralize an enemy’s spaceassets or communication systems. Examplesinclude land-launched ASAT weapons, sealaunchedcruise missiles targeting the enemy’scommunication uplinks, and aircraft carryingdirected-energy weapons capable of destroyingorbiting satellites. Dispersing such systemsaround the globe and in all environments allowsone to engage an enemy’s space-basedassets with overwhelming force through multiplemeans.Employing a strategy of dispersal and concentrationpreserves the flexibility of protectingexpansive LOCs while allowing engagementof an adversary’s “central mass” whenand where needed. 36 When attempting todeny the enemy’s use of his celestial LOCs,however, the war fighter must rememberthat—as with maritime communications—LOCs in space often run parallel to theenemy’s and may even be shared with him.Therefore, one frequently cannot attack anadversary’s space communications withoutaffecting one’s own.Considering a similar application of commandof the sea from maritime strategy, onesees that establishing command of space ensuresone’s access to and use of celestial LOCs.Yet space becomes a barrier to those who lacksuch access and use. A spacefaring nation’sability to access and use celestial LOCs is paramount;only by doing so can one fully realizethe advantages of operating in space. If suchaccess and use is not possible—whether an adversarydenies access to celestial LOCs or one’stechnological capability proves insufficient tolaunch space vehicles into orbit—then spaceeffectively becomes an obstacle or a barrier. 37Although such a condition cannot preventan enemy’s sporadic or minor attacks, establishingcommand of space and making spacea barrier to potential foes allow one to bettercontrol the escalation of future hostilities,give better freedom of action for conductingmilitary operations, minimize the effectivenessof an adversary’s counterattack, and providea significant strategic-deterrence capability.38 All of these measures better protect anation’s diplomatic, information, military,and economic interests.So What?The United States currently has supremacyin space and in the employment of spacebasedtechnologies, so the power approach tospace strategy presently used by many militaryplanners would seem to have served the nationquite well. As a result, the war fighter mightquestion the need to embrace a maritimeinspiredspace strategy. Nevertheless, spacepower strategy based upon a classical powerapproach is ill suited for describing and consideringthe true nature of military strategy in,from, and through space. The problem with aMahanian-style power strategy is that despiteits usefulness when a country attempts to

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