82 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>cept utilizes land, sea, air, or space systems tomeet this objective, such systems are of thegreatest importance in space strategy.As discerned from maritime strategy, oneshould generally disperse space-enabled technologiesand systems to cover the widest possibleregion, yet they should maintain theability to concentrate forces and effects rapidly.Such dispersal can protect a variety of interestswhile facilitating defensive operationsalong many different celestial LOCs at once. 34When one needs offensive operations to neutralizea significant threat, these technologiesand systems should then concentrate firepoweror other desired effects to defeat anadversary quickly. Tactical implementationwould include satellites that transmit a directional,low-power jamming signal. Although asingle satellite would have only a limited effectin a selected area, a constellation of such satellitesacting cooperatively could block anenemy’s celestial LOCs within a wide region ofspace. 35 Similarly, such an implementationwould also include a constellation of orbitingweapons platforms capable of deployingkinetic-energy weapons against one or moreterrestrial targets.As with the space-cruiser concept, thisstrategy of dispersal and concentration shouldemploy both terrestrial and space-based systems.Therefore, one should use land, sea,and air assets in conjunction with each otherto attack and neutralize an enemy’s spaceassets or communication systems. Examplesinclude land-launched ASAT weapons, sealaunchedcruise missiles targeting the enemy’scommunication uplinks, and aircraft carryingdirected-energy weapons capable of destroyingorbiting satellites. Dispersing such systemsaround the globe and in all environments allowsone to engage an enemy’s space-basedassets with overwhelming force through multiplemeans.Employing a strategy of dispersal and concentrationpreserves the flexibility of protectingexpansive LOCs while allowing engagementof an adversary’s “central mass” whenand where needed. 36 When attempting todeny the enemy’s use of his celestial LOCs,however, the war fighter must rememberthat—as with maritime communications—LOCs in space often run parallel to theenemy’s and may even be shared with him.Therefore, one frequently cannot attack anadversary’s space communications withoutaffecting one’s own.Considering a similar application of commandof the sea from maritime strategy, onesees that establishing command of space ensuresone’s access to and use of celestial LOCs.Yet space becomes a barrier to those who lacksuch access and use. A spacefaring nation’sability to access and use celestial LOCs is paramount;only by doing so can one fully realizethe advantages of operating in space. If suchaccess and use is not possible—whether an adversarydenies access to celestial LOCs or one’stechnological capability proves insufficient tolaunch space vehicles into orbit—then spaceeffectively becomes an obstacle or a barrier. 37Although such a condition cannot preventan enemy’s sporadic or minor attacks, establishingcommand of space and making spacea barrier to potential foes allow one to bettercontrol the escalation of future hostilities,give better freedom of action for conductingmilitary operations, minimize the effectivenessof an adversary’s counterattack, and providea significant strategic-deterrence capability.38 All of these measures better protect anation’s diplomatic, information, military,and economic interests.So What?The United States currently has supremacyin space and in the employment of spacebasedtechnologies, so the power approach tospace strategy presently used by many militaryplanners would seem to have served the nationquite well. As a result, the war fighter mightquestion the need to embrace a maritimeinspiredspace strategy. Nevertheless, spacepower strategy based upon a classical powerapproach is ill suited for describing and consideringthe true nature of military strategy in,from, and through space. The problem with aMahanian-style power strategy is that despiteits usefulness when a country attempts to
SPACE POWER 83achieve supremacy in a medium of warfare,after the country has done so, its usefulness tothe strategic planner or policy maker becomesminimal. The US Navy long ago abandonedsea power as a stand-alone framework formaritime strategy since Mahan’s sea powerstrategy focused too narrowly on offensivestrategy and the need to seek a decisive battle.Similarly, space power is an inappropriatestand-alone strategy for space.Furthermore, a maritime-inspired spacestrategy has highlighted ideas not present incurrent space power strategy, including theidea that systems which ensure one’s access toand use of celestial LOCs are the most criticalconcern of space strategy. Consequently, systemsthat protect and defend LOCs in spacehave priority over those that do not share thismission—including purely offensive weaponsystems that don’t protect and defend celestialLOCs. 39 A proper understanding of offensiveand defensive strategies reveals that one mayuse the latter to ensure access to celestialLOCs. Defensive strategies, therefore, thatharden space systems against electromagneticdamage, provide self-defense against offensive1. United States Joint <strong>Force</strong>s Command, Joint <strong>Force</strong>s CommandGlossary, http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm.One uses diplomatic, information, military, and economicareas of national power in effects-based operations.2. Gen Thomas D. White, chief of staff of the <strong>Air</strong><strong>Force</strong>, “<strong>Air</strong> and <strong>Space</strong> Are Indivisible,” <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> 4, no. 3(March 1958): 40–41.3. However, many critics have argued against combiningair and space strategies, noting that propulsive, aerodynamic,and orbital conditions make air and space quitedistinct environments. Maj M. V. Smith, Ten PropositionsRegarding <strong>Space</strong>power, Fairchild Paper (Maxwell AFB, AL:<strong>Air</strong> University Press, October 2002), 94–96.4. See Capt A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea <strong>Power</strong>upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,1890).5. E. B. Potter et al., eds., Sea <strong>Power</strong>: A Naval History(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960), 19.6. George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea <strong>Power</strong>: TheU.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford UniversityPress, 1994), 276. “The <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> took over the most popularNavy positions—and turned them against the Navy” (ibid.).7. “Command of the air replaced command of the seaas the main determinant of national destiny.” Ibid.; andJohn B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Mariattack,or incorporate redundant system capabilitiesare all suitable methods of protectingcelestial LOCs while achieving a significantlevel of command in space. Sincedefensive strategy is just as important as offensivestrategy in any overall war plan, anyspace strategy that focuses too intently onthe application of force or the role of offensiveweapon systems is myopic.Today outer space supports the actions ofthe military services. To a significant extent,many soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmenare already intimately involved with employingspace-enabled technologies when theyexecute their missions. In effect, we now havespace warriors. Because of the inherent limitationsof a power-type space strategy, a maritimeinspiredstrategy can better enlighten thesewar fighters on the correct strategy for spacewarfare. Our war fighters demand and deservethe best strategies for considering future militaryoperations, and the best framework forspace strategy is based upon centuries of maritimeexperience. We would do well to acknowledgethat fact. qNotestime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper no. 19 (Newport,RI: Naval War College Press, 2004), 5.8. The failure of naval officers to understand and appreciatenaval history and maritime strategy has been welldocumented for over 100 years. J. K. Laughton, “The ScientificStudy of Naval History,” Journal of the Royal UnitedServices Institute 18 (1875): 508–9; and John B. Hattendorf,“The Uses of Maritime History in and for the Navy,” NavalWar College Review 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 13–38.9. The National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington,DC: [The White House,] September 2005), 1–2,http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/4844-nsms.pdf;Adm Mike Mullen, chief of naval operations, “CNO Guidancefor <strong>2006</strong>: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era,”http://www.navy.mil/features/<strong>2006</strong>CNOG.pdf (accessed12 May <strong>2006</strong>); Gen J. L. Jones, commandant of the MarineCorps, Marine Corps Strategy 21 (Washington, DC: Departmentof the Navy, Headquarters US Marine Corps, 3 November2000), 1, http://www.marines.mil/templateml.nsf/25241abbb036b230852569c4004eff0e/$FILE/strategy.pdf;and Hattendorf, “Uses of Maritime History,” 19.10. The environment of operations—including thestrategic positions within it—affects one’s strategy. WolfgangWegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War, trans.
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Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
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PIREPsJoint Airspace Management and
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APJInterdependenceKey to Our Common
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APJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CHI
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ASPJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CH
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True to form, the Air Force has res
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Red Flag Still Matters—After AllT
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Integration of Space-BasedCombat Sy
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3. Report of the Commission to Asse
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PIREP 29creation of ACMs. One antic
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