Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AIR WAR 115this force 8,800 miles, on 12 April Great Britainestablished a total-exclusion zone—a circlewith a radius of 200 nautical miles—aroundthe Falklands.Designating the British fleet as the enemycenter of gravity for purposes of defendingthe islands, the Argentinians intended to harassthat force as far from the coast as possibleto prevent it from approaching the islandsand landing troops. Only the FAA could assumethat task because the ARA had to withdrawits fleet to the safety of the harbors afterthe nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror sankthe battle cruiser General Belgrano on 2 May. TheFAA and Naval Aviation Command providedthe Argentinian air assets, the former directlyattacking the British fleet and troops with theMirage III EA, Mirage 5 Dagger, A-4B/C Skyhawk,Canberra MK 62, and IA-58 Pucara, andthe latter employing the Super Etendard, A-4QSkyhawk, and Aermacchi MB-339.For the most part, these aircraft attackedsurface targets with conventional munitions,such as free-fall or parachute-retarded 250-,500-, and 1,000-pound bombs; 2.25- and 2.75-inch rockets; 20 mm and 30 mm cannons; and7.62 mm machine guns. Only the Super Etendardcould deliver the latest-generationweapon, the radar-guided 1,300-pound AM-39Exocet missile with a 30-mile range, but theArgentinians had an inventory of only fivemissiles. For air combat, only the Mirages hadmissile capability—the Matra 530 infraredmissiles with a six-mile range and visual fieldlimited to 30–40 degrees, which forced theaircraft to position itself behind an opponent.Thus, the Argentinian air component facedthe difficult challenge of overcoming technologicaland armament obstacles to reach itsobjectives, which brings to mind a Clausewitzianassertion: “That, however, does not implythat the political aim is a tyrant. It must adaptitself to its chosen means, a process which canradically change it; yet the political aim remainsthe first consideration. . . . Once theexpenditure of effort exceeds the value of thepolitical object, the object must be renouncedand peace must follow.” 17The DefensiveThe surprising British reaction of recapturingthe islands through military action forcedthe Argentinian military government to takeunplanned actions and adopt a defensive posture.The quick formation of Task Force 317,a product of the excellent British intelligenceservice’s alerting its government about the invasion,prompted General Galtieri to sendmore troops to the islands without consultingthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. The deployed forces,members of the 10th Mechanized InfantryBrigade (without its armored vehicles) andthe 3rd Infantry Brigade, joined the 5th MarineBrigade, based in the islands since the occupation,to form the ground defense. Airliftersflew more than 10,000 men and theirlogistical gear to the Falklands during April.Later we shall see how this decision negativelyaffected the course of the war.The Argentinians formed the Fuerza AéreaSur (FAS) (Southern air force), based in ComodoroRivadavia, on 5 April under the commandof Brig Gen Ernesto H. Crespo, who reporteddirectly to the military junta. Hecontrolled all aircraft designated by the FAAand Naval Aviation Command and based onthe continent. Vice Adm Juan Lombardo, theatercommander of South Atlantic operations, ledthe Argentinian naval units and the FalklandIslands garrison, the latter with Gen MarioMenendez of the Argentinian army. To defendthe islands, General Menendez had IA-58 Pucaraaircraft from the FAA and Aermacchi MB-339s and Mentor T-34Cs from Naval AviationCommand, in addition to ground units. Clearly,the Argentinian command’s organization conflictedwith principles of joint operations suchas centralized command, maximum integration,full use of forces, and mutual support.Clausewitz refers to the defense as the mostpowerful form of war, noting, “But if we arereally waging war, we must return the enemy’sblows; and these offensive acts in a defensivewar come under the heading of ‘defense’—inother words, our offensive takes place withinour own positions or theater of operations.Thus, a defensive campaign can be fought withoffensive battles, and in a defensive battle, we