Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

104 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006Do NothingA valid alternative to the difficulties of regulationwould be just letting the technologyemerge as international-market and socialforces dictate. Proponents of this strategywould rely on the involved parties (governmentsand multinational corporations conductingthe majority of the R&D) to selfregulatethe use and distribution of MNT. It isalso possible that NT research will hit an intellectualbrick wall and that the sheer difficultyof mastering nanoscience and its applicationswill slow the arrival of MNT such that a disruptivetechnological revolution never occurs oris drastically mitigated.This strategy holds the highest level of riskand is essentially a strategy of hopeful optimism.Multiple R&D programs will likely leadto multiple successes, which could very welllead to competition at the national militarylevel as well as an MNT arms race. Multipleprograms will mean varying levels of success,and the leading organization or state will beless likely to agree to regulation, particularly ifsuch regulation would decrease or eliminateits lead. Given MNT’s tremendous potentialfor both peaceful and violent applications,controlling it with a “do nothing” strategy isanalogous to providing nuclear reactors toevery country under the assumption that nonewill use them to develop nuclear weapons.This strategy is unlikely to work and is in facthighly dangerous.Forbid Research and DevelopmentIf MNT is so dangerous, then why allow itto be developed at all? Why invent anothernuclear-bomb equivalent? Proponents of thisstrategy—such as the aforementioned BillJoy—would advocate at a minimum the following:(1) adoption of a voluntary moratoriumon the part of the scientific communityagainst further MNT-related research,and ultimately, (2) the establishment of aninternational set of laws to forbid any R&Dinto MNT. Mr. Joy believes that the US unilateralabandonment of biological-warfareresearch is a “shining example” of the beginningsof such a strategy. 43In many ways this path is almost as dangerousas the do nothing strategy, except it mighttake longer for the dangers to emerge. Thereare two main problems with this strategy: verificationand the dual-use nature of MNT. Evenif every country agreed to the research ban,how would the other nations verify compliance?Unlike nuclear technology, MNTdoesn’t require exotic materials that can bedetected at a distance to create deadly weapons,and nuclear weapons can’t make millionsof copies of themselves. Detecting non-stateactorprograms would be even more difficult.We are left with the same problems faced bybiological-weapons-control agencies, exceptthat biological weapons are desired only bycertain types of organizations. Virtually everyone—states,organizations, and individuals—will want NT. The potential benefits of MNTmake it very attractive, particularly for poorercountries; it not only enables nations to makeweapons easily, but also to purify and desalinatewater, create inexpensive yet sturdyhomes, provide distributed and reliable power,and possibly even expand or improve theirfood supplies. In short, MNT can help a poorcountry provide the basic necessities of life,which leaves no economic or military incentiveto comply. In fact, such a strategy wouldonly push development to noncomplyingcountries. 44 This creates another problem:there would be no “complying” country capableof defending against a rogue, MNT-equippednation unless complying countries maintainedcovert and illicit R&D programs. To paraphrasethe National Rifle Association slogan,if nanotechnology is outlawed, only outlawswill have nanotechnology.ConclusionBased on the radically unprecedented directand indirect threats to US national securityposed by MNT, the United States shouldadopt a cooperative strategy of internationalregulation to control and guide R&D. Theregulation should maximize the security ofthe processes but should not constrict innovationor liberal distribution of the technology’s