Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

80 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006Using maritime strategy as a framework forspace strategy has benefits, but this approachhas weaknesses too. The most readily apparentone is the disparity between the requiredtechnologies to operate within the two environments.Despite the sophistication andtechnological advancement of today’s warships,they generally are not as advanced asmost spacecraft. The technological sophisticationrequired to operate from, through, andin space seems more similar to that requiredto operate in the air—especially aircraft designedto fly at very high speeds and altitudes.Since available technology frequently dictatesmilitary tactics, it stands to reason that tacticsemployed in space should more closely resemblethose of air operations rather thanmaritime operations. 21If maritime operations seem to have littleapplicability at the tactical level of space warfare,the war fighter might wonder about theutility of a maritime-inspired space strategy.The answer lies in a paradox: at the tacticallevel of warfare, space activities resemble airactivities, but at the strategic level of warfare,space activities resemble maritime activities. 22Regardless of the shortcomings arising fromthe technological and tactical disparities betweenspace and maritime operations, onecan formulate the strategic principles of spacewarfare without considering the precedent oftechnology and tactics, which tend to changewith the passage of time anyway. This is a goodthing since strategic principles—if indeedthey are such—should remain timeless. 23 Sousing a maritime strategy as a framework actuallyincreases the likelihood of deriving an enduringstrategy of space warfare.Even though the diplomatic, informational,military, and economic interests in the maritimeenvironment closely resemble those inthe space environment, space is not the sea.Despite the strategic-level similarities betweenmaritime and space operations, the aforementionedtechnological and tactical differencesbetween the two environments necessitate thatany space-warfare strategy have a context andlexicon all its own. 24 Therefore, a maritimeinspiredspace strategy simply provides a commonlanguage for thinking about military operationsfrom, into, and through space.What It Means forSpace StrategyAlthough the power approach to spacestrategy is prevalent among military planners,one should note that much of a maritimeinspiredstrategy for space already agrees withcontemporary literature on space strategy. Asmentioned above, maritime strategic thoughtsuggests that space has inherent value as ameans of communication, making it vital toensure one’s access to and use of space. Thisthinking is supported by Joint Publication3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, whichnotes the need to “provide freedom of actionin space for friendly forces while, when directed,denying it to an adversary.” 25 Consequently,joint doctrine properly emphasizesthe need to ensure one’s access to and use ofcelestial LOCs while minimizing the enemy’ssame access and use. 26Additionally, a maritime-inspired spacestrategy underscores the idea that space operationsand activities are closely tied to nationalinterests. This thought is borne out by the factthat much of the US economy and its day-todaycommercial operations rely upon spaceenabledsystems; furthermore, because spacereliantcommerce and trade affect the overalleconomic well-being of the United States,space is tied to national power. More importantly,the precedent of maritime strategy suggeststhat any spacefaring nation may protectand defend its interests in space, even with theuse of force. Such sentiments are in agreementwith the Space Commission Report of 2001,which maintains that because the UnitedStates relies upon many space-enabled technologies,it may protect its interests by employingmeans that “deter and defend” againsthostile acts in and from space, including, byimplication, the potential use of force. 27Nevertheless, a maritime-inspired spacestrategy also provides insights not found inthe current literature on space strategy. Themost profound of them concern the proper