Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

SPACE POWER 79by using a more encompassing maritime strategyas a strategic springboard for considering thecomplex interactions of space warfare.Corbett’s Maritime StrategyOne finds the best maritime strategicframework for considering space strategy inthe writings of Sir Julian Stafford Corbett(1854–1922), a British theorist and strategistconsidered by many historians as Great Britain’sgreatest maritime strategist. He is renownedfor his work Some Principles of MaritimeStrategy, published in 1911, which received acclaimfor its “fusion of history and strategy” indescribing the strategic principles of the maritimedomain. 11 Even though Corbett writes onmany of the same issues as Mahan, Corbettmore accurately details the intricacies of maritimestrategy since he addresses those areasindirectly affected by naval operations, such asdiplomatic and economic concerns.According to Corbett, the sea has inherentvalue as a means of communication. 12 Becauseof this, naval warfare seeks to ensure one’s accessto and use of sea lines of communication(SLOC) while denying the same to the enemy.One who can successfully do so enjoys all thebenefits of operating upon and from the seaand has “command of the sea.” 13 By establishingsuch command, a maritime nation canmove freely along SLOCs while minimizingthe risk coming from an enemy’s attacks alongthem. The vital necessity of ensuring one’s accessto and use of LOCs places primary importanceupon naval vessels that directly supportthis mission; vessels that do not serve this function—includingthe battleship—are of secondaryimportance.Corbett describes how navies can affect thebalance of power between competing nations.By building a superior naval fleet and achievingcommand of the sea, a nation garnersmore diplomatic, military, and economicpower than nations without a strong navy. Indoing so, a maritime nation can better protectits worldwide interests and remain capable ofinterfering with an adversary’s seaborne commerceand trade. Even minor actions canachieve modest diplomatic and economic resultsbecause such efforts against an adversary’seconomic trade routes or fleet can affect thebalance of wealth and power between rivals. 14Since a maritime nation extensively uses itsSLOCs for trade and commerce, it must protectand defend those lines considered mostvital. To do this, Corbett argues that navalforces must disperse along expansive LOCsyet be able to concentrate overwhelming forcerapidly when needed. 15 No matter how mucha war plan calls for the close concentration ofnaval forces, protection of commerce andtrade along SLOCs necessitates the dispersalof forces. Thus, a sound maritime strategyplaces concentration in tension with dispersalat all times. 16 Corbett writes, “Such is concentrationreasonably understood—not huddledtogether like a drove of sheep, but distributedwith a regard to a common purpose, andlinked together by the effectual energy of asingle will.” 17One finds Corbett’s most controversial departurefrom Mahan’s sea power thought inhis belief that defensive strategy is just as necessaryas offensive strategy. Like the Prussianmilitary theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), Corbett views offensive strategy as themore “effective” form of war and defensivestrategy as the “stronger” form—both ofthem integral parts of any overarching militarystrategy. 18 Because the defense is thestronger form of warfare, a defensive strategyenables inferior naval forces to achieve notableresults, especially when one considersthat if those forces undertook offensive operationsagainst a superior foe, they wouldlikely be destroyed. Defensive strategy comesinto play when political objectives necessitatepreventing the enemy from acquiring somethingor achieving a political objective. 19 Furthermore,defensive strategy involves an attitudeof alert expectation that awaits themoment when the enemy exposes himself,making possible a successful counterattack. 20Despite the many advantages of this approach,Corbett was concerned that most naval officersof his day had exalted offensive strategyand actions at the expense of implementinga sound defensive strategy.