62 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>and corps staffs. Install a soldier as chief ofstrategy or chief of plans in each AOC, andinstall an airman in a similar position in eachcorps. The devil will be in the details: the servicesmust select officers well versed in groundand air schemes of maneuver, and both theArmy and <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> personnel communitiesmust see to it that officers who serve in theseliaison roles maintain viable career paths(joint service should expand rather than contractleadership opportunities for aircrewmembers and fire supporters alike). Such abold move would be worth the personnel turbulence.By investing real authority in sisterservicepersonnel, senior ground and air commanderscan focus every plan on the jointteam’s strengths. Most importantly, the presenceof effective joint leadership at the componentlevel guarantees that every game startswith all the stars in the lineup.At the same time, a focus on junior officerscould help the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> develop its futurestars. At the outbrief for Joint Urban Warrior’06, a multicommand urban-warfare experiment,Maj Gen Mike Worden, USAF, askedparticipants how to most effectively integrateairpower at battalion level. Can we improveon the current situation wherein senior JTACsserve as enlisted battalion ALOs? EBALOslearn planning and liaison skills at seven-levelschool but never have the opportunity to immersethemselves in fighter, bomber, attack,and reconnaissance tactics that young aircrewmembers have. We could best infuse significantairmanship in battalion-level planning byresurrecting the BALO program, whereinA-10 pilots attached themselves to maneuverunits during their first or second flying tours.In a resource-unconstrained world, opening aBALO program to the majority of airframesand crew positions would expose battalioncommanders and staffs to a wide range of airpowercapabilities; in turn, it would expose awide cross section of aviators to ground schemesof maneuver—albeit at significant cost.Current funding and manpower limitations,however, make significant changes inbattalion-level integration unlikely. To improvetactical-level air-ground integration, the<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> must look one level higher, highlightthe role of the brigade ALO, and placetop performers in that role. In the current environment,brigade ALOs—usually junior captains—getanywhere from two to nine monthsof training and then deploy to Iraq or Afghanistanas the senior <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> representative toa colonel who commands 5,000 soldiers. TheALO’s ability to advocate makes or breaks airpower’scontribution in a large battlespace—historically, though, <strong>Air</strong>men have shunnedbrigade ALO duty. 12 If the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> wants effectiveintegration at the grassroots level, itshould assign its up-and-comers as ALOs—precisely as the Marines do.The Marine Corps uses a ground-liaisontour as a stepping-stone to weapons school,ensuring that lower-level ground commandersget the best airpower advice available.According to Col Lawrence Roberts, USMC,commander of Joint <strong>Force</strong>s Command’s JointFires Integration and Interoperability Team,most of the graduates of the USMC Weaponsand Tactics Instructor Course do a tour of12–18 months as ground forward air controllers(GFAC)—equivalent to battalion or brigadeALOs—en route to that school: “To ensurethe ground community is well representedby aviators, and to ensure the training cadreof the squadron is well represented by aviatorswith ground experience, those consideredfor weapons school must achieve the GFACwicket first or a career-level school like ExpeditionaryWarfare School (EWS) . . . GFAC beingthe preferred prerequisite, EWS a suitablealternative.” 13Although the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> may not be ready tohave its weapons-school selectees do a 12-to-18-month tour at an Army post en route toNellis, AFB, Nevada, it should at least assignsecond-assignment mission commanders oraircraft commanders to these critical billets.Doing so would instantly improve the qualityof advice given to Army commanders and simultaneouslybuild a bench of well-roundedfuture <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> commanders. Flying squadronsdeserve leaders with joint vision and experience—andBattlefield <strong>Air</strong>men, divisioncommanders, and corps commanders demandcommanders of air support operations
COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 63squadrons and ASOGs who can orchestratethe full range of airpower’s capabilities.Finally, after planting jointness more deeplyinto war-fighting headquarters at all levels, theservices should optimize their approaches tofire-support coordination—primarily by redefiningstandard coordination measures tomatch current practice. A memorandum fromJames A. Thomson, president of RAND Corporation,to Secretary of Defense Donald H.Rumsfeld included lessons for conductingmajor combat operations, the second of whichfocused on integration of air-land operations:“Changes need to be made in the traditionallinear approach to the coordination of air andground fire support. A nonlinear system of‘kill boxes’ should be adopted, as technologypermits.” 14 To be sure, the traditional idea of afire support coordination line is irrelevant incounterinsurgency operations and had novalue in Iraq in 2004—kill boxes formed thecommon frame of reference for tasking air assets.Looking to the future, as the RANDmemo argues, “kill boxes can be sized foropen terrain or urban warfare, and opened orclosed quickly in response to a dynamic militarysituation.” 15As an executive summary for the secretaryof defense, this memo goes into no further detail.Within four months, however, the <strong>Air</strong>Land Sea Application Center published FieldManual 3-09.34, Kill Box Multi-Service Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures [MTTP] for Kill BoxEmployment, 14 June 2005, and the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense commissioned ajoint test and evaluation of the new MTTP.Although the test is in its earliest phases, thefirst joint-test-and-evaluation experiments (attendedby the author) suggest that the newdocument has not fully captured the intent ofthe RAND memo.Kill boxes are to be opened and closed byexception to focus air-delivered fires in specificareas rather than to integrate air and surfacefires across the battlespace. Furthermore,the MTTP relies on a traditional approach ofsupported/supporting relationships regardingthe critical question of who opens andcloses kill boxes. Test-team members, led byCol Gary Webb, USAF, the test director, areexploring improvements to the MTTP—andthey might benefit from RAND’s research.The new MTTP leaves authority in the supportedcomponent’s hands, but RAND analystshave suggested an innovative, interdependentapproach. In a study entitled Beyond Close <strong>Air</strong>Support: Forging a New <strong>Air</strong>-Ground Partnership,Bruce R. Pirnie and others foresee mutuallyenabling partnerships between fire-andmaneuvercommanders in which “the mostappropriate commander [has] the requisiteauthority to accomplish his assigned tasks”and in which “Army and <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> staff-levelofficers working together in the ASOC wouldopen and close [kill boxes] as needed” because“to an increasing degree, especially forthe Army’s light forces, maneuver and air attackwill enable each other, and they need tobe thought out together.” 16 The JFEC/ASOCexperience in Baghdad suggests that this ispossible, and the rules of engagement forweapons approval offer an overarching principlefor kill-box management: risk assessment.Quite simply, the commander most able toassess and mitigate political and military riskshould control a given kill box. In a counterinsurgencyfight, the ground commander willalways be responsible for managing the politicalfallout of joint fires, and in a close fighthe or she will add the risk-to-troops factor tothe equation—so maneuver commandersshould control those kill boxes. In deep operations,however, the air commander will oftenhave more visibility on the political risk ofbombing. Furthermore, the air commanderalmost always will be better positioned (withimportant input from the special operationscomponent) to determine the military risk ofa mission. In all these cases, a joint collocatedteam—just like the team from the third floorof Victory Palace—should manage the processon behalf of the responsible commanders.ConclusionGeneral Metz is not alone in his enthusiasmfor the current partnership betweenground power and airpower. At the Joint Firesand Effects Seminar at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in
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Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
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PIREPsJoint Airspace Management and
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BOOK REVIEWS 121whose contributions
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BOOK REVIEWS 123Franco: Soldier, Co
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CONTRIBUTORS 127Col Howard D. “Da
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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARDGen John A.