Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

ASPJQuick-LookThe Nature of Close Air Support in Low Intensity ConflictLT COL PHIL M. HAUN, USAFSINCE THE CESSATION of conven-tional hostilities in Afghanistan in thefall of 2002 and Iraq in the spring of2003, the United States Air Force hasprovided close air support (CAS) in low intensityconflicts (LIC). In Iraq, US forces havefaced the challenge of controlling sprawlingurban areas, as witnessed in the battle for Fallujah.In Afghanistan, on the other hand, ourforces have conducted operations against theTaliban and al-Qaeda in small villages spreadthroughout the rugged, mountainous terrainof central and eastern Afghanistan. Despitethe significant differences in operations, however,the nature of LIC CAS remains consistent:air operations conducted in a low-threatenvironment against an elusive enemy. Aircrewstrained in CAS with an emphasis onplacing bombs on mechanized fielded forceshave been frustrated in LICs by the lack of“valid” targets (i.e., a perception that they aresimply “drilling holes” in the sky on the majorityof missions). Joint doctrine has done little toeducate Airmen in this regard. Joint Publication(JP) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Close Air Support (CAS), focuses onthe methods of coordinating and integratingfires with little mention of the other means bywhich airpower can support ground forces.The additional tasks of visual search, groundconvoyescort, and enhancement of commandand control (C2) have all proven invaluableassets to ground commanders.This article highlights the differencesbetween conventional and LIC operationsand underscores the role of LIC CAS as onebeyond that of providing firepower. It thenconsiders how current joint doctrine andtraining emphasize conventional operationswithout adequately addressing LIC CAS.Finally, it provides concrete suggestions forimproving both doctrine and training to betterprepare Airmen for the unique demandsof this effort.Conventional versusLow IntensityConflict OperationsConventional and LIC operations differ significantlyaccording to the nature of the enemy,the specified military objectives, and the methodsby which military operations are conducted.In conventional warfare, the enemy isa state actor protected by a mechanized militaryforce. The enemy state has a populaceand occupies territory. LIC, however, involvesremnant fighters, such as the Taliban in Afghanistanor insurgents recruited from the localpopulation or neighboring countries, as in Iraq.In conventional war, strategic objectivesfocus on the coercion of the enemy state. Militaryoperations primarily involve (but do notconfine themselves to) targeting the enemy’sconventional forces. Target sets include C2centers, enemy air defenses, and fieldedforces, all susceptible to identification by airand space assets and engagement by airpower.In LIC, objectives shift to the security and stabilizationof an already-occupied region. Militaryobjectives focus more on peacekeeping107