122 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>merous incorrect assumptions. Most important,the authors aim the spotlight on the most significantaspect of the bomber war: the men who flewthe missions against Germany and into the teeth ofHermann Göring’s Luftwaffe.In RAF Bomber Command’s parlance, the termtail-end Charlie designated the man who occupiedthe loneliest of positions in the tail of the bomber.Fighting intense cold, sleep, and the ever-presentfear of German night fighters, the rear-turret gunnerswere among the bravest men on any bombercrew. In American vernacular, tail-end Charlie denotedthe aircraft in the dangerously vulnerablerear position of the formation. Regardless of one’sperspective, the meaning remained the same: thisposition invoked fear. The book Tail-End Charliestakes an extraordinary look into the last half of thebomber war. Weaving historical operations withcomments and views from the men who flew thesemissions, the authors paint a clear and terrifyingpicture of what bomber crews endured during thispart of the war.Both authors bring unique talents to their task.John Nichol, an RAF flight lieutenant who becamea prisoner of war after his Tornado was shot downduring the first Gulf War, wrote several books, includingTornado Down and The Last Escape, uponreturning from Iraq. He has also written five novels.Tony Rennell authored The Last Days of Glory: TheDeath of Queen Victoria and several other books.They effectively blend their writing styles to producea work that is both historically indispensableand enjoyable to read.Any worthwhile study of the CBO, in particularone that emphasizes RAF Bomber Command, mustfocus, at least in part, on <strong>Air</strong> Marshal Sir ArthurHarris—the command’s indomitable leader fromFebruary 1942 until the end of the war. Armed withhis unbending vision of what he believed to be theproper prosecution of the bomber war, Harris hasbeen vilified—to some degree unfairly—as the solearchitect of the destruction of German cities. Althougha man who indeed held sway within BomberCommand and who proved unwilling to submit hisauthority to the destruction of what he called “panacea”targets, he has become the undying symbol forthe conduct of the command. Nichol and Rennelloffer perhaps one of the most balanced and evenhandedassessments of Harris that I have read althoughI believe they could have better supportedtheir positions by including many of the bombingdirectives handed down to Harris throughout thewar. These documents demonstrate that althoughHarris often did ignore directives and orders, heusually complied with them.In another volatile debate, the authors accuratelybroach the issue of the Dresden firebombing.The word Dresden, which conjures up images of Alliedmurder and terror bombing, has come to symbolizeall that was “wrong” with the CBO. In light ofunsubstantiated claims of hundreds of thousandsof people killed, those who condemn the CBO haveadopted “Remember Dresden” as their ballyhooedbattle cry. Although official German reports afterthe bombing list the actual number of dead at18,375, with each subsequent telling of the horrorof Dresden, those numbers seem to swell. I believethat Nichol and Rennell successfully demonstratethat Dresden was indeed a legitimate target on thatFasching night, 14 February 1945. Despite Harris’sflippant and callous comment that “Dresden was amass of munitions works, an intact governmentcentre, and a key transportation point to the east.It is now none of these things,” its legitimacy as amilitary target remains clear.For all the ferocity of the European air war, theincredible losses incurred by both the RAF andUSAAF bomber forces, and the accomplishmentsof the men in those commands, it is a shame thatwe do not have more excellent books about thisarea of World War II. John Nichol and Tony Rennellhave accomplished what many others have not:they have written a superb book. For years, we haveconsidered authors like Max Hastings and MartinMiddlebrook preeminent experts in the field. Ithink that Nichol and Rennell will soon join them.Although Tail-End Charlies contains 22 photographs,it offers no maps or appendices of bomber andcrew losses, bomb tonnages, sorties flown, targetshit, and the like. These would have certainly madean outstanding book much better.The authors brilliantly confront the controversialissues of Bomber Command’s reprehensible dealingwith men who broke under the strain of combat,the debate over daylight versus night bombing,arguments about the efficacy and morality of thebomber offensive, and Churchill’s politically expedientdisregard for the command after the war. Theauthors also tackle the final disgrace of not awardingBomber Command a campaign ribbon for itsfive-year war against Germany. Scholarly researched,professional in its presentation, and incredibly enjoyableto read, Tail-End Charlies is definitely a musthavebook. Readers interested in the CBO againstGermany in World War II can do no better thanTail-End Charlies. Period!Lt Col Robert Tate, USAFRMaxwell AFB, Alabama
BOOK REVIEWS 123Franco: Soldier, Commander, Dictator by GeoffreyJensen. Potomac Books, Inc. (http://www.potomacbooksinc.com), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles,Virginia 20166, 2005, 160 pages, $19.95 (hardcover),$12.95 (softcover).From May 1980 to June 1983, I was at an air base10 miles northeast of Madrid, Spain. FranciscoFranco had been dead for five years, and a youngking—Juan Carlos—was trying to establish democracyafter 35 years of dictatorship. I soon learnedthat many members of the older generation, waryof “democratic government” and its social ills,yearned for “the good ole days” under Franco. InFebruary 1981, to punctuate the fragility of Spain’sdemocracy and Franco’s lingering influence, someconservative military officers seized the NationalAssembly in Madrid, hoping that the king and armywould abolish democracy. Fortunately for Spain,the king—with the army’s support—took command,and the rebellion melted away.In this short biography, Geoffrey Jensen—holderof the John Biggs ’30 Cincinnati Chair in MilitaryHistory at the Virginia Military Institute and a leadingauthority on modern military history, the Spanishmilitary, and counterinsurgency—has producedan excellent overview of the life of the modernworld’s longest-sitting dictator at the time of hisdeath. The subtitle accurately reflects the author’sframework of the book, dividing Franco’s life intothree major stages. Throughout this concise andwell-paced biography, Jensen consistently shows ushow Franco’s military experiences influenced hispolitical career as the Nationalist leader during thecivil war and then as dictator of Spain.Although his father was a naval officer, Francobecame an army cadet. After commissioning, hesteadily rose in rank, helped by assignments toSpain’s Army of Africa and its campaigns againstthe Rif tribesmen of Morocco. He returned to Spainas the commandant of the new military academy.He went back to Morocco and reluctantly joinedthe Nationalist rebellion against the government inMay 1936. Within a year, Franco had become thede facto head of the rebellion. After the end of thecivil war, Franco worked to establish a viable governmentwhile walking a thin line between the Alliedand the Axis powers during World War II. After thewar, taking advantage of the Cold War between theUnited States and the Soviet Union, Franco garneredacceptance and economic aid from the West.In his waning years, he coached future king JuanCarlos, hoping he would continue Franco’s rightist,conservative government. After the dictator’s deathin 1975, Juan Carlos instituted a constitutionalmonarchy instead.Of particular importance to Franco’s developmentas a military leader, to which Jensen makesregular references, were his experiences with theSpanish Army of Africa and the Spanish ForeignLegion in their campaigns against the Rif tribesmen.Jensen points out that Franco developed hisruthlessness as the Nationalist leader during thecivil war and then as dictator during his tours ofduty in North Africa. Faced with an enemy who oftenmutilated Spanish corpses, the Spanish soldiersand officers demonstrated a growing acceptance ofbrutality and inhumanity, likewise terrorizing theirArab opponents. Not immune to such influences,Franco practiced and condoned similar conductduring the civil war and his follow-on regime.Jensen also emphasizes Franco’s development asan operational-level commander. Although Francowas no strategic genius, “he had grasped the importanceof the operational level of war [that level betweenthe tactical and strategic levels which servesto link the two] very early, at a time when technologymade rapid advances” (p. xii). From his combat experiencesin North Africa, he came to promote cooperationamong all military arms and services.These experiences would serve him well in defeatingthe Republican armies during the civil war. Forexample, he ensured that his staff included officersskilled at operational planning. Jensen regularlymentions Franco’s “joint” experience during hiscombat tours in North Africa.Franco: Soldier, Commander, Dictator is a good bookfor the general reader as well as the military historian.The author provides an excellent criticalanalysis of Franco’s life but does not get boggeddown in details and minutiae, although on severaloccasions, he digresses a bit into less-relevant issues.Overall, I highly recommend this book.Dr. Robert B. KaneEglin AFB, FloridaAllied Fighter Aces of World War II: The <strong>Air</strong> CombatTactics and Techniques of World War II byMike Spick. Stackpole Books (http://www.stackpolebooks.com), 5067 Ritter Road, Mechanicsburg,Pennsylvania 17055-6921, 2004,248 pages, $19.95 (softcover).Allied Fighter Aces examines specific tactics usedby the best-scoring Allied fighter pilots during theair war in Europe, Africa, and the Pacific, often
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