Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

The Battle for the Hague—1940: The First GreatAirborne Operations by Lt Col E. H. Brongers,translated by C. C. W. van Romondt Vis. UitgeverijAspekt (Aspekt Dutch Publisher) (http://www.uitgeverijaspekt.nl), Amersfoortsestraat 27,3769 AD Soesterberg, 2004, 293 pages, $15.95(softcover).In May 1940, Germany launched its attack onWestern Europe and in 10 weeks occupied France,Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Althoughthe Ardennes breakthrough and the assaulton Fort Eben Emael are familiar, the operations inthe Netherlands are less well known and not frequentlydocumented in English. The Dutch put upstout resistance but ultimately were overcome byGerman panzers and the bombing of Rotterdam.The attack on the Hague, the political center ofthe country, had two purposes: (1) to seize the governmentand thus paralyze Dutch military activitiesand (2) to overcome the canal and river defenseslocated in the center of a series of defendable linesknown as Fortress Holland. Germany had establisheda paratrooper arm in the Luftwaffe early in1933 as well as an air-landing division that usedtransport aircraft to assault airfields and then fightas infantry. Hitler’s plan called for paratroopers tojump and seize airfields where German aircraftcould fly in reinforcements and supplies; theywould also secure bridges to allow panzer and infantrydivisions to move up quickly and seize keyDutch cities. The element of surprise, the lack ofmodern armament in the Dutch armed forces, andthe small size of the Dutch army and air force wouldall lead to a quick and easy German victory.In 1940 Western countries appreciated neitherthe size nor the capabilities of German paratroopers,whose existence had remained a secret (theyhad seen action only during the seizure of Oslo,Norway, earlier that year). In order to move the airlandingdivision and resupply the dropped paratroopers,the German military made available atotal of 430 Ju-52 transports. Although the Dutchplanned to withdraw into Fortress Holland, theirarmed forces could not deal with air attack or thecombined-arms concept of blitzkrieg.On 10 May, following extensive German reconnaissanceboth on the ground and in the air andafter the bombing of three airfields around theHague, German paratroopers began dropping whileJu-52s swooped down towards the runways. However,the Dutch proved less passive than Germanplanners anticipated, shooting up a majority ofthese aircraft and killing German troops. More importantly,the Ju-52s could not return to Germanyto pick up more troops. The Germans failed toseize the three airfields, and other paratrooperswere scattered to Hoek van Holland and other areasnorth of the Hague.The paratroopers enjoyed more success in Rotterdamand areas near the critical Moerdijk bridges.Dutch troops bitterly contested Dordrecht, anothercritical target. After four days of fighting, the Luftwaffebombed the center of Rotterdam to breakDutch resistance; at the same time, attempts by theDutch to link with French troops coming from Belgiumfailed. The Dutch queen reluctantly evacuatedto Britain along with the government, and the Dutchmilitary was forced to cease resistance on 15 May.Few military historians have succeeded in determiningwhat effect this Dutch defense had on furtherGerman military operations. German recordsof the Battle of the Hague were destroyed in 1945,but Brongers uses German and Dutch sources toestablish that airborne landings during OperationSea Lion were restricted, that the Luftwaffe neverrecovered from the losses to its transport aircraft,and that a lack of aircraft and manpower hamperedthe drop on Crete in 1941.This English translation of a Dutch text will appealto World War II enthusiasts and airpower advocatesalike. The Battle for the Hague enhances ourunderstanding of the efforts of the smaller powers,120