64 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>2005, a number of speakers emphasized theinterdependent relationship between fire andmaneuver. The RAND memo to SecretaryRumsfeld highlighted the “increasing interdependenceof air and ground forces,” notingin particular how “air operations reduced substantiallythe costs and risks of ground operations”in Iraq. 17 Recent events demonstrate thatjointness has taken root even more deeply incurrent operations. Army and <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> personnelin Baghdad cemented their partnershipin MNC-I’s JFEC and ASOC; the trust andcloseness they developed grew to encompassall the players involved in focusing joint firesand effects within Iraq. The Marines’ DASC,Baghdad’s ASOC, and the CAOC in Qatarjointly managed an air war that facilitated successin <strong>Fall</strong>ujah; the CAOC in turn led a processthat worked through the JFEC and tactical-level FSEs to maximize airpower’s nonlethalinfluence on Iraqi elections.Because many of these elements had neverpracticed together, they stumbled occasionally,and soldiers, sailors, marines, and <strong>Air</strong>menshould work together to correct those deficiencies.As RAND’s memo argued, “fixedwing aviation should be better integrated withground forces by increasing the realism andfrequency of joint training.” 18 At the sametime, the services can work to create a moreeffectivejoint lessons-learned process, developinnovative joint-assignment policies, and adjustnewly developing fire-support doctrine—all to ensure that future commanders understandhow maneuver and fire enable eachother so they can start every joint game withtop players in the lineup. qNotes1. Lt Gen Thomas F. Metz to Lt Gen Walter E.Buchanan III, letter, 9 February 2005.2. III Corps presentation. Slides available from the Officeof the Commanding General, III Corps, Fort Hood, TX.3. For more detail on the organization of the JFEC, seePatrecia Slayden Hollis, “Part 1: Joint Effects for the MNC-Iin OIF II” [interview with Brig Gen Richard P. Formica],Field Artillery, May–June 2005, 5–9, http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/2005/MAY_JUN_2005/PAGE5-9.pdf.4. Ibid., 7–8.5. Army Regulation 15-6, Procedure for Investigating Officersand Boards of Officers, 30 October 1996.6. Lt Col John T. Ryan, former commander, 2d Battalion,12th Cavalry Regiment, to the author, e-mail, 19May 2005. The term sparkled refers to a marking techniquevisible through night observation devices.7. Lt Col Gary Kling (presentation, Naval AmphibiousBase Little Creek, Norfolk, VA, 11 May 2005); and idem tothe author, e-mail, 19 May 2005.8. Capt Joseph A. Katz, “Afghanistan: The Role of ‘Showof-Presence’<strong>Air</strong>craft in the First Democratic Elections,”Field Artillery, January–February 2005, 15, http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/2005/JAN_FEB_2005/PAGE15-17.pdf.9. Author’s notes from the briefing, ca. 10 January 2005.10. 3d BCT / 1st Infantry Division TACP to MNC-IASOC, electronic chat, 30 January 2005. Logs on file at712th <strong>Air</strong> Support Operations Squadron, Fort Hood, TX.Quotation is unclassified, but database and logs are classifiedSecret.11. Col Michael Formica to the author, e-mail, 25 May2005.12. See Colonel Formica’s comments above. Significantly,Colonel Formica had a highly experienced lieutenantcolonel serve as his ALO during November’s <strong>Fall</strong>ujahoperations. He then took two <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> captains underhis wing for follow-up operations.13. Col Lawrence Roberts to the author, e-mail, 18April <strong>2006</strong>.14. James A. Thomson to Donald H. Rumsfeld, memorandum,7 February 2005.15. Ibid.16. Bruce R. Pirnie et al., Beyond Close <strong>Air</strong> Support:Forging a New <strong>Air</strong>-Ground Partnership, RAND Report MG-301-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005),86, 83, 85, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG301.pdf.17. Thomson to Rumsfeld, memorandum.18. Ibid.
ASPJQuick-LookA New Operational Assessment ParadigmSplitting the StoplightsMAJ KIRSTEN MESSER, USAFMAJ SHANE DOUGHERTY, USAFOPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT (OA)plays a crucial role in the successfulapplication of airpower, enablingdevelopment and revisionof air strategy by “closing the loop” on the airtasking order’s cycle. Because the global waron terrorism has prompted alterations in theapplication of airpower, however, analystsmust shift their approach to OA to accommodatethose changes. The conflicts in which theUnited States has fought since the end of theCold War have emphasized the large-scale applicationof airpower to deliver precise, kineticeffects. By contrast, in Operations EnduringFreedom and Iraqi Freedom, the air componentfinds itself in a supporting role, deliveringfewer kinetic effects in favor of nonkineticones such as deterrence. In such a context,analysts must tailor their approach to OA sothey can accurately assess the attainment ofdesired effects and support the joint force aircomponent commander’s (JFACC) decisionson the best use of limited resources.Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Controlfor Joint <strong>Air</strong> Operations, gives the air componentcommander responsibility for assessing“the results of joint air operations.” 1 <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>Operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures(AFOTTP) 2-3.2, <strong>Air</strong> and <strong>Space</strong> OperationsCenter, assigns this responsibility to theJFACC’s operational assessment team (OAT). 2Doctrinal guidance on how to conduct assessmentfocuses mainly on tactical-level assessments,including battle damage assessment(BDA) and munitions effectiveness assessment(MEA). Guidance specific to assessment at theoperational level describes a general processof “rolling up” the tactical-level assessmentsusing the strategy-to-task linkage developed bythe Strategy Division.Using this delineation from task to objectiveas the foundation for assessment remainsthe same regardless of whether the air componentis supported or supporting. There are,however, significant differences in how onebuilds an assessment on that foundation. Whenthe air component assumes a supporting role,uncertainties exist in determining the goal tobe assessed, building tactical-assessment inputto the OA process, and evaluating and reportingeffects across components.With airpower as supporter, the operationalobjective might read, “Support command Xin achieving effect A.” So the air componenthas two goals: it must provide support to commandX and do so with the purpose of achievingeffect A. Which of these goals should theassessment measure?Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages.Looking at things from an effectsbasedperspective (achieve effect A) is generallythe preferred approach to assessmentbecause it captures progress toward the overallgoal and highlights opportunities to improve65
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Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
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BOOK REVIEWS 121whose contributions
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BOOK REVIEWS 123Franco: Soldier, Co
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CONTRIBUTORS 127Col Howard D. “Da
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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARDGen John A.