102 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>techno-economic paradigm (TEP) gains increasingsupport from business, and (2) adeployment period, when the paradigm becomesthe new norm. During the installationperiod, investor enthusiasm for thenew TEP grows into a frenzy leading to anincreasing gap between the “haves,” whoare profiting from the new TEP, and the“have-nots,” who are still invested in theold TEP. 33 Ultimately the investment frenzyforms a stock bubble, which bursts andbrings on the turning point, usually a seriousrecession or even a depression. It isduring the turning point that society andthe judicial system are forced to reformand shift to meet the characteristics of thenewly established TEP. 34If this model of technological revolution iscorrect—and it appears to match the last fivetechnological revolutions well enough—thensometime during the development of MNTthere will be a period of social, political, andeconomic unrest as the world system is pulledin two directions, embracing the new TEP versusclinging to the old. Given the staggeringarray of changes that MNT can bring, this periodmay be particularly stressful. Moreover, ifMNT has already enabled some of its moredangerous potential applications—such asknowledge-based mass destruction—beforeproper political and social control structureshave been established, this period could becatastrophic.What Strategy Should theUnited States Pursue?There are three basic strategy courses thatthe United States can pursue to deal withMNT:• some form of deliberate internationalregulation and control,• a “hands-off” approach that lets naturalmarket forces dictate development andregulation, and• a total ban on MNT development.International RegulationTwo strategic approaches have relevance to internationalregulation of MNT:• a hegemonic regulation imposed on therest of the world by the United States, or• a cooperative regulation overseen andenforced by an international organization.In either case, regulation will succeed—if itdoes—only by removing the majority of reasonsnations will have to develop “uncontrolled”MNT.The basic premise in regulation should beto maximize public access to the benefits ofMNT while eliminating independent (i.e., unregulated)development by minimizing accessto, or interference with, the manufacturingtechnology itself. Ideally, freely providing thefruits of MNT to the world population will decreasethe urge to develop unregulated alternativeR&D programs and may simultaneouslyreduce the impetus for civil and/or resourcerelatedconflicts by virtually eradicating theeffects of poverty. 35The Center for Responsible Nanotechnology,a nonprofit think tank “concerned with themajor societal and environmental implicationsof advanced nanotechnology,” has proposeda solution based around a nanofactory,a self-contained, highly secure MM system—in effect a highly advanced NT version ofGershenfeld’s desktop fab-lab apparatus. 36 Inthis strategy, a closely guarded crash developmentprogram would be set up as soon as possibleto develop the MM expertise required tobuild a nanofactory. It is essential that thenanofactory be developed before any possiblecompeting MNT R&D program can come tofruition. Nanofactories would then be reproducedand distributed to nations and organizations(at some point possibly even to individuals)around the world, with emphasisplaced on the most poverty-stricken regions.This “standard” nanofactory would be theonly approved MNT manufacturing apparatusin the world and would even have internallimitations as to what could be constructed(no replicating assemblers, for example, ex-
MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 103cept under very carefully controlled andmonitored conditions).The advantages of this strategy are that itwould offer a very large carrot—with the stickof regulation—in the form of the nanofactories.They could act as valid tools of humanitarianassistance, as leverage to prevent balkinggovernments from pursuing their ownrogue MNT development programs, or evenas assurance that citizens’ needs are beingmet. 37 The appeal of (and the demand for)the nanofactories would likely be enormous,particularly if they are produced for personaluse. As Gershenfeld has noted about his conceptuallysimilar fab-labs, “The killer app forpersonal fabrication is fulfilling individual desiresrather than merely meeting mass-marketneeds.” 38 By restricting nanofabrication methodsto the standard nanofactory alone, thethreat of gray-goo replicators would be minimizedprobably as much as is possible. 39Of course, there are disadvantages andrisks in this strategy as well. Although widespreadavailability of nanofactories may reducethe desire for independent MNT R&Dprograms, “noncomplying” groups will try tohide their projects, thus making complianceeven harder to verify. A significant risk is inherentin distributing the nanofactories; theunits will require extensive, built-in securityto protect both their inner physical workingsand their operating software. Every hacker inthe world (not to mention rogue organizationsor governments) would be dying tocrack nanofactory security. As a possible solution,the nanofactories must be programmedto destroy themselves if any attempt to accessthe classified areas of the unit occurs. Thiswill lead to many, many broken nanofactories,but since they can be created relativelyeasily and cheaply, replacing them shouldnot be an issue.In order for this strategy to have a decentchance of working, the United States shouldnot attempt to assume a hegemonist stanceand become the sole governing body of thissystem. Such a strategy would require a US-onlynanofactory development program. Furthermore,US efforts to dominate nanofactorytechnology will likely result in a “nanofactoryrace” that the United States could lose. Europe,Japan, Korea, China, and India are allconducting research into nanotechnology. 40However poorly the US national image isperceived throughout the world today, itcould grow exponentially worse if the UnitedStates emerged as the sole MNT superpower.Therefore, for both technical and diplomaticreasons, the US primacy option is notthe best solution.However, the United States should play amajor role in establishing an internationalcontrol organization to formulate and carryout the regulation strategy. Such an organizationwould have a better chance of actuallydeveloping a working nanofactory beforecompeting efforts do so (although maintainingsecurity would be horrendously difficult)as well as encouraging international legitimacyfor the nanofactory plan, which in turnwould likely result in greater buy-in by theworld community. There are already somerumblings of international support for anarms-control-like containment structure forNT. For example, the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization’s special report on emergingtechnologies notes that “the need for controlof these new technologies is more importantnow than in previous times of scientific development.”41An organization like the one describedhere will be supremely difficult to establishand maintain and will require many yearsof diplomatic maneuvering to secure theproper agreements. As economist DavidFriedman notes,We don’t have a decent mechanism for centralizedcontrol on anything like the necessaryscale. . . . Our decentralized mechanisms . . .depend on a world where there is some workabledefinition of property rights in which theactions that a person takes with his propertyhave only slight external effects, beyond thosethat can be handled by contract. Technologicalprogress might mean that no such definitionexists—in which case we are left with zero workablesolutions to the coordination problem. 42We must determine whether a workable solutionexists and do so quickly. MNT could be 50years away—then again, perhaps only 10.
- Page 2 and 3:
Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
- Page 4 and 5:
PIREPsJoint Airspace Management and
- Page 6 and 7:
APJInterdependenceKey to Our Common
- Page 8 and 9:
6 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 20
- Page 10 and 11:
APJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CHI
- Page 12 and 13:
10 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2
- Page 14 and 15:
ASPJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CH
- Page 16 and 17:
True to form, the Air Force has res
- Page 18 and 19:
Red Flag Still Matters—After AllT
- Page 20 and 21:
Integration of Space-BasedCombat Sy
- Page 22 and 23:
est alternative. In other cases, un
- Page 25 and 26:
power projection, but advances in a
- Page 27 and 28:
3. Report of the Commission to Asse
- Page 29 and 30:
PIREP 27ized, programmed, funded, a
- Page 31 and 32:
PIREP 29creation of ACMs. One antic
- Page 33 and 34:
PIREP 31Link 16 and Joint Airspace
- Page 35 and 36:
PIREP 33Missile Defense Systems, th
- Page 37 and 38:
CADRE’s Professional EducationOpp
- Page 39 and 40:
ASPJQuick-LookThe Air Force Needs N
- Page 41 and 42:
QUICK-LOOK 39system should become a
- Page 43 and 44:
APJThe Air Force’s New Ground War
- Page 45 and 46:
THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 43
- Page 47 and 48:
THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 45
- Page 49 and 50:
THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 47
- Page 51 and 52:
THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 49
- Page 53 and 54: THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 51
- Page 55 and 56: New USAF Doctrine PublicationAir Fo
- Page 57 and 58: Counterinsurgency AirpowerAir-Groun
- Page 59 and 60: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 57ticula
- Page 61 and 62: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 59and Ai
- Page 63 and 64: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 61The af
- Page 65 and 66: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 63squadr
- Page 67 and 68: ASPJQuick-LookA New Operational Ass
- Page 69 and 70: QUICK-LOOK 67den on the OAT. First,
- Page 71 and 72: Filling the Stealth Gap and Enhanci
- Page 73 and 74: FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 71Each of t
- Page 75 and 76: FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 73the US wa
- Page 77 and 78: FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 75mit the F
- Page 79 and 80: Space PowerAn Ill-Suited SpaceStrat
- Page 81 and 82: SPACE POWER 79by using a more encom
- Page 83 and 84: SPACE POWER 81role of offensive and
- Page 85 and 86: SPACE POWER 83achieve supremacy in
- Page 87 and 88: Military TransformationEnds,Ways, a
- Page 89 and 90: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 87to organi
- Page 91 and 92: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 89course, w
- Page 93 and 94: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 91mind-set
- Page 95 and 96: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 93sponding
- Page 97 and 98: NOTAM 95The document’s authors ha
- Page 99 and 100: MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 101 and 102: MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 103: MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 107 and 108: MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 109 and 110: ASPJQuick-LookThe Nature of Close A
- Page 111 and 112: QUICK-LOOK 109CAS missions. The pub
- Page 113 and 114: Clausewitz and the Falkland Islands
- Page 115 and 116: CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- Page 117 and 118: CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- Page 119 and 120: CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- Page 121 and 122: CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- Page 123 and 124: BOOK REVIEWS 121whose contributions
- Page 125 and 126: BOOK REVIEWS 123Franco: Soldier, Co
- Page 127 and 128: APJAir and Space Power Journal, the
- Page 129 and 130: CONTRIBUTORS 127Col Howard D. “Da
- Page 131: EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARDGen John A.