Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 57ticulated by the corps commander andechoed in the air component commander’sair operations directive, called for airpowerto respond to troops-in-contact (TIC) situations.Consequently, the ASOC continuouslymonitored the Joint Air Request Net, whichlinked all battalion, brigade, and divisionTACPs and, using kill boxes as a commonframe of reference, moved air assets aroundthe country in response to developing situations.Knowing that maneuver commanderswere disciplined and deliberate in their TICdeclarations—knowing that they had weighedconsiderations of proportionality and militarynecessity carefully before asking for airpower—theASOC worked with the CAOC tominimize response time. Ultimately, airgroundteamwork combined with perceptiveintelligence work to reduce average TIC responsesof 20–25 minutes in the summer of2004 to six to seven minutes throughout November,December, and January. Furthermore,in the nine months in which III Corpsand the 3d ASOG formed the core of MNC-I’sJFEC, the team boasted a perfect record byresponding to all 811 TIC declarations. Withouta doubt, glitches occurred: communicationsdifficulties hampered some TIC responses,and no one would suggest that sucha record would be possible without the completeair dominance the coalition held overIraq. But every soldier and airman involvedin the tasking process from Baghdad to Qatarwas justifiably proud of the achievement.In addition to supporting TICs, more traditionalairpower missions involved the applicationof lethal fires. With both conventionaland special operations forces, Airmen conductedtime-sensitive targeting operations andpreplanned precision strikes; the most unusualof the latter included terrain-denial missionsagainst known insurgent firing positions.Everyone understood that insurgents woulddesert the positions at weapon impact becausethey tended to use homemade launchers withrudimentary timing devices, but commanderswanted to prevent repeat uses and perhaps deterless-committed insurgents from using theirshoot-and-scoot tactics. In all these cases, theJFEC applied US Central Command’s rules ofengagement and ensured that proper authoritiessanctioned the use of force.A number of nonlethal airpower innovationsproved far more prevalent than lethalfires, however, and represented the ingenuityand drive of the coalition military establishment.On a countrywide scale, fighter aircraftconducted infrastructure-security missions, simultaneouslyfulfilling the multinational-forcecommander’s strategic priority of protectingIraq’s lifeblood—oil and electrical systems—from insurgent attacks and the CFACC’s directionnot to waste fuel, time, or effort in airbornealertorbits around the country. On a smallerscale, fighter crews conducted nontraditionalintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance(NTISR) missions on behalf of ground commanders.For example, during a StrykerBrigade cordon-and-search mission in Mosul,F-18s continually updated the JTAC (in thecommander’s Stryker) on enemy and civilianmovements outside the cordon, allowing thecommander to reposition his platoons accordingly.After the combined-arms rehearsal fora 39th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) mechanizedoperation north of Baghdad, the AH-64Apache troop commander explained to thevisiting ALO how commonplace joint airattacktactics had become, noting that almostdaily they came up on common frequencieswith local JTACs and overhead fighters, usingthe team to develop situational awareness.One battalion commander, Lt Col Tim Ryan,highlighted the immediate impact of nonlethalCAS when he described his experiencessouth of Baghdad:On one large operation, I had [an unmannedaerial vehicle (UAV)] on station early to observethe target area as we approached; we quietlybrought in the fast movers at altitude just beforewe hit the objective and then rotary wing camein after the first door was breached because oftheir audio signature. On that morning we hadseveral “runners” that [the] UAV or F-16 [identified];the F-16 sparkled and did an on-the-nethandover to the [OH-58D] Kiowas that came inlow on the targets and fixed them in place untilground forces could capture them. I was constantlyamazed at how precise the grids and [situationreports] from the fast movers were, giventheir speed and altitude. . . .