108 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>operations and the reduction of insurgentinfluence on the populace. The targeting ofinsurgents hiding within the populace is acomplex task since they often appear as smallgroups of nonuniformed guerilla fighters. Ourforces need detailed human intelligence tolocate and identify targets, as well as positivecontrol of air strikes by tactical air control partiesto prevent fratricide and collateral damage.Although in conventional war the number oftargets successfully engaged serves as a roughmeasure of success, in LIC such attacks indicatea deterioration in security and stability.As with the nature of the enemy and militaryobjectives, the types of military operationsconducted in conventional conflict versus LICvary significantly. In conventional war, targetsets include state C2, military headquarters,and fielded forces, all subject to identification,targeting, attack, and assessment. Our forcescan employ combined air, land, and sea poweragainst the enemy. <strong>Air</strong>power may need to performextensive air superiority, suppression ofenemy air defenses, strategic attack, interdiction,and conventional CAS missions. Bycontrast, in LIC there are no enemy aircraft toengage, no enemy air defenses to attack, nostate headquarters to surgically strike, and nofielded forces to interdict. <strong>Air</strong>power still has acritical role to play, but it typically supportsthe occupying ground forces. These missionsinclude tactical airlift; intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance; and LIC CAS.Close <strong>Air</strong> Support inLow Intensity ConflictIn LIC the security and stability of the populationare of utmost importance. <strong>Air</strong> strikes,therefore, are significantly restricted in orderto limit collateral damage, a factor which canalienate the populace and increase sympathiesfor the insurgents, as well as weaken domesticand international political support. In lieu ofdropping bombs, CAS aircrews find themselvestasked with such missions as groundconvoyescort, visual reconnaissance, and airborneCAS alert. Sorties involving theemployment of weapons can account for asfew as 4 percent of the total number of missionsflown. 1 The rare requirement for kineticeffects, however, does not undermine theimportance of the presence of armed aircraft.Firepower from the air proves most critical inan emergency situation with friendly troopsunder attack. Proper weapons employmentnot only protects friendly lives but also preventsfratricide and collateral damage, both ofwhich can have negative consequences on thestrategic level.In LIC, having dependable CAS assetsallows ground forces to operate with reducedindigenous firepower since they rely on airpowerto supply fires previously provided byArmy artillery. It also allows ground commandersto deploy a larger percentage of groundforces with a reduced reserve force. 2 CASassets overhead serve as a deterrent to enemyground attack—that is, a ground convoy coveredby visible air assets is much less likely tobe attacked than one which is not. 3 In Afghanistanthis has led to a significant increase indemand for ground-convoy escort, with somecommanders refusing to depart from safehouses until airpower arrives overhead. 4Even when ground forces do not requirethe presence of firepower, CAS assets can providethem with important support. <strong>Air</strong>mencan perform route reconnaissance for convoys,search named areas of interest for enemyactivity, and conduct searches for missingfriendly vehicles. Further, they can provide aline-of-sight relay between Army tactical operationscenters and their deployed groundforces for critical updates.Close <strong>Air</strong> Support—DoctrineCAS is a critical element of ongoing LICoperations. However, CAS as written in jointdoctrine addresses conventional operationswhile neglecting the significant challengesencountered in LIC. According to JP 3-09.3,“CAS provides firepower in offensive anddefensive operations to destroy, disrupt, suppress,fix, harass, neutralize, or delay enemyforces.” 5 To this end, JP 3-09.3 describes how toorganize, plan, prepare, request, and execute
QUICK-LOOK 109CAS missions. The publication tacitly assumesthe presence of hostile targets subject toengagement from the air. This, however, is notusually the case in LIC operations.In light of the low percentage of missionsemploying weapons (as low as 4 percent inOperation Enduring Freedom), one mustquestion how to best utilize the other 96 percentwhich do not engage targets. Having airborneCAS alert as their primary mission, theseaircrews cover specific vulnerability times overhigh-risk areas and remain prepared to provideCAS should an emergency or a troops incontact (TIC) situation arise. Although alertCAS remains the highest priority, both airmenand soldiers realize that aircrews waiting overheadfor a TIC situation can also use this timeto support ground forces in other ways. Forexample, having aircraft overhead duringconvoy escort deters ambush and improves C2by adding a radio relay between convoys andheadquarters. <strong>Air</strong>crews can also search forbroken-down or lost vehicles, as well as reconnoiterroads for vehicle traffic and potentialhazards. Taking advantage of the high ground,CAS aircrews can improve the efficiency andsuccess rate of the ground mission by enhancingsituational awareness and communicationsrelay, all without ever having to place abomb on target. Unfortunately, these missions,which take place close to ground forces,are provided by air, and they support groundoperations not addressed in joint doctrineand scarcely mentioned in <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> tactics,techniques, and procedures.Close <strong>Air</strong> Support—TrainingUS <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> aircrews preparing for LICoperations currently train with CAS tactics,techniques, and procedures developed foruse against conventional ground forces. Themajority of air-to-surface ranges located inthe United States, Europe, and the Pacificare filled with such mechanized targets astanks, armored personnel carriers, surfaceto-airmissiles, and so forth, with few urbanor mountainous ranges available. <strong>Air</strong> Warrior,the premiere joint CAS exercise, remainsa conventional force-on-force battle. Despitethe existence of one LIC CAS exercise—<strong>Air</strong>Warrior II—most CAS training remains conventional.As a result, CAS aircrews findthemselves inadequately prepared to conductLIC operations.Changing the Way We Thinkabout Close <strong>Air</strong> Support inLow Intensity ConflictThe <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> can improve its doctrine andtraining to include LIC operations by takingtwo steps. First, it can work with the other servicesto expand JP 3-09.3 by including adescription of CAS during LIC operations.This section can expound upon the nature ofthe enemy, objectives, and operations, as wellas the expanded role of CAS in providing supportnot limited to firepower. In addition, the<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures(AFTTP) 3-1 series should include detaileddiscussions of such topics as ground-convoyescort and Army C2 networks. Second, the <strong>Air</strong><strong>Force</strong> must give attention and investment priorityto air-to-surface ranges and major exercisesfor training in LIC operations. Further, itshould create more urban and mountainousranges, along with opportunities for <strong>Air</strong>mento practice ground-convoy escort prior toencountering the mission in combat. 6ConclusionThis article has focused on the differencesbetween conventional and LIC operationsand offered suggestions for improving doctrineand training to better prepare <strong>Air</strong>menfor the challenges of LIC CAS. <strong>Air</strong>power canprovide much more than firepower when itsupports ground forces. For example, <strong>Air</strong>mencan support ground operations withouthaving to place a bomb on target by conductingsuch missions as visual search, groundconvoyescort, and enhancement of C2.Improving the understanding and trainingof <strong>Air</strong>men for LIC CAS increases the potentialfor airpower to affect the battlespace
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Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
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PIREPsJoint Airspace Management and
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APJInterdependenceKey to Our Common
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APJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CHI
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ASPJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CH
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True to form, the Air Force has res
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Red Flag Still Matters—After AllT
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Integration of Space-BasedCombat Sy
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est alternative. In other cases, un
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power projection, but advances in a
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3. Report of the Commission to Asse
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PIREP 27ized, programmed, funded, a
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PIREP 29creation of ACMs. One antic
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PIREP 31Link 16 and Joint Airspace
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PIREP 33Missile Defense Systems, th
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CADRE’s Professional EducationOpp
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QUICK-LOOK 39system should become a
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Counterinsurgency AirpowerAir-Groun
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