11.07.2015 Views

Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

108 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>operations and the reduction of insurgentinfluence on the populace. The targeting ofinsurgents hiding within the populace is acomplex task since they often appear as smallgroups of nonuniformed guerilla fighters. Ourforces need detailed human intelligence tolocate and identify targets, as well as positivecontrol of air strikes by tactical air control partiesto prevent fratricide and collateral damage.Although in conventional war the number oftargets successfully engaged serves as a roughmeasure of success, in LIC such attacks indicatea deterioration in security and stability.As with the nature of the enemy and militaryobjectives, the types of military operationsconducted in conventional conflict versus LICvary significantly. In conventional war, targetsets include state C2, military headquarters,and fielded forces, all subject to identification,targeting, attack, and assessment. Our forcescan employ combined air, land, and sea poweragainst the enemy. <strong>Air</strong>power may need to performextensive air superiority, suppression ofenemy air defenses, strategic attack, interdiction,and conventional CAS missions. Bycontrast, in LIC there are no enemy aircraft toengage, no enemy air defenses to attack, nostate headquarters to surgically strike, and nofielded forces to interdict. <strong>Air</strong>power still has acritical role to play, but it typically supportsthe occupying ground forces. These missionsinclude tactical airlift; intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance; and LIC CAS.Close <strong>Air</strong> Support inLow Intensity ConflictIn LIC the security and stability of the populationare of utmost importance. <strong>Air</strong> strikes,therefore, are significantly restricted in orderto limit collateral damage, a factor which canalienate the populace and increase sympathiesfor the insurgents, as well as weaken domesticand international political support. In lieu ofdropping bombs, CAS aircrews find themselvestasked with such missions as groundconvoyescort, visual reconnaissance, and airborneCAS alert. Sorties involving theemployment of weapons can account for asfew as 4 percent of the total number of missionsflown. 1 The rare requirement for kineticeffects, however, does not undermine theimportance of the presence of armed aircraft.Firepower from the air proves most critical inan emergency situation with friendly troopsunder attack. Proper weapons employmentnot only protects friendly lives but also preventsfratricide and collateral damage, both ofwhich can have negative consequences on thestrategic level.In LIC, having dependable CAS assetsallows ground forces to operate with reducedindigenous firepower since they rely on airpowerto supply fires previously provided byArmy artillery. It also allows ground commandersto deploy a larger percentage of groundforces with a reduced reserve force. 2 CASassets overhead serve as a deterrent to enemyground attack—that is, a ground convoy coveredby visible air assets is much less likely tobe attacked than one which is not. 3 In Afghanistanthis has led to a significant increase indemand for ground-convoy escort, with somecommanders refusing to depart from safehouses until airpower arrives overhead. 4Even when ground forces do not requirethe presence of firepower, CAS assets can providethem with important support. <strong>Air</strong>mencan perform route reconnaissance for convoys,search named areas of interest for enemyactivity, and conduct searches for missingfriendly vehicles. Further, they can provide aline-of-sight relay between Army tactical operationscenters and their deployed groundforces for critical updates.Close <strong>Air</strong> Support—DoctrineCAS is a critical element of ongoing LICoperations. However, CAS as written in jointdoctrine addresses conventional operationswhile neglecting the significant challengesencountered in LIC. According to JP 3-09.3,“CAS provides firepower in offensive anddefensive operations to destroy, disrupt, suppress,fix, harass, neutralize, or delay enemyforces.” 5 To this end, JP 3-09.3 describes how toorganize, plan, prepare, request, and execute

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!