Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

58 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006On the day before the elections, [an F-15Eflight] was focused on the periphery of the objectivearea since we’d already been on stationfor about 45 minutes and didn’t need them inan area we already had control of on the ground.They spotted four runners that exited a houseoutside of our cordon and then they guidedground forces, my crew in this case, on to thetargets who were hiding in the reeds under anoverhang on the bank of the river. I’d walked inthe dark within ten feet of one guy and [the aircraft]sparkled the target right behind me, toldthe TACP to tell me to turn around; I saw thebeam through my [night observation device]and captured the first of four detainees. Thatwas pretty Hooah! 6To be sure, nonlethal airpower amountedto much more than NTISR; when necessary,commanders could “escalate” nonlethal effects.Due to the political ramifications of urbanbombs, commanders rarely asked forweapons release with TICs—but they oftenasked for shows of force to cause insurgents tobreak contact or prevent crowds from complicatingtactical situations. One notable situationoccurred in Baghdad in November 2004,as the battle for Fallujah raged just a few milesto the west, when a convoy stopped to dealwith a large improvised explosive device justoutside a Sunni mosque. Friday prayers hadrecently concluded, and a crowd estimated atwell over 1,000 began marching from themosque toward the convoy; the ground commanderimmediately declared a TIC and hadthe JTAC request a low and loud show of force.The ASOC and division TACP coordinatedwith the Army’s air command and control forpasses well below the coordinating altitude—and after the second low pass from an F-15E,the crowd dispersed, allowing the convoy tocontinue without incident.FallujahJoint integration of lethal and nonlethalfires and effects faced its sternest test in thebattle to retake Fallujah in November 2004—but the 1st MARDIV and its DASC had neithera common doctrinal foundation with theJFEC/ASOC/CAOC team nor a history of exercisingwith Army and Air Force assets. Doctrinaldifferences were exacerbated by theplacement of Marine expeditionary-forceboundaries immediately south and west ofBaghdad, creating a seam between the ASOCand DASC directly between Baghdad InternationalAirport and Fallujah—the busiest,most critical areas of central Iraq. As difficultiesarose in the summer of 2004, primarily ascoalition forces responded to an uprising ofMuqtada al-Sadr’s militia in Najaf, CAOC,DASC, and ASOC personnel created altitudebasedcoordination measures that proved effectivein a small-scale fight. However, no onein the command-and-control chain believedthat a fairly low-altitude cap on Marinecontrolledair operations would suffice inFallujah, considered the site of the densesturban air operations since those in Hue, SouthVietnam, more than 35 years ago.Led by Lt Col Gary Kling, USMC, theMARDIV’s operations air officer, and Lt ColPatrick Johnson, USAF, the ASOC director,and building on the joint example set withinthe JFEC, members from all services workedout the solution. Colonel Kling argued effectivelythat he needed control over the entireair effort around Fallujah. Colonel Johnsonpointed out that to manage the air warthroughout the rest of the country—to preventinsurgent attacks elsewhere from drawingcombat power away from the main effort—aswell as adequately support the Fallujahfight and enable the CFACC to fulfill his responsibilitiesas airspace control authority forthe entire area of operations, the ASOCneeded complete visibility into the DASC’sfight. Ultimately, after months of painstakingwork and carefully cultivated trust, everyonein the chain of command bought into a planbased on the twin pillars of unity of commandand transparency—and, as Colonel Kling toldUS Joint Forces Command’s Joint CAS Symposiumof 2005, the execution almost perfectlymatched the plan. From the division commandpost, assisted by an air support liaisonteam, he orchestrated all rotary- and fixedwingflights and fires within 15 miles of Fallujahand Ramadi, fires controlled by a mix ofMarine forward air controllers, Navy SEALs,