Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

116 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006can employ our divisions offensively.” 18 Immediatelyafter taking charge of the FAS, GeneralCrespo ordered that the crews be trained toattack ships, using as a simulated target a modernType 42 Argentinian navy destroyer. Theresults were discouraging, suggesting that crewswould suffer 50 percent losses during attacks;nevertheless, the training continued until thewar started, and General Crespo proved thathe had the necessary intelligence and intuitivejudgment to confront the powerful enemy. 19Tactics and StrategyClausewitz wrote, “This gives rise to thecompletely different activity of planning andexecuting these engagements themselves, andof coordinating each of them with the othersin order to further the object of war. One hasbeen called tactics and the other strategy.” 20From this definition, we can conclude that theuse of tactics is only one way to employ strategyto achieve the political purpose of war. As indicatedpreviously, the Argentinians had assumeda defensive position, as expressed intheir political goal of “hold[ing] the islandsand fac[ing] the Royal Navy onslaught.” Towardsthis end, their strategy sought to preventthe British fleet from approaching thecoast and fulfilling its goal. Only the FAS couldcarry out that mission.But General Crespo encountered severalobstacles that prevented his forces from performingoptimally—some caused by a lack oftechnology and others by the command structure’sorganization. Take, for example, GeneralGaltieri’s arbitrary decision to dispatchmore troops while implementing the initialplan to defend the islands. This deploymentused all available transport airplanes—four C-130s and some F-27s. Unfortunately, the limitednumber of transport planes and the short5,500-foot runway at the Port Stanley airfieldprevented the deployment of artillery piecesor armored vehicles.General Galtieri’s deficient intelligence apparatusprevented him from sensing the needto enlarge Port Stanley’s landing strip so thatcombat aircraft could operate from there. 21The FAA had the means to perform theneeded construction work in a little morethan one week; indeed, had the lengtheningtaken place, the war might have turned outdifferently. 22 As it turned out, the FAS had tooperate from continental bases far away fromthe islands, including those at ComodoroRivadavia (540 miles), San Julián (440 miles),Río Gallegos (470 miles), Río Grande (430miles), and Trelew (625 miles), the last fourbases hosting combat aircraft like the MirageIII EA, Mirage 5, A-4B/C/Q Skyhawk, SuperEtendard, and Canberra. At Comodoro Rivadavia,the Argentinians stationed transport,tanker, surveillance, diversion, and searchand-rescueaircraft—specifically, C-130s, KC-130s, Learjet 35s, F-27s, and helicopters.From the Argentinian air fleet, only the A-4and Super Etendard could be air-refueled,something they had to do twice on each combatsortie. The distance between the bases andthe islands limited the operation of the MirageIII and Mirage 5 to a maximum of 10minutes, precluding the use of afterburners.This limitation prevented the Argentiniansfrom achieving air superiority over the islandsor offering air cover to missions beyond therange of interceptor airplanes. Furthermore,massed attacks against the British fleet provedimpossible because Argentina possessed onlytwo KC-130 tankers. 23 Despite these restrictions,the pilots scored important hits throughinventiveness and courage, making AdmiralWoodward doubtful about the war’s outcome:“In that stage, the war had become a fight betweenthe Royal Navy and the Argentinean AirForce for the prize. Who was winning in thatprecise moment? I am afraid we were not.” 24On 1 May, the FAA’s baptism of fire occurredwhen it lost two Mirage III EAs and one Canberrain action, showing General Crespo thathigh-altitude attacks made Argentinian aircraftvulnerable to the British surveillance radarsand Harriers. Henceforth, operationstook place at low altitude, with aircraft flyingbarely over the waves. The Argentinians followedthis tactical procedure during the restof the conflict to defeat the technologicalshield protecting the British fleet.