74 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>cruise, but just as sophisticated electroniccountermeasures and enhanced tactics replacedearly performance-based threat-avoidance techniques,so can the Nighthawk offset its moderateperformance with advanced mission simulationand planning. Autorouting softwarecreates minimum-risk routing and links it toan accurate autopilot, allowing the jet to wormdeeply into IADS-protected territory. <strong>Link</strong>ingthe F-117’s ability to shrink threat envelopesintelligently with its larger payload of more diverseordnance (mostly true precision weapons)produces a useful addition to the GSTF.Enhancing the Nighthawk’s GSTF contributioneven further would require incorporatinga second facet of General Jumper’s GSTFvision. Specifically, this involves “horizontallyintegrated command, control, intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (C 2 ISR),” inwhich a host of space assets, unmanned aerialvehicles, and wide-body platforms collects anddisseminates information on the order of battle.We would then run this information throughpredictive-analysis tools to develop predictivebattlespace awareness (PBA) with the goal ofnot only gaining a detailed understanding ofthe current battlespace but also predictinghow it will change with respect to threats andtargets: “Machine-level coordination with spacebasedplatforms will fill gaps in the airborneplatforms’ coverage.” 20 A couple of technologicalenhancements to the Nighthawk canleverage data available in the PBA concept toenhance the aircraft’s value in upcoming conflicts.Now is the time to adapt the Nighthawkto ensure that it fits future war-fighting concepts.To fill the current stealth gap and enhancethe long-term GSTF concept, we shouldretain the F-117.What the F-117 NeedsIn order to access data resident in the C 2 ISRnetwork, the F-117 must have a data gateway—a data link. The architecture of the system isunimportant as long as it allows reception—and perhaps minimal input to the network. Byleveraging threat and target information collectedby ISR assets, the Nighthawk can increaseits lethality and use its own predictivetools to enhance survivability. This capabilityrepresents a step beyond “real time in thecockpit” by providing imagery and text for targetingas well as route and threat information.Before this can happen, the Nighthawk requiresairborne access to planning resourcesresident in the existing F-117 mission-planningsystem. To minimize threat exposure, the aircraftpresently uses computer-calculated routing(autorouting)—a ground-based system thatutilizes threat data available before launch. 21Thus, in certain cases, the information used toplan the mission could be outdated; ideally, ofcourse, routing data would draw on real-timethreat information. If an airborne autorouter(threat data from the C 2 ISR network accessedvia the aforementioned data-link gateway)were incorporated into the Nighthawk, the jetcould worm its way through enemy defensesintelligently, based on current threat information.Alternatively, routing data could be generatedon the ground, with information fromthe C 2 ISR network, and passed via the datalinkgateway to an airborne force of F-117s.Though timely, the airborne version wouldlikely offer only a simplified solution that mightnot wholly account for the routing of otheraircraft. The ground-based version would takeadvantage of larger processors, dedicated missionplanners, and knowledge of multiple,conflicting routes. In either case, airborne accessto autoroute planning would greatly enhanceadvanced IADS penetration.This approach differs fundamentally fromthe supersonic, high-altitude penetration solutionoffered by the F-22—but it is no lessvalid. Potentially, in fact, it offers more flexibilitysince threat avoidance through autoroutingremains valid at both high and lowaltitude. Long-distance, supersonic flight becomesrealistic only at high altitude, and, asGeneral Jumper correctly stipulated, we needboth high-altitude and supersonic flight toshrink late-technology SAM envelopes. Intelligentlyworming by means of a precalculatedroute at low altitude enables the Nighthawk tocapitalize on direct as well as indirect terrainmasking. Stealth, intelligent routing, andmedium- or low-altitude operations will per-
FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 75mit the F-117 to penetrate an advanced IADSduring the gap years and beyond.Breaching the IADS is only the most obviousadvantage, however. According to GeneralJumper’s concept of PBA, time-sensitive targetinggains new dimensions. We will usereachback to complete PBA for targeting variousaspects of the enemy’s ability to wage war.In the general’s vision, “targeting will entailmore than a target name, a black-and-whitephotograph, and mensurated coordinates.Desired mean point of impact . . . analysis ofsecond- and third-order effects, [rules of engagement]target confirmation, and collateraldamageassessment will be part of a processcompleted and transmitted” to attack aircraft(such as the F-117) equipped with an appropriatedata gateway. 22With these two simple, technology-basedupgrades, the Nighthawk would reach newheights of lethality. Armed with timely threatdata and a plethora of laser-guided and GPSaidedweapons, the F-117 could bring to beartrue precision-delivery ability via proven andflexible tactics on almost any IADS. Imaginefor a moment the following scenario: A forceof F-117s launches to join a strike package ofB-2s with F-22 escort. As they fly to a prestriketanker, a higher-headquarters, time-sensitivetarget comes to light. Headquarters staff examinesit, determines the rules of engagement,and conducts a collateral-damage assessment.Concurrently, F-117 mission planners choosethe appropriate ordnance from the variety alreadyairborne within the Nighthawks’ bombbays and plan the most survivable route—lowor medium altitude—consistent with the threatsand desired effects. Meanwhile, national assetsconfirm the electronic order of battle(noting new threat locations and identifyingthe truly active SAM systems) and submit thedata to the C 2 ISR network. With several newthreats located and others assessed as dormant,Nighthawk mission planners replan thestrikes and introduce new routes and the timesensitivetarget-data package to the network.Instead of receiving a verbal update on theelectronic order of battle, the pilots get newroutes to their original targets. One pilot, justfinishing prestrike aerial refueling, receivesthe time-sensitive targeting order, route, targetcoordinates, photos, and desired meanpoints of impact. The rest of the package departsto conduct the planned strike while thelone Nighthawk descends to low altitude andjoins the new data-linked route to the designatedhigh-priority target. In this example,timely, accurate data increases flexibility anddrives survivability and lethality to new levels.ConclusionPossible adversaries such as China and Iranare aggressively upgrading their IADS with advancedSAMs and state-of-the-art communicationsystems. The <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s approach to defeatingsuch systems makes extensive use ofLO technology, which has proven successfulin recent operations. The current mainstay ofthe LO strike force consists of the service’sfleets of limited-production F-117s and B-2s—fewer than 100 combined. But PBD 720 proposesto eliminate the F-117 in the next coupleof years; moreover, small numbers and lowmission-capable rates compromise the highlycapable B-2. Although the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> has embracedstealth technology and plans a host ofnew weapon systems to make up for theseshortfalls, most remain in the developmentalstage. Although operational, the F-22 will notbe available in large numbers for some time;even then, the aircraft’s small, inflexible airto-groundweaponry impedes it. Similarly, theJASSM’s range and unitary warhead limits itstarget set. As a whole, the systems in developmentare excellent long-range solutions to thepresent stealth gap.But the possibility of confronting an aggressiveand well-armed adversary in the shortterm, combined with the imminent demise ofthe F-117, will create a stealth gap and hamperUS power projection. The Nighthawk’s excellentLO characteristics, good range, GPS independence,diverse weapons with a surfeit ofavailable target-based effects, bunker-bustingability, and true precision capabilities are unmatchedin either the current or future inventory.Instead of retiring the F-117, the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>would do well to consider the advantages of
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Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
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PIREPsJoint Airspace Management and
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APJInterdependenceKey to Our Common
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6 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 20
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APJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CHI
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ASPJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CH
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True to form, the Air Force has res
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Red Flag Still Matters—After AllT
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Integration of Space-BasedCombat Sy
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est alternative. In other cases, un
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APJAir and Space Power Journal, the
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CONTRIBUTORS 127Col Howard D. “Da
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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARDGen John A.