44 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>The Base Security ZoneWhereas legacy base-defense doctrine wasdesigned for Cold War–era linear battlefields,emerging joint doctrine treats expeditionarybases more like joint operating areas (fig. 1).The final draft of Joint Publication 3-10, “JointSecurity Operations in Theater,” adapts thebest practices of defending bases to the nonlinearbattlefields of today. The core of thisdoctrine seeks to ensure that the designatedbase commander can dominate the area aroundthe base from which the enemy can launchstandoff and penetrating attacks. Importantly,the new publication establishes a BSZ as ajoint operating area around critical fixed installations(such as air bases) and describesterrain that the base commander should influenceas the battlespace from which the enemycan attack the base. The fact that this terrainincludes the area traditionally known as theman-portable air defense system (MANPADS)footprint (the area the enemy could use to attackaircraft approaching/departing the basewith shoulder-launched SAMs) is of criticalimportance to the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>. This requirementof influencing terrain outside the fencecreated a new battlefield-control measurecalled the “base boundary” (fig. 2), defined inthe joint publication asa line that delineates the surface area of a basefor the purpose of facilitating coordination anddeconfliction of operations between adjacentunits, formations, or areas. The base boundaryis not necessarily the base perimeter; rather itshould be established based upon the factors ofmission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops andother support available, time available (METT-T),specifically balancing the need of the base defenseforces to control key terrain with theirability to accomplish the mission. 10Because the terrain included in the baseboundary is subject to constraints of the landcomponent or host nation, the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> willuse the BSZ to internally address the total areaoutside the base perimeter that might threatenthe base with standoff attacks. The optimaljoint situation would have the BSZ and baseboundary encompassing the same terrain.Analysis of the base’s mission as well as theenemy, terrain, time, troops available, and civilianconsiderations will determine the BSZ,which surrounds the base. Historical knowledgeof the enemy’s use of standoff weaponslike rockets and mortars in Vietnam, togetherwith recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan,shows that the BSZ must extend a minimumof five kilometers from base resources(e.g., aircraft operating surfaces, maintenancefacilities, and billeting locations). DedicatedFigure 1. Emerging joint nonlinear battlefield. (Adapted from briefing, Command and Control GeneralOfficer Steering Group, subject: Headquarters USAF/XOS-F Integrated Base Defense Command andControl, 3 November 2004.)
THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 45BaseBoundary<strong>Air</strong>BaseBSZUrbanAreaFigure 2. Notional base boundary. (Adapted from <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-10.2,“Integrated Base Defense Command and Control,” draft [topline coordination copy], 1 April <strong>2006</strong>, 8.)base-defense forces integrated under onecommander should conduct security operationswithin the zone. Normal BSZ operationsin the future will resemble offensive-style effortssuch as Desert Safeside. The base’s areaof interest, where the enemy can do planningand preparation for an attack against a givenbase, reaches beyond the BSZ to anticipate andcounter enemy threats (fig. 3). Base-defenseforces are not responsible for operations inthe area of interest, but they can shape the environmentby coordination with joint/coalitionforces and/or the host nation.The next challenge for <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> doctrineentails determining which component commandsthe air base. In Iraqi Freedom and EnduringFreedom, we assigned base commandto the component with the preponderance offorces. Although doing so may appear appropriateon the surface, air bases have uniquerequirements—for example, countering thethreat of shoulder-fired SAMs. If the Armycommands an air base simply because it has alarge logistics operation (and thus a largenumber of troops) on base, the commandermay or may not place a high priority on thecritical issue of defeating the MANPADSthreat. The component with the most stringentsecurity requirements should serve asbase commander.Tactical Command and ControlProsecuting ground-combat operations inthe BSZ will require a robust tactical C2 infrastructurerun by the base-defense operationscenter (BDOC) (fig. 4). The C2 architecture
- Page 2 and 3: Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
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NOTAM 95The document’s authors ha
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QUICK-LOOK 109CAS missions. The pub
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Clausewitz and the Falkland Islands
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BOOK REVIEWS 121whose contributions
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BOOK REVIEWS 123Franco: Soldier, Co
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CONTRIBUTORS 127Col Howard D. “Da
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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARDGen John A.