Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

118 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006Moral ForcesBetween 1 and 20 May, the war had twomain actors—the FAS and Task Force 317,each of which inflicted serious damage on theother. John F. Lehman, US secretary of theNavy, asserted in his report to Congress on 3February 1983 that “in spite of the heroic effortsby the Sea Harrier pilots, the Britishnever got anything close to air superiority overthe Falkland Islands.” 32 Argentinian aviationcontinued reaching its targets.At that time of the year, the British enjoyedan advantage caused by the weather and shortdaylight hours. Airplanes could not even takeoff on 17 of the war’s 44 days because of adverseweather conditions and the availabilityof only nine hours of daylight. But the factorthat favored the British fleet most was thelarge number of Argentinian bombs that hittheir targets without exploding, perhaps becausethe low altitude and rapid delivery preventedthe fuses from functioning properly. 33Had the bombs detonated, the British fleetwould have perhaps met a different fate.On 21 May, the British took advantage ofbad weather conditions to start OperationSutton by landing 5,000 men at San CarlosBay. This time the changing weather did notwork to their advantage since conditions improvedquickly, facilitating attacks by Argentinianaviation and creating what the Britishcalled Bomb Alley. Attacks came from the continentand the islands, but British troops stillsecured a beachhead in San Carlos and its vicinityby 27 May. From this moment on, theconflict favored the British, but the FAS continuedattacking the fleet (e.g., the risky missionagainst the Invincible).As the British forces gained ground, Argentinianaviation focused on supporting its ownsurface forces with the goal of preventing theBritish from advancing and landing moretroops—for example, the sinking of a Britishlogistical landing ship and a landing boat, thedisabling of a landing ship, and the damagingof a frigate, all at Bahia Agradable. Argentinianaircraft also launched day and night attacksagainst command posts. The FAS operateduntil the war ended, and despite theconclusion of its basic mission and the imminenceof British victory, it sought to bolsterthe morale of ground forces resisting the finalBritish attack. On 13 June, one day before theArgentinian surrender, a C-130 landed in PortStanley to unload a 155 mm gun that wasnever used.The Argentinians’ inability to obtain timelyinformation, due to the deficient work of theintelligence-and-information center, preventedawareness of the real British situation whenthe FAS was executing its last mission. AdmiralWoodward described conditions aboard theaircraft carrier Hermes, 300 miles east of theislands on 13 June: “We are already at the limitof our possibilities, with only three warshipsfree of major operating problems (Hermes,Yarmouth, and Exeter). From the force of destroyersand frigates, forty five percent havebeen reduced to zero operating capacity.” 34The Argentinian air component had lost a totalof 74 airplanes, 33 of them in combat missions,in addition to 41 crew members whosacrificed their lives pursuing their country’sobjectives. Unfortunately for Argentina, theseindividuals did not have the correct situationalinformation (at the correct time) they neededto defeat one of the world’s most powerfuland technologically advanced fleets.ConclusionConsequently, it would be an obvious fallacyto imagine war between civilized peoples as resultingmerely from a rational act on the partof their governments and to conceive of war asgradually ridding itself of passion.—Carl von ClausewitzAs the Argentinian army’s chairman andchief of staff, General Galtieri was mainly responsiblefor the conflict but did not understandmodern joint military operations. Hedelayed air force involvement, thinking thata large, poorly armed ground force coulddefend itself. Vice Admiral Lombardo faredlittle better when he attempted to use airplanescapable of only limited combat to defendthe islands against the versatile Harriers