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Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

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68 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>capability. However, it does ensure that theOAT will have access to the lower-level inputsrequired for performing assessments. Identifyingcritical information ahead of time reducesthe data-mining load and streamlinesthe data-reporting process by limiting the requestto only that information needed to completethe assessments.Determining the impact of air operationson achieving the desired operational-level effectrepresents a third challenge of assessmentfrom a supporting role. When the air componentis not responsible for achieving the effect,the OAT may not have insight into the actualresults of air operations. AFOTTP 2-3.2 encouragesthe establishment of cross-componentrelationships to enhance component-level assessments.3 But when the air component assumesa supporting role, these relationshipsbecome essential. It is especially critical thatthe air component ensure reliable insight intothe effects it provides by establishing feedbackmechanisms.The nature of the global war on terrorismclouds this murky issue even further. From theair component’s perspective alone, the emergenceof multirole aircraft and other capabilitieshas complicated the assessment process.In current conflicts, for example, US aircraftdeliver nonkinetic support, such as nontraditionalISR and “presence.” Unlike an assessmentof kinetic operations, whereby the aircomponent can close the loop through BDAwithout input from the supported component,the air component alone cannot evaluate theultimate effect of nonkinetic operations. Onemust document, report, and track the linkagebetween air support and end effect acrosscomponents. Furthermore, the air componentneeds to develop enduring internal processesto evaluate nonkinetic effects at thesame level of detail it does for kinetic effects.The air component must document when,where, and with whom its aircraft are working,as well as the effect desired by the supportedcommander; further, it must record this informationin a central location and enter the outcomeof each sortie, based on feedback fromthe supported component. Although missionreports currently describe each sortie, onegenerally finds them filed in a folder ratherthan catalogued in a meaningful, user-friendlyway that allows analysts to extract key informationabout the effects provided by airpower.When airpower acts in a supporting role,effects-based analysis can succeed only whenthe air component receives feedback from thesupported component on the last portion ofthe effects chain.In summary, the use of airpower in theglobal war on terrorism is driving changes inthe way we assess our progress toward realizingoperational objectives. Split assessmentprovides the JFACC information about his orher performance in the context of the overalljoint effect, and the use of AIRs lightens thetactical-assessment load on a pared-down OAT.Finally, one must establish a close working relationshipwith the supported component’sassessment team in order to accurately capturethe effects produced by airpower. Use ofall three techniques allows the OAT to providethe JFACC an assessment tailored to the currentconflict, enables the development ofstrategy, and supports decision making on theuse of limited resources.Opportunities for continued improvementin the assessment process remain plentiful.We must acquire a clearer understanding ofhow airpower truly contributes to counterinsurgencyoperations in today’s conflicts. Wemust learn how to perform tactical assessmentsfor nonkinetic effects and do so with alean, forward-deployed force. Lastly, we needto master the coordination of reporting andassessment across components. Progress inthese areas will assure our continued dominancein warfare, even as the shape of thebattlefield changes beneath us. qNotes1. Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control for Joint<strong>Air</strong> Operations, 5 June 2003, III-26, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_30.pdf.2. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Operational Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures (AFOTTP) 2-3.2, <strong>Air</strong> and <strong>Space</strong> Operations Center,13 December 2004, sec. 3.5.3. Ibid.

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