Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 59and Air Force JTACs within the city. 7 Outsidethat 15-mile circle, the ASOC controlled anair umbrella that responded to 81 TIC situationsthroughout the two weeks of intense operations,dropping bombs and conductingshows of force from Al Qaim in the westernMarine sector to Baqubah to Mosul.Significantly, the plan was not a lowestcommon-denominatorcompromise; rather, itcombined the best aspects of two differing approachesto joint fires. The DASC and theMARDIV’s operations officer for air controlledall aircraft that entered Fallujah but gave theASOC unfettered access to all its network serversand chat rooms, providing liaison officersaround-the-clock and allowing ASOC officersand technicians to move air assets in anticipationof MARDIV requirements. That exemplarymultiservice cooperation ensured effectiveapplication of lethal airpower and pointedthe way to another innovative joint success.Election SupportAs the battle for Fallujah wound down, theMarine expeditionary force focused on conductingcivil-military operations and rebuildinga devastated city; the 1st Cavalry Division’sBlack Jack Brigade conducted follow-on operationsin the villages surrounding Fallujah.Almost simultaneously, MNC-I shifted its planningfocus to support of the IndependentElectoral Commission of Iraq and electionpreparations. As the corps and its major subordinatecommands concentrated on securityof election materials and middle- and outerringprotection of election sites (the Iraqishandled all inner-ring security), all the whileresponding to a surge of enemy activity in andaround Mosul, air strategists at the CAOCoffered an innovative approach based ontheir experience with Combined/Joint TaskForce 76’s joint-fires element in Afghanistan:air presence.According to Capt Joseph A. Katz, USA, thetask force and CAOC planners had three goalsin mind: to “provide security to CoalitionForces . . . instill a sense of instability and insecurityin anti-coalition militia attempting todisrupt election safety and participation; andprovide a sense of security and support tolocal nationals as they prepared to participatein their first-ever democratic voting experience.”8 Shortly after the successful Afghanelections, a CAOC team led by Maj IoannisKoskinas, USAF, attempted to gather morethan the existing anecdotal evidence, hopingto determine the effectiveness of air presenceand support development of an air-presenceplan for Iraq in January. The team ran intoskepticism, however, both from the ASOGcommander, who asked for more data beforebuying into the concept, and from a few MultinationalForce-Iraq and unified-commandlevelbattle-staff officers who accused theCAOC team via e-mail of trying to create amission for the air component.As it turned out, the only soldier whose votecounted was already two or three steps aheadof the air-component planners. When advisedby skeptical analysts to keep aircraft out ofsight and out of mind during elections, GeneralMetz aggressively stopped the briefingand exclaimed, “Absolutely not. I want themlow—I want them loud—I want them everywhere!I don’t completely understand it, butthis population responds to airpower, bothfixed- and rotary-wing . . . so get the air outthere.” 9 Thereafter, the CAOC/JFEC/ASOCteam wasted no time merging such clear topdownguidance with the bottom-up situationalawareness resident at brigade- and divisionlevelfire support elements (FSE) and TACPs.The major subordinate commands designatedvillages, drew air-presence routes, and directedoverflight altitudes based on maneuvercommanders’ desire to deter or reassure, dependingon the local situation. The CAOC positionedtanker assets to support those routesand surged air presence in the week leadingup to the successful election.As with the Afghan case, little data exists toprove or disprove the effects of air presence.Most evidence is anecdotal, as was the reportfrom the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division’stactical operations center in Baqubah: “Tellthe guys in [the joint operations center] thatfrom the 3 BCT grunts’ perspective, air presenceworks. Our Iraqi Army counterparts re-