70 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>systems. Still, the nascent technology allowedonly moderately reduced signatures via shapeblending and the use of radar-absorbent materials.Early low observable (LO) drones andaircraft such as the A-12 (and later the SR-71)still needed to rely on speed, overflight, andelectronic countermeasures to ensure survivability.Later, ground-breaking research byGerman and Soviet physicists Arnold Sommerfeldand Pyotr Ufimtsev, respectively, greatlyadvanced the science by enhancing the understandingof radar’s reaction to simple shapes.However, American practicality embodied inBill Schroeder’s finite, two-dimensionally surfacedaircraft models and Denys Overholser’scomputer simulations was required to allowLockheed to design the first aircraft completelyreliant on stealth. 1 By early 1983, theworld’s first modern LO aircraft—the F-117ANighthawk—was ready for war. 2Since then, LO technology has shown itsworth a number of times. Although importantto the air campaign in Operation Iraqi Freedom,it proved decisive in theaters with robustIntegrated <strong>Air</strong> Defense Systems (IADS), asdemonstrated in Operations Desert Storm andAllied <strong>Force</strong>. However, the battlefield continuesto become more dangerous with the steadyproliferation of highly lethal surface-to-airmissile (SAM) systems and the linking ofhighly capable radar systems via expansive, oftenautomated, communication systems to ensurethe sharing of target information acrossthe shooter network. Of particular concernare China and Iran, potential adversaries interestedin aggressively upgrading their defensivesystems.Recognizing these emerging threats andthe inherent merit of LO technology, the <strong>Air</strong><strong>Force</strong> made a significant investment in the B-2Spirit bomber. When the Spirit became operationalin 1997, it joined a tiny pool of limitedproductionstrike assets dedicated to penetratingan IADS rather than beating it back. Today,the bulk of the LO force consists of about 50F-117As and 21 B-2s, buttressed by an emergingF-22 fleet. Program Budget Decision (PBD)720, however, demands the retirement of 10Nighthawks in fiscal year (FY) 2007 and theremainder of them in FY 2008. 3 If PBD 720becomes law, the majority of the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’sLO strike force would exit the field, leavingonly a small group of aircraft for missions requiringsurprise through stealth. Cutting 50 ofthe country’s dedicated LO strike assets whileit faces potentially hostile, well-armed nationsis risky—and may have profound effects. Ifconfronted with a mature and aggressiveIADS, the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> may discover that it hascompromised combat capability by allowing astealth gap to develop. Potentially, the UnitedStates may find itself unable to enforce its willin areas of vital interest.Even though the service has embraced LOtechnology and plans to field a host of followonstealthy combat aircraft, nearly a decadewill pass before they can replace the venerable,proven Nighthawk. Even when this new generationof aircraft reaches the front lines,many of their capabilities won’t match thosecurrently resident in the F-117. Furthermore,the Nighthawk’s unique capabilities can helpenable the Global Strike Task <strong>Force</strong> (GSTF)concept. This article contends that a stealthgap exists and that the F-117 could fill it. Italso demonstrates how minimal fiscal outlayson F-117 upgrades could not only help addressthis problem but also support the goal ofimplementing the GSTF concept.Current and Future CapabilitiesLike chaff, electronic countermeasures,improved maneuverability, or expansive flightenvelopes, stealth technology is just anothertool that allows an aircraft to survive its approachto and egress from a target. Othermethods achieve the same outcome, but allbenefit from stealth. Rather than treatingstealth as a strap-on package, one must give itconsideration during every step of aircraft development.By all accounts, the F-15E is a superbaircraft, but no modification can make itstealthy; rather, one needs an entirely new design.This fact has spawned the next generationof LO aircraft and weapons, including the F-22,F-35, and AGM-158 Joint <strong>Air</strong>-to-Surface StandoffMissile (JASSM) to complement our tinyarsenal of B-2s and F-117s.
FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 71Each of these systems has strengths as wellas weaknesses that affect its ability to close thelooming stealth gap. The F-22 is optimized forair-to-air combat but will have the ability toemploy the GBU-32 (a 1,000-pound Joint DirectAttack Munition [ JDAM]) and GBU-39small-diameter bomb (SDB). 4 Classified as anear-precision weapon, the JDAM can achievea circular error probable (CEP) slightly in excessof two meters (disregarding target locationerror [TLE], a factor associated with theuncertainty of actual target location). 5 Becauseof the JDAM’s predominantly “launchand leave” employment, without coordinaterefinement before release, the TLE (which canexceed seven meters) is large enough to excludeit as a true precision weapon. 6 In fact, allweapons aided by the global positioning system(GPS) (including the SDB) and droppedfrom a platform without some method of correctionfor TLE have the same problem. Theinitial version of the SDB, with its 12-channelGPS guidance package combined with theGPS Accuracy Improvement Initiative and improvedTLE, can attain a CEP of only five toeight meters. 7 This level of accuracy rendersthe SDB (with a warhead containing just 50pounds of explosive) suitable for only a limitedtarget set. At some time, the F-22 may overcomethis limitation with high-resolution syntheticaperture radar (SAR) mapping that will allowprerelease coordinate refinement—or with alater version of the SDB projected to incorporatea terminal seeker and target-recognitionsoftware. Until then, the F-22 remains incapableof delivering precision weapons.Nor will the F-22 be able to destroy manyhardened or buried targets. The GBU-32 uses a1,000-pound Mk-83 general-purpose warhead—not a dedicated, case-hardened penetratorsuch as the BLU-110. Furthermore, althoughthe SDB reportedly has good penetration capability,its ability to destroy anything otherthan small or soft targets with its diminutivewarhead is suspect.Perhaps the F-22’s greatest disadvantage isthat it won’t be available in large numbers forsome time. Although the aircraft officially becameoperational in December 2005, the paucityof assets ensures its primary use in theair-to-air mission, with only a modest bombdroppingrole during conflicts in the near future.8 Annual production numbers vary fromsource to source—and from budget decisionto budget decision—but will likely stay in theneighborhood of 36 aircraft per year. Thepresident’s budget submission for FY 2005 allowedfor an end state of 276 aircraft; however,an internal Department of Defense PBD of2004 recommends an end state of 183, andPBD 720 suggests the same number. 9 In theend, the roughly 180 aircraft that we could possiblyprocure by 2010 will add only modestly tothe United States’ stealthy strike capability.The most substantial addition to this capabilitymight well come from the F-35, which,unlike the F-22, can drop a variety of GPSaidedweapons as well as laser-guided bombsand comes equipped with an electro-opticaltargeting system. 10 This system will allow guidanceof these bombs for true precision-deliverycapability. <strong>Air</strong>craft can attack hardened targetswith either the GBU-31 equipped withthe BLU-109 penetrator-bomb body or thevenerable GBU-10 similarly equipped. Like theF-22, however, the F-35 will not be available fora number of years. The first flight of the productionmodel is slated for late <strong>2006</strong> with aninitial operational date of 2013. 11 But in lightof recent acquisition-program delays withsimilar manned systems, this date seems optimistic.More than likely, the F-35 will not jointhe existing stealth strike force in large numbersfor another decade—possibly even later.The AGM-158 JASSM—an autonomous,stealthy, and precise air-launched strike assetavailable today—could help legacy aircraftbridge the stealth gap. The system’s GPS-aidedinertial navigation is augmented by a terminalinfrared seeker that reportedly can drive a TLEinclusiveCEP to the three-meter level, thus attainingtrue precision. Absence of the terminalseeker reduces accuracy to about 13 meters. 12The weapon can purportedly deliver its 1,000-pound-class unitary warhead—with penetrationcapabilities close to those of the BLU-109—approximately 200 nautical miles (nm). 13Already operational on the B-52 and B-2—and soon to be operational on the B-1, F-16,and F/A-18E/F—the JASSM will help shrink
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Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
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PIREPsJoint Airspace Management and
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APJInterdependenceKey to Our Common
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APJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CHI
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ASPJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CH
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True to form, the Air Force has res
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Red Flag Still Matters—After AllT
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Integration of Space-BasedCombat Sy
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BOOK REVIEWS 121whose contributions
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BOOK REVIEWS 123Franco: Soldier, Co
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APJAir and Space Power Journal, the
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CONTRIBUTORS 127Col Howard D. “Da
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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARDGen John A.