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Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

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60 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>ally like the fighters overhead.” 10 Even withoutthe data, however, the election-support planrepresents a near-perfect blend of multicomponent,operational-level planning withboots-on-the-ground, tactical-level understanding.From battalion to corps to CAOC tocarrier air wing, the joint team came togetherto innovate and set conditions for success on30 January.ScorecardClearly, the integration of MNC-I’s JFECwith the ASOC and corps TACP represents ahuge step forward in the joint application oflethal and nonlethal effects—as does the effectiveworking relationship between MNC-I’sheadquarters and the CAOC. (Although not asubject of this article, the battlefield coordinationdetachment at Al Udeid played a criticalrole, with its commander, Col James Waring,USA, and his key staff representing their parentcomponent as effectively in Qatar as didtheir <strong>Air</strong>man counterparts in Baghdad.) Similarly,the MARDIV/corps/air-component relationship,evidenced in the DASC/ASOCtransparency and teamwork, demonstratedhow effectively our separate service doctrinescan be mined for common ground. Finally,the teamwork of lower-level TACPs and FSEsacross the country replicated the higher-levelrelationships; by election time, air support operationssquadrons had become as totally integratedat brigade and division level as had theparent group with the corps. The ASOG commandertraveled extensively during his tour,visiting Battlefield <strong>Air</strong>men at 21 forwardoperating bases and paying courtesy calls onbattalion and brigade commanders and staffs.Everywhere, commanders and operations officerstold the same story: “I grew up nottrusting CAS because at National TrainingCenter exercises and Warfighters [corps- anddivision-level readiness inspections] it was toohard to coordinate and never where or when Ineeded it. But here, every time I asked theJTAC to get air—every time—you guys answeredthe call.”These great leaps forward did not occurwithout stumbles, however. Joint teamwork atlower levels sometimes took a while to developbecause of the poor integration of CAS intotraining and exercises. As Col Michael Formica,USA, commander of Black Jack Brigade, explained,“In my first few months in country, Irarely put air into my plan—this was becausewe did not understand how it could assist us ina counter insurgency fight—then I saw the incredibleresults in <strong>Fall</strong>ujah and in our followonoperations. After that, in our North Babiloperations and election prep, I never leftwithout my JTAC and always requested air tosupport our operations.” 11 To use a baseballanalogy coined by Col Arden Dahl, formercommander of the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s joint air-groundoperations group, Colonel Formica and hispeers used CAS like a relief pitcher but laterrealized they needed CAS in the startinglineup. Future exercise designers must capturethat lesson and ensure that soldiers and airmentogether understand the processes to integrateair effectively from the opening pitch.Those battalion- and brigade-level seamsbecame especially evident inside the close urbanenvironment in <strong>Fall</strong>ujah. The key playersat the 1st MARDIV, MNC-I, and ASOG workedfor weeks to solve the top-level DASC/ASOCproblem, but they failed to identify doctrinaldisconnects between Marine regimental andbattalion air officers and their <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>counterparts, waiting until late in the game toassemble the 29-man <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> team that accompaniedthe heavy Army units into the city.As a result, some members of the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>team did not arrive in <strong>Fall</strong>ujah until after theMARDIV’s air-coordination meeting. Moreimportantly, not understanding the MarineCorps’ reliance on its battalion air officer, theASOG commander allowed one <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> elementto employ without an enlisted battalionair liaison officer (EBALO). In interviews, Marinepilots indicated that they missed the oversightand situational awareness a qualifiedEBALO would have provided during check-inbriefs. Perhaps a few interservice scrimmagegames would have created sufficient familiarityto avoid those misplays; in the future, weshould demand that we practice together.

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