72 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>the stealth gap. However, it too has limitations.For a standoff weapon, it enjoys exceptionalrange, though still inadequate to reach targetsdeep within an enemy IADS. The threat systemsresident in the IADS will dictate the releaselocation of the weapons. One can easilyimagine a theater where legacy aircraft haveto deliver ordnance 50–100 nm from the edgeof the IADS, which will limit the weapons totargets within the barrier SAM ring or just beyond.Additionally, the JASSM currently carriesonly a penetrator warhead—not a suitablechoice for all targets. The AGM-158’s limitedrange and inability to produce desired effectsagainst all targets keep it from providing a finalremedy to the stealth gap.The B-2, on the other hand, goes a longway toward doing so. The aircraft certainly hasthe range and LO features to strike nearly anywhere.Its SAR provides excellent range andrange-rate information that, when combinedwith GPS position and velocity data, can reduceTLE. One could then send this informationto weapons such as the GBU-36 and GBU-37 GPS-aided munitions to destroy a variety oftargets. A near-precision weapon consisting ofa guidance tail kit mounted to an Mk-84 bombbody, the GBU-36 will likely be replaced by thestandard GBU-31 JDAM. The GBU-37 has asimilar tail kit but mounts to the 4,500-poundBLU-113 penetrator, giving the B-2 a deeppenetrationcapability to complement itsmore-conventional weaponry. Although neitherweapon is precise, the B-2’s ability to minimizeTLE allows these munitions to approachtrue precision. 14Unfortunately, the limited number of B-2sand their periodic nonavailability due toscheduled and nonscheduled maintenanceadversely affect the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s ability to usethem to destroy large numbers of targetsquickly and decisively. Indeed, only 16 of thesebombers are combat coded, and those aircrafthave a mission-capable rate of just 30.5 percent.15 Often, however, an aircraft in need ofminor repair may still prove suitable for combat—butnot against a robust IADS, whichwould require fully combat-capable aircraft.The remainder of the current LO strikeforce consists of the 50 F-117s, which, likeother aircraft, have strengths and weaknesses.This single-seat attack aircraft has less rangethan a true bomber but more than most tacticalfighters, enabling it to perform deep-strikemissions. Based on this author’s observations,mission-capable rates compare favorably tothose of other fighters (around 80 percent),ensuring the availability of a suitable force. Aninfrared targeting system with a laser designatordrives TLE to zero. The F-117’s two bombbays have internal storage for a variety ofweapons, including Paveway II and III laserguidedbombs, unguided cluster-bomb units,and the inertially guided and GPS-aided enhancedGBU-27, which can also guide to a laserspot. JDAM capability will be incorporatedby the end of the year; however, funds forthe integration of wind-corrected munitionsdispenserintegration have already been absorbedby PBD 720. This flexibility in weaponryallows the jet to attack a host of targets:buildings, bridges, and area targets, as well asdeeply buried, hardened targets. In fact, itsability to destroy hardened targets is unparalleled.By using two GBU-27 Paveway III precisionweapons in an optimized delivery, the systemcan penetrate deeper than even the B-2’snear-precision GBU-37. 16 Additionally, the enhancedGBU-27 (which doesn’t require laserguidance) gives the Nighthawk an all-weather,deep-penetration, hard-target defeat capability.USAF photoAs an added benefit, all these weapons canbe brought to bear with minimal or no helpfrom the GPS. Although this system has provenitself reliable and extraordinarily valuable to
FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 73the US war machine, which has incorporatedit into every new weapon, overreliance on anystrength can create both a weakness and anopportunity for an adversary. Plans for GPSjammers clog the Internet, for example, andat least one Russian firm (Aviaconversia) currentlymarkets a portable GPS jammer of unknowneffectiveness. But more credible andserious threats to the GPS may exist: “Nationsor groups hostile to the U.S. possess or canacquire the means to disrupt or destroy U.S.space systems by attacking the satellites inspace, their communication nodes on theground and in space, or ground nodes thatcommand the satellites.” 17 Even a partially disabledGPS would degrade or conceivably nullifyall B-2 and F-22 munitions. The F-117,though, would still find and destroy its targets—whetherburied and hardened or tinyand hidden—and do so with just the rightweapon for the desired effect.The aircraft’s maturity offers yet anotheradvantage. Having flown over 1,600 combatmissions since 1989, the F-117 has demonstratedits effectiveness, lethality, and survivability.Its tactics are established, and its capabilitieswell understood. The aircraft stands byto fill a critical role for the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, forming(along with the B-2) a thin line that comprisesour nation’s LO strike capability. This forcewill fill the gap until such time that otherdedicated, stealthy strike platforms becomeavailable and mature enough to face a sophisticatedIADS.Any member of a supposedly antiquatedweapon-system community knows about thescarcity of resources and plans for sustainmentas well as the acquisition of new capabilities.Although funds for sustaining the F-117haven’t dried up (several airframe improvementsare under way, assuring integrity for theforeseeable future), plans and money for newweapons and capabilities are rapidly fading.This situation points to the crux of the problem:eliminating the F-117 and depriving it ofupgrades will deny us the robust LO strikeforce we need to overcome today’s and tomorrow’sstealth gap. The Nighthawk’s uniqueand worthwhile advantages have enabled it todevastate our enemies. The fact that we havenot replicated these capabilities in the newLO generation of aircraft guarantees not onlya stealth gap but also a strike-capabilitiesgap—not an appealing prospect for the future.Global Strike Task <strong>Force</strong>In 2001 Gen John Jumper, then the <strong>Air</strong><strong>Force</strong> chief of staff, outlined the GSTF conceptand his vision of the service’s kick-downthe-doorforce, making the point that “theconcept hinges on precision weapons andstealth capabilities inherent in the B-2 andF-22.” General Jumper identified the key technologiesthat will enable successful GSTF operations:precision, all-weather weapons, stealth,and supercruise. In his concept, “B-2s, enabledby F-22s and in conjunction with standoffplatforms such as the B-52, will target theenemy’s antiaccess weapons, launch sites, and[command and control] . . . just as we havedone with air defense networks in recent conflicts.”The F-22s will complement the B-2s’moonless-night operations by using stealthand supersonic cruise to shrink the enemy’sthreat rings and deliver air-to-ground weaponsday or night. 18Technically speaking, neither the B-2 nor theF-22 can currently deliver precision weapons.Granted, the B-2’s SAR mapping capability andexcellent munitions make it more than capableof performing its role, but the F-22 will remainunable to deliver precision weapons unless wefund, develop, and field an SDB versionequipped with a terminal seeker. Even then,the aircraft’s diminutive warhead will restrictits ability to destroy all but a subset of existingtargets. In the meantime, the F-22 can engageonly a narrow array of targets compatible withthe GBU-39 and the GBU-32, thus essentiallyeliminating any target requiring penetrationand substantial blast, buried and hardenedtargets, and area targets. The tiny B-2 fleet willhave to handle anything else.Consider, for a moment, the F-117 in thisrole. Having explored daytime operations, theNighthawk has already completed a host of testsinvolving new tactics and a daytime-compatiblepaint scheme. 19 The aircraft cannot super-
- Page 2 and 3:
Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
- Page 4 and 5:
PIREPsJoint Airspace Management and
- Page 6 and 7:
APJInterdependenceKey to Our Common
- Page 8 and 9:
6 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 20
- Page 10 and 11:
APJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CHI
- Page 12 and 13:
10 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2
- Page 14 and 15:
ASPJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CH
- Page 16 and 17:
True to form, the Air Force has res
- Page 18 and 19:
Red Flag Still Matters—After AllT
- Page 20 and 21:
Integration of Space-BasedCombat Sy
- Page 22 and 23:
est alternative. In other cases, un
- Page 25 and 26: power projection, but advances in a
- Page 27 and 28: 3. Report of the Commission to Asse
- Page 29 and 30: PIREP 27ized, programmed, funded, a
- Page 31 and 32: PIREP 29creation of ACMs. One antic
- Page 33 and 34: PIREP 31Link 16 and Joint Airspace
- Page 35 and 36: PIREP 33Missile Defense Systems, th
- Page 37 and 38: CADRE’s Professional EducationOpp
- Page 39 and 40: ASPJQuick-LookThe Air Force Needs N
- Page 41 and 42: QUICK-LOOK 39system should become a
- Page 43 and 44: APJThe Air Force’s New Ground War
- Page 45 and 46: THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 43
- Page 47 and 48: THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 45
- Page 49 and 50: THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 47
- Page 51 and 52: THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 49
- Page 53 and 54: THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 51
- Page 55 and 56: New USAF Doctrine PublicationAir Fo
- Page 57 and 58: Counterinsurgency AirpowerAir-Groun
- Page 59 and 60: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 57ticula
- Page 61 and 62: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 59and Ai
- Page 63 and 64: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 61The af
- Page 65 and 66: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 63squadr
- Page 67 and 68: ASPJQuick-LookA New Operational Ass
- Page 69 and 70: QUICK-LOOK 67den on the OAT. First,
- Page 71 and 72: Filling the Stealth Gap and Enhanci
- Page 73: FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 71Each of t
- Page 77 and 78: FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 75mit the F
- Page 79 and 80: Space PowerAn Ill-Suited SpaceStrat
- Page 81 and 82: SPACE POWER 79by using a more encom
- Page 83 and 84: SPACE POWER 81role of offensive and
- Page 85 and 86: SPACE POWER 83achieve supremacy in
- Page 87 and 88: Military TransformationEnds,Ways, a
- Page 89 and 90: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 87to organi
- Page 91 and 92: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 89course, w
- Page 93 and 94: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 91mind-set
- Page 95 and 96: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 93sponding
- Page 97 and 98: NOTAM 95The document’s authors ha
- Page 99 and 100: MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 101 and 102: MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 103 and 104: MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 105 and 106: MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 107 and 108: MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
- Page 109 and 110: ASPJQuick-LookThe Nature of Close A
- Page 111 and 112: QUICK-LOOK 109CAS missions. The pub
- Page 113 and 114: Clausewitz and the Falkland Islands
- Page 115 and 116: CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- Page 117 and 118: CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- Page 119 and 120: CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- Page 121 and 122: CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- Page 123 and 124: BOOK REVIEWS 121whose contributions
- Page 125 and 126:
BOOK REVIEWS 123Franco: Soldier, Co
- Page 127 and 128:
APJAir and Space Power Journal, the
- Page 129 and 130:
CONTRIBUTORS 127Col Howard D. “Da
- Page 131:
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARDGen John A.