Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

SPACE POWER 83achieve supremacy in a medium of warfare,after the country has done so, its usefulness tothe strategic planner or policy maker becomesminimal. The US Navy long ago abandonedsea power as a stand-alone framework formaritime strategy since Mahan’s sea powerstrategy focused too narrowly on offensivestrategy and the need to seek a decisive battle.Similarly, space power is an inappropriatestand-alone strategy for space.Furthermore, a maritime-inspired spacestrategy has highlighted ideas not present incurrent space power strategy, including theidea that systems which ensure one’s access toand use of celestial LOCs are the most criticalconcern of space strategy. Consequently, systemsthat protect and defend LOCs in spacehave priority over those that do not share thismission—including purely offensive weaponsystems that don’t protect and defend celestialLOCs. 39 A proper understanding of offensiveand defensive strategies reveals that one mayuse the latter to ensure access to celestialLOCs. Defensive strategies, therefore, thatharden space systems against electromagneticdamage, provide self-defense against offensive1. United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Forces CommandGlossary, http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm.One uses diplomatic, information, military, and economicareas of national power in effects-based operations.2. Gen Thomas D. White, chief of staff of the AirForce, “Air and Space Are Indivisible,” Air Force 4, no. 3(March 1958): 40–41.3. However, many critics have argued against combiningair and space strategies, noting that propulsive, aerodynamic,and orbital conditions make air and space quitedistinct environments. Maj M. V. Smith, Ten PropositionsRegarding Spacepower, Fairchild Paper (Maxwell AFB, AL:Air University Press, October 2002), 94–96.4. See Capt A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Powerupon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,1890).5. E. B. Potter et al., eds., Sea Power: A Naval History(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960), 19.6. George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: TheU.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford UniversityPress, 1994), 276. “The Air Force took over the most popularNavy positions—and turned them against the Navy” (ibid.).7. “Command of the air replaced command of the seaas the main determinant of national destiny.” Ibid.; andJohn B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Mariattack,or incorporate redundant system capabilitiesare all suitable methods of protectingcelestial LOCs while achieving a significantlevel of command in space. Sincedefensive strategy is just as important as offensivestrategy in any overall war plan, anyspace strategy that focuses too intently onthe application of force or the role of offensiveweapon systems is myopic.Today outer space supports the actions ofthe military services. To a significant extent,many soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmenare already intimately involved with employingspace-enabled technologies when theyexecute their missions. In effect, we now havespace warriors. Because of the inherent limitationsof a power-type space strategy, a maritimeinspiredstrategy can better enlighten thesewar fighters on the correct strategy for spacewarfare. Our war fighters demand and deservethe best strategies for considering future militaryoperations, and the best framework forspace strategy is based upon centuries of maritimeexperience. We would do well to acknowledgethat fact. qNotestime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper no. 19 (Newport,RI: Naval War College Press, 2004), 5.8. The failure of naval officers to understand and appreciatenaval history and maritime strategy has been welldocumented for over 100 years. J. K. Laughton, “The ScientificStudy of Naval History,” Journal of the Royal UnitedServices Institute 18 (1875): 508–9; and John B. Hattendorf,“The Uses of Maritime History in and for the Navy,” NavalWar College Review 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 13–38.9. The National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington,DC: [The White House,] September 2005), 1–2,http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/4844-nsms.pdf;Adm Mike Mullen, chief of naval operations, “CNO Guidancefor 2006: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era,”http://www.navy.mil/features/2006CNOG.pdf (accessed12 May 2006); Gen J. L. Jones, commandant of the MarineCorps, Marine Corps Strategy 21 (Washington, DC: Departmentof the Navy, Headquarters US Marine Corps, 3 November2000), 1, http://www.marines.mil/templateml.nsf/25241abbb036b230852569c4004eff0e/$FILE/strategy.pdf;and Hattendorf, “Uses of Maritime History,” 19.10. The environment of operations—including thestrategic positions within it—affects one’s strategy. WolfgangWegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War, trans.