Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

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48 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006adjacent to the zone to minimize risks to allforces. The BSZ’s GTO must also consider theeffects required to support the AOC’s air taskingorder. Although a playbook, the GTOmust remain flexible and easily modified duringexecution in response to urgent circumstancesor developing situations. Additionally,the future-operations cell identifies expectedshortfalls in defense-force capability and recommendsappropriate requests for forces orcapabilities for the base commander to forwardthrough the chain of command.A current-operations cell functions on behalfof the defense-force commander to monitorGTO execution and exercise C2 of allforces within the BSZ (the traditional S-3 roleof Air Force base-defense and Army units).This cell also maintains current situationalawareness of joint/coalition operations outsidethe base boundary but within the BSZ. Furthermore,it monitors the status of base-defenseforces operating outside the base boundaryunder the tactical control of adjacent-areacommanders for base-defense tasks.A fire-support coordination cell, anothercritical current-operations cell capability, plansand integrates indirect joint-fire missions suchas close air support or artillery in the BSZ. Althoughthis cell integrates these fires, it doesnot control them; instead, it facilitates themwithin established joint procedures. Successfulair-base defense in the dynamic threat environmentof an expeditionary air base in oneof Dr. Barnett’s “non-integrating gap” countriesrequires robust C4ISR. Fielding a transformedBDOC will prove critical in this effort.Force-Protection IntelligenceDesert Safeside and other Iraqi Freedom /Enduring Freedom experiences showed thatseizing the initiative in a hostile BSZ requiresaggressive ground-combat operations. A newmission area called force protection intelligence(FPI), a key enabler for the active defenseforces, began as a force-protection initiativeby CENTAF to support base defense.The Headquarters Air Force FPI WorkingGroup—run jointly by Headquarters Air ForceIntelligence, the Air Force Office of SpecialInvestigations (AFOSI), and Headquarters AirForce Security Forces—merged existing definitionsof intelligence and force protection todefine FPI as analyzed or vetted all-source informationthat drives effective force-protectiondecisions and operations. It simply means thatthe Air Force needs to apply the full spectrumof intelligence capabilities to commanderswho must make effective decisions in theforce-protection mission area. 13Continuous application of the entire intelligencecycle is critical to anticipating enemytactics and/or developing target-intelligencepackages to neutralize threats. Base-defenseoperations require the prioritization, collection,analysis, fusion, and tailoring of threatinformation into products and services for disseminationin support of current and futuresecurity operations. This capability demandsadvanced training in analytical skills and revisedtactics, techniques, and procedures thatincorporate AFOSI and intelligence methodsand sources. FPI personnel must receive analyticaltraining when initially placed in an FPIposition, periodically refresh their skills in across-functional environment, and evaluatethem prior to deployment. This assessmentcapability must allow rapid and thoroughanalysis of all-source information at the lowestpossible level yet still provide reachback capabilitiesto theater and national sources. Intelligenceand AFOSI assessment capabilitiesmust be scalable to the defense situation andable to provide dedicated, full-time support tointegrated-defense missions if necessary. 14 Theassessment capability requires new organizationalstructures, additional communicationsequipment, and either additional personnelor inventive manpower solutions to fully integrateintelligence and AFOSI with securityforces in BSZ operations.Fighting the Air BaseJust as all sailors have a battle station towhich they report at designated times of elevatedthreat, so should Airmen have such astation and participate in base defense. Ac-
THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 49cordingly, a draft Air Force instruction hascodified a fight-the-air-base concept, outlininga process by which Airmen gradually step uptheir participation in base-defense activities asthreats increase. 15 Each escalating phase ofmanning battle stations—coded green, yellow,orange, and red—has associated conditions ofreadiness attached (fig. 5). Assigning all Airmento a battle station, training them in theappropriate duties, and exercising the planrepeatedly will dramatically expand the collectivepower of the base-defense force.GREENYELLOWORANGERED• Security forces provide full-timesecurity operations• All Airmen contribute as sensors• Security forces and select Airmenprovide full-time security operationsbased on the threat and theinstallation commander’s intent• Tactical warning issued to prepare forbattle stations• All Airmen contribute as sensors andensure readiness• Security forces and select Airmenprovide full-time security• All Airmen armed for self-defense• Battle stations prepared• Security forces serve as the installation’squick-reaction force• All Airmen take shelter, defend their battlestation, or are designated mission criticalby the installation commander’s decision• Forces quickly neutralize the enemy tocontinue the missionFigure 5. Proposed Air Force battle stations.(Adapted from Air Force Instruction 10-246, “InstallationArming and Response,” draft [four-digitcoordination package], 17 January 2006, 2.)Increasing the capability for base defenserequires including ground-combat tasks in thebasic skill sets of all Airmen. 16 For example,although Airmen currently receive instructionin firing a weapon, they do not learn how andwhen to employ that weapon; neither do theylearn combat skills common in the otherarmed forces. Identifying the requirement forthese skills in Iraqi Freedom / Enduring Freedom,CENTAF established the basis for expeditionarycombat training for all Airmen witha theaterwide program called Combat RightStart. Developed as a short-term solution tothe need for ground-combat skills, the programbecame a requirement (19 hours oftraining) for all Airmen in the CENTAF theaterbefore they deploy to a designated combatzone like Iraq. Although an Air Force ExpeditionaryAirmen Integrated Process Team isbuilding a road map to fulfill these requirementsover the long term, Airmen must sustainthese combat skills by undergoing periodicancillary training, and the fight-the-baseconcept outlined above must become part ofan installation’s defense plans. Lastly, theforce must regularly rehearse going to battlestations in order to assure proficiency whencalled into action.Posturing the ForceAlong with better doctrine, robust C4ISR,FPI, and ground-combat training for all Airmen,security operations in the BSZ will requiremore effective use of security-forces capabilitiesthan do traditional flight-line orperimeter-security missions. Whereas a notionalexpeditionary base in the current IraqiFreedom threat environment might call for200 to 300 security forces to protect its flightline and perimeter, that same base duringexecution of robust BSZ operations will needcloser to 1,200 such forces. In order to supportthis new responsibility, the Air Force’s securityforces are undergoing a complete transformationdesigned to shift tactical doctrine aswell as tactics, techniques, and procedures froma Cold War focus on an industrial-securitymodel to an expeditionary war-fighting focuson offensive and defensive operations in theBSZ. Rather than follow the historical practiceof training, equipping, and manning like apolice force with some combat skills, the transformedsecurity forces will train and organizeas a competent war-fighting capability insteadof an installation police force.The Cold War force structure of our currentsecurity forces (designed to support
Page 2 and 3: Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
Page 4 and 5: PIREPsJoint Airspace Management and
Page 6 and 7: APJInterdependenceKey to Our Common
Page 8 and 9: 6 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 20
Page 10 and 11: APJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CHI
Page 12 and 13: 10 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2
Page 14 and 15: ASPJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CH
Page 16 and 17: True to form, the Air Force has res
Page 18 and 19: Red Flag Still Matters—After AllT
Page 20 and 21: Integration of Space-BasedCombat Sy
Page 22 and 23: est alternative. In other cases, un
Page 25 and 26: power projection, but advances in a
Page 27 and 28: 3. Report of the Commission to Asse
Page 29 and 30: PIREP 27ized, programmed, funded, a
Page 31 and 32: PIREP 29creation of ACMs. One antic
Page 33 and 34: PIREP 31Link 16 and Joint Airspace
Page 35 and 36: PIREP 33Missile Defense Systems, th
Page 37 and 38: CADRE’s Professional EducationOpp
Page 39 and 40: ASPJQuick-LookThe Air Force Needs N
Page 41 and 42: QUICK-LOOK 39system should become a
Page 43 and 44: APJThe Air Force’s New Ground War
Page 45 and 46: THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 43
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Page 55 and 56: New USAF Doctrine PublicationAir Fo
Page 57 and 58: Counterinsurgency AirpowerAir-Groun
Page 59 and 60: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 57ticula
Page 61 and 62: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 59and Ai
Page 63 and 64: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 61The af
Page 65 and 66: COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 63squadr
Page 67 and 68: ASPJQuick-LookA New Operational Ass
Page 69 and 70: QUICK-LOOK 67den on the OAT. First,
Page 71 and 72: Filling the Stealth Gap and Enhanci
Page 73 and 74: FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 71Each of t
Page 75 and 76: FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 73the US wa
Page 77 and 78: FILLING THE STEALTH GAP 75mit the F
Page 79 and 80: Space PowerAn Ill-Suited SpaceStrat
Page 81 and 82: SPACE POWER 79by using a more encom
Page 83 and 84: SPACE POWER 81role of offensive and
Page 85 and 86: SPACE POWER 83achieve supremacy in
Page 87 and 88: Military TransformationEnds,Ways, a
Page 89 and 90: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 87to organi
Page 91 and 92: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 89course, w
Page 93 and 94: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 91mind-set
Page 95 and 96: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 93sponding
Page 97 and 98: NOTAM 95The document’s authors ha
Page 99 and 100: MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
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MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATION
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ASPJQuick-LookThe Nature of Close A
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QUICK-LOOK 109CAS missions. The pub
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Clausewitz and the Falkland Islands
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CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
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BOOK REVIEWS 121whose contributions
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BOOK REVIEWS 123Franco: Soldier, Co
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APJAir and Space Power Journal, the
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CONTRIBUTORS 127Col Howard D. “Da
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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARDGen John A.
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