Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

THE AIR FORCE’S NEW GROUND WAR 43rity police lacked adequate organization, training,or equipment to provide security defensein an insurgent environment, the survey revealedthat ground forces in South Vietnamwould not conduct static defense of air bases.The study concluded that we had no satisfactorysystem for coping with attacks from standoffweapons, recommending that the Air Forcecontinue seeking an early solution to thisproblem and emphasize testing the feasibilityof new terminal-defense proposals. 5 Standoffattacks against air bases since the beginning ofIraqi Freedom already exceed 1,500; althoughneither the operational impact nor humantoll has proven severe, new weapons technologyand improved enemy tactics and trainingpromise to increase their effect. Undoubtedly,because of the enemy’s willingness, determination,and adaptivity, his aim will improve.The proliferation of precision-guided mortarsand rockets gives enemy forces the potentialof 10-meter accuracy when attacking airbases. 6 Such accuracy would have devastatingeffects on large aircraft and unsheltered smallaircraft, not to mention increased casualtiescaused by strikes on living and working areas.Coupled with the “media” effect, this scenariowill severely degrade the effectiveness of airand space power. Readily available commercialsatelliteimagery and simple reconnaissanceby sympathetic workers employed on the airbase magnify the enemy’s capabilities evenmore. Successful standoff attacks could alsoresult in reluctance to base expeditionary airpowerclose to the fight, thus reducing the responsivenessand effectiveness of the air componentand risking an unintended shift backtoward a conventional supporting role for theAir Force.Seizing the InitiativeIn part, Air Force security forces have notadjusted to combat the standoff threat becauseduring the Cold War, the standoff-attackfootprint became an Army mission—codifiedin 1985 in Joint Security Agreement 8, whichspecified that the Army would provide exteriordefense for Air Force bases. 7 Althoughthis agreement gave the Army the “outside thewire” mission, several joint exercises as well asexperience in Operations Desert Shield andDesert Storm proved this tasking impractical;consequently, in 1992 joint doctrine formallytransferred this responsibility to base commanders.The formal abrogation of Joint SecurityAgreement 8 in 2005 meant that in futureconflicts, the Air Force would have todefend its air bases in accordance with jointdoctrine. 8Perimeter fences, barricades, and high-techsensor systems are critical components ofbase security, but regardless of their effectiveness,they all detect the enemy only after hehas begun an attack, or they help respond afterhe has already attacked a base. A base’sdefense forces, however, must seize the initiativefrom the enemy by getting inside hisplanning cycle and launching a preemptiveattack. Operation Desert Safeside / Task Force1041 at Balad Air Base, Iraq, demonstratedthe effectiveness of this approach. In responseto over 400 standoff attacks against Balad,Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF)launched this 60-day operation, with TaskForce 1041 capturing 17 high-value targets,over 100 other insurgents, and eight majorweapons caches, sustaining no casualties despiteheavy enemy engagement. Afterward,enemy attacks from the task force’s sector virtuallyceased. The architects of Desert Safesideknew that “there is only one way to stopa determined enemy from attacking a base;you have to kill or capture him and take hisweapons. This was true at Balad, and it will betrue at other bases; and the brave men andwomen of TF 1041 proved it!” 9Task Force 1041 demonstrated that the AirForce possessed the capabilities needed tosuccessfully dominate the base security zone(BSZ) and provide a secure operating environmentfrom which to launch, recover, and sustainairpower. This operation also dispelledthe perception that Army units are better organized,trained, and equipped than Air Forcesecurity forces to conduct such operations.Unlike previous Army units, the task forceachieved the desired effect.