Fall 2006 - Air & Space Power Chronicle - Air Force Link

66 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2006strategy. When the air component lends support,however, the JFACC is responsible neitherfor determining the overall desired effectnor for developing the overall strategy to meetit. In this case, effects-based assessment (EBA)may fail to identify shortfalls of the currentstrategy (since the air component—hence theOAT—may not have insight into the strategy).Furthermore, even if weaknesses in the strategybecome apparent, the JFACC has limited abilityto implement improvements since the supportedcomponent has that responsibility.These limitations reduce the utility of EBAwhen the air component provides support.On the other hand, if the OAT focuses onproviding support (support command X), it canconfine the assessment to tasks and objectivesunder the JFACC’s control, thus improvingthe ability to use assessment to shape strategy.Such an assessment, though, may go no furtherthan measuring whether or not the aircomponent gave the supported commanderwhat he or she asked for. This relies on thesupported commander to determine how bestto employ airpower and never addresses theoverall desired effect, much less the causallink between airpower actions and achievementof that effect.To reap the benefits of both approachesand mitigate the drawbacks, we have introduceda “split assessment.” For each objective,the OAT presents two assessments: one ofprogress toward the overall joint effect andone of airpower’s contribution toward that effect(see fig.). We use a modification of thestoplight chart. The color of the top half ofthe block represents a qualitative assessment(green, yellow, or red) of airpower’s contribution,and that of the bottom half indicates alike assessment of the overall joint effect.Figure. Split assessmentThe OAT assesses airpower’s contributionbased on the strategy-to-task structure. Largelydrawing on performance-based metrics, thisportion of the assessment in some cases includesa roll-up to the tactical, objective level. However,since the JFACC does not have ultimate responsibilityfor reaching the operational objective,the top half of the block usually doesn’t reflectthe level of attaining the overall objective. Insteadit indicates the air component’s contributionto the overall joint effect. The top half dealswith actions and effects under the JFACC’s control,lends itself to shaping air strategy, and supportsthe JFACC’s decision making on the bestuse of limited resources.Since the supported commander must producethe overall joint effect, the assessment ofprogress toward that objective falls under hisor her control as well. The OAT does not performthe assessment that determines the colorin the bottom half of the block; the supportedcommand performs that function. It existsprimarily to benefit the JFACC’s situationalawareness and to provide context for the tophalf of the block. Assessment of the joint effect,by itself, should not dictate changes tostrategy. Although we discuss the split assessmenthere in the context of the JFACC’s actingas a supported commander, one could applythe same technique more broadly to assessother enabling functions, such as intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); spaceoperations; and information operations.Split assessment measures the support ofthe commander and the attainment of specificeffects, but some difficulties remain whenthe air component assumes a supporting role.Specifically, this situation usually produces alower operations tempo than one would findin a major air war, which results in a smallerair operations center with relatively fewer personnel.This, in turn, leads to a smaller OAT,reduced in-house tactical-assessment capabilities,and fewer attached personnel. DoctrinalOA guidance assumes that a robust in-housetactical-assessment capability exists. The variousproducts of such an assessment, including mission assessment, BDA, and MEA, not only serve as stand-alone analyses to inform the commander, but also form the tactical-levelfoundation on which the OAT relies to deter-mine performance at the operational level. Re-duction of this function places a heavier bur-