86 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>IN MY OFFICE, I have a unique toy calleda “transformer.” It looks like a simple carwith working wheels and what appear tobe chrome headlights. But wait! When Itake it apart and transform it into a great warrior,the toy acquires a totally different purpose,appearance, and way of performing itsduties even though its material makeup doesnot change.In the military, one finds confusion aboutwhat transformation really means. The Departmentof Defense’s (DOD) Office of <strong>Force</strong>Transformation (OFT) asserts that transformationin the department “addresses threemajor areas—how we do business inside theDepartment, how we work with interagencyand multinational partners, and how wefight.” 1 Many of the initiatives at the OFT involveequipment and technologies in supportof transformation, including the Navy’s LittoralCombat Ship, operationally responsive satellites,airships, and directed-energy weapons.The late Vice Adm Arthur Cebrowski suggestedthat “one of the great rules for transformationis if you want to transform go wherethe money is and on arrival, change the rules.” 2As a result, billions of dollars have been reprogrammedin military programs. According toSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “a greatdeal of programmatic redirection has takenplace.” 3 The most visible transformational effortsby the OFT and the DOD focus on equipmentand technologies.Admittedly, the OFT’s efforts have movedbeyond toys—the resources needed for warfighting. Admiral Cebrowski was adamant thatthe military transform the way it fights as wellby strongly emphasizing such areas as networkcentricwarfare, effects-based operations, leadershipdevelopment, and cultural intelligence.The war in Iraq has helped shepherd these effortstowards a new mode of war “dependenton fast movement, interdependence amongforces, jointness down to the tactical level,persistent fires and persistent surveillance.” 4For these efforts, the OFT and DOD concentrateon methodologies—how the military doeswar fighting.Dr. Francis Harvey, secretary of the Army,recently referred to the transformation of theArmy asan approach that is best described as evolutionarychange leading to revolutionary outcomes.This priority . . . means we must make a smoothtransition from the current Army to a futureArmy—one that will be better able to meet thechallenges of the 21st Century security environment.It means we must prepare our forces, inmindset, training and equipment, to operate infuture ambiguous and austere environments.But to be truly successful, this transformationmust build on our enduring Army values andrich traditions—preserving the best of the past,while changing and improving for the future. 5However, in Breaking the Phalanx, a book widelyread by military professionals, Douglas A.Macgregor, an expert on transforming themilitary, finds great resistance by the militaryto the concept of transformation, which hedescribes as a revolutionary concept:Change in military affairs can be evolutionary orrevolutionary. For it to be implemented quickly,however, the direction of organizational changemust be more revolutionary than evolutionary.This is because most of the arguments againstchange are not based on disputes about warfighting;opposition is usually rooted in established,peacetime, bureaucratic interests. . . . In otherwords, changing the organizational structureand strategic focus of the U.S. Armed <strong>Force</strong>s willrequire not only pressure and influence fromabove and outside the services, but also anticipationof how the prior experiences and culturalnorms of the rank-and-file professional militaryresistant to change will lead them to slow otherwisemisdirected change. 6Macgregor’s later book, Transformation underFire, continues his quest to change the militaryto a more relevant force for today. Here, hewrites that his focus in the earlier book wasconsistent with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’srequirement for the Army—the capability of“moving rapidly from widely dispersed stagingareas overseas and in the continental UnitedStates, deploying into a crisis or regional conflictand initiating an attack, all without pausing.”His emphasis, however, has shifted to theorganizational structure of the military: “how
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 87to organize army capabilities effectively toprovide the joint force with needed groundcapabilities.” 7Thomas P. M. Barnett has different ideasabout military transformation, which becomeapparent when he writes about or briefs hisvision to attentive audiences. He bases hisworldview on a key assumption that the conventionaland nuclear military might of theUnited States and global interdependencehave made major warfare a thing of the past—that the United States is more likely to be “embroiledin dysfunctional parts of the world[what Barnett calls the “gap”] battling terroristsand rebuilding failed states.” 8 For Barnett,transformation depends upon the geostrategicsetting—the way the world has changedand the need to be proactive in response tothose changes.All of these transformational efforts are important,but it becomes difficult to determineif the focus for transformation is on equipmentand technologies, the way the militarydoes war fighting, the organizational structureof the military, or the geostrategic setting. Infact, all of these components are critical, butwe must tie them together coherently to producea shared vision of transformation, allowingthe military culture to transform the mindsetof those who do the fighting. Without thecoherence of addressing all components oftransformation, change can still take place—but it becomes something less than real transformation.The true version requires considerationof the ends, ways, and means of theorganization within the strategic context.A Different TransformationMind-SetEffective transformation requires that organizationsaddress four specific considerations:the geostrategic setting (the context for transformation),the ends (the purpose of the organization),the ways (the methods that the organizationuses to achieve those ends), and themeans (the resources used to accomplish theways). This approach of “context, ends, ways,means” provides a holistic, coherent approachto transforming an organization; without it,an organization does not truly transform.The context provides the purpose for undergoingtransformation. It could be the geostrategicsetting or perhaps an emerging technologyor method that demands dramatic, innovativechange. For the United States, the context ofthe geostrategic setting changed dramaticallyin 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and thesubsequent downfall of the Soviet Union. Todaywe still grapple with the impact of thosechanges—and the world keeps changing whilewe contemplate the end of the Cold War. Regardlessof whether one believes that the worldis shaped according to the “core” and the“gap,” as does Barnett, or by a “clash of civilizations,”as does Samuel Huntington, or themyriad other ways of depicting the world, wedo not have a bipolar world on the edge of asuperpower confrontation—at least not today.Since the world has changed dramatically, themilitary must do so as well or become irrelevant.Organizations generally don’t have the luxuryof setting the strategic context, but theydo have a choice in their reaction to contextualchange. Once the context is determined,three approaches—one of which is transformation—addressthe changing needs of large,complex organizations (similar to changes inthe business world). The approaches, whichdeal with the ends (purpose or product), ways(methods), or means (technology and resources),include transforming the organization’spurpose (focusing on ends), reengineeringits methods (focusing on ways), ordownsizing or “rightsizing” its technology andresources (focusing on means) (see table).Table. Focus of organizational changeStrategic Secondary TertiaryFocus Focus FocusTransformation Ends Ways MeansReengineering Ways MeansRightsizing MeansTransformation is the most comprehensiveapproach. To transform a large organization,one must look at the end product and be will-
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Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
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PIREPsJoint Airspace Management and
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APJInterdependenceKey to Our Common
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APJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CHI
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ASPJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CH
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True to form, the Air Force has res
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Integration of Space-BasedCombat Sy
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