100 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>indirect threats to US security. Given the potentialdangers, it would be irresponsible notto prepare for MNT’s emergence.Direct ThreatsThe most obvious threats posed by MNT arethose based directly on the application of thetechnology itself, as a source for both betterweaponry as well as faster and more widespreadarms production.State-Based Arms Races. Intentional misuseof MNT will probably pose the greatestdirect threat to national security. MM willallow anyone with access to the technologyto quickly and economically create weaponsof virtually any description. The aspiringarms producer would have to provideonly designs, power, and basic materials. Ifthe arms producer is a state, then the resultingflood of extremely high-quality militaryequipment will enable that state topromptly and easily overwhelm any non-MNT-equipped enemy.With the rapid prototyping capability providedby MM, the time period for such abuildup could be on the order of weeks ormonths; multiple, rapid arms races could surfacewith regularity around the world. 20 Suchraces would likely not be limited to conventionalweapons as we know them today. Anarms race based on “smart” weapons of massdestruction (WMD) would be possible, suchas a smallpox virus engineered to kill onlypeople with a certain genetic trait. 21Individual-Based Arms Races. States maynot be alone in weapons-production activities.MNT-enabled personal manufacturing couldallow WMD production to shift from governmentsto small groups or even to individuals;this democratization of arms production is thedarker side of PF. Bill Joy, cofounder and chiefscientist of Sun Microsystems, has dubbed thiscapability knowledge-enabled mass destruction,calling it “a surprising and terrible empowermentof extreme individuals.” 22 Given the predilectionof some hackers to create harmfulcomputer viruses just for the thrill of it, it isnot a great conceptual leap to imagine that“nanohackers” might decide to do the samewith actual viruses.Perhaps the most frightening weapon ofall—and thus no doubt a natural aspirationfor potential nanohackers—is the infamousself-replicating gray-goo assemblers. Designinga gray-goo replicator would be an extraordinarilycomplex undertaking, however,and would require solving a multitude of extremelydifficult engineering challenges; accordingly,some have argued that such an effortwould be either impossible or highlyunlikely. 23 However, a dedicated and concertedattempt could conceivably fall short ofthe goal but still come up with something extremelydangerous and uncontrollable. Tohelp ensure that the accidental creation of agray-goo nanomachine remains a practical impossibility,Drexler’s Foresight Institute, anonprofit organization he founded to “helpprepare society for anticipated advanced technologies,”has prescribed guidelines for thesafe development of NT. The institute recommendsavoiding the use of replicators (i.e., assemblers)entirely, or at a minimum, designingthem so that they cannot operate in anatural environment. 24Surveillance. An early application of MNTand NT will likely be inexpensive yet advancedmicrosurveillance platforms and tools. Massproduced, these disposable sensors could beused to blanket large areas, providing ubiquitoussurveillance of the people within. Althoughobviously a battlefield concern, suchsurveillance could also be employed againstany group or population, raising privacy andlegality issues. 25Environmental Damage. MNT was originallyperceived as a potential cure-all for a variety ofenvironmental problems: nanobots in the atmosphere,for example, could physically repairthe ozone layer or remove greenhousegases. Recently, however, NT is increasinglyseen as a potential environmental problem inits own right. Both NT and MNT are expectedto produce large quantities of nanoparticlesand other disposable nanoproducts, the environmentaleffects of which are currently unknown.This “nanolitter,” small enough topenetrate living cells, raises the possibility of
MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 101toxic poisoning of organs, either from thenanolitter itself or from toxic elements attachedto those nanoparticles. 26Indirect ThreatsWe can expect severe disruptions from MNTsince it gives “little or no advantage to the entrenchedleader of an earlier technologicalwave.” 27 Thus, it has the potential to radicallyupset the geopolitical playing field and posepowerful indirect threats to national security.Economic. Glimpsing the potential economicchange triggered by MNT, Bill Joy has estimatedthat the wealth generated by fusing theinformation and physical worlds in the twentyfirstcentury will equal a thousand trillion USdollars. As former US House Speaker NewtGingrich observed, this is equivalent to “adding100 US economies to the world market.” 28No one can be quite sure what an MNTbasedeconomy would look like, but mostspeculations seem to agree that it would probablyresemble the software economy withproduct design being the most difficult andexpensive part of production—distributionand manufacturing being very inexpensive. Acurrent analogy would be the millions of manhoursand dollars expended to create a computerword-processing program, compared tothe ease with which users can “burn” copies ofthe program with their home computers anddistribute them to friends. This analogy alsopoints out the problems with piracy and intellectualproperty rights that would almost certainlyplague an MNT economy. 29Essentially a highly advanced manufacturingprocess emphasizing distributed, low-costmanufacturing, MNT directly threatens economiesthat are heavily dependent on mass production.For example, China’s economic growthdepends on using mass human labor to produceinexpensive, high-quality goods; in 2004it provided over $18 billion worth of manufacturedgoods to the Wal-Mart department-storechain. 30 But what will happen to China’seconomy when Wal-Mart is able to use its ownMNT-enabled fabrication facilities at home toproduce higher-quality goods at even lowercost? For that matter, when consumers areable to produce their own high-quality, lowcost,custom-designed products in their ownhomes, who will need Wal-Mart?MNT is also expected to improve energytechnologies such as solar energy by makingsolar cells tougher and much more efficient;combined with more efficient manufacturingand lighter but stronger vehicles (carbonbasedmaterials can be up to 60 times as strongas steel), the requirements for petroleumfueledenergy supplies may decline rapidly.This would obviously have significant impacton oil companies and countries with oil-basedeconomies; a correspondingly significant disruptionis likely for the shipping industry,which last year ordered petroleum-shippingtankers valued at $77.2 billion. 31 In addition, ifdistributed manufacturing were to allow mostpeople or communities to construct what theyneed locally, international trade in physicalitems may also decrease, which casts somedoubt as to whether globalization’s “peacethrough interdependence” effect will be aspowerful in the future. Indeed, isolationismmay become a more attractive policy optionfor many countries.Social. MNT’s medical applications maypresent some of the greatest social and ethicalchallenges in human history. Issues of cloning,genetically modified crops, abortion, andeven cochlear implants have created politicalatomic bombs in recent years—MNT offers acompletely new level of control over the humanbody and its processes. Accordingly, MNThas been embraced by the transhumanistmovement, which advocates using technologyto intellectually, physically, and psychologicallyimprove the human form from its current“early” phase to a more advanced “posthuman”phase. Reactions to transhumanistconcepts range from enthusiasm to indifferenceto outright fear and hostility. HistorianFrancis Fukuyama has declared transhumanismone of “the world’s most dangerous ideas.” 32Revolutionary. The final threat discussedhere essentially results from a synergy ofthe other threats. Prof. Carlota Perez hasadvanced a model of technological revolutioncomposed of two periods: (1) an installationperiod, during which the new
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Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
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