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Intertemporal Substitution and Recursive Smooth Ambiguity ...

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is ambiguity averse if he prefers a sure lottery obtained as the mean value of a given act tothe act itself.Definition 3 The decision maker with {≽ s t} exhibits ambiguity aversion if for all s t , forall c ∈ C <strong>and</strong> g +1 ∈ G +1 ,(c, m(g +1 , µ s t)) ≽ s t (c, g +1 ).Similarly to this definition, we can define ambiguity loving <strong>and</strong> ambiguity neutrality inthe usual way. An immediate consequence of this definition is the following:Proposition 1 Suppose {≽ s t} satisfies Axioms A1-A7. Then {≽ s t} exhibits ambiguity aversionif φ ≡ v ◦ u −1 is concave. 16The proof of this proposition is straightforward <strong>and</strong> is omitted. Clearly, when v ◦ u −1is linear, {≽ s t} displays ambiguity neutrality. Thus, the ambiguity neutrality benchmark isthe recursive expected utility model. We need additional conditions to establish the conversestatement that ambiguity aversion implies concavity of v ◦ u −1 . The reason is that, to provethis statement, one needs to know preferences over binary bets on some P s t, but our axioms<strong>and</strong> representation hold only for fixed P s t. To deal with this issue in the KMM model, KMM(2005) consider a family of preference relations indexed by rich supports of second-orderbeliefs, <strong>and</strong> impose an assumption that ambiguity attitude <strong>and</strong> risk attitude are invariantacross these supports (see their Assumption 4). We can adapt their assumption to establishthe converse statement. Since the proof is similar to their proof of Proposition 1 in theirpaper, we omit it here.We now turn to comparative ambiguity aversion.Definition 4 Let the representations of the preferences of persons i <strong>and</strong> j share the samesecond-order belief µ s t on the same support P s t for all s t . Say that {≽ i s} is more ambiguitytaverse than {≽ j s} if for all s t , for all c ∈ C, m ∈ M <strong>and</strong> g t +1 ∈ G +1 ,(c, m) ≽ j s(c, g t +1 ) =⇒ (c, m) ≽ i s (c, g +1),t<strong>and</strong> if this property also holds for strict preference relations ≻ i s<strong>and</strong> ≻ j t s. t16 It is easy to check if v ◦ u −1 is concave, {≽ s t} satisfies the uncertainty aversion axiom of Gilboa <strong>and</strong>Schmeidler (1989).17

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