Giant_and_Dwarf-FIN

Giant and DwarfToo much money flows into poor projects, which have been poetically deemed “whiteelephants”. There are too many examples to count: the world’s tallest building in Dubai,the gigantic mosques and government buildings in the Nigerian capital of Abuja and thefootball stadiums in South Africa. 119 Billions of dollars are thrown at these projects and theylook really nice on election posters and flyers but the population in these countries are justas poor with or without them. In reality, they are actually poorer as millions of tons of oilleave the country during the process of building these white elephants.Another aspect of the relationship between raw materials and the organization ofa country is based on the fact that the governments of such countries are directly dependenton income from the export of these raw materials and do not need to tax their owninhabitants. There is no awareness among their populations that the state is spending theirtax dollars and therefore they have the right to expect specific services from the governmentand its officials. This widens the gap between the political elite and the general population.Diametrically opposed to taxation, income derived from exports of raw materialsallows for patronage to take place in which voter receive bribes directly from public fundsjust before elections. Of course the best access to such funds is enjoyed by those in controlof the country and bribing voters allows them to tighten their grip on power. Buying votesin societies with strong clan and tribal connections largely takes place on a wholesale basiswith a concentration of such bribes being given to local leaders. Of course, such funds oftenneed to be shifted out of public finances and into some black market funds in order to soflagrantly bribe voters with public funds.Collier reaches the conclusion that in countries where such patronage is not profitableor possible; politicians are more likely to attract honest people with interest in the solidgovernance of the country. Where such patronage is possible, just the opposite occurs:democratic politicians are more likely to attract crooks than altruists. “Economists in generalthink that competition itself leads to the survival of the fittest. When political patronage isfeasible, an election leads to a victory of the most corrupt candidate. This leads us to the lawof the political jungle: survival of the fattest,” he writes.Speaking of oil, political patronage and corrupt voters, it’s important to note that oneof the forms of national corruption in oil-rich countries is the subsidies provided for petroland diesel fuel. Cheap petrol and diesel fuel lead to waste that is reflected in rapid increasesin domestic consumption: Saudi Arabia with its 27 million inhabitants consume as muchoil as 80-million strong Germany. Germany has at least three-times as many people andis a global economic and trade superpower. Unsustainably high and growing domesticconsumption in oil-rich countries has serious consequences, and not just domestically; itaccelerates the arrival of a global oil crisis and will accelerate a drop in the quantity of oilavailable on international markets.119 Of course these projects are not restricted to developing and oil-rich countries, examples in Slovakiainclude the money spent on the national tennis centre, hockey arenas and completely unnecessary andoverly expensive motorways and tunnels—there is no need to look abroad.140